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Baily Coale, oil on canvas, circa 1942, courtesy of the 
Navy Art Collection (accession number 88-188-U). e 
image envisages a moment of the critical 1946 Naval War 
College student war games that are the subject of this 
book—a eeting detection by searching aircra, through 
heavy cloud cover, of a force of ships.
e inset is a U.S. Navy photograph of USS Midway (then 
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as it appeared in 1946 during Operation FROSTBITE in 
the Davis Strait. Its mission was to operate in severe 
northern-latitude conditions of the kind that the war 
games and exercises of this book (conducted a few months 
later) played out.
e image on the title page is Rear Adm. Allan E. Smith, 
then chief of sta to the President of the Naval War 
College (and later acting President in his own right), who 
was extensively involved in the conduct of student war 
games in 1946.
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FOREWORD
The study of the history of naval warfare is an integral part of the Naval War Col-
lege’s educational programs. The importance of the discipline was firmly estab-
lished with the foundation of the College in 1884 by the initial contributions of 
both the College’s founder, Stephen B. Luce, and his successor as its President, Capt. 
Alfred Thayer Mahan. Historical research and analysis has continued as a recog-
nized element of the academic life of the institution for over 125 years. Nowhere 
has the history of warfare at sea been more thoroughly investigated and analyzed 
for the professional purposes of the U.S. Navy than at the Naval War College. No-
where is there a more logical requirement for a corpus of relevant source materials 
or for an academic research department devoted to new research in naval history. 
On 1 January 2003, the College’s Maritime History Department was established 
as part of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies to carry out this function. Predating 
this, a program for the publication of books and source materials on the history of 
naval warfare was formally established by the College in 1975, with the series of 
books known as the Naval War College Historical Monographs. To encourage and 
make more widely known the College’s extensive collections for historical research, 
including its archives, historical manuscripts, and associated materials in the Naval 
War College Museum’s collection, the series has been restricted to publications of 
book-length works that deal with the history of naval warfare and that are based 
wholly or in part on the source materials in the Naval War College library’s Naval 
Historical Collection and in the Naval War College Museum. As the series has de-
veloped over the past forty years, these works have taken a variety of forms, includ-
ing bibliographies and conference proceedings; many of them have been edited 
historical documents from the College’s rich historical collections. This book series 
is now managed by the Maritime History Department in collaboration with the 
Naval War College Press and the head of the Naval War College’s Naval Historical 
Collection.
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Consistent with the earlier books that have appeared in this series since 1975, 
this study of naval war gaming at the Naval War College in 1946 is based primar-
ily on materials in the Naval War College archives and historical collection. With 
this volume, Dr. Hal Friedman, of Henry Ford College in Dearborn, Michigan, 
directly complements his two earlier studies in this same series, Digesting History: 
The U.S. Naval War College, the Lessons of World War Two, and Future Naval War-
fare, 1945–1947, published in 2010, and Blue versus Orange: The U.S. Naval War 
College, Japan, and the Old Enemy in the Pacific, 1945–1946, published in 2013. The 
first volume looked at the broad range of the educational activities at the Naval War 
College under its twenty-sixth President, Adm. Raymond Spruance. The second 
began a two-part study focused on the specific activity of war gaming, which the 
College had been developing since then-lieutenant William McCarty Little deliv-
ered the first lecture in Newport on the subject in 1886. By 1946 the Naval War 
College had, over a period of sixty years, developed the art of war gaming into one 
of its signature teaching and research tools for thinking about naval warfare. This, 
the third volume in the trilogy, Blue versus Purple, turns the emphasis to the pro-
cess by which the Naval War College’s gaming efforts slowly refocused from the war 
against Japan that had just ended to the new and emerging threat that the Soviet 
Union was beginning to pose in the opening days of the Cold War.
Today, after a span of another six decades, the Naval War College has developed 
that art of war gaming even further. In many ways, the war gaming conducted 
today, with the assistance of computers and in a very modern building, may seem 
completely different from and foreign to what is described in this book. Yet Fried-
man’s close analysis of the procedures and practice reveals that the fundamental 
purpose was much the same—an attempt to understand human reactions and deci-
sion making. Up to now, few naval historians have been able to penetrate the pro-
cess and explain clearly the practice of war gaming in this period. The Naval War 
College Museum and the Naval War College library have collections of both paper 
records and three-dimensional objects associated with war gaming from earlier 
periods. While experts in war gaming clearly understand these processes, explana-
tions that are accessible to a broader audience interested in naval history have been 
lacking, particularly for the immediate post–World War II period.
With this volume, Dr. Friedman has made another significant contribution to 
both the history of the Naval War College and the history of naval war gaming. This 
volume, like his previous volumes, evokes for the reader the laborious and detailed 
process of war gaming in this era and helps us to understand why an automated 
approach with computers became attractive in the 1950s. Above all, it is particu-
larly interesting to see the character of naval thinking in 1946, when the U.S. Navy 
was making the transition from total war to peace but was realizing that another 
conflict with a different enemy might be possible. In this, Dr. Friedman makes 
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an important contribution by showing how the experience of naval operations in 
World War II continued to have a useful place in the curriculum of the Naval War 
College by illustrating some enduring aspects in naval warfare, while at the same 
time College faculty and students were beginning to imagine what sort of different 
challenges might be faced when fighting a major war in the context of the newly 
emerging world of atomic weapons.
John B. Hattendorf, D.Phil.
Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History 
Chairman, Maritime History Department 

PREFACE 
This book is about the war-gaming activities of the Naval War College (NWC) in 
the late summer and fall of 1946 in Newport, Rhode Island. It is the third book in 
a trilogy on the immediate postwar Naval War College. My earlier works focused, 
first, very generally on how the College viewed future naval warfare in the 1945–47 
period, then on the war games in the 1945–46 academic year. More particularly, 
my first look at the Naval War College was a general exploration of the College’s 
reaction to the end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War. Here I 
again direct my attention to the Pacific, as I did in the second book, because of 
its importance to the Navy for the half-century previous to the present. In effect, 
I want to look at how the end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War 
impacted the Naval War College in terms of changing its focus from Japan to the 
Soviet Union as the primary enemy in the Pacific basin. This exploration may also 
prove especially insightful given that the 1940s was precedent setting in terms of 
the origins of the Navy’s maritime strategy.1 
More exactly, the first book set the context for the later works by looking at Ad-
miral Raymond Spruance’s public addresses, instructor and guest lectures, and stu-
dent theses to determine what kind of future naval world these officers perceived 
and how they felt the United States would have to conduct its peacetime and war-
time naval operations in that postwar world. The second book looked at the war 
games in the fall of 1945 and the winter of 1946, games in which Japan, or “Orange,” 
was still the primary enemy. This present book explores how and why the Soviet 
Union, or “Purple,” became the hypothetical enemy in the 1946–47 academic year.2 
These studies are particularly significant given that the period falls between the 
end of the war and the early formulation of the Containment Doctrine against the 
Soviet Union. The importance of the events between the fall of 1945 and the begin-
ning of containment as a coherent American foreign policy in the fall of 1947 is 
why I have chosen the book’s chronological parameters. This transitional period 
is especially valuable as a window through which to explore institutions like the 
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Naval War College that were shifting from a hot war 
to a cold one.3 
This immediate postwar transition entailed the 
reconstitution of the College on a full-time basis after 
its reduced wartime status, first under the presiden-
cy of Vice Adm. William Pye and then, from March 
1946 onward, under Admiral Spruance. Spruance 
had been charged by Fleet Adm. Chester Nimitz, 
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), with the strategic 
reformulation of American naval doctrine for the 
atomic and Cold War contexts of the postwar period. 
Some of these reforms began with Vice Admiral Pye 
before the war even ended. Pye, for instance, called 
for expanding the College so it was capable of teach-
ing a tenfold increase in officers by way of a three-
tiered educational structure consisting of a Com-
mand and Staff Course, War College Course, and Advanced Course. Pye presided 
until the end of his tenure over the six-month courses that had been the order of the 
day since before the war, but he began preparations for returning to a full course. 
By the time the war ended, the Naval War College had also started to provide joint-
service education for officers from the other services, as well as personnel from the 
State Department. Most 
important for purposes 
of this study, however, 
is that because of the 
sudden end of the war, 
the 1945–46 curriculum 
could not be changed 
in time for the conven-
ing of classes to reflect 
the complete defeat of 
Japan or the rise of the 
Soviet Union as the na-
tion’s probable next en-
emy. That change had to 
await the 1946–47 aca-
demic year.4 
This new focus on 
the Soviet Union in the 
College’s maneuvers 
Adm. Raymond Spruance, 
President of the Naval War 
College, 1946–48
Naval War College, 1946
 PREFACE xxi
reflected late wartime Pacific Fleet practices and cur-
rent fleet doctrine. In general, the maneuvers in the 
new academic year reflected strategic scenarios from 
the late Pacific War when Orange was the enemy, but 
they employed new scenarios if Purple was the op-
ponent. Many of the scenarios involving Blue (the 
United States) against Purple entailed Blue strikes on 
or invasions of Kamchatka, and scenarios of Purple 
attacking Blue involved Purple strikes or invasions of 
the Aleutians. The operational and tactical aspects 
of the exercises and maneuvers still heavi ly reflected 
a combination of both interwar and wartime naval 
doctrine, once again equally emphasizing surface 
warfare and naval aviation, and submarines (SSs) 
again fulfilling primarily scouting and fleet strike 
functions. Another carryover was the pattern where-
in the few aircraft carriers available to each side would be neutralized early in the 
maneuver, and both sides lacked the possibility of reinforcement by land-based air 
forces or submarines. Thus, many of the scenarios were again constructed such that 
the maneuvers became surface battles between Blue and Purple. While this may 
seem anachronistic, many of the scenarios in fact reflected the situation that had ac-
tually existed at the end of the battle of the Coral Sea 
in May 1942 and especially in the Solomon Islands by 
November 1942, when the United States and Japan 
had been obliged to rely heavily on surface forces in 
the absence of their exhausted carrier groups (CAR-
GRUs). Another purpose of this book, therefore, will 
be to look at these various situations and explore why 
the Naval War College staff—that is, the military 
faculty—might have thought them pertinent to of-
ficer education.5
Though not as a major part of the analysis, the 
book also looks at some continuities in American 
naval doctrine across the interwar, wartime, Cold 
War, and post–Cold War periods. There is an inter-
esting similarity in how the fleet was supposed to 
fight in these different periods. While the battleship 
remained the primary element of fleet doctrine up 
to the Japanese strike on Pearl Harbor, by then it 
was already heavily dependent on submarines for 
Vice Adm. William Pye, 
President of the Naval War 
College, 1942–46
Fleet Adm. Chester 
Nimitz, Chief of Naval 
Operations, 1945–47
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scouting and initial strikes and even more so on carrier air forces for scouting, 
gunfire spotting, strikes against enemy capital ships, and naval air cover vis-à-vis 
enemy carrier planes. While in the Pacific War the aircraft carrier became the ob-
vious primary weapon, carrier groups still needed to be protected at night by bat-
tleships and other heavy surface forces, just as those surface forces needed protec-
tion provided by the carrier groups during the day. Carriers obviously remained 
at the center of American naval power during the Cold War and after—but not in 
navies lacking carriers. Soviet naval doctrine, for instance, stressed initial strikes 
against American carrier battle groups by, first, torpedo-firing, later missile- 
firing, submarines, followed up by strikes from long-range, land-based naval 
aviation, and then surface battle groups. Some of the 1946 scenarios at the Na-
val War College already reflected this pattern of doctrine. Finally, there are also 
potential insights in this war-college history for the U.S. Navy today and in the 
future. Given recent advances in Chinese antiship missile technology, it might 
not be as easy for American surface battle groups, carrier or otherwise, to venture 
into western Pacific waters during a conflict with the People’s Republic of China 
unless missile-firing submarines and even land-based stealth bombers pave the 
way, much as submarines and carriers paved the way for battleships in late inter-
war scenarios.6
I have been selective in analyzing the exercises and Operations Problems. This 
book, like its predecessors, is focused on the Pacific, because I wanted to study the 
maneuvers that were conducted as the Naval War College curriculum transitioned 
from Orange to Purple as the primary hypothetical enemy. Orange had been the 
primary Pacific enemy for the Naval War College as far back as 1906, and war gam-
ing had focused the most heavily on Orange since 1911, so one purpose of the book 
is to narrate how that transition happened. I have limited the exercises and Op-
erations Problems to those conducted between July and November 1946. Actually, 
exercises and Operations Problems were held all through the academic year; how-
ever, one played after November 1946 focused again on Orange, in a scenario that 
repeated the Iwo Jima operation. The remaining exercises and Operations Problem 
during the 1946–47 academic year involved Purple, but in the Atlantic. Accord-
ingly, my analysis stops in November 1946.
Not all the exercises were identically organized. A typical Operations Problem 
contained what the Naval War College called “Statements of the Problem” and 
“Staff Solutions” for both Blue and Purple, a record of the actual board game called 
the “History of the Maneuver,” and even in a few cases “Maneuver Critiques.” Most, 
however, lacked some of these elements. The chapters that follow, recording the 
exercises and Operations Problems in detail, are uneven in organization, therefore, 
because of the nature of the surviving records.7 I have devoted one entire chapter 
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and elements of a second to describing in detail what the Naval War College called 
“Maneuver Rules.” These were the procedures by which the exercises and Opera-
tions Problems were conducted, including such matters as the computation of dam-
age to ships and planes and the impact of weather. While my previous studies have 
outlined the maneuvers and the Rules in basic form, this book offers more detail.8
This book is a very straightforward, chronological narrative. I have not attempt-
ed to analyze deeply or “deconstruct” what the historical actors said but instead 
have taken great pains to record what they did at the time in a readable narrative. 
I think the value of this type of account is to allow readers to see what these war 
games represented at this time so that they can make their own judgments about 
the ideas enunciated in these years. Moreover, I have found myself a bit reluctant 
to judge these officers harshly where their ideas about future naval warfare turned 
out to be wrong or even wrongheaded. This was a very fluid period, and there was 
no quick formula to produce the “answers.” Establishing the strategic, operational, 
and tactical constructs for the security of the Republic against a threat about which 
they knew almost nothing, and using potentially revolutionary new weapons about 
which they also knew almost nothing, was indeed an awesome challenge. Provid-
ing those answers at the conclusion of a major war as a new type of limited war 
was looming, and in a context of limited resources, must have been an even more 
daunting task. 
In addition, a narrative account is in order since this work represents fairly new 
territory, historiographically speaking. Seminal works exist about the Naval War 
College in the interwar period and its impact on the Pacific War;9 however, there 
have not been many studies on the post-1945 period. The works completed tend 
to be organizational histories and studies of the College.10 Those that are strategic 
in nature focus on the College’s role in a limited chronological window, either very 
early in the Cold War or much later in that conflict.11 In addition, articles were 
written on American naval strategy during the Cold War under Naval War College 
auspices, as well as lectures by guests and instructors and theses by students.12 So 
far, however, no monographs cover the Naval War College’s contribution to strate-
gic policy throughout the entire Cold War. My work does not fill this niche either, 
but I hope that by focusing on the immediate postwar period it complements the 
existing studies of the College both in the prewar years and during the Cold War 
as well as gives future historians a path by which to begin to forge a history of the 
College’s contribution to U.S. strategy during the entire Cold War.
Throughout, unless otherwise indicated, figures, maps, and photographs are 
courtesy of the Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode 
Island. 
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I Context at the College
The Naval War College Curriculum in Perspective, 1946–1947
Most of this study explores in detail the processes, procedures, and peda-gogy of the war games, or “Operations Problems,” played at the Naval War College during the 1946–47 academic year. However, to give some 
sense of the larger curriculum, this chapter looks at selected academic materials 
that were offered to the junior and senior classes of June 1947. In particular, it looks 
at the lecture, discussion, and reading activities related to studies meant to help the 
student officers prepare for the actual Board and Chart Maneuvers that they were 
to practice in their exercises and Operations Problems. 
The Theses
In late June 1946, Rear Adm. Allan Smith, chief of staff to the President of the 
Naval War College, issued a directive about the thesis projects the students of both 
classes were to complete during the academic year. The first thesis was due by 15 
January 1947 and was to address “Relations between Russia and the United States, 
and Their Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy.” The second was due by 1 May 1947 and 
was to be on “The Influence of the Atomic Bomb on Future Naval Warfare.” A suggest-
ed length for each thesis was nine thousand words; six thousand was the minimum; 
an original and carbon copy were to be submitted by the students, and the original 
would be returned before the end of the course. Further details could be found in 
“Annex A, Hints on Thesis Writing.” Classified material had to be cleared through 
the head of the Naval War College’s Department of Intelligence, Capt. Richard 
Hartung.1 
Annex B of Smith’s instruction was a suggested bibliography of unclassified 
readings on these subjects. Students were expected to augment them with their 
own research and draw from “appropriate” presentations and lectures in the Col-
lege curriculum. While theses were to demonstrate that students had prepared 
themselves in their subjects and were familiar with the opinions of “prevailing” 
authorities, their research was to be extensive and “profound” enough to develop 
original thoughts and opinions: “Most to be desired is a comprehension on the part 
of the student of the fundamental principles of the subject under study and a dis-
cussion in his thesis of his views on their significance in national and naval affairs.” 
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On the first subject, no summary of relations with Russia was needed; any histori-
cal introduction was to be brief, not more than 20 percent of the total length of 
the thesis. “Chief attention” was to be given to the factors that had controlled such 
relations in the past, the “validity” of such factors in the present, and the opinion of 
the student about their application for the future. As to the second subject, “This is 
an unlimited field and the student has considerable latitude of treatment. Particular 
attention should be focused on the effects of this new weapon on our strategical 
and tactical concepts.”2
Annex A’s “hints” began by stating that the purpose of student theses was to 
elicit opinions on “matters of importance” to naval affairs as well as to cause the 
students to work with research materials and exercise their minds in collating, 
evaluating, and condensing them in support of definite conclusions. “The accent 
is placed upon research and original thought by the student.” The resources were 
to be the Naval War College’s archives and library, as well as a “careful reading” of 
newspapers and magazines. The College’s librarians would be able to supply mate-
rial beyond that listed in Annex B; students could obtain classified material from 
the archives. The archivist, in fact, had a list of classified material for “convenient” 
reference by the students. Students did not have to read books from cover to cover 
but should skim, using the tables of contents, indices, and first and final chapters, 
so as to allow fairly wide reading on given subjects. “Rapidly dissecting” books in 
this manner, students were to allow themselves to be led from one source to an-
other and thus complete a general survey of the field in which they were interested.3 
After browsing, students were to begin formulating a methodological approach 
to their project. They were especially to begin creating an outline, in terms of an 
“Introduction,” “Scope of Thesis,” “Development of a Theme,” and “Conclusions.” 
The actual subdivision would depend on the student’s knowledge, but outlines in 
general would save much energy and time in creating a “unified” work. The out-
line was, in fact, the “framework” for the finished thesis; after creating it, the stu-
dent was to begin “serious reading,” taking notes on index cards, summarizing or 
quoting information directly, and adding the student’s thoughts. These “thesis cards” 
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were to emphasize the student’s original thoughts, be dated or otherwise orga-
nized, and include “nearly everything” needed to write the thesis. In effect, the 
students’ thesis cards, outlines, and tables of contents were to establish what they 
were going to say in their theses as well as at what points their ideas would be 
expounded.4
The next step was to recheck the outline for unity, logical framework, coherent 
connections, and proportionality of each section to its importance. Students were 
to cut out “ruthlessly” sections that were not germane and arrange their materials 
as was best for their reader. The students were not merely to narrate a story or cre-
ate a work of “pure exposition” but to contribute an exposition and argument. As 
to writing itself, the advice was simply to start at the beginning. Some theses, how-
ever, were best written as separate sections to be fitted together later, but generally, 
“consecutive” thought would probably be clearer if the paper was written from the 
beginning through to the end.5
Admiral Smith detailed format, paper size, pagination, margins, binding, han-
dling of quotations, citations, submission, and copies. He reiterated that the paper 
represented an endeavor to outline “a method of approach and attack in writing a 
Fig. 1
Annex B: Bibliography
 4 BLUE VERSUS PURPLE
thesis.” Experience indicated that the greatest difficulty was simply getting started; 
once reading and preparation of notes were under way, the project should pick up 
momentum. Finally, additional material was to be found in such publications and 
periodicals as State Department Bulletins, Vital Speeches, Foreign Policy Reports, So-
viet Russia Today, Foreign Affairs, Time, Newsweek, the Saturday Evening Post, Col-
lier’s, the New York Times, and Periodical Indexes.6
The Staff Presentations
A major part of the 1946–47 Naval War College curriculum comprised Staff Pre-
sentations, or lectures, delivered to the students between early July 1946 and early 
Fig. 1, continued
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May 1947. In total, there were forty, and they fell into several categories. First, there 
were lectures on straightforward naval topics. For instance, on 2 July 1946, Cdr. Al-
bert Pelling, an instructor in the Department of Tactics, lectured on “Employment 
of Ship’s Weapons,” addressing doctrine, the use of guns in naval surface actions, 
night actions, fire effect, and even the “Atomic Gun Ship” of the future. 
About two weeks later, Capt. Fred Dickey, an instructor in the Department of 
Intelligence, gave a lecture on “Fast Carrier Task Forces,” in which the centrality of 
aircraft carriers to naval power was clearly recognized. Captain Dickey introduced 
the students to carrier doctrine and procedures but also pointed out the continuing 
roles of heavy surface ships. 
Three days later, Cdr. Lauren Johnson, of the Department of Tactics, introduced 
students to “Shore and Tender Based Aircraft, Their Organization and Employ-
ment.” Commander Johnson’s lecture focused on the important role played by naval 
patrol planes and naval patrol bombers in strike, search and patrol, antisubmarine 
warfare, air-sea rescue, minelaying, and photographic reconnaissance. He spoke 
against the background of calls by some in Washington, D.C., for the dissolution of 
Navy shore-based aviation.7 
On 3 January 1947, Capt. Donald Evans, an instructor for the junior class, deliv-
ered a long lecture on “Organization and Functioning of Naval Staffs,” which intro-
duced the students to basic functions and organizations of naval staffs, pointed out 
differences from Army staff organization, and gave examples of naval staff organi-
zation and operation from both the wartime Atlantic and Pacific theaters.
On 15 March, Commander Pelling lectured on “Naval Gunfire Support Plans,” 
addressing not only such issues as target analysis, logistics, schedules of fire, and 
communications but also how important naval gunfire support had been during 
the war and what its future might be. On 20 February, Cdr. Earl Hydeman, a mem-
ber of the senior class of June 1947, spoke on “Submarine Operations in the Sea of 
Japan,” looking at the strategic significance of these operations, the technology that 
had been developed to carry them out, and the operation plan for what the Navy 
had termed the “Japan Sea Patrol Pack.” 
Capt. Donald Evans, 
USN
Cdr. Albert Pelling, 
USN
Capt. Fred Dickey, 
USN
Cdr. Lauren Johnson, 
USN
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On 29 April, Capt. Henry Moran, an instructor in the Department of Intel-
ligence, gave an unusual lecture—“The Antarctic Region” and the Navy’s recent 
expedition to the area, the Antarctic Developments Project of 1947, known as Op-
eration HIGHJUMP. 
The final lecture on what might be considered fairly traditional naval topics 
was given on 1 May by Cdr. James Reed, an instructor for the junior class, on “The 
Anti-submarine Warfare Situation Today.” Commander Reed concentrated on 
the antisubmarine problems created for the U.S. Navy by the German Type XXI 
U-boat.8
There were also a small number of lectures on what today would be termed “joint 
military operations” and at the time “defense unification.” On 18 July 1946, Lt. Col. 
Donald Dunlap, U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF), of the Department of Intelligence, 
delivered a lecture on “Strategic Bombing.” Given the controversial aspects of this 
subject, Colonel Dunlap gave significant credit to the other services but also wanted 
students to understand how important his own service’s aerial offensives had been 
in both the European and Pacific theaters to eventual Allied victory.
On 26 November, Lieutenant Colonel Dunlap gave another lecture, this time 
on “Air Force Trends in the United States, Great Britain and the USSR,” laying out 
and comparing the orders of battle, material development, aircraft production, and 
future trends of the air forces of the three nations. On 9 April 1947, Capt. Richard 
Bates, head of the Department of Research and Analysis, delivered “Estimate of the 
Situation: Part I,” in which students were reintroduced to the Naval War College’s 
pamphlet Sound Military Decision, but with a new joint-service interpretation from 
the Armed Forces Staff College. On 10 May 1947, Colonel Dunlap spoke again, on 
“Army Air Force Operations.” The students viewed a film, Air Force Highlights in 
World War II, after which Dunlap and his colleagues Col. Lewis Lyle, a student in 
the senior class of June 1947, and Lt. Col. Richard Leary, a student in the junior 
class of June 1947, both of the Army Air Forces, devoted most of the presentation 
to tactical operations in Europe and to the Eighth Air Force’s operations against 
Schweinfurt, Germany, of 17 August 1943.9 
Cdr. Earl Hydeman, 
USN
Capt. Henry Moran, 
USN
Cdr. James Reed, 
USN
Lt. Col. Donald 
Dunlap, USAAF
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Out of the forty Staff Presentations that academic year, eleven were historical 
studies of various military operations. For instance, on 30 August 1946, Col. Fe-
odor Schmidt, U.S. Army, of the Department of Intelligence, delivered the first of 
a series of lectures entitled “Strategic Employment of Military Forces: World War 
II.” Part I focused on the campaigns between 1939 and 1941 in Poland, Finland, 
Norway, Western Europe, and the Balkans.
On 11 September 1946, Cdr. Dale Mayberry, an instructor for the junior class, 
lectured on “The Search for and Sinking of the Bismarck,” providing a brief review 
of the naval operations leading up to this episode, German naval strategy, a narra-
tive of the ship’s sinking, and lessons learned about radio intelligence, aerial search, 
weather, and British naval influence on German strategy.
On 25 October, Colonel Schmidt delivered his second lecture, this time on the 
major wartime diplomatic conferences in Washington, London, Casablanca, Que-
bec, Cairo, Yalta, and Potsdam, with stress on the global situations and overall stra-
tegic picture. Three days later, Capt. John Sweeney, the head of the Department of 
Tactics, spoke on “The Battle of the River Plate,” recounting the British destruction 
of the German heavy cruiser (“pocket battleship”) Graf Spee, especially the role of 
South America in both British and German naval strategies, the tactical aspects of 
the engagement, and the principles demonstrated by the British naval victory. 
The next day, Capt. Cornell Sullivan, head of the War Gaming Section in the 
Department of Tactics, presented “The Battle of the North Cape,” the engagement 
that had seen the destruction of the German battle cruiser Scharnhorst. After look-
ing at the German cruiser’s operations against British sea lines of communication, 
Captain Sullivan provided a detailed account of the action, which proved to be the 
last major German surface threat to the Allied Arctic supply line.10 
These history-based “lessons learned” lectures continued on 13 November with 
Colonel Schmidt’s “Strategical Employment of Military Forces, World War I.” Most 
of this lecture was focused on the major early ground campaigns of the western 
front and German failure there, but Colonel Schmidt provided information as 
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campaigns of the Great War. Richard Bates, then a commodore and head of the 
Department of Research and Analysis, spoke on 23 November on “The Battle of 
the Coral Sea,” discussing the preliminaries, including the Doolittle Raid on Japan, 
the Coral Sea area, Japanese plans and dispositions for the region (to the extent that 
they were yet understood in the United States), and Allied command organization 
and positions prior to the battle. On 16 December the students received a lecture 
from Capt. Paul Crosley, an instructor in the Department of Strategy, on “Jutland 
Strategy.” Captain Crosley started with the global situation in 1916, British and 
German naval strategies, events at sea and on land leading up to the classic naval 
engagement, and the “sortie” itself. Colonel Schmidt delivered two more lectures 
on the strategic employment of military forces in World War II. The first of these, 
on 31 January 1947, treated the Russo-German war between the German invasion 
in June 1941 and the Russian summer and winter offensives of 1943–44. 
Colonel Schmidt also devoted part of his lecture to the war in North Africa up 
to the German defeat in 1943, including Allied strategic plans and concepts for the 
theater. His final lecture in this series took place on 19 April and looked at the Al-
lied invasions of Sicily, Italy, and Western Europe, as well as the Western Allied and 
Soviet culminating offensives in 1944–45. The last of the historically based lectures 
was by now-captain Bates, on the battle of the Coral Sea, recounting the strategic 
and tactical aspects of the battle itself, including plans, uses of technologies, and 
“battle lessons.”11
The next significant section was on administration, logistics, and supply, a total 
of eight lectures. The first of these was delivered on 11 October 1946 by Capt. James 
Bierer of the Navy Supply Corps, an instructor in the Department of Logistics; 
entitled “The General Supply System,” it was a general outline of the organization 
and functions of, and future trends in, Navy supply, accounting, and finance. A 
day later, Col. Woodrow Vaughan, U.S. Army, and Col. Robert Wood, U.S. Army 
Air Forces, both students in the senior class of June 1947, introduced naval officers 
especially to the organizations, functions, and terminology of their respective ser-
vices’ supply systems.
Capt. John Sweeney, 
USN
Capt. Cornell Sullivan, 
USN
Capt. Paul Crosley, 
USN
Cdr. Dale Mayberry, 
USN
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Three days later, Cdr. Constantin Mathas of the Department of Logistics lec-
tured on “Theater Logistic Planning Agencies in the Pacific Ocean Area.” He gave a 
historical background and, especially, joint aspects worked out from 1943 to 1945. 
He also looked at the organization of the J-4, or Supply, division on the staff of the 
Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas (CINCPOA), the distinctions between 
the types of commands, and the organization and duties of Commander, Service 
Force, Pacific Fleet.12 
On 17 October, Captain Bierer spoke on “Ships and Advanced Base Supply,” sig-
nificant in terms of how the Pacific War had developed. After looking at these two 
types of supply, he focused on the exercise of control over them by Commander, 
Western Sea Frontier. Cdr. Charles Daily, Civil Engineer Corps, an instructor in 
the Department of Logistics, gave a lecture on 19 October on “Logistic Functions 
Performed by the Bureau of Yards and Docks,” specifically about the functions and 
departments of the bureau and especially its vast wartime expansion. 
On the same day, Commander Mathas took up “Personnel Procurement and 
Training,” not only wartime matters, but also, especially, how the Navy was going 
to handle the postwar period in terms of procurement and training for the officer 
and enlisted categories. On 21 October, Captain Crosley lectured on a topic abso-
lutely vital to morale, “Mail as a Logistic Problem in Operation Plans,” focusing on 
coordination with other government agencies and with operational activities and 
movements. Finally, on 8 May 1947, Captain Bierer delivered a talk on “Logistic 
Support of Joint Overseas Operation,” especially the responsibilities, organization, 
and planning procedures at the theater-commander level.13
Four lectures were devoted late in the academic year to various aspects of am-
phibious operations. On 20 March 1947, Lt. Cdr. James Curran of the U.S. Naval 
Reserve (USNR), an instructor in the Department of Intelligence, presented a lec-
ture on “Landing Plans” that looked at the planning process at the attack-force 
level, the numerous stages of planning and execution, and the criticality of am-
phibious operations to Allied victory. 
Col. Woodrow 
Vaughan, USA
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A week later, Commander Curran, in “Landing Ships and Landing Craft,” em-
ployed the U.S. invasion of Saipan in June 1944 as a detailed case study of the plan-
ning process, the numerous types of assault and landing ships and craft developed 
during the war, and the mammoth logistical effort that these operations entailed. 
Two days later, Col. Robert Bare, U.S. Marine Corps, of the Department of Intel-
ligence, delivered “Amphibious Operations in the Central Pacific, Part I,” on the 
general situation in the Central Pacific in the spring of 1943, the planning and exe-
cution phases for the operations against the Gilberts in the fall of 1943, and conclu-
sions about naval gunfire support, artillery support, amphibian tractors, command 
ships, and underwater demolition teams. On 5 April, Colonel Bare delivered Part 
II of his lecture, applying the same topics to the operations against the Marshalls in 
early 1944.14 
There were also three lectures on base development during the war and its fu-
ture implications. On 15 October, Captain Bierer gave a lecture on “Advance Bases 
and Their Problems.” After outlining the organization of base development within 
the Navy and aspects of military government, Captain Bierer took the students 
through the assault and landing phases of amphibious operations and the role of 
bases in both the initial posthostilities period and more advanced development 
phases. He also looked at the problem of disestablishing bases during and after the 
war. The next day, Commander Mathas spoke on “Base Development Planning,” 
especially how little prewar experience the Navy had possessed, early wartime ex-
periences in the South Pacific, and then the massive efforts by CINCPOA in the 
latter stages of the war. Commander Mathas concluded with the argument that 
base planning needed the same attention to detail as operational planning. Capt. 
Henry Eccles, head of the Department of Logistics, gave a lecture on 1 May on “The 
Development of Over-Seas Bases.” Captain Eccles, the architect of the logistical 
aspects of the Naval War College’s early postwar curriculum, spoke on the vital im-
portance of the Navy’s bases for its prosecution of the war, command relationships 
and organization, planning, transportation, allocation of real estate, construction, 
Cdr. Charles Daily, 
USN
Lt. Cdr. James Cur-
ran, USNR
Col. Robert Bare, 
USMC
Cdr. (later Captain 
and Rear Admiral) 
Henry Eccles, USN 
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sanitation, personnel, floating versus shore-based facilities, the future, and even the 
“psychological” aspects of base development, which he called “esprit de corps.”15 
Finally, there came a miscellaneous group of three lectures. On 16 July 1946, 
Lt. Col. Michael Sampas, U.S. Marine Corps, an instructor in the Department of 
Intelligence, presented on photographic reconnaissance—support of amphibious 
operations, British wartime methods of aerial photography, types of cameras used 
by American combat aircraft, and especially training. 
The next day, Lt. Cdr. Valenti Holzapfel, a junior-class instructor, gave a lecture 
on “Rockets,” including a history of British development of the weapon, the types of 
air and surface rockets in use in 1946, and trends for future use in shore bombard-
ment, ground assault, and aerial attack.
Finally, on 20 February 1947, Cdr. Richard Antrim, a student in the senior class 
of June 1947, presented “Observed Effect of International Law on the Japanese,” a 
lecture that looked at the role, and sometimes ineffectiveness, of international law 
during wartime, giving especially examples of Japanese violations of international 
law in the treatment of prisoners and wounded.16 
Spruance and the Welcome Aboard
In mid-July 1946, Admiral Spruance welcomed the students of the senior and ju-
nior classes of June 1947 to the Naval War College. In his remarks he informed 
them that an atomic bomb had been exploded the day before at Bikini Atoll, in the 
Marshall Islands, in a “test of great proportions which should do much to further 
the science of naval warfare.” Spruance argued that while the present was being 
called the “Atomic Era,” that was simply a new name for something that had been 
going on for centuries—the “gradual increase” in the effectiveness of weapons of 
war. Over the centuries the basic principles of war had not changed, only their 
applicability. One of the main purposes of the Naval War College was, Spruance 
pointed out, to offer students the opportunity to master these principles and ap-
ply them so that the services could prepare to defend the country and in wartime 
defeat its enemies through “proper planning, clear thinking, sound decisions and 
skillful application of the means available.” 
Lt. Col. Michael 
Sampas, USMC
Lt. Cdr. Valenti 
Holzapfel, USN
Cdr. Richard Antrim, 
USN
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Spruance informed the students that the Naval War College was a “school of 
ideas” and that an important “device” to that end, developed through the years, was 
the Estimate of the Situation. The more ideas that were expounded, the more use-
ful the Naval War College became. Exposition, however, was better than argument: 
“State your case and then let the other person state his but if you cannot get to 
this level then argument is better than no ideas at all.” Naval War College staff and 
student officers were all “students of war” in a setting of “freedom of expression.”17 
The eleven-month course, the first since 1940–41, he explained to the students, 
was meant to “gradually unroll” their minds, through reading, seeing, and hearing a 
panorama of both successful and unsuccessful warfare. The basis for their develop-
ment and, he thought, their greatest opportunity was the series of “problems” that 
had been devised for the year. Much effort had been put into the problems so that 
the students could extract much from them. Students would be required to pro-
duce solutions and one of the solutions would be selected for play in the war-game 
phases of the problems. The student officers would make constant estimates, reach 
sound decisions, and then implement them. They would need to be fully aware of 
the capabilities and limitations of weapons systems to employ them adequately. 
The problems would exercise their abilities in ways not otherwise possible short of 
war. Accordingly, they were not to “spare” themselves; the more time spent on the 
solutions, the better. He warned them that they would generally be dissatisfied with 
their solutions but assured them that they would see improvement as the problems 
went by.18 As a background for the year’s course, Spruance told them, they would 
hear a series of lectures and participate in a series of studies on international affairs. 
“Well known” lecturers in such fields as journalism, science, diplomacy, education, 
and public information would appear. Each lecture would end with a question pe-
riod that Spruance thought would be “quite” challenging and interesting. He also 
introduced them to the two thesis topics for the year and generally reiterated for 
them the “wonderful” opportunity they had to improve themselves for the good 
of their services. Except for the first week in July, they would be given Wednesday 
afternoons off during July, August, and September so they and their families could 
enjoy Newport; Spruance was certain they would enjoy the town, the weather, and 
the people. In fact, he was equally certain that their families would have “improved” 
themselves by association with the local community.19
The Naval Communications Course
The Naval Communications section of the course occurred between 8 and 17 Au-
gust 1946. On the first day of the course, students drew publications from the ar-
chives, went through an orientation, studied the topic “General Communications,” 
and participated in seminars on that subject. Study and seminar discussion con-
tinued each day of the course, on most days interspersed with lectures on topics 
such as “Employment of Naval Aircraft vs. Warships,” “Radio Communications,” 
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“Communication Security,” “Communication Intelligence,” “Amphibious Commu-
nications,” and “Communications and Electronics in the Exercise of Command.” 
Organization charts introduced students to the role of naval communications in 
the larger Navy. Lecture, study, and seminar activity were also devoted to “Voice 
Procedure Recordings,” “Radio Telephone Procedure Drill,” and “Message Drafting 
Exercises.” The section ended with a seminar, the Operations Problem Communi-
cation Planning Exercise, and a final postproblem seminar.20
Numerous references were listed for the students to use, including Navy Regula-
tions, the U.S. Navy Visual Call Sign Book, the U.S. Navy Voice Call Sign Book, the 
U.S. Navy Mail Service Manual, the U.S. Navy Radio Call Sign Book, Notes on Com-
munication Security, Communications Instructions, Wartime Instructions for Mer-
chant Ships (both visual and radio), and the International Code of Signals (again, 
both visual and radio). Most of the students were issued one copy of each publica-
tion. Seminars were conducted in the Pringle Auditorium, the exercises and plan-
ning seminars in the Maneuver Room of Pringle Hall. Except when it joined the 
senior class in the auditorium, the junior class would conduct its activities in the 
Old Maneuver Room in Luce Hall.21 
The “General Objective” was to familiarize student officers with the capabilities, 
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command in naval, joint, and combined operations. “Special Objectives” included 
appreciation of the vital role of communications in the exercise of command and 
of the coordination required between operational and communication planning 
and training; of the dependence of command on communications in the conduct 
and supervision of operations; and of the potentials of communications security 
and communications intelligence. “Special Objectives” also included, in this case, 
understanding of the complexities of communication problems, of the problems 
involved in message drafting and in radiotelephone procedure and control, and of 
the principles of communication security.22 
A schedule of events indicates how intensive these courses were. On the first 
day, for instance, students received staff lectures on “Some Communications Fail-
ures Vital to Command during World War II” as an introduction to communica-
tions publications. Study of these references was followed late the same morning 
by seminars on “Items of Communication Knowledge Essential to Flag Officers 
and Staff Officers” and “Items of Communication Knowledge Essential to Com-
manding Officers.” These seminars involved student officers in discussion and 
were followed by additional reading and seminars on the duties of shipboard 
communication officers and staff communication officers. The second day of the 
course involved more readings, a lecture on the “Employment of Naval Aircraft vs. 
Warships,” and seminars on “Naval Aircraft and Submarine Force Communica-
tions.” In addition, Army student officers, not familiar with Navy topics like vi-
sual signaling, assembled in the Old Maneuver Room for a training film. The third 
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communications of “importance” to infantry division and airborne division com-
manders. The day concluded with reading material on “Radio Material and Wave 
Propagation,” as well as seminars on “Some Aspects of Radio Wave Propagation 
Associated with Command Functions” and “Electronic Logistics.” The fourth day 
entailed additional readings on fleet and shore radio organization, seminars on 
shore radio organization and fleet radio communications, and readings on radio 
procedures. The students then heard recordings of radiotelephone procedures in 
the auditorium and then participated in a “Radio 
Telephone Procedure Drill.”23
The fifth day of the course saw readings and 
then seminar discussions on radio countermea-
sures, communications security, and physical se-
curity, as well as a lecture on “Communications 
and Electronics in the Exercise of Command.” The 
students received lectures on cryptographic aids 
and communications intelligence, as well as read-
ings on cryptographic and transmission security, 
Fig. 4  
Senior class student talks, 
Naval Communications 
Course, August 1946
Fig. 5  
Junior class student talks, 
Naval Communications 
Course, August 1946
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while the day after that saw a message-drafting exercise and additional readings 
and lectures on communications security. The second-to-last day of the course 
was focused on amphibious communications, specifically readings and seminars 
on “Planning and the Movement to an Objective,” “Naval Gunfire,” “Air Support,” 
“Joint Expeditionary Force,” “Naval Attack Force,” “Landing Force,” “Fighter Direc-
tion,” and “Radar and Radar-Countermeasure Communications.” The final day fin-
ished with staff lectures on the “Mechanics of NWC Communications,” “Operation 
Problem Communication Plans,” an exercise in “Operation Problem Communica-
tion Plans,” and a seminar discussion.24
Guidance entitled “Assignments of Subjects for Talks by Student Officers” sug-
gested that student talks might supplement material previously studied or even 
serve as the main sources of new information. A student talk was to be based on 
personal experience or observation, supplemented by the reading of “pertinent” 
reference material, which might but need not be course readings. Talks were to 
leave time for subsequent discussion. Finally, a short staff questionnaire on the 
benefits of the Naval Communications Course was given to solicit recommenda-
tions for changes or improvements.25
The Naval Intelligence Course 
Late in August 1946, Admiral Smith prepared instructions for a course in Naval In-
telligence Studies for the junior and senior classes of June 1947. These instructions 
again illustrate how the College’s curriculum operated in conjunction with the Op-
erations Problems. Phase I of the course was oriented toward both classes; only the 
senior class would participate in Phase II. Phase I would entail lectures on naval in-
telligence by representatives of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI); study of the 
publication Naval Intelligence, February 1946, with seminars led by ONI officers; 
study of intelligence annexes from World War II operations plans; and preparation 
and presentation of intelligence estimates and plans by student officers. The overall 
course studied the application of procedures and practices in intelligence during 
the war by some of the more successful American naval commanders. It also served 
as an exercise in the practical use of the operational functions of command and in 
the solution of “typical” military problems.26
Rear Adm. (in photo, Captain) 
Thomas Inglis, USN (right); other 
man unidentified 
Capt. (in photo, Vice Admi-
ral) Carl Espe, USN
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Phase I took place between 4 and 9 September. The first day saw the drawing 
of publications, an orientation from Captain Hartung (also the officer in charge 
[OINC] of the Command and Staff class of June 1947), and a lecture from Rear 
Adm. Thomas Inglis, Chief of Naval Intelligence, on “Intelligence: Organization 
and Mission.” 
The next day, students received a lecture on “Strategic and Operational Intel-
ligence” from Capt. Carl Espe, head of the Operational Intelligence Branch of the 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV); Captain Espe led a seminar 
on the topic later in the day. The 6th followed the same pattern, with the study of 
chapters in Naval Intelligence, February 1946 on naval air intelligence and amphibi-
ous intelligence, then lectures on those subjects by, respectively, Cdr. John Lamade, 
assistant to the OINC of OPNAV’s Air Intelligence Branch, and Capt. John Mosher, 
U.S. Naval Reserve, an instructor in intelligence at the National War College. Lat-
er in the day, Captain Mosher and Commander Lamade led seminar discussions 
on their lecture topics. The fourth day of Phase I 
brought a staff lecture on “Current Intelligence,” 
along with the study of further chapters; the last 
day of Phase I saw additional readings, a lecture on 
“Current Intelligence” by Capt. Wallace Wharton, a 
reservist, and a seminar discussion led by Captain 
Wharton.27
Phase II was conducted for the senior class be-
tween 10 and 13 September, with the first day de-
voted to an orientation and a study of operations 
plans, specifically their intelligence annexes. The 
next day, Phase II groups prepared for a later semi-
nar by reviewing the intelligence annexes of a num-
ber of operations plans and heard a staff presenta-
tion on the “Search for and Sinking of the Bismark 
[sic].” Day three was devoted to additional study 
and preparation for the next day’s seminar, which 
would involve individual as well as group presen-
tations. The project divided the senior class into 
twelve groups of five to six students each, each group 
noting the “good” and “bad” points of its assigned 
plan. Groups 1 and 2 took Operation FORAGER, 
the invasion of the Marianas, while Groups 3 and 
4 handled Operation STALEMATE II, the assaults on 
Palau and Morotai. Groups 5 and 6 had Operation 
INDUCTION, the invasion of Lingayen in the Philip-
pines, Groups 7 and 8 Operation DETACHMENT, the seizure of Iwo Jima. Operation 
Fig. 6 
Phase II student groups
 18 BLUE VERSUS PURPLE
Map 1
The Pacific basin
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ICEBERG, the invasion of Okinawa, was done by Groups 9 and 10. Finally, the intelli-
gence annex for the projected (but of course never conducted) invasion of the home 
islands of Japan, Operation OLYMPIC, was reviewed by Groups 11 and 12.28 
The students, acting as if they were the intelligence officers on the staffs of the 
theater commanders involved, analyzed joint staff studies, fleet intelligence bul-
letins, and studies of terrain, theater, and engineering aspects, etc., related to the 
operations and their requirements; studied the intelligence material available; and 
considered the intelligence that had been available at the time to the Joint Intel-
ligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas. Student officers then prepared intelligence 
estimates for the operation and a plan for obtaining the needed operational infor-
mation. Students subsequently compared their work with the actual intelligence 
annexes and prepared brief comments on the strengths and weaknesses of their 
own work, again by the criteria of Naval Intelligence, February 1946. One student 
from each group would be selected to present his estimate, plan, and comment for 
class discussion.29
The Theses Again 
In early January 1947, Admiral Smith issued to the staff a procedural reminder 
about the approaching deadline for the theses on “Relations between Russia and 
the United States, and Their Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy.” The originals of the 
theses were to be distributed to assigned reviewing officers for comment (but with-
out actual comments being written on the original theses) and then finally approval 
by Admiral Smith.30 Three weeks later, Admiral Smith issued another memo to the 
Naval War College staff about the next step in the process. By this time, the Topic 1 
theses had been read once; the reviewing officers were now “desired” to give them a 
second reading to ensure “correct evaluation” and to prepare for a critique.31
By early April, the staff and students were preparing for the Critique on Topic 1. 
Its purpose was to assist the staff and students in synthesizing their ideas on Rus-
sia into a concept that would be useful in their service relations, their duties, their 
civilian interactions, and the creation of an understanding of Russia that the United 
States had not enjoyed concerning Japan in World War II (understandings that 
today, at least, College representatives might be asked to brief to policy makers in 
Washington, D.C.). The “General Plan” was to lay a foundation during the first half 
of the period allotted for the Critique in historical, geographical, “racial” (Smith’s 
word), military, political, and economic contexts through Staff Presentations and 
guest lecturers. Student presentations would then take place to achieve a consensus 
of student thought, one that represented both conventional and unusual approach-
es. In effect, the goal was to create a “Russian Estimate,” or a military “Estimate of 
the Situation,” concerning American relations with the Soviet Union.32 
In the second reading, the reviewing officers were not to assign marks but mere-
ly to comment briefly on merit, especially the quality of the development of ideas 
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(all in language suitable for transcription as the chief of staff ’s comment to the 
student). Staff officers’ comments were also to recommend theses for presentation 
in the Critique in early May, especially those show-
ing that the student “has employed reasonable as-
sumptions and that the development has been logi-
cal and sound.”33
On the same day, Captain Hartung sent Capt. 
Gail Morgan, Naval War College Secretary, a 
memo warning of the need for precautions when 
students had civilians outside the College (or per-
haps their wives) type their theses. Hartung re-
minded Morgan that theses could use classified 
material, but if they did they had to be classified 
and cleared through the head of the Department 
of Intelligence. Hartung wanted student officers 
cautioned about fully observing security regulations in hiring uncleared civilian 
typists.34 
Fig. 7
Theses Reading Detail, 
Topic 1, first reading
Fig. 8
Comments on Thesis, 
Topic 1, first reading
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Fig. 10
Comments on Thesis, 
Topic 1, second reading
The same format for a thesis critique was used about a month later for Topic 2. 
Here, the focus was on ideas about the capabilities and limitations of the atomic 
bomb so that strategic and tactical concepts could 
be developed for the employment of the weapon, as 
well as insight into its possible influence on future 
naval warfare. In this case, the Staff Presentations 
would be on the results of Operation CROSSROADS 
(the 1946 Bikini tests) and the probable impact of 
the atomic bomb on fleet disposition and move-
ment. The presentations from eight “outstanding” 
student theses presented a “cross-section” of stu-
dent thought by officers from various branches and 
arms.35
Spruance and the Full Circle of Graduation 
In early June 1947, Admiral Spruance gave a short 
address to the graduating classes before introduc-
ing Fleet Admiral Nimitz, the CNO, as the keynote speaker. Spruance recalled the 
Fig. 9
Theses Reading Detail, 
Topic 1, second reading
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work the students had done in the past year, especially the 
problems the staff had devised to test them, the lectures to 
which they had listened, and the theses they had written. All 
of these activities had been geared to bringing the students up 
to date with conditions as they “actually” existed in the postwar 
world and to set them thinking into the future. No one could 
foresee the future for the United States in the area of interna-
tional affairs, he argued, but he was certain that global condi-
tions would be “decidedly” unsettled for the present. He hoped 
that the United Nations would be able to solve issues of disagreement between na-
tions in satisfactory and peaceful ways; he was certain that if war came, it would 
not be of American making. He was also certain that the United States would do 
everything “honorable” to avoid war but again, if it came, it would be up to officers 
such as those in the graduating classes to win that war with minimal losses to the 
United States.36
He further reminded them that modern wars were won through the united ef-
forts of all the branches of the armed forces, “each contributing its share toward 
Capt. Gail Morgan, 
USN
Fig. 11
Atomic Bomb Theses Read-
ing Detail, First Reading
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the proper employment of the weapons and resources placed by the country at its 
disposal for the prosecution of the war.” He hoped, therefore, that the work the 
students—officers of the Army, USAAF, Navy, and 
Marine Corps—had been doing together for the past 
year had given them better insight into the many 
problems that they would have to solve jointly in the 
future. Noting that the Naval War College for the first 
time had had a Foreign Service officer as a student, 
Spruance hoped that everyone had been reminded of 
the need always to keep in mind the close relation-
ship that had to exist in both peace and war between 
foreign and military policy.37
Fig. 12
Atomic Bomb Theses Read-
ing Detail, Second Reading
Fig. 13
Comments on Thesis, 
Topic 2
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II The Maneuver Rules, June 1946
In late June 1946, Rules for Chart and Board Maneuvers were issued for the in-coming 1946–47 classes. The Rules paint a very detailed portrait of how Naval War College staff and students conducted war-game simulations in the first 
full academic year after the end of World War II. This chapter describes in greater 
detail than previous works on the Naval War College precisely how war simulations 
were conducted and demonstrates how war games of this type were simulated be-
fore the postwar revolution in electronics.1
The Rules began with a foreword characterizing Chart and Board Maneuvers 
as serving to “create successive changes in military situations under study.” These 
changes were to simulate the “realities” of war, at least to the extent that those re-
alities were brought about by the actions of the opposing commanders and their 
subordinates in the games. The foreword pointed out, however, that the Maneuver 
Rules “merely” prescribed methods and “conventions” for conducting the maneu-
vers, that the Rules were based on “well founded” opinions, and that they repre-
sented a “conservative” average of “true” conditions while “simple” enough to pre-
vent prolonged delays in application. “When accepted, interpreted and employed 
in this spirit they fulfill their purpose.”2
“Chart Maneuvers,” the foreword explained, covered “vast areas” and were “stra-
tegical” in nature. “Board Maneuvers,” in contrast, covered more-restricted areas 
and were used for more-tactical exercises. However, in either type of maneuver, 
student officers who functioned as Student Commanders saw only those ships and 
aircraft that were within their effective visibility or radar range. All maneuvers were 
divided into sequentially numbered “moves” representing successive intervals of 
time. Generally, moves for Board Maneuvers were of three minutes’ (game time) 
duration or multiples of three, while Chart Maneuvers involved moves embracing 
the actions of several hours or even days. There were many points of similarity in 
the conduct of Chart and Board Maneuvers but also differences requiring different 
procedures, materials, and staffs. (Page i.)
Student Commanders were to be “scrupulous” in avoiding transmission of in-
formation during a Chart or Board Maneuver except by methods that would be 
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available at sea under game circumstances, since “unauthorized conversations be-
tween student commanders tend to destroy the value of a maneuver, and to relieve 
a subordinate of making decisions on his own responsibility and initiative.” Once 
all of the lessons to be derived from a maneuver had been “clearly demonstrated,” in 
the opinion of the Director of the Maneuver, it was to be terminated. The instruc-
tion emphasized that while it was customary to call the maneuvers “games,” they 
were in “no sense” contests to see who won or who lost. (Pages i–ii.)
Section A of the Rules: Conduct of Chart and Board Maneuvers
Preliminary to a maneuver, a specific Problem depicting a military situation was 
drawn up for the student officers to solve. Solutions for the Chart or Board Ma-
neuver were then selected, the solutions were made available to the Student Com-
manders, and other student officers were assigned as their Subordinate Command-
ers. Each Problem was to include a Statement of the General Causes that created 
the game Situation, such as the broad progress of operations to date, instructions 
or orders that had been received by higher authority, the composition and loca-
tions of own forces, the state of defense of one’s own bases and outposts, informa-
tion on enemy forces (including size, general location, and bases), the “attitude” of 
neutral powers, logistics support available, and meteorological, hydrographic, and 
topographic data. Each Problem also included any Special Situations or conditions 
that would have a bearing on the Problem, as well as an explanation of what was 
expected of the student officers. (Page a-1.)
For a Chart Maneuver, one end of the Maneuver Room was screened off to 
form a “Master Plot,” the headquarters of the Maneuver Staff. Student Command-
ers were not to visit this enclosure during a maneuver. The Maneuver Staff itself 
kept the Master Plot of the maneuver. Each Student Commander handling a force 
kept a Strategic Plotting Chart in his assigned room. This plot tracked the move-
ments of all elements of his force as well as those of other friendly and enemy forces 
with which the Student Commander was concerned. Forms to be employed by 
the Student Commanders, found outside the Maneuver Room, included Aircraft 
Flight, Fuel Account Message, and Record of Move Forms, as well as Fuel Work 
Sheets. Documents for use by the Maneuver Staff included Aircraft Casualty and 
Information Forms, Air Damage and Umpire Communication Records, Move Um-
pire Check-Off Sheets, Radar Contact, and Umpire Damage Reports. Members of 
the Maneuver Staff were appointed from among the student officers by the Naval 
War College staff. The Director of the Maneuver was in charge of the maneuver’s 
conduct and responsible for the coordination of the Maneuver Staff; the Director 
was the arbiter in all cases, and his decisions were final. He also conducted the Post-
Maneuver Critique. (Pages a-1 to a-2.)
In addition, there were two Assistant Directors who supervised the Master 
Plot and took charge of successive moves in alternation. In general, the Assistant 
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Directors announced the lengths of the moves, the weather conditions, and other 
General Conditions of exercises on bulletin boards. They announced when forms 
and “flimsies” (tracings on tissue paper) were to be turned in, announced Maneu-
ver Time during moves, determined contacts, transmitted “appropriate” informa-
tion to Student Commanders, consulted with Damage Umpires regarding damage 
to be assigned to various forces, supervised the History of the Maneuver, and initi-
ated discussion during the Critique. Liaison Officers were also assigned, as inter-
mediaries between the Director and the Student Commanders, on the one hand, 
and an Air Umpire, on the other, the latter having one or more assistants. The Air 
Umpire had a number of duties, including the general oversight of the operation 
of aircraft and the maintenance of records of aircraft available to each side. The 
Air Umpire also received Aircraft Flight Forms, assisted the Director with respect 
to aircraft operations and contacts, and determined the results of aerial attacks, 
the latter subject to change by the Director. The Air Umpire further informed the 
Director, the Plotting Officer, the Damage Umpire, and the Recorder of the dam-
age done by these air attacks. Finally, the Air Umpire maintained a separate plot of 
aircraft operations. (Pages a-2 to a-3.) 
The Move Umpire received flimsies of ship and aircraft movements as well as 
the Record of Previous Moves. In addition, he transmitted these flimsies to the 
Master Plot as well as the Records of Moves to the Recorder of the History of the 
Maneuver and the concerned Assistant Director. The Communication Umpire and 
his assistants supervised the application of the communication rules: they received 
and examined messages from the Student Commanders, determined from the Stu-
dent Commanders’ Communication Plans which addressees could be reached on 
which circuits and which required relays, and recorded each message on the Com-
munication Record Form. The Communication Umpire and Communication As-
sistants computed the time of delivery of the message, had Marine Corps orderlies 
prepare copies of the messages and deliver them to originators and addressees via 
pneumatic tubes when Maneuver Time reached the proper time of delivery, and 
kept “dummy” clocks to show the current Maneuver Time. The Recorder, under 
the supervision of the Director and Assistant Directors, recorded the History of the 
Maneuver. Moreover, when the maneuver started, the Director published “neces-
sary” information concerning the first move and established Maneuver Time for 
the beginning and length of the move. Having noted the announced length of a 
move and the weather conditions, each Student Commander updated his Strategic 
Plotting Chart, including the intended movements of his vessels and aircraft for the 
entire period of the move. (Pages a-3 to a-4.)
A number of conventions were followed in plotting. The position of the Main 
Body was indicated by a dot within a small square, other detachments and single 
ships by dots within small circles. A wavy line over a circle indicated a submerged 
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submarine. Tracks of vessels proceeding on the sur-
face were drawn with full lines, tracks of submerged 
submarines and aircraft in flight with dotted lines. 
All tracks were labeled to show the ship, aircraft, or 
force; course and speed; and the direction of unit 
movement, with an arrowhead for ships and a T 
for aircraft. Each point at which a change of speed 
or course was made was indicated and labeled with 
the time of such change; each point where a sub-
marine left or returned to the surface or an aircraft 
landed or took off had to be shown. 
Tracings of data on the Strategic Plotting Charts 
were made on tissue paper with soft black-lead 
pencils. All flimsies indicated proposed tracks as 
completed at the end of the current move and had 
two reference points, usually latitudes and lon-
gitudes. A legend in the upper right-hand corner 
in colored pencil (blue indicating Blue forces and 
red for opposing forces) marked the move number 
and Maneuver Time, the composition of the force 
and its task designator, the name of the Student 
Commander (game role and actual name), and the 
room number. Each flimsy contained all informa-
tion with respect to composition and movements 
of forces by the Master Plot to determine contacts and results. If radar or anti-
submarine listening devices were being used during the exercise, that was stated, 
identifying ships and arcs of coverage. (Pages a-4 to a-5.)
Zigzags of ships had a specific symbol; actual speed, speed of advance on the 
base course, and the zigzag plan in use were noted. In addition, when vessels were 
accompanied by air patrols, the flimsy noted the composition, altitude, station, and 
purpose of the patrol, and the presence of the patrol was indicated on the track. 
The presence of an antisubmarine screen was indicated on the flimsy by dots or 
a broken circle around the circle that indicated the initial position, the number of 
dots representing the number of screening vessels. (Page a-5.)
Student Commanders were at liberty to change their intended movements at 
any time, for “good reason.” In such case, they submitted a “Modified Move,” warn-
ing the Director as soon as possible so that Maneuver Time would not be advanced 
before the change notification was made. The flimsy numbered the modification 
of a move, such as “Move 1, Mod. 2” and supplied the revised tracks of the forces 
affected, from the time of modification to the end of the current move, crossing 
Fig. 14
Example of tracing a move
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out the original. Flimsies for all moves were to be submitted to the Master Plot 
promptly when called for. Records of Moves for the just-completed moves were 
submitted at the same time. (Pages a-5 to a-6.)
At the beginning of each move, Aircraft Flight Forms and flimsies were to be 
submitted for all flights planned for that move. If flights were not planned but be-
came necessary at some point during the move, the Air Umpire was notified and the 
Aircraft Flight Form and flimsy were prepared and submitted as soon as possible. 
The same procedure was to be used if a flight was to be modified during a move. In 
order to expedite the computation of times required for aircraft to complete various 
legs of their flights, the lengths of legs were given to the nearest ten miles and the 
times of flight to the nearest five minutes. When flights were repeated—provided 
the weather did not change—a single drawing of the airplane tracks sufficed; the 
ship flimsy showed the points and times of the beginnings of each repeated flight. 
The airplane flimsy was marked “Repeated Flight,” with a table showing the indi-
vidual planes of each flight, start times, course changes, and completion times. If 
the flight legs were “very short,” as in the case of antisubmarine patrols, a figure was 
to be drawn around the ship or formation at the position of the first launch, show-
ing the outline of the patrol, the number of planes, and the hours during which it 
was to be flown. Flimsies for submarines showed whether the submarines were 
surfaced or submerged and, if the latter, depth, exact times of employing the peri-
scope—if employed—and the periods of listening for radio traffic, with or without 
a vertical antenna exposed. (Pages a-6 to a-7.) 
A Student Commander could ask the Master Plot to hold Maneuver Time to 
permit him to send a message. During Chart Maneuvers, all flimsies, Records of 
Moves, messages, and other papers were sent to the Master Plot by pneumatic 
tube. The Plotter, who was a civilian draftsman or technical assistant, transferred 
to the Master Plot the movements shown on all flimsies, entering course, speed, 
and times. The Director and Assistant Director then examined the Master Plot 
to determine whether any interactions had occurred. If none had occurred and 
all communications had been handled, the Assistant Director advanced Maneuver 
Time to the end of the move and called for the next move. If contact had been made 
or an important message was yet to be delivered, the Director or Assistant Director 
advanced the maneuver clock to or beyond the time of the contact or of delivery 
of the message and announced the new Maneuver Time over a loudspeaker. Infor-
mation concerning interactions and action subsequently taken was conveyed to 
and from the Student Commanders on “appropriate” forms in duplicate. Student 
Commanders then decided on their actions, wrote synopses of their decisions on 
the forms, and returned one copy to the Master Plot. Student Commanders could 
change planned movements of their forces and submit Modified Moves. The Di-
rector might authorize the exchange of information by Liaison Officers, message, 
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or phone, but the results of the interactions were decided by the Director before 
the maneuver resumed. When the end of a move was approaching, the Director 
might broadcast the date for the next move in advance so that Student Command-
ers might complete their plotting and thereby expedite the submission of flimsies 
when the next move was called for. (Pages a-7 to a-8.) 
Various records were also to be kept by the Student Commanders: Orders, Plans, 
and Special Instructions; track charts; a file of messages sent; a file of messages re-
ceived; a file of Records of Moves; fuel accounts; a file of Aircraft Flight Forms; a 
location for all carrier planes; and copies of diagrams showing cruising and other 
dispositions. 
As soon as possible after the completion of the last move, all student officers and 
Maneuver Staff assembled for a Critique. This began with comments on student 
officer solutions, followed by a brief History of the Maneuver in which the Master 
Plots for each move were shown on slides. The Director or an Assistant Director 
discussed “interesting” features and situations, the merits and defects of decisions 
and movements by each side, and strategic and tactical points demonstrated. Dur-
ing the discussion, student officers and the Maneuver Staff were free to make such 
comments as they desired; it was assumed that a “healthy difference” of profes-
sional opinion would arise. The Director and the Maneuver Staff were to give their 
personal views and call for those of the students. The discussion, however, was not 
to stray from the point at issue or become “undignified.” (Pages a-8 to a-9.)
Fig. 15
Example of a flimsy
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For a Board Maneuver, the equipment required 
was a Maneuver Board, model ships, “turning 
cards,” a plotting table with drawing instruments 
and protractors, screens, and tactical plotting 
sheets. The Maneuver Board represented a por-
tion of the earth’s surface, either sea or land. The 
board was divided into large squares and each large 
square subdivided into a hundred small squares. 
Each small square represented a thousand yards on 
a side. The tracks of the forces moved were shown by white chalk, those of torpe-
does in the colors (blue or red) of the ship models that had “fired” them. Model 
ships were shown in several sizes and shapes to indicate types, as seen in figure 16. 
Tracks of single ships were dotted, those of two or more ships in column in solid 
lines. Positions at the end of the moves were indicated by numerals corresponding 
to the number of the move. 
Model ships had metal strips with which could be assembled formations of a 
division, squadron, or fleet of any size, at intervals of three hundred, six hundred, 
seven hundred, or a thousand yards. Additionally, turning cards constructed to the 
scale of the Maneuver Board were used to plot the track of a ship during a move. 
The straight edge of the card represented the distance that a ship would move on 
a straight course during three minutes at a speed in knots as indicated; a circle on 
the turning card represented the turning circle of the ship, assuming a tactical di-
ameter of one thousand yards. The card allowed for the retardation of speed due to 
the turn; straight lines tangent to the turning circle represented the new paths of a 
ship making changes of course in multiples of fifteen degrees. The numbers along 
the tangent sides represented the position the ship would reach in three minutes at 
the average engine speed in knots during the move. In use, the card’s straight edge 
was laid in the direction of the actual course at the beginning of the move, with the 
zero point at its position at that time. If a turn had begun in a previous move and 
had now to be completed, the card was laid from the beginning of the turn and the 
position of the ship fixed by carrying the card along from its position in the turn at 
the end of the previous move. (Pages a-9 to a-11.)
All target data, such as target angle, course, and speed, were determined from 
the plots kept by the Student Commanders. Tactical Plotting Sheets and Range 
and Target Angle Indicators were issued by the Drafting Room for this purpose. 
Student Commanders were to keep clear of view of their enemy’s model ships; in 
fact, they were not to be permitted to see portions of the Maneuver Board beyond 
the effective visibility from their ships. Screens were employed, or Student Com-
manders were placed out of the sight of the board. When a Student Commander 
so separated moved his force on a Plotting Sheet, his moves were handled in the 
Fig. 16
Model ship type designa-
tions and features
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same way as those of a Chart Maneuver, except that the Director could have them 
transferred to the Maneuver Board, the Master Plot, or both. Student Command-
ers thus separated from the board were given information in the same way as in a 
Chart Maneuver. (Page a-11.)
Forms to be used by Student Commanders in Board Maneuvers, found on 
shelves outside the Maneuver Room, included those for Aircraft Flight, Message, 
Mine Laying, Move and Gunfire, and Torpedo Fire. Documents used by the Ma-
neuver Staff included Air Damage and Umpire Communication Records; Aircraft 
Casualty, Information, Radar Contact, Ship Data, Submarine Information, and 
Target Indicator Quick Decision Maneuver Forms; Damage Computer Work, Fire 
Distribution, Ammunition Expenditure Tally, and Move Umpire Check-Off Sheets; 
Fire Effect Tables for 1946; and Force Damage Summaries. 
The Maneuver Staff for a Board Maneuver was appointed from the Naval War 
College staff or student officers. The Director was charged with the conduct of the 
maneuver and the Critique. He decided the length of the moves, weather and vis-
ibility conditions, and such matters as damage from torpedo or mine hits. Liaison 
Officers aided in the conduct of the maneuver, while the Communication Umpire, 
with two assistants, supervised the application of the Communication Rules. The 
Chief Damage Computer was to supervise gunfire damage computing as well as 
the recording and reporting of all damage and ammunition expenditure. The Chief 
Damage Computer was also to assist the Director in the application of the Gunfire 
Section of the Maneuver Rules on the Maneuver Board. (Pages a-12 to a-13.)
The Air Umpire saw that the moves of aircraft, aircraft carriers, or other ves-
sels flying planes on or off were plotted on the Master Plot. He also received the 
Aircraft Flight Form from the Aircraft Commanders and recorded combat and op-
erational losses. In addition, the Air Umpire decided results of aerial engagements 
and resolved aerial interactions. He additionally decided the damage inflicted by 
aerial bombs and torpedoes and informed the Chief Damage Computer about such 
damage. All final decisions about damage, however, were up to the Director. Simi-
larly, the Plotter, again a civilian draftsman or technical assistant, was responsible 
for plotting the moves of all forces on the Master Plot; informing the Director and 
Submarine and Air Umpires of all contacts between forces on the Maneuver Board; 
and plotting the tracks of torpedoes fired during the maneuvers. He also plotted 
the locations of minefields as well as supervised the preparation of blueprints and 
slides for use in the Critique. The Historian was to keep the History of the Maneu-
ver, obtaining from the Assistant Directors and the various umpires such notes and 
comments as they desired to be included. In order to facilitate the preparation of 
the Critique, the Historian divided the maneuver into periods that corresponded to 
moves. There were also Move Umpires, each of whom received all forms submitted 
by Student Commanders of his side, scrutinized them “carefully” for compliance 
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with Maneuver Rules, and required corrections when necessary before submitting 
them to the Maneuver Staff. Each Move Umpire reported to the Director when all 
forms for his side had been submitted and when all moves for his side had been 
made on the Maneuver Board. (Pages a-13 to a-14.)
When a move was announced, each Student Commander made out and sub-
mitted to the appropriate umpire a Move and Gunfire Form. This form was to 
show exactly what movement his vessels would make during the impending move 
and what gunfire, if any, they were to deliver. The Student Commander was also 
to place on the Maneuver Board arrows pointing to his targets in time to enable 
the enemy commander to know that he was under fire. Also submitted were any 
messages from his ships during the move, as well as any Mine Laying, Torpedo 
Fire, or other forms that covered actions to be taken during the move. Forms thus 
submitted were to be complete and “definite,” not contingent on what other forces 
might do. A Move and Gunfire Form once submitted could not be altered without 
the approval of an Assistant Director. Even if altered, forces moved for at least one 
minute in accord with the form originally handed in. When Student Commanders 
had turned in their Move and Gunfire Forms and the forms had been “properly” 
verified, Move Umpires informed the Assistant Directors, the Director, and the 
Communication Umpire that the Student Commanders in question were ready to 
make the move. After receiving the “ready” reports, the Director broadcast, “Make 
Move No. ——,” whereupon students moved their units strictly in accordance with 
their Move and Gunfire Sheets, and the Maneuver Time was advanced to the end 
of the move. Should a new move be ordered before the damage of the last one had 
been determined, the Director would decide when to apply the effects. (Pages a-14 
to a-15.)
Aircraft Moves, however, were to be called for separately and were usually half 
an hour or more in length. For each Aircraft Move, all flights had to be specified on 
the Aircraft Flight Form. As soon as damage inflicted by aircraft was determined, if 
the total was 10 percent or more, each commander was to be notified of the effect 
on vessels under his immediate command. A commander could ascertain damage 
to ships of his own side but not under his personal command only by signal or mes-
sage to or from the commander of the damaged ship. The state of damage to ships 
of one side could be made known to commanders of the other only if the Director 
so desired. In addition, all damage during a three-minute move was to become ef-
fective at the end of the move in which it had been received. After all of this was 
resolved, the Critique of the Board Maneuver followed, according to the Rules for 
the Critique of a Chart Maneuver. (Page a-15.)
Section B: General Rules
Ships and aircraft in Problems were designated by letter and number symbols. 
Data for ships, aircraft, and weapons were given in current Naval War College 
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publications or in the Statement of the Problem. This data included the size of 
vessels—sizes of combatants expressed in tons standard displacement, and sizes 
of merchant vessels expressed in gross tons. There were five classes of ships. Large 
Ships had displacements of eighteen thousand tons or more, while Intermediate 
Ships were between eight thousand and 17,999 tons. Small Ships had displacements 
or tonnage of between three thousand and 7,999. Destroyers (DDs) were placed 
in a 200-to-2,999-ton category. A fifth class, Submarines, was not associated with 
a displacement or tonnage; all surface craft of 199 tons or less were classed with 
Submarines, due to the similarity of their silhouettes. The unit of distance used in 
Operations Problems was the nautical mile, two thousand yards, and the unit of 
range for gun or torpedo fire was one thousand yards. The unit of speed was the 
knot; the speed of ships was adjusted to the nearest half-knot, while the speed of 
aircraft was specified to the nearest five knots. Wind force was expressed as 0 to 12 
on the Beaufort scale; the velocity of wind in knots was taken to be five times the 
given figure. The state of the open sea in winds of from Force 0 to Force 3 were con-
sidered Smooth, in Forces 4–6 Moderate, in Forces 7–9 Rough, and Forces 10–12 
Heavy. The direction of the sea was to be considered the same as that in which the 
wind was blowing. Students were warned that navigational positions given to them 
by the Director would rarely be exact and would in fact be deliberately in error 
when the Director deemed warranted. (Pages b-1 to b-2.)
Damage to ships was classified as Above Water Damage, that caused by hits 
from gunfire, rockets, or bombs; Under Water Damage, owing to torpedoes, mines, 
rockets, bombs, ramming, or grounding; and Total Damage, the sum of the two. 
Relatedly, the prospective “life” of a ship was expressed as a whole number or a frac-
tion of fourteen-inch penetrative hits it might receive before sinking. The remain-
ing life of a ship at any instant was a percentage, to the nearest 10 percent. Life of 
the ship lost due to Above Water Damage and Under Water Damage was recorded 
separately as percentages of total life. During Chart Maneuvers, the Director could 
arbitrarily assign damage in combat—to ships as a percentage of life lost, and to 
aircraft as a number of planes destroyed. His decisions, in general, would be guided 
by the Rules set forth in the following chapter. (Page b-2.)
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III The Maneuver Rules Continued, June 1946
The distributed Maneuver Rules specified “ideal” underway conditions for passages in smooth seas. Ideal conditions meant no damage, no current, a clean bottom, no paravanes streamed, and nothing being towed. A condi-
tion of not having to keep station in formation or maintain what was called “reserve 
steam” also was defined. 
Section C of the Maneuver Rules: Speed and Logistics
Engine speed was to correspond to the engine revolutions being made under ideal 
underway conditions; engine speed was considered the same as speed through the 
water and, in ideal conditions, over the ground. Ground Speed was Engine Speed 
corrected for deviations from ideal underway conditions and was to be the speed 
plotted on the Maneuver Board or Charts. Reserve Speed was the difference be-
tween the highest Engine Speed immediately available and the engine speed being 
made. Maximum Engine Speed Allowed (MESA) figures and losses due to sea con-
ditions are shown in figure 17. 
The Director was in charge, however, of the application of other rules, such as 
the maximum speed allowed for a vessel under tow. Vessels in formation, except 
the Guide, had to have a minimum Reserve Speed for station keeping depending 
on the Formation Engine Speed: for ten knots or less, one knot of Reserve Speed; 
for eleven to twenty-two knots, two knots; for twenty-three to thirty knots, three 
knots; and for thirty-one knots or more, four knots. If Formation Engine Speed 
was so increased as to reduce a ship’s Reserve Speed below that required, the vessel 
was to break formation. Moreover, the Formation Engine Speed plus the required 
Reserve Speed had to be within the MESA range. With a paravane streamed, a ves-
sel could not make more than twenty-five knots without losing the paravane itself; 
vessels streaming or recovering paravanes were restricted to twelve knots engine 
speed for six minutes. A submarine under way was classified as either in its surface 
condition or submerged. While in a surface condition, it was always to be ready 
for a quick dive. Changing between surface and submerged was considered to take 
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only one minute, and during that minute the submarine was capable of making a 
visual or radar contact.*
For large increases in speed in Chart Maneuvers, forty-five minutes was allowed 
to raise steam in one or more boilers. A steam vessel of destroyer size or less in port 
was to have enough steam available for half maximum speed (not to exceed fifteen 
knots) and be able to get under way thirty minutes after commencing preparations. 
Steam vessels of intermediate and small size in port were to have enough steam 
for up to ten knots and be able to get under way in forty-five and thirty minutes, 
respectively. A vessel with an internal combustion engine, in contrast, was able to 
get under way within ten minutes but could make only Engine Speeds allowed by 
the MESA table. Once under way, steam vessels could increase speed as soon as 
additional boiler power was available. When additional boiler power became avail-
able, engine speed was considered to be increased immediately (rather, that is, than 
work up gradually) to the level intended. (Pages c-3 to c-4.)
Speed changes took place at uniform rates dur-
ing a three-minute move; the mean speed during 
the move was to be used in plotting. Under Water 
Damage reduced a ship’s designed speed in propor-
tion, in 10 percent increments. The reduction was 
in addition to any owing to Above Water Damage; 
loss of speed was to be expressed in a percentage of 
original designed speed, converted to the nearest 
half-knot. All losses of speed were effective at the 
end of the move in which the damage was received. 
Above Water Damage up to 29 percent resulted in 
no loss of speed, nor would 30–49 percent Above 
Water Damage in a battleship (BB), heavy cruiser 
(CA), battle cruiser (CB), or battle carrier (CVB). 
The same percentage of damage in other types of 
ships resulted in a 10 percent loss of speed. Above 
Water Damage of 50–69 percent in battleships, 
heavy cruisers, battle cruisers, and battle carriers 
cost 20 percent of speed, 30 percent in other types 
of ships. A 50 percent loss of speed was suffered 
by all types receiving 70–79 percent Above Water 
Damage. A ship that received a Total Damage of 
80 percent or more would be unable to make more 
than five knots. (Page c-5.)
* “Maneuver Rules,” 24 June 1946, pp. c-1 to c-3, folder 2567, box 131, RG 4, NHC. Subsequent pages references 
in this chapter are to this source.
Fig. 17
MESA table
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The number of hours that a steam vessel could maintain various engine speeds 
at or near its designed maximum was as shown in figure 19. When those limits 
were reached, a steam vessel was to slow for six hours to a speed it could maintain 
indefinitely. It could then return to high speed. The Director could impose engi-
neering casualties at any time on ships running at or near maximum speeds. His 
decision would depend on the type of propulsion plant, the duration of high speed, 
battle damage incurred, the state of the sea, and presumed fatigue of personnel. 
Engineering casualties could involve anything from intermittent smoking to com-
plete breakdown. The students were reminded that engineering and other casual-
ties imposed could be “excessive” if current fleet doctrine concerning the upkeep 
of material and the health of personnel was disregarded, especially in the case of 
submarines. (Pages c-5 to c-6.) 
For purposes of computing fuel expenditure, Port Condition meant that main 
engines were not in use, with steam maintained for in-port use only. Stand-By Con-
dition meant that the main engines were ready for use, Underway Condition that 
main engines were actually in use. Fuel expenditures for Port and Underway Con-
ditions were calculated from data in the fleet tactical publication Fuel Expenditure 
Tables of Fleets. Stand-By Expenditures were double those for Port Conditions; un-
der way, fuel expenditure increased 10 percent while raising or keeping steam for 
five or more knots above the engine speed actually being made. For vessels in close 
formation, fuel expenditure was to be increased by 3 percent to allow for station 
keeping, while vessels with paravanes streamed increased fuel expenditure by 5 
percent. As regarded refueling, a fuel oil tanker, gasoline tanker, and aviation gaso-
line barge could deliver aviation gas to a carrier or tender at the rate of thirty thou-
sand gallons an hour. These ships could deliver and receive fuel simultaneously. 
Submarines making ten knots or more while charging batteries would expend fuel 
as if they were under way at maximum surface speed. If a submarine stopped or 
was making less than ten knots while charging batteries, the fuel expended would 
be half that for maximum speed. (Pages c-6 to c-9.)
Fig. 18
Change of Speed: Board 
Maneuvers
Fig. 19
Engine Speed Being Made
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Section D: Contact Rules
For purposes of adjudicating “contacts”—detec-
tions and interactions—“meteorological visibility” 
was defined as the maximum distance at which a 
large object could be seen without artificial illumi-
nation. Visibility, which depended on light from “heavenly” bodies and the den-
sity of the atmosphere, was tabulated in the Statement of the Operations Problem, 
along with sunrise, sunset, duration of twilight, times for moonrises and moonsets, 
and phases of the moon. During a maneuver, the Director might announce changes 
in meteorological visibility, perhaps as one mile or less in daytime in fog, rain, mist, 
or falling snow or on a moonless night in slight haze. Visibility was considered 
to be three miles during the day in light haze or rain and at night if there was a 
clear atmosphere and moonlight, and the object being observed was away from 
the moon. Five miles visibility during the day was possible in haze, three miles at 
night. Ten, fifteen, and twenty miles were listed as possible during the day given 
average-to-high barometric pressure and broken or clear sky; high barometer, clear 
sky, and dry air during the day would allow for meteorological visibility of thirty, 
forty, or fifty miles. “Low visibility” meant nine miles or less of meteorological vis-
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was twenty-one or more. Phases of twilight would be indicated by increased or 
decreased visibility as the occasion required. “Effective visibility” was the range 
at which an object had a reasonable chance of being seen. Effective visibility was 
dependent on meteorological visibility, the nature of the object, the background of 
the object, the position of the sun or moon, and the 
position of the observer. It was to be measured in 
nautical miles or yards, whichever happened to be 
more convenient. (Pages d-1 to d-2.)
All ships on the surface could sight other ships 
as unrecognized types at distances up to meteoro-
logical visibility at that time. However, sightings 
could not occur beyond certain limits of effective 
visibility. For instance, Large Ships could see other 
Large Ships at twenty-five miles, while Large and 
Intermediate-sized Ships could see each other at 
twenty-two miles. Large Ships could see smaller 
ones, and vice versa, at twenty miles, the same dis-
tance at which Intermediate and Small Ships could 
see each other. Intermediate Ships could see each 
other at twenty-two miles, and Small Ships could 
see each other at twenty miles. Submarine peri-
scopes could see but not identify Large Ships at 
fifteen miles, Intermediate Ships at thirteen miles, 
and Small Ships at ten miles; recognition for any 
type was possible only within 80 percent of me-
teorological visibility or the limits noted above for 
effective visibility, whichever was less. Effective vis-
ibility of unrecognized ship types from aircraft was according to the table in figure 
24; effective visibility from aircraft was reduced one mile for every additional thou-
sand feet of altitude. (Pages d-2 to d-3.)
Making smoke was also governed by rules. Oil-
burning ships were considered to exhaust gas at all 
speeds and intermittent smoke at speeds within 
two knots of maximum speed, while coal-burning 
ships made light smoke at all speeds. Smoke was 
visible by ships and aircraft forty miles away if 
heavy, thirty miles away if intermediate or light, 
and nine miles away if from a submarine snorkel. 
Submarines using periscopes would be able to see smoke in these three categories 
from fifteen, ten, and three miles, respectively. Aircraft could be seen in the air 
Fig. 24
Aerial visibility distances 
and altitudes
Fig. 23
Meteorological Visibility in 
Nautical Miles
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from other aircraft at distances given in figure 24, provided the difference of alti-
tude between the two aerial observers was not over two thousand feet. The distance 
of sighting was to be decreased half a mile for every additional thousand feet of dif-
ference in altitude. Airplanes could be seen during daylight by observers on surface 
vessels, through submarine periscopes, or by observers on land one mile farther 
than the distances given in figure 24. Airships, on the other hand, could be seen by 
any observer at the same distance at which a large vessel could be seen. (Pages d-3 
to d-4.)
Mines floating on the surface were considered visible from vessels on the sur-
face up to five hundred yards in smooth sea and daylight. Under other conditions, 
mines could not be seen at sufficient distance by ships proceeding at fifteen knots 
or more to avoid them. Mines floating on the surface or below the surface and an-
tennae floating on the surface could be seen by observers in aircraft within a radius 
of five hundred yards, provided that the altitude of the aircraft was not more than 
a thousand feet and the observer was concentrating on sighting such objects at that 
time. Minelaying by surface ships or aircraft was considered detectable at the same 
ranges at which ships or aircraft could be recognized; mine explosions were visible 
and audible at ranges up to ten miles. A submarine could be seen by any observer 
within six thousand yards, unless the submarine remained submerged at periscope 
depth or greater; did not expose the periscope when making more than three knots; 
did not expose the periscope within a thousand yards of surface ships or aircraft, 
or did not expose the periscope longer than specified in figure 25. The exposed 
periscope of a submerged submarine, however, could not be observed at all more 
than six thousand yards away; if less than one minute intervened between two peri-
scope exposures, the duration of the two exposures plus the intervening time was 
to be regarded as one continuous exposure. The snorkel of a submarine could be 
sighted as if it were a periscope; false sightings of 
periscopes or snorkels by surface ships or aircraft 
could be introduced into the exercise. (Pages d-4 
to d-6.)
The commander of a submerged submarine was to enter on his flimsy the Ma-
neuver Time at which his periscope was raised, whether he observed on a specified 
bearing or took an “all around look,” and the duration of periscope exposure. A 
look on a specified bearing was to take ten seconds; ten seconds was also the time 
allotted to shifting from an observation of one ship or unit to another. As an exam-
ple, a thirty-second exposure permitted the submarine commander to look at each 
of two bearings. A ten-second “all around look,” however, would give bearings only 
of vessels within 1,200 yards, distinguish whether other vessels were nearer or far-
ther than eight thousand yards, and identify a sighted vessel as Large, Intermediate, 
Small, or Very Small. For a look of ten seconds or longer on a designated bearing, 
Fig. 25
Visibility distances of 
submarine periscopes
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information would be given by the Director: within a seven-thousand-yard actual 
range, the type of vessel, whether friendly or enemy, exact compass bearing, and 
target angle—the observer’s relative bearing as seen from the target (see a more 
technical definition below)—on the center ship of a group. If the actual target angle 
was close to zero degrees or 180 degrees, the target angle was to be given to the 
nearest five degrees. As the actual target angle approached ninety or 270 degrees, 
it could be to the nearest fifteen degrees. In general, target angles were considered 
more accurate the greater the range, up to seven thousand yards. Ranges to targets 
for submarines between seven and five thousand yards were given within a thou-
sand yards of the actual, between 5,000 and 2,500 yards within five hundred, from 
2,500 to 1,500 yards within a hundred, and 1,500 
yards or less as accurately as could be measured on 
a plot. (Pages d-6 to d-7.)
The speed of a target was to be normally given as determined by the Student 
Commander from his plot. If supplied, the accuracy of the information was gov-
erned by the range and the number of observations taken. For instance, for a target 
seven to twelve thousand yards distant, it was considered that the Student Com-
mander should be able to ascertain the approxi-
mate type and, if a large vessel, whether friendly 
or enemy. At that range, it should also be possible 
to obtain an exact compass bearing; target angles, 
as noted above, for ranges within seven thousand 
yards; and ranges within one or two thousand 
yards of the actual figure, inaccuracy varying with 
the range. Speed, however, was not obtainable at 
this range. Above twelve thousand yards actual 
range, it would be possible to obtain only “very 
meager” information about the composition of the force, an exact compass bear-
ing, and a range figure within two to four thousand yards of the actual. Target 
angles, though, could not be obtained. Within the context of visibility, a submerged 
submarine could be identified one minute after firing a colored smoke bomb but 
smoke bombs could not be seen at a distance greater than four miles. (Page d-7.)
Effective visibility at night could be increased by the use of searchlights, the amount 
of searchlight needed depending on the existing meteorological visibility. Effective 
visibility at night, however, was not to exceed nine thousand yards for Large or Inter-
mediate Ships, 7,500 yards for small vessels, six thousand yards for Destroyers, and 
three thousand yards for Submarines. Searchlights, star shells, and parachute flares 
were visible at night in terms of a number of factors (figure 26). Star shell firing nec-
essary to maintain illumination of targets making fifteen knots was as in figure 27; if 
the target was moving faster, a proportionately higher rate of fire was necessary. The 
Fig. 26
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rate of fire, the horizontal range of burst, and the bearing limits of any search spread 
were stated by the Student Commander on the Move and Gunfire Form. (Pages 
d-7 to d-8.)
If properly illuminated by star shells or parachute flares, a target was visible for 
both recognition and gunfire at the ranges given in figure 28. Star shells or flares 
could, by accident or design, completely obscure vision beyond them. The deliber-
ate use of star shells or flares for this purpose, however, had to be in accordance 
with a definite plan submitted to the Director in advance. 
Similarly, there were various ranges for audibil-
ity. Ranges of audibility for gunfire, for instance, 
were twenty miles for twelve-inch guns or higher, 
fifteen miles for guns eight-inch to eleven-inch, ten 
miles for six- to seven-and-a-half-inch, seven miles 
for four- to five-and-a-half-inch, and five miles for 
three-inch guns or smaller. These ranges varied ac-
cording to wind, one’s own gunfire, and one’s own speed. If continued noise could 
be heard, true bearing could be estimated to the nearest multiple of forty-five de-
grees. Student Commanders furnished the Director with sketches or descriptions 
of their Underwater Sound Plans; the Director would announce the “assured sonar 
echo-range of the day,” that which would be obtained at sea by a bathythermo-
graph. (Page d-9.)
Echo-ranging performance could also vary from the assured sonar echo range 
of the day, the variance to be decided by the Director. When ranges were obtainable, 
bearings could be measured within plus or minus one degree. Turbulent masses of 
water, such as those caused by depth charge explosions or propellers at high speed, 
could, in the line of the sound beam, interrupt echo ranging from five to twenty 
minutes. The speed of one’s own ship would also reduce sonar range; eighteen to 
twenty knots would reduce the echo range by 25 percent, twenty-one to twenty-
two knots by 50 percent reduction, and twenty-three or twenty-four knots by 75 
percent. Ships making over twenty-four knots would not make any sound contacts. 
Passively, bearings within plus or minus five degrees and general information about 
a type and speed could be obtained by listening. The greatest range attainable for 
underwater sound listening was ten thousand yards; the Director could reduce that 
range as he deemed appropriate for conditions at the time. (Pages d-9 to d-10.)
Radar was assumed to be installed in all ships, all ships and aircraft were con-
sidered equipped with Identification Friend or Foe, and all shore stations possessed 
radar, as set forth in the Statement of the Problem. A nomogram (figure 30) was 
used to obtain theoretical maximum radar range under “perfect” operating condi-
tions; radar ranges given to Student Commanders never exceeded them. The theo-
retical maximums were reduced by the Director, the amount of reduction varying 
Fig. 28
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directly with the theoretical maximum range and 
inversely with the number of aircraft in a group 
to be detected. In addition, there were theoretical 
maximum radar search ranges for detection be-
tween ships. (Pages d-10 to d-11.)
Maximum ranges of main-battery fire-control 
radars were equal to those of surface search radars. 
Maximum ranges of double-purpose fire-control 
radars were thirty-eight thousand yards for a large target or over seven planes, 
thirty-five thousand yards for an intermediate target or three to seven planes, and 
twenty-four thousand yards for a small target or one to two planes. The average 
ranges, in miles, that might be expected from air-
borne search radar were as shown in figure 31. 
(Pages d-11 to d-12.)
The ranges given in tables could also be reduced 
by the Director, by amounts varying directly with 
the ranges given in the tables and inversely with the 
size of the target. The approximate bearing of ships or aircraft operating radar could 
also be given to the Student Commander of any unit carrying radar-direction- 
finding equipment, again at the discretion of the Director. Bearings could be ob-
tained at ranges up to one and a half times the 
theoretical maximum range of the operating radar; 
the Director would decide on the effectiveness of 
radar interference and deception. During a ma-
neuver, the Director would supply data obtained by 
radar. It was not considered practical, however, to 
give continuous information, as would be the case 
in actual service. However, “pertinent and timely” 
information, such as marked changes in course and 
disposition, that would be disclosed by the use of 
radar would be given to the Student Commander 
concerned. All ships suffering 30 percent or more 
Above Water Damage were considered to have lost 
all their radar equipment. (Pages d-12 to d-13.)
The Maneuver Rules indicated that smoke screens could be laid by any oil-
burning vessel, by any vessel or aircraft carrying special smoke apparatus, or by air-
craft carrying smoke bombs. For a smoke screen laid by ships to be dense enough 
to prevent vision by the enemy, it had to be laid by at least three vessels not over 
five hundred yards apart. For the smoke to lie on the surface, atmospheric condi-
tions had to be favorable and the relative wind had to be fifteen knots or more. The 
Fig. 29
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Director had to be informed at least three minutes beforehand (in Maneuver Time) 
that a smoke screen was being started or stopped. Aircraft smoke bombs or smoke-
bomb clusters were carried by aircraft in lieu of hundred-pound bombs; smoke 
bombs were assumed to produce smoke for nine minutes but only when dropped 
on water. To obscure vision, at least six bombs had to be laid and not over two 
hundred feet apart. Large smoke tanks could be carried—in lieu of 1,600-pound 
bombs—by naval patrol planes, naval patrol bombers, or similar shore-based air-
craft; one large smoke tank was able to produce a screen 2,400 yards long. Small 
smoke tanks could be carried in lieu of five-hundred-pound bombs by patrol 
planes, naval patrol bombers, carrier-based aircraft, or similar shore-based types 
and could produce screens 1,800 yards long. A smoke screen, however, was not 
considered to obscure a vessel during the three-minute move in which the screen 
was begun. Such laying of smoke, however, could be employed to interfere with 
gunfire. (Pages d-13 to d-14.)
The smoke emitted during a three-minute move was carried directly to leeward 
at the speed of the wind for three subsequent three-
minute moves, during which it would obscure vi-
sion. By the end of the fourth three-minute move, 
including that in which it was first emitted, the 
smoke would have entirely dissipated. The shape 
of a smoke area at the end of a three-minute move 
during which smoke was begun was determined 
from the position of the leader at the beginning 
of the move. A line was drawn in the direction 
in which the true wind was blowing and equal in 
length to the distance a particle of smoke would travel during the move. That point 
was joined with the position of the leader at the end of the move, defining the for-
ward edge of the smoke area—called “line (b)” (see figures 32, 33). In the 
same way, students determined a line for the rear vessel, the after edge of 
the smoke area, or “line (c).” Connecting the outer ends of lines (b) and 
(c) with a line parallel to the shape of the formation at the beginning of the 
move would result in “line (d).” The line connecting the inner ends of (b) 
and (c) through the formation as it existed at the end of the move would 
be “(e).” The smoke area was bounded by lines (b), (c), (d), and (e). This 
area was usually in the form of a parallelogram, but when the smoking 
unit made a marked change of course during the move, the smoke area 
frequently appeared as two triangles with apexes touching. Moreover, in 
plotting smoke screens, it was “convenient” to lay out the smoke for one 
move and then translate this block of smoke bodily in each successive move by the 
distance the smoke would be moved by the true wind. It was found that blocks of 
Fig. 32
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smoke laid out in second and subsequent moves would connect with the first block 
and with each other, forming a continuous smoke screen. Each block of smoke was 
labeled with the number of the move in which it was laid. (Pages d-14 to d-15.)
Section E: Communication Rules
Communication systems were to be simulated in Chart and Board Maneuvers in 
various ways. For instance, radiotelephone, telephone, and loud-hailers were simu-
lated by calls on specified telephone equipment during periods announced by the 
Director. In addition, visual, keyed radio and radar, wire and cable, radioteletype, 
message drops, and underwater sound were simulated by Message Forms via the 
Master Plot. Finally, mail, messenger, and other systems were simulated in writ-
ing, also via the Master Plot. Communication equipment in ships and shore sta-
tions and channels available to them were shown in confidential supplements to 
the Maneuver Rules. Communications of both opposing forces were conducted in 
accordance with U.S. Navy communication instructions, as well as the Communi-
cation Plans of the respective Student Commanders. Communication Plans had 
to include systems the Student Commander desired to use. They outlined radio 
channels and frequencies as well as conditions of radio and radar silence. Addition-
ally, there were plans for radio interception, countermeasures, and schedules for 
submarines and other types. There were also visual chains of responsibility (that is, 
for relaying), procedures for special equipment, voice codes, voice radio calls, and 
authentications. (Page e-1.)
Radio transmissions of certain powers could be intercepted and enemy Student 
Commanders given various information about them. For example, they might be 
allowed to listen in on voice transmissions or be given a copy of keyed messages 
transmitted in plain language. Finally, the enemy commander might be informed 
about the frequency, time, length, procedure, or general form of an encrypted trans-
mission. The effective range of any communication channel was to be decided by 
the Director, as the situation warranted. The interval between the instant the draft-
ing of a message commenced and its delivery to the addressee took into account 
loss of time for administration, operations, and “abnormal” conditions. Adminis-
trative and operational delays imposed were based on the number of plain-language 
words; messages sent in plain language or automatically encrypted and decrypted 
were considered to be drafted at the rate of five words per minute, to the near-
est minute, a rate that included all “normal” administrative delays. Messages were 
transmitted or received at the rate of ten words per minute, to the nearest minute, a 
figure reflecting all “normal” operational delays. The Director might also introduce 
“appropriate” additional delays for “abnormal” conditions: circuit congestion, dis-
regard or sudden change of a Communication Plan; encryption or decryption that 
was not automatic, the need to wait for a specified schedule of transmission, dam-
age to the transmitting or receiving ship or station, and relays. (Page e-2.)
 50 BLUE VERSUS PURPLE
Adding all delays to the normal Maneuver Time of drafting would give the Ma-
neuver Time of delivery to any particular addressee. The minimum time to de-
liver any message, other than by voice, was three minutes. For communications 
purposes, Student Commanders were considered to be present in all units of their 
command to which no other student officers had been assigned to game roles as 
subordinates. The exchange of messages was to be simulated in accordance with 
the “spirit” of the Communication Rules even if the originator and the addressee 
were the same student officer. The Maneuver Time at which the drafting of a mes-
sage commenced was the “Time of Origin”; the file number of the message was 
converted to Greenwich Civil Time, plus the day of the month for Chart and Board 
Maneuver messages. (Page e-3.) 
Section F: Gunfire Rules 
Radar Director Control could be used to the extreme range of the guns under con-
trol. Optical Director Control could be used to the limits of effective visibility, and 
pointer fire could be used by ships that had “Top Spots” (platforms high in the 
upperworks from which the fall of shot could be observed and aim corrections, or 
“spots,” given) but no directors (which tracked target movements, processed them 
with analog computers, and aimed the guns). Only Local Control (each gun aimed 
by its own crew) was available for vessels that had neither directors nor Top Spots 
(in effect, only submarines). Fire Effect was the damage done to a ship by a single 
target, expressed in percentage of target life lost in three minutes. Fire Effect was 
to vary with the weapon, the target, the range and target angle, and the method of 
spotting. These factors were found in the pamphlet Fire Effect Tables. Range and 
target angle were measured at the beginning of each three-minute move; moves of 
greater duration were divided into three-minute increments. Ranges themselves 
were to be measured to the nearest thousand yards. Target angle was the angle 
between the line of fire and the keel of the target ship, and measured to the nearest 
forty-five degrees. Line of fire was the bearing of the point of aim from the center of 
the firing ship. If within thirty degrees of the bow or stern, only bow or stern guns 
could bear on the target. Otherwise, all guns were considered to bear. A division of 
destroyers in close formation was considered to be a single firing unit or a single 
target; the center of the division was the point of aim, and all ranges and bearings 
were to be measured from or to that. The course of the division was assumed to be 
that of the Guide. (Page f-1.) 
Values in the Fire Effect Tables were computed for “normal” conditions of gun-
fire. Values were increased or decreased as conditions differed from “normal” by 
multipliers, M, more or less than unity, in accordance with certain rules. The Fire 
Effect of a ship or unit on a target equaled the Fire Effect of one of its guns, times 
the number of guns firing at a given target, times the multiplier from the Fire Ef-
fect Tables. The number of ships’ guns firing at the target was the number that the 
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commander wished to fire, without regard to any damage that may have been re-
ceived. Above Water Damage would reduce M one-tenth for every 10 percent of 
ship life lost. There were also ranges for Radar Spot and Top Spot. These could be 
reduced by the Director, but in general a twelve-inch, fourteen-inch, or sixteen-inch 
gun had a Radar-Spot range of thirty-five thousand yards and a Top-Spot range of 
twenty-six thousand. Eight-inch, six-inch, and five-inch guns had Radar-Spot and 
Top-Spot ranges equal to their maximums. A Plane Spot could be used when defi-
nite assignment of a spotting plane had been made and the plane was in the air. Top 
Spot could be used in all ships except submarines; when more than four ships were 
concentrating fire on a target, all types of spotting were considered effective. When 
neither Radar, Top, nor Plane Spots were considered effective, M was reduced by 
five-tenths. During the move in which fire was opened, M was also reduced five-
tenths; when fire was shifted to a new target, M was reduced three-tenths for that 
move, unless the new target was within 1,500 yards of the old one. (Page f-2.) 
These reductions continued in other contexts. For example, guns firing in Lo-
cal Control had their Ms reduced by one-tenth; M was increased by one-tenth for 
ships not under fire. Multipliers of ships undergoing air attack were reduced by an 
amount, in tenths, decided by the Director at the time. Moreover, the shock effect 
of a torpedo, mine, or bomb hit reduced M five-tenths for the three-minute move 
during which the hit was received. When a target ship undertook evasive maneu-
vers, the multipliers of the ships firing at the moving target and of the target ship 
itself were reduced by five-tenths if the Director decided that the evasive maneuver 
was effective. Similarly, when a target or a firing ship changed course and speed, 
or both, during a move to a degree that affected the gunfire of both, the Director 
decided the amount of reduction for the Ms. Pitch, roll, yaw, and spray could also 
collectively reduce the M of a ship—one-tenth in a moderate sea, two-tenths in a 
rough sea, and four-tenths in a heavy sea. (Page f-3.)
Visibility was taken into account but impacted M only when Radar Director 
Control or Radar Spot were not employed. In these cases, M was to be reduced 
one-tenth if gun or funnel gases drifted across the line of fire. When the target was 
obscured by a smoke screen, M was reduced by a number of tenths proportional to 
the time the target was obscured—unless indirect fire was used, in which case M 
was reduced by three-tenths. For two hours after sunrise and before sunset, glare 
reduced M by two-tenths when the sky was clear and the target bore within fifteen 
degrees of the sun. At night, M was reduced—by one-tenth when Radar Director 
Control was used and target illumination was effective, by two-tenths with Radar 
Director Control but no effective illumination. Without Radar Director Control at 
night but effective illumination, a three-tenths reduction was imposed for ranges 
up to five thousand yards, four-tenths over five thousand. (Pages f-3 to f-4.) 
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Vessels other than the target received “enfilade” 
damage if within a thousand yards of the target and 
a hundred yards of the line of fire. The amount of 
damage received by the enfiladed vessel was half 
that inflicted on the target. The total damage done 
to a division of destroyers under enfilade fire was 
twice the normal damage to the target. In addition, 
the fire of a ship was masked if it attempted to fire 
within a hundred yards over or past a ship that was 
a thousand yards or less from it. M in this case was 
reduced by a number of tenths proportional to the 
period masked in a three-minute move. At night 
at close range, or during a day or night melee, the 
M of firing ships might be further reduced as the 
Director chose. 
The Fire Effect of naval guns against shore tar-
gets was determined by the Director in each case; 
the Fire Effect of a single shore-battery gun against 
a ship was that given in the Radar Spot column of 
the Fire Effect Tables for the gun type nearest to that 
fired and the type of ship fired on. A summary of 
the losses to equipment, firepower, and speed due 
to damage was printed on Ship Damage Reports 
during a Board Maneuver. Finally, at the discre-
tion of the Director, a “Chance Factor” could be 
imposed on all the above to determine damage. 
A restricted publication, “Memorandum on the 
Application of the Chance Factor to the Scoring 
of Gunfire Damage on the Maneuver Board,” was 
used for this purpose. (Pages f-4 to f-5.)
Section G: Torpedo-Fire Rules
The types of torpedoes and their characteristics 
were given in confidential publications issued 
separately. Rules included the inability to train 
submerged tubes in azimuth. Tubes mounted on a 
surface ship’s deck near the side could be brought to bear within thirty degrees 
of the fore-and-aft line, while centerline tubes could be aimed within forty-five 
degrees. Every torpedo, except those carried by aircraft, could be fired at an angle 
up to ninety degrees from the direction of the tube. A vessel with deck tubes and 
spare torpedoes could reload in smooth seas in fifteen minutes, thirty minutes in 
Fig. 34
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moderate seas, in rough seas not at all. A submarine could fire all its loaded tubes 
in a three-minute move; in any of a submarine’s torpedo rooms two tubes could 
be reloaded in six minutes and four tubes in nine. Before a torpedo could be fired 
from a submerged submarine, however, the periscope had to be exposed for at least 
ten seconds, unless the torpedo was being fired by sound. Torpedo fire itself was 
to be indicated by filling out a Torpedo Fire Form and handing it to the Torpedo 
Umpire. (Page g-1.)
Single vessels could fire on their own initiative during a three-minute move, 
handing in the Torpedo Fire Form after the move had been made but before the 
next was called for. Otherwise, the form had to be handed in before the firing move 
was made on the board and could not specify torpedo fire earlier than the end of 
the first minute of movement on the Board subsequent to submission of the form. 
Such fire was to be considered complete at the Maneuver Time designated on the 
form—provided it conformed to the above restriction—unless the Torpedo Um-
pire was informed to the contrary immediately after this time was reached. If fire 
was held, it could be completed at any subsequent Maneuver Time by so informing 
the Torpedo Umpire. If firing settings were to be modified, a modified form was to 
be handed in. Data for torpedo fire were obtained by Student Commanders from 
their tactical plots; the Director, however, could furnish bearings and ranges that 
would be available under actual conditions. (Pages g-1 to g-2.)
A vessel receiving 50 percent or more Above Water Damage lost half of its deck 
torpedo tubes on each side. A vessel receiving 70 percent or more Above Water 
Damage lost all of its deck tubes. The tracks of a torpedo salvo fired from a division 
in formation were plotted from the center of the division, except that at ranges be-
low five thousand yards the division commander might elect to have the torpedoes 
plotted from individual firing ships. Of the total number of torpedoes fired from a 
vessel or dropped from aircraft not themselves under Effective Fire, 90 percent—to 
the nearest whole number—were considered to run hot, straight, and normal. If 
the firing ship or dropping aircraft was under Effective Fire, only 70 percent to 
the nearest whole number ran hot, straight, and normal. In any torpedo salvo, one 
torpedo was plotted on the right limit of the spread, one on the left limit, and the 
remainder equally spaced between them. When the launching or the track of a tor-
pedo could be seen from the target, the Director was to inform the Student Com-
mander concerned, who was then permitted to take action, modifying a previous 
move if necessary. (Page g-2.)
From the plots of the tracks and positions of the torpedoes and of such ships as 
might be in “torpedo water” and whose drafts exposed them to danger, the Direc-
tor would determine the number and distribution of hits. He based his decision on 
the type of torpedo, the type of target ship, the shape of the formation, and maneu-
vers taken to avoid. The effects of successive torpedo hits within fifteen minutes of 
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preceding hits were to be increased—by one-third for the first additional hit and 
two-thirds for any succeeding ones. A torpedo hit might cause a number of types 
of temporary or permanent casualties, as judged by the Director: one or all engines 
out of commission, one or all propellers destroyed, the rudder jammed, or a list 
preventing gunfire or the launching or recovery of planes. The Director could also, 
as in the case of gunfire, employ the Chance Factor. (Page g-3.)
Section H: Mine and Depth-Charge Rules
Mines were classified according to their method of use, either moored, drifting, 
or ground. They were also classified according to their method of firing: contact, 
influence (acoustic or magnetic), antenna, or controlled. Moored mines could be 
either contact, influence, antenna, or controlled. In addition, moored mines could 
be laid by surface ships or submarines in any depth of water up to 250 fathoms and 
could be set to watch at any desired depth. A Student Commander who directed 
ships or planes to carry mines could select the type of mine for each ship or plane 
but had to inform the Director before the beginning of the maneuver. This rule also 
applied to dummy mines. In a current, the submergence depth of moored mines 
was to be increased 5 percent of the length of the mine’s anchor cable times the 
strength of the current in knots. With a current faster than four knots or in rough 
seas, moored mines might drag, in which case they became inoperative. Whether 
all or part of a moored mine dragged and whether or not it was inoperative was de-
termined by the Director. For drifting mines, a suspended antenna was thirty feet 
long unless otherwise stated. Successive actuations of influence mines were limited 
to ten feet; the degree of protection against this type of mine was determined by the 
Director. Moored antenna mines, unless otherwise stated by the student, had upper 
antenna wires of ten feet shorter than the intended low water depth of the mine, 
not to exceed seventy feet. The downward antenna section of the anchor line was a 
hundred feet long. (Pages h-1 to h-2.)
Mines could become inoperative in various ways. Moored mines could go 
adrift, and drifting mines themselves became inoperative one hour after being laid 
unless otherwise stated. Influence mines became inoperative after an interval stat-
ed by the Student Commander on the Mine Laying Form. Five percent of contact 
mines, 10 percent of antenna mines, and 15 percent of influence mines would be 
initially defective; 10 percent of both antenna and influence mines would experi-
ence premature explosions; and 2, 5, and 10 percent of contact, antenna, and influ-
ence mines, respectively, would experience subsequent defects, per month. Mines 
laid by surface ships had to be laid at intervals of three seconds or more, but they 
could be laid at any speed up to thirty knots. Submarines could lay mines through 
their torpedo tubes either surfaced or submerged, but at intervals not less than one 
minute between mines carried at the same end of the boat and in different tubes. 
Submarines were not allowed to lay mines from forward tubes at speeds faster than 
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four knots, and they had to have at least forty feet of water under their keels when 
laying mines. They could carry only two mines per tube; reloading of tubes re-
quired three minutes. (Page h-2.)
In a Chart or Board Maneuver, for each mine operation a Student Commander 
handling the minelaying ships or aircraft was to deliver to the Director a filled-out 
Mine Laying Form. The Student Commander would submit a plan of his antici-
pated minefield; this Mine Plan could be drawn on a maneuvering board or on a 
flimsy made from a plot on a large-scale chart, in either case showing the naviga-
tional reference point to which the minefield was fixed. In addition, during the 
time that mines were intended to be effective, the Student Commander was to show 
his minefield on his Strategic Plotting Chart and on all flimsies of ship movements. 
In a Board Maneuver, the Student Commander laying mines was to indicate those 
mines on the Move and Gunfire Form for the ships concerned. Paravanes were 
assumed to be carried by all ships of more than three thousand tons. For a ship 
proceeding on a straight course, paravanes were considered to afford “complete” 
protection against moored contact mines, unless the ship struck the mine head-on. 
Paravanes, however, gave no protection against any other type of mine. Contact of 
a paravane with a mine antenna would destroy the paravane, whatever damage it 
might itself do. (Pages h-2 to h-3.)
If a ship entered a mined area, the Director had its track plotted on the minefield 
diagram and determined the number of mines, if any, that had detonated. Whether 
a ship was damaged by mines depended on the ship’s underwater structure (specifi-
cally, the draft of the ship or the depth of a submerged submarine). Damage could 
also be determined by the water levels at or through which the mines were set to 
watch and by the vertical length of the antenna wire, if the mine had any. Damage 
or absence thereof was affected also by whether or not the paravanes were streamed 
and whether the ship was on a straight or changing course. In the latter situation, 
the length of the ship and whether or not it had been degaussed (its magnetic field 
compensated for) could influence how much damage was done. A mine explosion 
did the same damage as a torpedo explosion. It was assumed, however, that a deto-
nating mine could not damage more than one ship. A mine inflicted Under Water 
Damage equal to three fourteen-inch penetrative hits, and second and third hits in 
the same field each equated to four fourteen-inch penetrative hits, in the case of 
ground mines and at the discretion of the Director. Its permanent effect on the life 
and capabilities of the ship was added to damage from other causes. 
Relatedly, a Student Commander initiating a depth-charge attack on a subma-
rine had to inform the Director of the number of surface ships or aircraft in the 
attack group and of the general plan of attack itself. The results of a depth-charge 
attack against a submarine would be decided by the Director. (Pages h-3 to h-4.)
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Section I: Aviation Rules 
Replacement airplanes delivered to combatant units were in “combat condition” 
and with crews. Landings and takeoffs at night from either airfields or ships en-
tailed using navigation lights that were visible for five miles on a clear, dark night. 
Land planes setting down on the water, seaplanes landing on land, and airplanes of 
any kind shot down by antiaircraft fire or in aerial combat were considered to have 
been totally destroyed. A Student Commander operating carrier-based planes was 
to be prepared at all times to inform the Director as to the location of his planes 
on the carrier and the readiness of both the airplanes and the flight deck. At the 
beginning of flight operations for each (game time) day of the maneuver, the Stu-
dent Commander furnished the Director a memorandum indicating the types and 
numbers of bombs, rockets, and torpedoes loaded on each plane and thereafter any 
changes that were made. (Page i-1.)
Elevators on aircraft carriers could carry in one trip the number of airplanes 
indicated in figure 35. An elevator’s round trip took one minute and any carrier 
could keep on its hangar deck half the aircraft of each type in its allowance. Half 
the allowance of each type could be “free launched” (i.e., without catapults) without 
moving airplanes between the hangar and flight decks. In an escort carrier (CVE), 
once half the allowance had been recovered, no more could land until planes had 
been struck below; in all other types of carriers, the total allowance of assigned 
operating aircraft could be landed without such delay. If the Student Commander 
chose to deckspot more than half the number of any one type of airplane, he wrote 
out for the Director the number of each type of airplane involved, the armament 
loading contemplated, and the amount of wind over the deck while launching. To 
free-launch planes from the flight deck, the apparent wind (as measured over the 
deck of a moving ship) was to be within ten degrees of the ship’s course and the 
wind over the deck not less than thirty knots for battle carriers, fleet carriers (CVs), 
or light carriers (CVLs) and not less than twenty knots for CVEs. To land planes, 
the apparent wind had to be within five degrees of 
the ship’s course and the wind over the deck not 
less than twenty-seven knots for battle, fleet, and 
light carriers, or twenty knots for escort carriers. 
(Pages i-1 to i-2.)
When the carrier’s course was more than twenty degrees off the true wind, five 
minutes were required to turn into the wind and begin landing or launching air-
craft. No change of course, however, was necessary to launch planes from flight-
deck catapults, provided the apparent wind was forward of the beam. The number 
of planes that could be launched from a carrier while it was landing airplanes was to 
be decided by the Director in each case. During daylight and in smooth or moder-
ate seas, airplanes could be free-launched at intervals of fifteen seconds and landed 
Fig. 35
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every thirty seconds. At night and during daylight 
in rough seas, these intervals were doubled. In ad-
dition, land planes could be launched from flight-
deck catapults at the rate of one plane per catapult 
per minute. Unscheduled launchings could start in 
accordance with a series of aircraft and flight deck 
conditions of readiness: in Condition Ten, aircraft could be launched as soon as 
wind conditions were satisfactory; in Condition Eleven, launches could take place 
in ten minutes; Condition Twelve meant twenty 
minutes, and Condition Thirteen meant thirty 
minutes. To change from one readiness condition 
to another required meeting the conditions noted 
in figure 36. A carrier could no longer launch or 
land planes if it had received 50 percent Above 
Water Damage or its after flight deck had been de-
stroyed. (Pages i-2 to i-3.)
Seaplanes could be launched by catapult from cruisers, other surface ships, and 
submarines if there was at least five knots of apparent wind down the catapult. 
A catapult could launch a seaplane every five minutes. However, it would take a 
submarine five minutes after surfacing to float a 
seaplane off its deck and another five to recover it. 
A ship stopped to hoist a seaplane out of the water 
could do so with each crane every five minutes if 
the wind was not above three knots. A ship could 
hoist a seaplane out of the water on the lee side 
every five minutes no matter the wind condition; 
a battleship or cruiser could recover seaplanes ac-
cording to figure 37. A battleship or cruiser could 
not launch or recover aircraft after receiving 50 
percent Above Water Damage. (Pages i-3 to i-4.)
The time required for refueling shore- and tender-based airplanes at a stan-
dard land-plane/seaplane base or larger air base is indicated in figure 38. When 
it came to rearming these planes, machine-gun ammunition, torpedoes, bombs, 
mines, and eleven-inch and five-inch rockets could be replaced in the same time 
required for refueling. Groups of land planes could be rearmed with the first hun-
dred bombs in the time required for refueling, but each additional hundred bombs 
or any increment of a hundred required an additional forty minutes. Seaplanes on 
parking aprons required the same time to rearm as did land planes; each seaplane 
at a mooring could be rearmed with the equivalent of four five-hundred-pound 
bombs in the refueling time. Each additional sixteen five-hundred-pound bombs, 
Fig. 36
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their equivalent, or any increment thereof would 
require an additional forty minutes. Each seaplane 
could also be rearmed by a seaplane tender (AV/
AVP) with four five-hundred-pound bombs during 
the time required for refueling, but each additional 
four five-hundred-pound bombs, their equivalent, 
or any increment thereof would take an additional 
twenty minutes for each plane. (Pages i-4 to i-5.) 
Battleships, cruisers, and submarines required 
thirty minutes to refuel and rearm one or more sea-
planes after hoisting them aboard. At night and in 
rough seas, this time was increased by 25 percent. 
Carrier planes could be landed, refueled, rearmed, 
and launched again within various times under 
various conditions outlined in figure 39. One hour 
was required on a carrier to rig and install smoke-filled bombs on an airplane and 
two hours were required to fill the smoke tanks themselves. (Pages i-5 to i-6.)
Airplane losses due to noncombat operational casualties could be assigned to 
any flight as the Director deemed appropriate. These losses, like those impacting 
other aspects of the maneuver, could become “excessive” if fleet doctrine concern-
ing upkeep and personnel rest was disregarded. Airplanes that expended more than 
80 percent of their fuel, for instance, would crash if the Director so determined. The 
rules also extended to speed and navigation. Time of flight was taken to the nearest 
five minutes, ground speed used in plotting aircraft flights to the nearest five knots. 
Ground speed, moreover, was to be obtained by subtracting the full wind velocity 
from the airspeed of the aircraft when the true wind was against the base course 
of the aircraft. Ground speed was obtained by adding the full wind velocity to the 
airspeed of the aircraft when the wind was with the base course of the aircraft; for 
plotting purposes, aircraft would be considered to make good their steered courses; 
lateral drift was disregarded. (Page i-6.)
When photographic missions were planned, Flight Forms indicated precise 
information desired. All aircraft had gun cameras that might be used for dam-
age evaluation; handheld cameras were available for each observation plane and 
each patrol plane. Patrol planes were equipped with radarscope cameras. Quick 
prints could be made from a limited number of selected exposures from all of this 
equipment within one hour after return to the base or carrier. Three hours, how-
ever, were required to make prints other than quick prints. Information obtained 
from photographs was to be furnished to the Student Commander by the Director. 
(Pages i-6 to i-7.)
Fig. 39
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Airships could enter or leave hangars when the wind was Force 4 or less, or in 
Force 5 or more provided that the wind was within forty-five degrees of longitudi-
nal axis of the hangar. The airship could moor to a mast in wind from any direction 
and could land in wind up to Force 4. Airships could be reserviced in two to six 
hours, depending on the duration of the previous flight. Finally, aircraft losses due 
to aerial combat and antiaircraft gunnery, along with percentage of damage done 
by bomb or rocket hits, were recorded in separate confidential pamphlets. (Page 
i-7.)
The rules detailed above illustrate the parameters in which staff and students were 
to conduct the war games. Bear these rules and parameters in mind as exercises and 
Operations Problems are recounted in the following chapters, since the Maneuver 
Rules set the context in which the students encountered the hypothetical enemies 
placed before them.*
* For an even more extensive examination of Naval War College war-game Maneuver Rules of the period, see 
Hal M. Friedman, Blue versus Orange: The U.S. Naval War College, Japan, and the Old Enemy in the Pacific, 
1945–1946 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2013), chaps. 2–5, 11. 

IV Search Exercises, Chart Maneuvers, and Relative 
Movement Exercises, July 1946
In early July 1946, the junior and senior classes of June 1947 began preparations for a Search Exercise—including the demonstration of a Chart Maneuver—that was to take place the following month. As recounted by Rear Admiral Smith in 
an instruction dated the 2nd, the purpose of the exercise was to acquaint students 
with the principles, forms, and standard methods of naval search. In addition, the 
exercise was to provide instruction in the mechanics of a Chart Maneuver and fa-
miliarize student officers with the publications and materials used. These publica-
tions included the Naval War College Maneuver Rules (summarized in the previ-
ous chapters) and such manuals as Aerial Search for Surface Targets, Fast Carrier 
Task Force Instructions, The Scouting Manual, and the U.S. Navy Combat Airplane 
Characteristics and Performance Data Sheets. Materials included Strategic Plotting 
Charts 7 and 8, drawing instruments, tracing paper for flimsies, and such standard 
forms as the Aircraft Flight Form, Fuel Account and Fuel Work Sheets, Message 
Form, and the Record of Move. The exercise itself was to take place between 2 and 
7 August 1946. 
On 2 August, students would draw the Statement of Exercise, study the state-
ment and the above publications, and assemble in the auditorium to commence the 
exercise. Move 1 and part of 2 would occupy 3–5 August; the remainder of Move 
2 and all of Moves 3 and 4 would take place on 6 August. Students would turn in 
flimsies, Flight Forms, Fuel Account and Fuel Work Sheets, Message Forms, and 
Records of Moves to the Master Plot as in a regular maneuver. On completion, they 
would draw the Staff Solutions and assemble in the auditorium for a discussion. 
Students worked in assigned rooms, sending forms to the Master Plot by pneu-
matic tube or messenger and receiving special announcements or instructions over 
the general announcing system. Members of the staff would visit student officers’ 
rooms during the exercise to answer individual questions; forms and paper for 
flimsies were found in racks outside the Maneuver Room in Pringle Hall, as well as 
in racks in the corridors of Pringle and Luce Halls.1 
Students unfamiliar with chart work were given plotting instructions. The nau-
tical mile was taken to be six thousand feet, two thousand yards, or one minute of 
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latitude (measured at the mid-latitude of a track). Courses were to be plotted in de-
grees, measured clockwise from 000 degrees at the north, and wind was described 
by the direction from which it was blowing.2
Statement of the Exercise: The Blue Situation
In the exercise, Blue, or the United States, was in a tense relationship vis-à-vis a 
coalition of western Pacific powers collectively known as Black. War appeared im-
minent, and Blue assessed that if Black decided to open hostilities, a sneak attack 
on the Panama Canal might be made to destroy canal installations and deny its use 
to Blue. Intelligence reports indicated that Black might have fitted out four or five 
merchant ships of about eighteen knots maximum speed as heavily armed auxilia-
ry cruisers, “well disguised” with “outwardly innocent” merchant-ship silhouettes. 
It was also reported that these ships carried six small but “highly efficient” float-
planes, capable of delivering attacks with weapons of a “new and highly destruc-
tive” type. These ships, last reported in western Pacific bases, had not been located 
for the last two weeks. 
Black naval forces were “generally concentrated” in the western Pacific and 
Blue fleet dispositions were such that any major Black move to the east could be 
detected early. In view of the threat to the Panama Canal, Blue Naval Air Sta-
tion Seymour Island, in the Galapagos Islands, had been activated. Fleet Air Wing 
(FAIRWING) 20 was to be established there; two patrol squadrons, VP-14 and 
VP-15, each consisting of fifteen PBM-5 Mariner naval patrol bombers, were cur-
rently present for duty. In addition, Blue Task Group (TG) 18.1 was off the coast 
of Baja California en route to the Gulf of Panama to provide additional protection 
for the canal. This task group consisted of Carrier Division (CARDIV) 3, with two 
fleet carriers under Rear Admiral BC; Cruiser Division (CRUDIV) 11, four light 
cruisers (CLs) under Rear Admiral BD; and Destroyer Squadron (DESRON) 19, 
eight destroyers under Captain BJ. The entire task group was commanded by Ad-
miral BC as Commander, Task Group (CTG) 18.1, and was in a standard cruising 
disposition on course 125 degrees at a speed of fifteen knots. By 1800 on 15 July, 
Cruiser Division 11 and Destroyer Squadron 19 had just completed refueling from 
a tanker, and Task Group 18.1 was at latitude 19°25ʹ N, longitude 107°07ʹ W.3 
Move 1 covered from 0500 on 15 July to 0600 on 16 July. The sea was smooth, 
meteorological visibility was fifteen miles, and the wind was Force 2, from 150. 
Cloud cover was 50 percent and broken, while sunrise was assumed to take place 
at 0600 and sunset at 1800 for all moves. Late in the afternoon of 14 July, Captain 
BK, Commander, FAIRWING (COMFAIRWING) 20 at Seymour Island, received 
instructions from his immediate superior to search for possible Black raiders ap-
proaching the Panama Canal. He was to assume that the maximum speed of the 
raiders was eighteen knots and establish a barrier patrol on the ninetieth meridian 
West from an initial point at latitude 00°00ʹ, longitude 90°00ʹ W to a northern 
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limit of latitude 11°00ʹ N, in order to detect passage of ships from the west. This 
patrol was to be conducted by single-plane flights and a 60 percent probability of 
detection was assumed. This patrol was to commence at 0600 on 15 July. There was 
also to be a daily eight-plane parallel sweep, with the southernmost plane’s track 
between Point A (5°00ʹ S, 90°00ʹ W) and Point B (07°00ʹ S, 83°00ʹ W), with a 62.5 
percent probability of detection. Search planes were to pass through their initial 
points at 0800 daily. At 1445 on 15 July, Barrier Naval Patrol Plane 14-P-1 sighted 
a suspicious merchant ship similar in appearance to the suspected Black raiders. 
Sighting the plane, the ship turned west at a high speed of about eighteen knots. As 
this move ended, students filled out the Plots and Flight Forms for the barrier patrol 
and parallel-sweep searches, approximated the position of the Black raider when 
sighted, and plotted the track of TG 18.1 commencing at 1800 on 15 July. They used 
plus-six time, maintained the Fuel Account and Fuel Work Sheets for light cruis-
er CL-81 throughout 
the exercise and were 
mindful of the Fuel 
Expenditure Table for 
that class of ship.4
In Move 2, from 0600 on 16 July to 0600 on 17 July, weather conditions remained 
the same, except for intermittent rain squalls to the northwest of the Galapagos. A 
special search was sent out from Seymour Island at 0600 to regain and develop the 
contact of 15 July. At about 1600, Naval Patrol Plane 14-P-7 sighted a merchant ves-
sel disappearing to the westward into a heavy rain squall at 5°15ʹ N, 95°55ʹ W. At 
2100, Rear Admiral BD, Commander, CRUDIV 11, ordered his ships to have boiler 
power available for thirty knots. He informed them that at 2200 on 16 July the divi-
sion would form a scouting line and conduct a search for the suspicious vessel using 
the Flank Sector Method. This scouting-line search assumed that the vessel was at 
5°20ʹ N, 97°45ʹ W at 2200 on 16 July on a westerly course and that it would not pass 
northward of a line connecting its 2200 position and Clipperton Island. This search 
was to commence at 1800 on 17 July, using assumed target speeds between fifteen 
and eighteen knots. Carrier Division 3 and DESRON 19 were to rendezvous with a 
tanker, refuel, and by 0600 on 18 July be in position at 10°00ʹ N, 106°00ʹ W to launch 
a dawn search. While the students were not to plot the movements of Carrier Divi-
sion 3 and Destroyer Squadron 19 before 0600 on 18 July, they were to track Cruiser 
Division 11, estimate the track of the Black raider, and record Move 1 for all forces. 
They were not required to plot the search flights from Seymour Island.5 
In Move 3, from 0600 on 17 July to 0600 on 18 July, the seas had become mod-
erate; the cloud cover was 40 percent, high, and scattered; and the wind was Force 
4 from 170. There were no new developments; students tracked the movements of 
Cruiser Division 11 and recorded Move 2 for Task Group 18.1. They used twenty- 
five knots as the speed for the scout on the western station; the scouts changed 
Fig. 40
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course every four hours to follow their search curves; they did not retire at night 
in reduced visibility. In Move 4, from 0600 18 July to 0600 on 19 July, the wind was 
Force 2 from 090, seas were smooth; clouds were 50 percent, high and broken; and 
Meteorological Visibility was twenty miles. At 0600, fleet carrier CV-12 launched a 
sector search covering the southwestern quadrant, twelve SB2C-5 Helldiver attack 
planes (VAs) in Scout Loading Condition. The radius of the search was four hun-
dred miles, between 130 degrees and 270 degrees true from the 0600 position of the 
carrier. After launching these planes, Carrier Division 3 and Destroyer Squadron 
19 steamed on course 250 degrees at fifteen knots until it was time to recover the 
planes. The movements of the carrier division during the launch and recovery could 
not be shown, due to the small scale of the plotting sheets, but students plotted the 
movements for each ship of Cruiser Division 11, Carrier Division 3 as a whole, and 
DESRON 19, as well the sector search for six of CV-12’s planes.6
In Move 4 Modification One, at 0805 Attack Plane 12-VA-1 reported two mer-
chant ships in company moving eastward at high speed at 6°30ʹ N, 109°50ʹ W. 
When the plane closed to investigate, the two ships reversed course to 260 degrees 
at about eighteen knots. At 0820, Attack Plane 12-VA-11 reported a single ship on 
a westerly course at about sixteen knots at 4°05ʹ N, 107°00ʹ W. Ten minutes later, 
Rear Admiral BC, Commander, Task Group 18.1, directed Rear Admiral BD to 
discontinue CRUDIV 11’s search and send one cruiser to close, investigate, and 
trail the contact made by 12-VA-11. Admiral BD himself, with the other cruisers, 
was to conduct a search with the Rear Direct Method for the two ships reported 
by 12-VA-1; these ships were to form a scouting line by 0400 on 19 July, scout to 
a distance of thirty-eight miles, or twice their maximum radar range, and main-
tain a scouting speed of twenty-four knots once the line was formed. Since his 
cruisers were radar equipped, BD was to form a scouting line at the point of the 
enemy’s assumed position at 0400. BD was also to assume that the enemy’s low-
est speed was sixteen knots and search accordingly on course 260. Admiral BD 
detailed light cruiser CL-83 to trail the contact made by Attack Plane 12-VA-11. 
The students tracked light cruisers CL-80, -81, and -82; turned in the Contact 
Report by Attack Planes 12-VA-1 and 12-VA-11 on Message Forms; and recorded 
Move 4 for Task Group 18.1.7
Staff Solution of Search Exercises 
In late July, a Staff Solution to the Search Exercise was issued, along with numerous 
sheets recording the moves noted above. The probability of detection was 60 percent; 
one plane cycle took 12.9 hours, and 3.4 cycles per day were required to cover the 
barrier continuously, which required that a plane start the patrol every seven hours. 
Since the Barrier Patrol was to detect the passage of ships from the west, the first leg 
was laid out from 00°00ʹ, 90°00ʹ W in a direction 8.6 degrees to the right of the nine-
tieth meridian and extending to the eleventh parallel of north latitude. The next leg of 
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the patrol was laid off 
to the west 55.2 miles 
along that latitude, and 
the following leg 8.6 
degrees to the east of 
south to the equator. 
From this point, the 
plane returned directly 
to its base.8
For the Parallel 
Sweep, with the prob-
ability of detection still 
62.5 percent, spacing 
was set at sixty miles. 
For the Flank Sector 
Method search, scouts 
headed directly for 
their starting points 
on the limiting en-
emy radius when the 
signal to form the 
Scouting Line was received. Cruiser Division 11 was to scout from left 
to right in the order CL-83, -81, -80, and -82. The sector search by car-
rier aircraft was to be carried out with twelve planes, each having a 7.5- 
degree sector to search. Plane 1 was to have the right-center sector, facing in the direc-
tion of the search, and Plane 7 the left-center sector; Planes 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 were to 
have the sectors in that order from the right of Plane 1, while Planes 8, 9, 10, 11, and 
12 were to have the sectors in that order from the left of Plane 7. Since the maximum 
chord of each search sector was greater than twice the visibility, each plane had to fly 
three legs. Planes 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 would have to fly a fourth leg to cover all of their 
assigned sectors.9 
Finally, for the Rear, Direct Method search, students were instructed to have 
the scouts head directly for their initial positions on the Scouting Line, which was 
a line normal to the assumed enemy course drawn through his assumed 0400 posi-
tion. The order of the Scouting Line from left to right was to be light cruisers CL-
81, -80, and -82, the distance between them thirty-eight miles, twice the maximum 
radar range of the ships.10
Exercise in Developing Task Force Dispositions 
Also late in July, the junior and senior classes of June 1947 were put through an ex-
ercise in “Developing Task Force Dispositions.” Admiral Smith again introduced 
Fig. 41
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the exercise, which took place between 26 and 31 July: a Statement of Exercise was 
issued on 26 July, which students were to study; an orientation in the auditorium 
of Pringle Hall was to take place on the same day; and a series of exercises was to 
take place over the subsequent days. Students also received lectures on the “Capa-
bilities and Limitations of Fleet AA [Antiaircraft] Defense” and “Guided Missiles,” 
and “Anti-Submarine Warfare” and viewed a training film, Battle of Empress Au-
gusta Bay. On the last day of the evolution, senior and junior students assembled 
separately for discussions of Student Solutions, which were to be turned in after 
the discussions.11
One of the objectives of the exercise was to familiarize students with various 
publications, including War Instructions, General Tactical Instructions, Current 
Tactical Orders and Doctrine, U.S. Fleet, and the tactical publications for ship and 
aircraft types. The exercise was also to familiarize students with the employment 
of the various types of ships and aircraft, especially in mutual support. Students 
drew diagrams of task force (TF) dispositions on maneuvering board sheets, using 
a circle spacing of a thousand yards and a scale that showed the entire disposition 
Fig. 44
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on one sheet. Diagrams showed the position of each surface ship or each unit of 
small ships in close formation, as well as the position and schedule of air patrols 
or air task units (TUs), fighter-direction ships, assignment of radar guards (includ-
ing radar pickets) and their sector assignments, and radar-intercept ships. It was 
assumed that battleships, cruisers, carriers, and fighter-direction ships were fitted 
with radar-intercept equipment.12
Exercise A, the Cruising Disposition, involved a balanced fleet organization of 
three fleet carriers and one light carrier, organized as Carrier Division 3, under 
Admiral BA. Rear Admiral BD commanded two battleships, Battleship Division 
(BATDIV) 9, while Rear Admiral BE commanded Cruiser Division 16, two battle 
cruisers. Cruiser Division 14, under Rear Admiral BF, was normally a unit of four 
light cruisers but in this case had only two ships. Rear Admiral BG commanded 
Cruiser Division 11, normally six light cruisers but in this case consisting of a single 
antiaircraft cruiser (CLAA). Destroyer Squadron 47, under Captain B-1, had nine 
destroyers, five of them under B-1 as Destroyer Division (DESDIV) 93 and the oth-
er four comprising DESDIV 94, under Captain B-2. DESRON 54, under Captain 
B-3, completed the organization; it had the five destroyers of DESDIV 107, under 
B-3, and another four under Captain B-4, Destroyer Division 108.13 
Aircraft included, first, fifty-seven F6F Hellcat fighter planes, twenty-four Hell-
divers, and twenty TBM-3 Avenger attack planes, organized into two fighter and 
two attack squadrons on fleet carrier CV-33. Fleet carrier CV-21 carried twenty-
five F8F Bearcat fighters, along with thirty-two Hellcat fighters, and twenty-four 
Helldivers and twenty Avengers, with a similar squadron organization. Fleet carrier 
CV-34, also with two fighter squadrons and two attack squadrons, carried forty-
nine F4U-1 Corsair fighters, along with four Hellcat night fighters and four Hellcat 
photoreconnaissance planes (which the other fleet carriers also carried), as well as 
twenty Helldivers and twenty Avengers. Light carrier CVL-27 carried twenty-two 
Bearcat fighters, two Hellcat photographic planes, and nine Avengers in one fighter 
squadron and one attack squadron. In addition, Battleship Division 9 carried an 
observation detachment of four SC-1 Seahawk observation planes; Cruiser Divi-
sions 16 and 14 each had similar detachments on board, and Cruiser Division 11 
had a detachment of the same type of plane but only two of them.14
The situation for Exercise A included a formation that was within range of en-
emy aircraft and in an area where enemy submarines might be operating. Weath-
er conditions included visibility variable out to ten miles, frequent rain squalls, a 
ceiling of five thousand feet, a temperature of 45 degrees Fahrenheit, and a wind 
from the southeast at Force 3. Sunrise was at 0745, sunset 1645. Enemy submarine 
torpedoes could travel at forty-five knots and had a range of five thousand yards. 
Students listed the assigned units in a tactical organization, showing the command 
relationship, and produced a diagram for a Day Cruising Disposition.15
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In Exercise B, the Approach Disposition, Carrier Division 8 under Admiral 
BA—again three fleet carriers and one light carrier—was accompanied by Battle-
ship Division 6 (three battleships under Rear Admiral BC) and Battleship Division 
9 (now two battleships under Rear Admiral BD). Rear Admiral BE commanded 
Cruiser Division 16 of two battle cruisers, Rear Admiral BF commanded the four 
light cruisers of Cruiser Division 14, and Captain B-5 commanded Destroy-
er Squadron 25, five of its destroyers in Destroyer Division 49, under him, and 
four more in DESDIV 50, under Captain B-6. DESRON 47 consisted of five ships 
from DESDIV 93 under Captain B-1 and four under Captain B-2 in DESDIV 94; 
DESRON 54 under Captain B-3 similarly comprised five ships directly under B-3 
in DESDIV 107 and four under Captain B-4 in DESDIV 108. Finally, eight destroy-
ers of DESRON 60 were commanded by Captain B-7, four of them directly under 
B-7 as Destroyer Division 119 and the other four under Captain B-8 as DESDIV 
120. Exercise B involved the same aircraft as Exercise A, plus a detachment of six 
observation planes for Battleship Division 6 and four more for Cruiser Division 
14. The situation entailed a major enemy force fifty miles distant forming an Ap-
proach Disposition, evidence that it was accepting a surface engagement. At this 
point, fleet carriers CV-21 and CV-34 and light carrier CVL-27 had been sunk. The 
enemy force consisted of six battleships similar in characteristic to the Indiana- and 
South Dakota–class fast battleships, four heavy cruisers similar to the Baltimore 
class, four light cruisers similar to the Cleveland class, and twenty-four destroyers 
similar to the Fletcher class. Enemy air strength had been neutralized except for an 
estimated eight fighter planes and eight attack planes. The enemy force was on a 
course of 230 degrees at twenty knots and bore 050. The nearest enemy base was 
five hundred miles away to the northeast; neither force had land-based air support 
available, nor were additional ship-based aircraft available to either. Weather con-
ditions, sunrise, and sunset were the same as in Exercise A. The students listed the 
assigned ships, showing command relationships, as in Exercise A, and produced a 
diagram for an Approach Disposition.16
Exercise C was a Battle Disposition. The fleet and aircraft organizations were 
the same as for the start of Exercise B, except that fleet carriers CV-21 and CV-34 
and light carrier CVL-27 had been sunk and Blue had no carrier aircraft left. 
Weather conditions were the same. By this time, the enemy force was deploying for 
battle. Both forces had high-speed torpedoes available with ranges of twenty-six 
thousand yards at fifty knots and 40,600 yards at forty knots. Enemy air strength by 
this time had been neutralized, but Blue still had observation planes on its battle-
ships and cruisers for spotting. Students drew a diagram of a Battle Disposition for 
the forces listed and a diagram for a “normal” action.17 
Exercise D entailed another Battle Disposition. By now, the fleet consisted of six 
light cruisers under Rear Admiral BF, as Cruiser Division 14, and twelve destroyers 
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of Destroyer Squadron 25, under Captain B-5 (five 
ships directly under him as DESDIV 49, four under 
Captain B-6 as DESDIV 50, and three under Cap-
tain B-7 as DESDIV 119). It was 2000; an enemy 
task group consisting of one fast battleship, four 
light cruisers, and eight destroyers had been sight-
ed at sunset, bearing north a hundred miles from 
Blue’s transport loading area. The enemy’s course 
was 180 degrees, its speed twenty-five knots. A 
land-based radar search plane was tracking the en-
emy force and reporting continuously to Admiral 
BF. Admiral BF’s mission was to protect the land-
ing of Blue troops and supplies. There was almost 
continuous light rain, visibility of zero to two thou-
sand yards, a ceiling of zero to five hundred feet, 
and a wind from the northeast with Forces 1 to 3. 
Sunrise was at 0700, and the sun had set at 1700. 
Students produced a diagram of a Blue formation 
for a surprise night light-force (i.e., light cruisers, 
destroyers, and destroyer escorts) torpedo attack 
on the enemy.18
Exercise E involved Blue Task Force 18, con-
sisting of Task Groups 18.1, 18.2, and 18.3. Each 
task group was similar in number and type to the 
ships and aircraft listed in Exercise A, and they oc-
cupied Stations 1, 2, and 3, respectively, in the Task 
Force Disposition. The task force was approach-
ing a group of enemy-held islands to conduct a 
daylong sustained strike operation to inflict maxi-
mum damage on shore installations and on any enemy aircraft present. Two of the 
islands had airstrips from which shore-based patrol planes might operate; enemy 
fighter, attack, and patrol aircraft were known to be based there. The number of 
these planes, however, had not been ascertained since photographic intelligence of 
the target area was “meager.” Two nights before, one of Blue’s night-search patrol 
planes had reported six ships in the harbor of the largest island and had received 
heavy antiaircraft fire from the ships and the shore installations. Air searches by 
Blue shore-based patrol planes during the last week had not located any enemy 
surface force near enough to threaten the proposed operation; these searches were 
being continued in “sufficient” scope to have detected any departure of enemy 
ships from the target area. A Blue submarine was also to operate on lifeguard 
Fig. 45
Ship and formation 
symbols
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N O T E S  1 Allan Smith, “Search Exercise: Including a Dem-
onstration of a Chart Maneuver,” 2 July 1946, pp. 
1–3, folder 2581, box 135, RG 4, NHC. Pringle and 
Luce Halls were and are connected at the second-
floor level by an enclosed walkway, visible in the 
photograph on the back cover of Hal M. Friedman, 
Digesting History: The U.S. Naval War College, the 
Lessons of World War Two, and Future Naval War-
fare, 1945–1947 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College 
Press, 2010).
 2 Smith, “Search Exercise,” p. 4. 
 3 Ibid., p. 5. At the Naval War College, Black typi-
cally meant Germany, but here it is obviously either 
a resurgent Japan or the Soviet Union, the latter 
often obliquely referred to in the United States in 
this period as “any other power.” For country color 
codes, see Michael Vlahos, Blue Sword: The Naval 
War College and the American Mission, 1919–1941 
(Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1980), p. 
163. For American perceptions of potential threats 
from Japan and the Soviet Union between 1945 
and 1947, see Hal Friedman, Creating an American 
Lake: United States Imperialism and Strategic 
Security in the Pacific Basin, 1945–1947 (Westport, 
Conn.: Greenwood, 2001), pp. 1–62.
 4 Smith, “Search Exercise,” p. 6. 
 5 Ibid., p. 7. 
 6 Ibid., p. 8. 
 7 Ibid., p. 9. 
 8 “Staff Solution of Search Exercises including a 
Demonstration of a Chart Maneuver,” 29 July 1946, 
p. 1, folder 2581-A, box 135, RG 4, NHC.
 9 Ibid., pp. 1–2.
 10 Ibid., p. 2. 
 11 “Exercise in Developing Task Force Dispositions: 
Schedule of Employment,” 26 July 1946, p. 1, folder 
2583, box 135, RG 4, NHC.
 12 Ibid., pp. 2–3. 
 13 Ibid., p. 3. 
 14 Ibid., pp. 3–4. 
 15 Ibid., p. 4. 
 16 Ibid., pp. 5–6. 
 17 Ibid., pp. 6–7. 
 18 Ibid., pp. 7–8. 
 19 Ibid., pp. 8–9. 
 20 Ibid., pp. 9–10. 
duty (i.e., pilot rescue) within a designated area in the immediate vicinity of the 
islands.19 
At the time of the first strike’s launch, the general target area was to be 150 
miles distant on a bearing of 015 true. The launching position for the first strike 
was to be reached by 0500. Task Group 18.3 had been assigned to strike one of 
the islands containing an airstrip with possible enemy aircraft present. The other 
two task groups had been assigned “suitable” targets, including ships in the harbor. 
Fast Carrier Task Force Special Picket Destroyers and Rescue Combat Air Patrol 
were to be provided by these two task groups. No Anti-Submarine Patrol was re-
quired but a TCAP—Top (high-altitude) Combat Air Patrol—was to be maintained 
throughout the day. The latter could be reduced in size as damage to the target area 
mounted. Times of launch and order and types of strikes by TG 18.3 corresponded 
with the general plan of the Task Force Commander. Weather called for twenty-
mile visibility and cloud coverage of five-tenths, with top clouds at seven thousand 
feet and the base at five thousand. The wind was from the southeast at Force 3, 
sunrise was at 0745, and sunset was at 1645. Students produced a diagram of the 
Task Force Disposition, including pickets, aircraft radio homing beacon approach 
sectors for returning aircraft, and the paths of outgoing and incoming strikes. The 
diagram was additionally to show the Air Plan of the Day for Task Group 18.3 and 
to indicate the location, altitude, and composition of all Combat Air Patrols (CAPs) 
employed by TG 18.3, except for TCAP.20


V Maneuver Rule Supplements, Naval Communica-
tions, and More Relative Movement, August 1946
On 10 August 1946, copies of “Board Maneuver Rules: Supplement to Ma-neuver Rules” were issued to the students. The first section, “Conduct of the Maneuver,” described the Supplement as offering a way to “speed up” 
the conduct of Tactical Board Maneuvers. The Maneuver Rules, however, were to 
remain the basis for the maneuver except as modified by the Director or as modi-
fied by the paragraphs that followed. Move Sheets (no longer “Forms”) were to be 
filled out by a member of the Student Commander’s staff according to the latter’s 
wishes; the staff member, or “Move Plotter,” was to be designated. Gunfire Sheets 
(also replacing “Forms”) were to be filled out and damage computed by a member 
of the Maneuver Staff, the “Damage Computer.”1
The primary purpose of the Move Sheet was to help the Move Plotter keep track 
of his commander’s ships on the Maneuver Board. The Move Sheet also served 
as a record of a ship’s movements. It was subject to review by the Move Umpire, 
who would also check to determine that ships were being maneuvered according 
to their capabilities. Upon conclusion of the maneuver, the completed Move Sheets 
were to be turned into the Historian for use in the History of the Maneuver. The 
Gunfire Sheet was intended as an aid to the Damage Computer in determining the 
gunfire damage inflicted by the ships of the command to which he was assigned. 
Prior to the end of a move during which his ships were firing, the Damage Com-
puter was to notify the Force Damage Recorder of the opposing forces—another 
member of the Maneuver Staff—of the amount of damage sustained by target ves-
sels during the move. The Force Damage Recorder was to keep track of the damage 
inflicted on vessels of his force for each move and the total damage inflicted on 
each ship for the maneuver. The Gunfire Sheets were subject to review by the Chief 
Damage Computer, who was to satisfy himself that the damage was being correctly 
computed and recorded. Upon conclusion of the maneuver, all Gunfire Sheets were 
turned over to the appropriate Force Damage Computer, who prepared a summary 
of the damage inflicted on his force. The Historian was then to receive the sheets. 
(Pages 1–2.) 
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Special Speed and Spotting Rules held that there was to be no reduction in a 
ship’s speed because of sea conditions except as specifically imposed by the Direc-
tor. All combatant vessels except destroyers could accelerate five knots during a 
three-minute move; destroyers could accelerate ten knots. The rate of deceleration 
was equal to that of acceleration. Vessels steaming singly could make the maximum 
speed that was given for the fleet or in the Statement of the Problem; vessels steam-
ing in formation kept a three-knot speed reserve for station keeping. Any reduction 
in speed because of damage sustained was specified in the Ship Damage Report. 
Only the tracks of Division Guides were plotted when ships were in line of bearing. 
The tracks of individual ships were to be plotted by Drafting Room personnel, as 
required by the Director, when “convenient,” so as not to interfere with the progress 
of the maneuver. (Pages 2–3.)
To compute Gunfire Damage, the tables in the Supplement would hereafter be 
used instead of the Fire Effect Tables. Reductions to multiplier M were prescribed by 
the Director in each instance and were in general based on those listed in Section 
F of the Maneuver Rules. The reduction of a ship’s Fire Effect as given in Rule F-5 
was assumed by the ship’s commander as soon as damage was ascertained. It was 
applied in damage computations for the move following that during which it was 
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reports. The Total Damage listed for the unit concerned at the time of damage 
computation governed; this also applied to the losses of ship’s equipment and speed 
incident to the damage sustained as tabulated in the Ship Damage Report. (Page 3.)
An example given for Gunfire Damage Computation had Blue’s fast battleship 
BB-58 opening fire on Purple battleship BB-1 during Move 1 with nine sixteen-inch 
guns at twenty-one thousand yards. No reductions are assigned by the Director, the 
speed of the ships is twenty knots, no changes of course or speed occur during the 
move, and the student is to compute the Total Damage at the end of Move 2. The 
total reduction to multiplier M for Move 1 is zero; the Normal Gunfire Damage in-
flicted during a three-minute move on a B-class target (a thirty-five-thousand-ton 
battleship) such as Purple BB-1 at twenty-one thousand yards is 10 percent. Since 
BB-1 is penetrated by sixteen-inch shells, the student enters the Chance Sinking 
Tables with 10 percent damage. Since the first unused letter is N, the ship is not 
sunk. Since Chance Damage might be more or less than 10 percent, the student 
is to enter the Chance Damage Tables with that argument. Here, the first unused 
number is a one, so the Chance Damage due to gunfire for Move 1 is 10 percent and 
is in addition to other Above 
Water Damage that might 
have been inflicted by bombs 
or rockets. 
In this example, the Di-
rector assigns a reduction to 
Blue fast battleship BB-58’s 
multiplier M of two-tenths, 
because of the ship’s change 
of course and speed during 
Fig. 48
Ship Damage Report 
Fig. 49
Table 2: Type B Target
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Move 2. The reduction to M for damage sustained on Purple battleship BB-1 is 
minus 1, and the total reduction to M for Move 2 is 0.3. By Move 2, the range has 
closed to twenty thousand yards and the Normal Gunfire Damage at this range was 
20 percent. The damage inflicted by BB-58 on its target is now 0.7 times 20 percent, 
or 14 percent. The Chance Sinking Tables help the student determine that BB-1 
is not sunk by this damage but sustained Chance Damage of 20 percent and Total 
Damage during Moves 1 and 2 equal to 30 percent. (Page 4.) 
The assessment of Torpedo Damage was, in many cases, made by the Director. 
When operations were rapid and complex—with damage accumulating on attack-
ing units—arbitrary assessments that promptly allocated definite damage could be 
made, and the concerned ships notified of such damage. It was thought that this 
procedure, by affording immediate results, was frequently preferable to attempting 
to figure out damage more accurately by the use of tables. Percentage of Hits Tables, 
however, for various conditions of torpedo fire were furnished for guidance and 
use when “practicable.”
Fig. 51
Table 11: Ammunition 
Expenditure
Fig. 50
30 Percent Life Destroyed 
Table
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The tables shown in figures 52 and 53 outline the conditions that were consid-
ered in making damage decisions and how percentages given could vary to fit the 
conditions. The tables also took into account the number of torpedoes fired that 
ran “hot, straight, and normal.” Concerning Table 12 of the Rules (figure 52), if the 
target group took effective evasive action, the student was to multiply by 0.5 (i.e., 
reduce the percentage of hits by half). Each ship in the target group was subject 
to the percentage of hits obtained from this table; the hits were distributed by the 
Director. Fractional hits were not to be assessed; instead, one vessel of the target 
group was given a percentage chance (equal to the percentage of a hit) of receiving 
one hit. Table 16 (figure 56, below) was used to determine whether or not a hit had 
been scored, by means of a single throw of two dice by the students. Table 13 (fig-
ure 53) applied to zigzagging targets; if a target was not zigzagging, a factor of 1.3 
(i.e., increasing the percentage of hits) was applied. If the target ship maneuvered 
“radically” immediately after torpedoes were fired, the student was to multiply by 
0.7 (i.e., in favor of the target); if the target ship was in a formation of three or more 
vessels, the student was to multiply by 1.2, the result not to exceed 100 percent. If a 
destroyer or destroyer escort was in position to start “depth bombing” one minute 
Fig. 53
Table 13: Torpedo Fire: 
Percentage of Hits—Firing 
Unit, Submarines 
Fig. 52
Table 12: Torpedo Fire—
Percentage of Hits from 
Destroyers and Cruisers
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or more before a submarine fired a smoke bomb, the student was to multiply by 
zero—that is, there would be no hits. (Pages 16–18.)
To obtain target damage inflicted per torpedo hit, the hits determined from 
the preceding tables were to be multiplied by the percentages contained in Table 
14 (figure 54). This was Under Water Damage, and it affected the ship’s speed im-
mediately. (Page 19.)
Whenever mines were laid, a report was made immediately to the Director, giv-
ing the location, direction, and number of lines, the distance between lines, and 
the depth of and spacing between mines. Damage caused by a mine hit was to be 
half that caused by a torpedo. In the case of mines laid in rows encountered by a 
formation in column, a single throw of two dice would determine whether or not 
one of the ships struck a mine. In the case of mines laid in rows and a formation in 
column open order, line of bearing, or a compound formation, the number of hits 
depended on the type of formation, its course, and the direction of the minefield. 
In this case, the decision as to the number of mine hits and the ships hit belonged to 
the Director. Distribution of mines laid by aircraft was also taken into account. For 
“practical” purposes, these patterns were considered random, and the percentage 
chance of an individual ship actuating one of the mines when passing through the 
field was obtained from the formula 
Percentage Chance = (M × T)/W,
in which M is the number of mines laid, T is the ship’s beam, and W is the width 
of the minefield. For example, if thirty mines were laid in a field six thousand feet 
wide, a vessel sixty feet in beam had a Percentage Chance of actuating one mine 
equal to (30 × 60)/6000 = 0.3 and so would incur 30 percent damage. (Pages 20–21.)
Fig. 54
Table 14: Damage Inflicted 
by Each Torpedo Hit, All 
Classes
Fig. 55
Table 15: Mine Hit on 
Single Vessel in Column
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The probability of an event was expressed in terms of percentage. Table 16 (fig-
ure 56) gives these percentages and corresponding numbers resulting from a single 
throw of two dice. Thus, if the Percentage Chance of a vessel striking a mine while 
traversing a minefield is 30 percent and a six or seven resulted from the throw of 
the dice, the ship is considered to have struck the mine. Increments of 5 percent 
were accounted for by adding three to the numbers corresponding to the 10 per-
cent divisions. Therefore, if the Percentage Chance of a ship striking a mine is 35 
percent and either a three, six, or seven results from the throw of the dice, the vessel 
is considered to have struck a mine. Tables 16 was also used in any other situation 
to determine whether or not an event took place when the chance of its occurring 
was known. (Page 21.)
Additionally, Target Ship Classes were designated (see figure 57). For this pur-
pose, combatant and auxiliary ships of the U.S. fleet were divided into ten groups 
of ships according to tonnage, armament, and ability to resist damage. For “conve-
nience,” alphabetical designations were given to each class, from A to L but omit-
ting I. (Appendix A, pages 1–2.)
The scoring procedure by which chance factors were applied to Gunfire or Tor-
pedo Damage was the subject of a special memorandum. If the ship was receiving 
penetrative hits, the student entered the Chance Sinking Tables and took the first 
letter encountered. If that letter was S, the ship was counted as sunk and removed 
from the board; students 
thereafter took letters in or-
der across the page, marking 
out each as it was used. If the 
ship was not being penetrat-
ed, the student was to use the 
Chance Damage Tables with 
the percentage of life lost 
Fig. 56
Table 16: Percentage 
Chance versus Numbers 
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during the move (unless the damage was equal to or less than 5 percent), again tak-
ing the first unused entry, this time a number, as the Chance Damage for the move. 
This was added to the damage that had been accumulated in previous moves in 
order to produce the total. (Appendix B, page 1.)
As an example, a battleship of thirty-five thousand tons, a “type B” target, is 
under fire from nine sixteen-inch guns for three minutes at a range of twenty-two 
thousand yards. No reductions to multiplier M are effective. The student needs to 
work out whether the ship is sunk or, if not, what the Chance Damage is. Table 2 
of the Normal Gunfire Damage Tables shows that the proportion of life lost is 10 
percent. Sixteen-inch shells are penetrative at this range, so the student must enter 
the Chance Damage Table covering 10 percent of the ship’s life lost. Since the first 
unused letter in the table is N, the ship is not sunk. The first unused number was 1; 
therefore Chance Damage is 10 percent Above Water Damage for the three-minute 
move. This was the reduction in firepower in tenths (in this case, one-tenth) for the 
move. Taking the numbers in order across the page, the student marks out each as 
it is used. Students also kept a cumulative record of Chance Damage for scoring 
the future Fire Effect of the ship in case of Above Water Damage. This method was 
also used for determining speed reduction in the case of Under Water Damage. 
(Appendix B, page 2.) 
Torpedo or Mine Damage was considered Under Water Damage. If the ship 
could be penetrated by torpedoes (Target Classes F to L, i.e., heavy cruisers to de-
stroyers) such that magazines or gasoline storage tanks could explode and cause 
the loss of the ship, students entered the Chance Sinking Table with the percentage 
of target life lost, derived from a table. If the first unused letter was S, the ship was 
sunk; if the first unused letter was N, the student entered the Chance Damage Table 
and took the first unused figure. This figure was the Under Water Damage caused 
by the torpedo or mine; it did not affect the ship’s Fire Effect, as Above Water Dam-
age did. In the example provided, a heavy cruiser is torpedoed, and the table in-
dicates that the proportion of life lost is 30 percent; entering the Chance Sinking 
Table with 30 percent life lost, the student finds the result N, and in the Chance 
Damage Table, the student would find the first unused number is a 2. Therefore, 
Under Water Damage inflicted by the torpedo is 20 percent. (Appendix B, page 3.)
Another complication requiring special elaboration was the “Application of a 
Chance Factor to the Scoring of Gunfire Damage on the Maneuver Board.” Percent 
of Life Destroyed was tabulated for 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, and 90 
percent. When the Naval War College Fire Effect Diagrams were recomputed by 
the Princeton Statistical Research Group, it had become evident that in certain cir-
cumstances, 100 percent (or even more) of a ship’s life could be destroyed in a single 
move, but that did not mean statistically (a ship’s “life” being an average value) that 
the ship was certain to be sunk in the move. Actually, its probability of destruction 
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was only 0.63. Therefore, alternative scoring sequences were provided in the event 
that a ship had 100 percent or more of its life destroyed in a single move. If the per-
centage of life destroyed in a move was between 95 and 125, a special 100 percent 
sequence was used; if between 125 and 150, a 150 percent sequence was applied; if 
the life destroyed was greater than 150, the ship was removed from the game board 
whether or not it had been subjected to penetrative hits.2
N O T E S 1 “Board Maneuver Rules: Supplement to Maneuver 
Rules,” 10 August 1946, title page and p. 1, folder 
2577 H, box 133, RG 4, NHC. Subsequent page 
  references in this chapter, until the next endnote, are 
to this source.
 2 Ibid., app. B, “Explanation of 100% and 150% 
Tables,” 21 December 1945.

VI More Exercises and More Rules, August–September 
1946
The Naval War College curriculum included not only gaming, of course, but direct, real-world instruction and demonstrations—the numerous lectures already mentioned, live exercises and demonstrations in fighter direction 
(with actual ships and aircraft, at training facilities in the Newport area), commu-
nications drafting and encryption training, and the like. One such event, formally 
a communications exercise, is recounted here because its scenario and planning as 
well as its decision factors serve to introduce readers to the actual gaming that is 
the true focus of this book. 
Communications Exercise: Operation Plan No. 3-44 
This exercise entailed the communications-related requirements of a simulated 
operation plan and battle plan. Operation Plan No. 3-44 placed Vice Admiral BF, 
Commander, Task Force (CTF) 31, the Raiding Force, and Commander, Air Forces, 
3rd Fleet (COMAIR3FLT), in charge of Task Group 31.1, the Striking Group, which 
consisted of four fast battleships organized as Battleship Division 5; two fleet car-
riers organized into Carrier Division 2; four heavy cruisers as Cruiser Division 6; 
eight light cruisers as Cruiser Divisions 9 and 11; twenty-six destroyers organized 
into Destroyer Squadrons 5, 12, and 14; and the nine destroyer leaders (large de-
stroyers, often with extra space and communications for embarked commanders) 
of Destroyer Squadron 21. Task Group 31.2, the Air Support Group, was under 
the command of Captain B-15 and consisted of Fleet Air Wings 1 and 10, thirty-
six scout planes and forty-nine naval patrol planes, respectively. The Air Support 
Group also included twenty-four dive-bombers of the Army’s 3rd Bombardment 
Group. Finally, Admiral BF commanded Task Group 31.3, the Submarine Group, 
which consisted of twelve submarines organized into Submarine Squadron (SUB-
RON) 6, under Captain B-14. 
In the General Situation, Blue was extending control of the sea to the west to and 
including the line of Kiska–Marcus–Truk–Rabaul. The 3rd Fleet was to capture 
Truk Atoll and use it as an operational base. Enemy forces consisted of an Orange 
naval force composed of several battleships, fifteen to twenty cruisers, and about 
thirty-five destroyers. These fleet units were at Truk; Blue knew that twenty to 
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twenty-five Orange submarines were also operating in the Truk area. Orange also 
had an undetermined number of seaplanes, land planes, auxiliaries, and defense 
craft based at Truk. Orange shore defenses were principally batteries of fourteen 
six-inch guns with maximum ranges of twenty-five thousand yards, distributed 
on islands of the atoll. There were also about twenty-four mobile three-inch an-
tiaircraft guns and about a hundred mobile .50-caliber antiaircraft machine guns. 
Sixteen-inch guns on the islands of Moen and Tol were out of action. Orange cruis-
ers and destroyers were usually equipped with mines for tactical use, which made 
it dangerous to follow them or pass through waters recently used by them. Their 
aircraft were also equipped with mines, of either drifting or anchored type.1 
Orange aircraft strength on Truk was estimated at eighteen PBY Catalina na-
val patrol bombers, twenty Hellcat fighters, and ten Avenger and twelve Helldiver 
Map 3
Some Pacific Home and 
Outlying Naval Bases




 88 BLUE VERSUS PURPLE
attack planes. The island of Ponape had no fighters or bombers, but it did have five 
PBM Mariner naval patrol bombers. Eniwetok had an additional four Mariners, 
along with thirteen B-17 Flying Fortress heavy bombers, and there were another 
thirty B-17s and eight Mariners elsewhere in the Marshalls. In the Marianas, Or-
ange had about fourteen Catalinas but was not believed to have any fighters or 
bombers. Admiral BF ordered the Submarine Division (SUBDIV) to depart its pa-
trol station at Truk at 1800 on 18 September and return to base. By the same time, 
the Blue Amphibious Force was to be in the vicinity of Rabaul, prepared to capture 
Truk after a successful action. Blue Task Force 51 was to capture Wotje and Jaluit, 
covered by Task Force 52 in the process. Task Groups 52.1 and 52.2 would raid 
Marcus Island and the Marshalls, respectively, in order to bring about maximum 
destruction of the air and shore installations there. Task Forces 51 and 52 would 
depart Pearl Harbor on 4 September. Admiral BF also assumed that all available 
Orange combatant units would defend Truk against the Blue threat, that Orange 
forces were in strength, approximately as reported, and that a major action would 
be fought in daylight on 9 September. He further assumed that visibility would be 
high, that smoke would lie on the surface, that aircraft could be flown, and that the 
present “excellent” weather would continue. He additionally assumed that Orange 
submarines would be present; that Orange would exert his maximum effort to car-
ry out attrition attacks on Blue forces at night by air, surface, and submarine forces; 
and that Blue surface forces would be discovered by Orange prior to 9 September.2
Admiral BF’s Striking Group was to destroy or drive off Orange sea forces and 
reduce Orange air forces by destroying enemy aircraft and reducing Orange air fa-
cilities at Truk by the time of the Blue air attack at 0600 on 9 September. Air strikes 
by the Striking Group and the Air Support Group on heavy ships (i.e., battleships, 
battle cruisers, and heavy cruisers) were also to be coordinated, and the Air Sup-
port Group was to assist in destroying or driving off Orange air and sea forces in 
the area as well. In particular, the latter unit was to locate and track Orange surface 
forces on the night of 8–9 September, conduct searches in accordance with the 
supplied Air Search Diagram, Annex B (see figure 58), destroy Orange aircraft, 
reduce Orange air facilities at Truk at 0330 and 0700 on 9 September, and reduce 
the fighting strength of Orange heavy ships by aerial torpedo attacks coordinated 
with air strikes from the Blue carrier units after 1000 on 9 September, as directed 
by Commander, Striking Group. The Air Support Group was also to maintain re-
connaissance of Truk. In addition, this unit was to establish a land-plane base at 
Kavieng and seaplane bases at Rendezvous BLOSSOM and CUSTARD on the night of 
8–9 September.3 
The Submarine Group was to provide radio beacons for the Air Support Group 
at Rendezvous APRICOT from 0245 to 0315, assist in destroying Orange sea forces 
in the Truk Area, and observe all entrances to the atoll commencing at 1800 on 8 
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September. The Submarine Group was also to at-
tack Orange surface forces during their sortie from 
Truk, during which these forces would probably 
use the atoll’s northeast pass. Further, the subma-
rines were to trail enemy task forces during dark-
ness and interpose themselves between the Orange 
task forces and Truk during the day action. Addi-
tionally, the Submarine Group was to keep clear of 
Blue surface forces, remain within fifteen miles of 
the Truk barrier reef during daylight on 9 Septem-
ber, and destroy damaged Orange fleet units re-
turning to Truk. Battleships were the submarines’ 
primary targets, but the latter were also to guard 
against enemy submarines and drifting mines. 
Because of where the Submarine Group was to be 
stationed during the main action, there was a total 
restriction against bombing submarines within fif-
teen miles of the Truk barrier reef during the day-
light hours of 9 September.4
Operation Plan No. 3-44 was to become effec-
tive upon receipt, as were the 3rd Fleet Standard 
Logistic Plan Love and Raiding Force Special Fu-
eling Plan, Annex Dog. In addition, Communi-
cation Plan, Annex Charlie and Rendezvous List, 
Annex Able were to be used. Admiral BF informed 
his subordinates that his flagship would be the fast 
battleship BB-57, with the Striking Group. (The complexities of the delivery of 
these plans and orders to a lengthy, multiechelon distribution list was one of the 
points of the communications exercise.)5
Battle Plan No. 4-44 gave a more detailed task organization. The four battle-
ships of Battleship Division 5 were designated Task Unit 31.1.1, the “Battleline,” 
and were under the command of Rear Admiral B-1. The four heavy cruisers of 
Cruiser Division 6 and the nine destroyer leaders of Destroyer Squadron 21 were 
designated Task Unit 31.1.2, the Center Force, and placed under the command of 
Rear Admiral B-3. Task Unit 31.1.3, the Right Flank Force, was under Captain B-20 
and consisted of two light cruisers—less CL-55 and CL-56—from Cruiser Divi-
sion 9 and the nine destroyers of Destroyer Squadron 5. Task Unit 31.1.4, the Left 
Flank Force under Rear Admiral B-4, consisted of CL-55 and CL-56 from Cruiser 
Division 9 and the nine destroyers from Destroyer Squadron 12. Task Unit 31.1.15, 
the Carrier Group, under Rear Admiral B-2, consisted of the two fleet carriers 
Fig. 58
Air Search Diagram, 
Annex B, COMAIR3FLT 
Operation Plan No. 3-44
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organized into Carrier Division 2, the four antiair-
craft cruisers of Cruiser Division 11, and the eight 
destroyers from Destroyer Squadron 14. There was 
no change in the General Situation or the informa-
tion given in Operation Plan No. 3-44. However, it 
was now made clear that Orange forces consisted 
of a major surface force of five battleships, seven to 
eight heavy cruisers, eight to ten light cruisers, and 
thirty to thirty-five destroyers, all reported to be 
anchored in Truk Harbor as of 8 September. There 
were also a reported twenty to twenty-five Orange 
submarines at Truk, and Orange aircraft strength 
was now reported as eighteen Catalinas, twenty 
Hellcat fighters, and ten Avenger and twelve Hell-
diver attack planes. Additionally, there were about 
seventeen Mariner naval patrol bombers, fourteen 
Catalina naval patrol bombers, and forty-three Fly-
ing Fortress heavy bombers in the Marshalls, Mari-
anas, and Caroline Islands.6 
As to the disposition of his own forces, BF again 
pointed out that Blue submarines were operating 
in the vicinity of Truk and that Blue land-based 
aircraft would bomb Truk and scout for Orange 
surface forces prior to the main engagement. He 
assumed that Blue submarines would furnish con-
tact reports on Orange surface forces upon the de-
parture of those forces from Truk and their attempt 
to make night attrition attacks on Blue. Blue land-based aircraft would also report 
contacts with Orange surface forces as they bombed Truk, and they would do so 
through the night. He added an assumption that Orange light forces and subma-
rines would attempt to mine the waters ahead of the Blue surface forces.7
His battle line would initially engage the Orange battle line at extreme ranges, 
close as rapidly as possible to ranges between twenty and twenty-two thousand 
yards, close to moderate ranges (under twenty thousand yards) when the rate and 
volume of enemy fire were reduced or made ineffective, and provide its own Air 
Spot and Battleline Inner Anti-Submarine Patrol. His Center, Right Flank, and Left 
Flank Forces were to defend the battle line against enemy light force attacks. Cruis-
er planes were to furnish Air Spot and Battleline Intermediate Anti-Submarine 
Patrol, while destroyers supported the cruisers with torpedo attacks against the 
Orange battle line when directed by the Officer in Tactical Command (OTC). The 
Fig. 59
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Carrier Group was to make dawn air strikes against planes and air installations on 
Truk with a quarter of its fighters and half of its dive-bombers. It was to make dawn 
air strikes on the Orange battleships with the remainder of its planes, less those 
needed for antisubmarine and combat air patrols. The Carrier Group was ordered 
to make repeated air strikes on Orange air and surface forces throughout the day, 
furnish its own combat air patrol, as well as one for the battle line, and furnish its 
own Anti-Submarine Patrol. When the Blue battle line was engaged with its Orange 
counterpart, the Carrier Group was to operate on the disengaged side, out of range 
of the Orange main-battery guns.8
Planes were to report any drifting mines or submarines sighted. All planes 
armed with depth charges and all destroyers making contact with submarines were 
to attack “vigorously.” All other ships were to follow the movements of the Car-
rier Group until deployed for surface action. Fighter direction officers were to be 
stationed in fleet carrier CV-10 and fast battleship BB-57. Cruising Dispositions 5 
or 5N were to be used as signaled, followed by Approach Disposition 6 and Battle 
Disposition 7. Commander, Striking Group was again in BB-57; Rear Admiral B-1, 
Commander, Battleline, was designated the second in command. Battle Plan No. 
4-44 was to become effective upon signal; Commander, Air, 3rd Fleet Communi-
cation Plan Dog was in effect. Annexes to the plan were included, as were instruc-
tions for distribution to the Commanders, Battleline, Carrier Group, and Center, 
Left Flank, and Right Flank Forces.9
Antiaircraft Fire Effect and Aircraft-Damage Maneuver Rules 
A day later, additional Maneuver Rules were issued for Anti-Aircraft Fire Effect 
and Rules Governing Damage Inflicted by Aircraft. In terms of Aerial Combat, 
the Director of the Maneuver would, in general, assign aerial combat losses in ac-
cordance with Table A, making “due allowance” for the disposition of aircraft with 
respect to altitude, formation, and position. The aircraft initiating the attacks were 
designated “attackers” or N in number, while the aircraft being attacked were desig-
nated as “defenders” or M in number. For the purpose of determining the results of 
sustained attacks, a three-minute interval would take place between each attack. In 
addition, the losses due to attacks initiated by airplanes other than fighters and the 
results of attacks occurring at night or in fog would be decided after consideration 
of the conditions and circumstances under which each such engagement occurred. 
Each attack was to involve the expenditure of an eighth of the available machine-
gun ammunition for the guns involved. Guided missiles carried to the vicinity of 
the target by parent aircraft would be destroyed if the parent aircraft was shot down 
prior to the launching of the guided missile. Guided missiles in free flight that were 
subject to interception by fighter aircraft could be shot down, but the loss incurred 
would only be half as much as if the guided missile were a defending fighter. The 
losses incurred by intercepted suicide aircraft would be the same as that listed in 
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column 4 of Table A and the losses sustained by the 
aircraft making the interception in this case would 
be a fifth of that indicated in column 3 of Table A.10
When it came to Aircraft Losses Caused by Anti- 
Aircraft Fire, a battery of four antiaircraft guns of 
over 4.5-inch caliber was considered to be the stan-
dard unit of fire for the purpose of computing the 
effectiveness of antiaircraft fire. Guns of other cali-
bers would be multiplied by the coefficients given 
in Table B to convert them to standard units of antiaircraft fire. Guns under two-
inch calibers would be classified as antiaircraft machine guns.11
The number of antiaircraft gun standard units 
of fire and the number of antiaircraft machine gun 
standard units of fire that would bear on and have 
the attacking aircraft within effective range would 
be determined by the Director of the Maneuver. 
This decision would also take into consideration 
the type and direction from which the attack was 
made, the altitude of the aircraft involved, the dis-
position of the firing ships, and their antiaircraft 
commitments. The number of standard units of 
antiaircraft fire from any ship or ships that would 
bear on the attack might be reduced by the amount 
specified in Table C if the ship or ships concerned were affected by the conditions 
indicated in Table C. The basic percentage of aircraft losses to antiaircraft fire was 
taken from Table D. The basic percentage of loss to antiaircraft guns was obtained 
by using the number of effective standard antiaircraft gun units as an argument. 
The final percentage of airplane losses to antiaircraft guns and antiaircraft machine 
guns was determined by multiplying the basic percentages taken from Table D by 
Table E.12
At night or when the attacking aircraft could not be seen visually for more than 
two thousand yards, the percentage taken from Table D would be reduced by 50 
percent for ships with fire control radar. Ships without fire control radar would not 
be able to fire under these conditions unless they could see the aircraft, in which 
case the percentage taken from Table D would be reduced by 90 percent. Aircraft 
losses to antiaircraft fire during the approach would be assumed to take place be-
fore the aircraft involved dropped their bombs or torpedoes or fired their rockets. 
Aircraft losses to antiaircraft fire during the retirement would be 20 percent of the 
losses incurred during the approach. When it came to the Accuracy of Aircraft 
Attacks, Table F was to be used as a guide in determining the percentage of hits 
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obtained by aircraft making an attack with bombs or rockets as well as by guided 
missiles of the “pilotless” or suicide type. Bomb and rocket hits were determined 
to the nearest whole number after deducting aircraft losses to antiaircraft fire dur-
ing the approach. The figures for the percentages of 
hits obtained by guided missiles were applied to the 
number remaining after interception by fighters 
and included losses to antiaircraft fire and misses. 
If the target maneuvered during the attack, the per-
centage of hits taken from Table F would be mul-
tiplied by the reduction factor taken from Table G 
to obtain the percentage of hits on a maneuvering 
target. In night or low-visibility attacks with planes 
equipped with radar or “suitable” radar accesso-
ries, the final percentage of hits taken from Table F 
would be reduced by 50 percent.13
When it came to aircraft torpedo hits on ships, torpedoes that ran hot, straight, 
and normal would have a probability of hitting various targets as indicated in Table 
H. The percentage of hits taken from Table H could be varied by the roll of dice. In 
this case, Roll 1 would decrease the percentage of hits by 20 percent, while Roll 2 
would decrease it by 10 percent. Roll 3 would incur no change, while Roll 4 would 
increase the percentage of hits by 10 percent. Roll 5 would increase the percentage 
of hits by 20 percent; Roll 6 would incur no change.14
Table I was to be used as a guide in assessing the damage resulting from hits by 
various types of bombs, rockets, aerial torpedoes, and guided missiles on the target 
classes of ships indicated. The damage resulting from any one hit was to be expressed 
in “loss of life.” For bombs and rockets, Table I gave the damage resulting from hits 
Fig. 69
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that penetrated the armored decks as well as hits that did not penetrate. The armor 
plate penetration curves in Appendix I would be used to determine whether a bomb 
hit was penetrative or nonpenetrative. Damage from guided missiles would equal 
that assigned to the type of bomb or rocket in Table I that most nearly approximat-
ed the type of warhead employed in the guided missile that was used. Damage from 
hits by suicide aircraft would be equal to that of a five-hundred-pound general- 
purpose (GP) bomb—
assumed to be pen-
etrative for ships with 
no armor—plus the 
damage resulting from 
the type of bomb or 
rocket carried. Ta-
ble J was to be used 
as a guide in assessing 
damage resulting from 
the detonation of an 
atomic bomb within a 
target area.15
Bomb or rocket 
damage was to be treat-
ed in the same manner 
as gunfire damage if it 
was desired to apply 
the element of chance 
in computing the 
amount of damage sus-
tained by any particu-
lar target as outlined 
in the “Memorandum 
on the Application of 
the Chance Factor to 
the Scoring of Gunfire 
Damage on the Ma-
neuver Board.” If the 
bomb or rocket pen-
etrated the armored 
decks of the target 
ship, as indicated in Table I, the “Chance of Sinking” sequence for the percent of life 
destroyed was entered and the first unused letter was noted. If this letter was S, the 
Fig. 70
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Fig. 71
Ship Deck-Armor  
Characteristics
 1 “Naval Communications: Operation Plan No. 3-44 
and Battle Plan No. 4-44,” 13 August 1946, pp. 1–2, 
folder 2584-K, box 135, RG 4, NHC. These exercises 
were obviously based on the U.S. operations against 
the Gilbert and Marshall Islands of late 1943 and 
early 1944, especially the raid against Truk in Febru-
ary 1944. For an account of those strikes in terms of 
wartime American combined-arms naval doctrine, 
see Trent Hone, “U.S. Navy Surface Battle Doctrine 
and Victory in the Pacific,” Naval War College 
Review 62, no. 1 (Winter 2009), pp. 68–69, 76–81.
 2 “Naval Communications,” p. 2.
 3 Ibid. 
 4 Ibid., pp. 2–3. 
 5 Ibid., p. 3. 
 6 Ibid., p. 4. 
 7 Ibid., pp. 4–5. 
 8 Ibid., p. 5. 
 9 Ibid., pp. 5–6. 
 10 “Anti-Aircraft Fire Effect and Rules Governing 
Damage Inflicted by Aircraft,” 13 August 1946, pp. 
1–2, folder 2577-J, box 133, RG 4, NHC.
 11 Ibid., p. 2. 
 12 Ibid., pp. 2–4. 
 13 Ibid., pp. 4–6. 
 14 Ibid., p. 6. 
 15 Ibid., pp. 7, 9. 
 16 Ibid., pp. 9–10. 
ship was considered “d,” or sunk. If the letter was 
N, the ship was not sunk and the appropriate “Fire 
Effect Reduction” sequence was entered to obtain 
the loss of Fire Effect. If the damage sustained 
was the combined result of bombs or rockets that 
would penetrate and bombs or rockets that would 
not penetrate, then only the percent of loss of life 
suffered from the penetrative hits was to be used to 
enter the sinking sequence. In this case, if the ship 
was not sunk then the sum of loss of life inflicted by 
the penetrative and nonpenetrative hits would be 
used to enter the Fire Effect Reduction Sequence in 
order to obtain the resulting loss of Fire Effect. The 
Move Time employed for any one computation in-
volving the Chance Factor, as described above, was 
to be limited to that required to complete the attack 
by the aircraft or the group of aircraft involved. The 
result of each additional attack would be figured 
separately.16
N O T E S


VII Board Maneuver Exercises, September 1946
In early September, the junior class of June 1947 was issued instructions and parameters for six Board Maneuver Exercises that were to take place between 13 and 17 September. The object of Exercise 1 was to familiarize students with 
the sections of the Maneuver Rules that applied to the Board Maneuver, to furnish 
an exercise in the mechanics of ship movements on the board, and to acquaint 
students with the Move Sheet. Students were referred to various parts of Sections 
A–C of the Maneuver Rules, Characteristics of the Blue Fleet, and the Supplement 
to Maneuver Rules. 
Exercise 1
For Exercise 1, students were divided into six groups, Section A consisting of 
Groups 1, 3, and 5 and Section B of Groups 2, 4, and 6. Members of the Naval War 
College Staff supervised. The exercise was divided into three phases, as indicated 
in figure 74. Odd-numbered groups were to maneuver on the northernmost part 
of the Maneuver Board and even-numbered groups on the southernmost. Each 
student prepared a Move Sheet for the forces to which he was assigned. The staff 
member supervising each group would examine each Move Sheet and notify the 
Director of the Maneuver when the group was ready to make the move on the 
board. Moves were to be made when the Director so announced; student officers 
made their moves in succession in the order of listing, the senior officer of each 
group going first.*
The General Situation for Exercise 1 had Blue units maneuvering indepen-
dently. These units included fast battleships BB-58 and BB-59, organized as Bat-
tleship Division 3; heavy cruisers CA-68, -69, -70, and -71, as Cruiser Division 
5; and Destroyer Squadron 19, divided into Destroyer Division 191, consisting of 
DD-697, -698, -699, and -700, and DESDIV 192, with DD-701, -702, -703, and 
-704. BATDIV 3 was steaming in column at a distance of a thousand yards (i.e., 
between ships) on a course of 000 degrees and an engine speed of sixteen knots. 
The ships of CRUDIV 5 were also in column but at a distance of six hundred yards, 
* “Board Maneuver Exercises,” 4 and 11 September 1946, pp. 1–3, folder 2587, box 135, RG 4, NHC. Subsequent 
page references in this chapter are to this source.
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also on a course 000 but at fifteen knots. DESRON 
19 was steaming in Squadron Formation No. 5M 
on a division line of bearing of 090 degrees, at 
intervals of five hundred yards, with each division 
in column. It was at a distance of three hundred 
yards on course 000 and with an engine speed of 
fifteen knots. The wind was from the northeast at 
Force 1, with seas smooth, visibility normal, and 
cloud ceiling ten thousand feet. (Pages 4–5.)
Phase I consisted of Moves 1, 2, and 3. In Move 
1, Battleship Division 3, Cruiser Division 5, and Destroyer Squadron 19 continued 
on their courses and speeds, but in Move 2 BATDIV 3 performed a “column right” 
of forty-five degrees while maintaining engine speed. Cruiser Division 5 increased 
speed to twenty-four knots, and DESRON 19 performed a squadron change of 
course to 090 degrees at the same engine speed. 
Destroyer Division 192 then increased speed by 
six knots and changed its course to 090 degrees 
to maintain its intervals. In Move 3, BATDIV 3 
reduced speed to twelve knots, while Cruiser Di-
vision 5’s ships turned starboard to 045 and con-
tinued the increases of engine speeds that it had 
started in Move 2. DESRON 19 completed the ma-
neuver it had started in Move 2, with DESDIV 191 continuing course and speed 
and DESDIV 192 slowing to fifteen knots. Upon completion of Move 3, when or-
dered by the Director, students shifted to their units for Phase II. They also wrote 
course and engine speed for Move 3 on the Maneu-
ver Board for the group taking over. (Page 5.)
For Phase II (Moves 4, 5, and 6) the wind was still 
from the northeast, but this time at Force 4; the seas 
were now moderate; and visibility and ceiling were the same as in Phase I. In Move 4, 
BATDIV 3 continued on its course and decreased its engine speed, while Cruiser Di-
vision 5 turned to port fifteen degrees. Commander, DESRON (i.e., COMDESRON) 
19 had his Division Commanders take charge of their divisions and act indepen-
dently. Destroyer Division 191 changed course forty-five degrees to starboard and 
increased engine speed to twenty knots, while DESDIV 192 increased engine speed 
to twenty knots but maintained a course of 090 degrees. Move 5 began with Battle-
ship Division 3 forming a line of bearing 135 degrees relative to the left of the 
Guide. Fast battleship BB-58 maintained course and engine speed, but BB-59 in-
creased speed to 15.5 knots and changed course to 030. Cruiser Division 5 main-
tained course and speed, as did DESDIV 191, while DESDIV 192 turned port in 
Fig. 72
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column from 090 to 000. In Move 6, BB-58 maintained its course and speed, while 
BB-59 continued the maneuver it had started in Move 5. Cruiser Division 5’s ships 
came left thirty degrees, and DESDIV 191 ships came left forty-five degrees while 
maintaining speed. Destroyer Division 192 ships continued their course and speed. 
Upon completion of Move 6, students again shifted, this time for Phase III, leaving 
course and speed information for the next groups. (Page 6.)
Phase III, or Moves 7, 8, and 9, simulated the same weather conditions as Phase 
II. In Move 7, BB-58 continued on a course of 045 degrees with a speed of twelve 
knots, while BB-59 reduced speed to twelve knots and changed course to 045. Cruis-
er Division 5 came right in column to 030 while continuing its speed of twenty- 
four knots. Destroyer Squadron 19’s DESDIV 191 came right forty-five degrees and 
continued at twenty knots, while DESDIV 192 maintained course and speed. Move 
8 saw BATDIV 3 ships turning right forty-five degrees and increasing speed to six-
teen knots, while Cruiser Division 5 turned starboard sixty degrees and maintained 
engine speed. Within DESRON 19, DESDIV 191 turned port 135 degrees to course 
000 and increased speed to twenty-five knots, while DESDIV 192 came right ninety 
degrees and increased to the same speed. Move 9 saw BATDIV 3 turning left in 
column ninety degrees and increased speed to the maximum; Cruiser Division 5, 
less heavy cruiser CA-71, turned starboard forty-five degrees and also increased 
engine speed to the maximum allowed. CA-71 left the formation and proceeded 
on course 180, also at maximum speed. DESRON 19’s ships all increased speed to 
maximum and continued on the same courses. Move 9 ended Phase III as well as 
Exercise 1. (Page 7.)
Exercise 2
The object of Exercise 2 was to familiarize the student with the Gunfire Section of 
the Maneuver Rules, the Board Maneuver Rules, the Supplement to the Maneuver 
Rules, and the Gunfire Sheet used in a Board Maneuver. Students were referred to 
these sources, as well as to Characteristics of the Blue Fleet. Exercise 2 simulated 
an engagement between the Blue Force used in Exercise 1 and a Purple Force of 
the same number and types of ships. Student and staff assignments for Exercise 1 
carried over to Exercise 2, with Groups 1, 3, and 5 controlling the Blue Force and 
Groups 2, 4, and 6 the Purple Force. Each student filled out a Move Sheet and a 
Gunfire Sheet for the unit to which he was assigned. The sheets were again inspect-
ed by a member of the staff, who notified the Director when the group was ready for 
the move. Again, moves were made on the board when announced by the Director; 
to reduce the time needed for the exercise, tracks were plotted prior to the exercise. 
The General Situation specified that the Purple Force comprised Battleship Divi-
sion 1 (BB-1 and BB-2); Cruiser Division 1 (CA-1, -2, -3, and -4); and Destroyer 
Squadron 1, containing Destroyer Division 11 (DD-1, -2, -3, and -4) and DESDIV 
12 (DD-5, -6, -7, and -8). The wind was again from the northeast at Force 4, the 
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seas were moderate, visibility was normal, skies 
overcast, ceiling five thousand feet. (Pages 8–9.)
The Blue Force had Battleship Division 3 in col-
umn at a distance of a thousand yards on course 000 
degrees at an engine speed of twenty-three knots. 
BB-58 was serving as Guide, and one spotting plane 
from each ship was on station. Cruiser Division 5 
was also in column, at a distance of six hundred 
yards on 045 and speed twenty-five knots. Heavy 
cruiser CA-68 was the Guide, and again each ship 
had a spotting plane on station. DESRON 19 too 
was in column, with intervals between divisions of 
1,500 yards and a distance between ships within each division of three hundred 
yards. Its course was 045, its speed was twenty-five knots, and DESDIV 191 was in 
the lead. No Blue ships had received any previous damage. In Move 1, BATDIV 3 
continued its course and speed; BB-58 opened fire with its main battery on Purple 
fast battleship BB-1 and with its secondary battery on Purple DESDIV 11. At the 
same time, Blue BB-59 opened fire with its main battery on Purple BB-2 and with 
its secondary battery on Purple Destroyer Division 12. Purple DESDIV 11 opened 
fire on Blue BB-58, and Purple DESDIV 12 opened fire on Blue BB-59. Cruiser Di-
vision 5 continued its course and speed; its heavy cruisers CA-68, -69, -70, and -71 
opened main-battery fire on, respectively, Purple heavy cruisers CA-4, -3, -2, and -1. 
DESRON 19 continued its course and speed, with DESDIV 191 opening fire on 
Purple BB-1 and DESDIV 192 on Purple BB-2; the two Purple battleships returned 
the fire with their five-inch guns. (Page 9a.) 
The Purple Force disposition had BATDIV 1 in column at a distance of a thou-
sand yards on a course of 315 and at a speed of twenty-three knots. Fast battleship 
BB-1 was the Guide, and one spotting plane from each battleship was on station. 
Cruiser Division 1 was in column with a distance of six hundred yards on course 
225 and speed twenty-five. Heavy cruiser CA-1 was the Guide, and the Purple 
cruisers likewise had one spotting plane each on station. DESRON 1 was in column 
with intervals between divisions of 1,500 yards at a distance between ships of three 
hundred yards on a course of 315 and at a speed of twenty-five knots; Destroyer 
Division 11 was in the lead. Purple ships had been undamaged prior to Move 1. In 
Move 1, Purple battleship BB-1 opened fire with its main battery on Blue battleship 
BB-58 and with its secondary battery on Blue DESDIV 191. Purple battleship BB-
2’s main battery fired on Blue battleship BB-59 and its secondary battery on Blue 
DESDIV 192. Purple Cruiser Division 1 continued its course and speed, and its 
heavy cruisers CA-1, -2, -3, and -4 opened up with main-battery fire on Blue heavy 
cruisers CA-71, -70, -69, and -68, respectively. Purple DESRON 1 also continued 
Fig. 75
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on course and speed, its DESDIV 11 opening fire on Blue BB-58 and its DESDIV 
12 on Blue BB-59. (Page 10.)
In Move 2, Blue BATDIV 3 continued on course and speed; BB-58 continued its 
main-battery fire on Purple BB-1 and secondary-battery fire on Purple Destroyer 
Division 11. Blue BB-59 also continued shooting with its main battery at Purple 
BB-2 and with its secondary battery on Purple DESDIV 12, while Purple DESDIVs 
11 and 12 continued firing on Blue BB-58 and BB-59, respectively. By this time, 
Blue fast battleship BB-58 had been damaged 20 percent. Blue Cruiser Division 
5 continued on its course and speed, with heavy cruisers CA-68, -69, -70, and -71 
continuing their main-battery fire on Purple heavy cruisers CA-4, -3, -2, and -1, 
respectively. By this time, Blue heavy cruisers CA-68 and CA-70 had each received 
10 percent damage, CA-69 20 percent. Heavy cruiser CA-71 was still undamaged. 
Blue DESRON 19 maintained course and speed; DESDIV 191 continued to fire on 
Purple battleship BB-1 and DESDIV 192 on Purple battleship BB-2. Purple BB-1 
and BB-2 were firing their secondary batteries at DESDIVs 191 and 192, respec-
tively; DESDIV 191 had taken 20 percent damage by this time, and DESDIV 192 
had been 10 percent damaged. (Page 11.)
Move 2 also saw Purple BATDIV 1 continuing on its course and speed, its fast 
battleship BB-1 continuing main-battery fire on Blue BB-58 and Purple BB-2 still 
shooting at Blue BB-59. Both Purple battleships were taking fire from their Blue 
counterparts and Blue Destroyer Divisions 191 and 192; Purple BB-1 had received 
20 percent damage by this time, but Purple BB-2 was undamaged. Cruiser Division 
1 continued on its course and speed; heavy cruisers CA-1, -2, -3, and -4 carried on 
firing at Blue heavy cruisers CA-71, -70, -69, and -68, respectively. By this time, the 
Purple heavy cruisers CA-1 and CA-3 had been damaged 10 percent, 20 percent for 
CA-2; CA-4 remained undamaged. Purple DESRON 1 was on its same course and 
speed, with its two divisions continuing their fire on the two Blue battleships and 
receiving secondary-battery fire in reply. By now Purple DESDIV 11 had been 20 
percent damaged, and DESDIV 12 had been 10 percent damaged. (Page 12.)
Move 3 for Blue entailed Battleship Division 3 changing course to 060 degrees at 
the same speed. Blue BB-58 continued its main-battery fire on Purple BB-1 and its 
secondary-battery fire on Purple Destroyer Division 11, while Blue BB-59 contin-
ued its main-battery fire on Purple BB-2 and its secondary-battery fire on Purple 
DESDIV 12. There was a reduction of 0.2 of the Blue battleships’ Fire Effect caused 
by the Purple battleships’ changing course, and each Blue battleship had by now 
been damaged 20 percent. Cruiser Division 5 slowed by five knots and turned to 
345; each Blue heavy cruiser carried on firing at its Purple counterpart from the 
previous moves. The Purple heavy cruisers too had changed course, causing a re-
duction of 0.2 in the Fire Effect of the Blue heavy cruisers; by this time, Blue heavy 
cruisers CA-68 and CA-69 had each been damaged 30 percent, CA-70 and CA-71 
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20 percent. Destroyer Squadron 19 did not change course or speed; Destroyer Di-
visions 191 and 192 continued their fire on Purple fast battleships BB-1 and BB-2, 
respectively. Their Fire Effect was reduced by 0.2 because of the change of course 
by the two Purple battleships, and they were still taking fire from the Purple battle-
ships’ secondary batteries; Blue DESDIV 191 had been 50 percent damaged by now, 
and Blue DESDIV 192 had taken 20 percent damage. (Page 13.)
Move 3 for the Purple Force saw BATDIV 1 changing course to 090 at the same 
speed, with BB-1 continuing its main-battery fire on Blue BB-58 and its secondary-
battery fire on Blue DESDIV 191. Purple BB-2 continued its main-battery fire on 
Blue BB-59 and its secondary-battery fire on Blue Destroyer Division 192. As the 
Purple battleships received fire from the Blue DESDIVs, their Fire Effect was also 
reduced by 0.2 because of a change of course by the Blue battleships, and each 
Purple battleship by this time had been damaged 20 percent. Cruiser Division 1 
had slowed by five knots and changed course to 000. Its ships were still firing on 
their Blue counterparts from the previous moves, and they too had seen their Fire 
Effects reduced by the change of course by the Blue heavy cruisers; also at this 
time, Purple heavy cruisers CA-1 and CA-2 were 30 percent damaged and CA-3 
and CA-4 20 percent. Purple DESRON 1 was on its same course and speed, and 
its DESDIVs 11 and 12 were continuing to fire on Blue battleships BB-58 and BB-
59, respectively. The Purple destroyer divisions were still taking fire from the Blue 
battleships, which had changed course sixty degrees to starboard. This change of 
course also saw the Purple DESDIVs’ Fire Effect reduced by 0.2, DESDIV 11 dam-
aged 50 percent, and DESDIV 12 20 percent dam-
aged. Exercise 2 now ended. (Page 14.) 
Exercises 3 and 4
Exercise 3 was for continued practice in the con-
duct of a Board Maneuver, in this case, another 
engagement between a Blue and a Purple force of 
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and opposing forces
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each of three moves; students were assigned to particular duties as each group con-
trolled various forces in turn. Student Commanders were to maneuver their as-
signed units under the direction of an OTC, with the general mission being one of 
inflicting maximum damage on opposing forces while sustaining minimum dam-
age to one’s own. While torpedo fire was not simulated, each side’s destroyers were 
maneuvered to torpedo-firing positions as directed by the OTC. (Pages 15–17.) 
Exercise 4 was intended to provide practice in the use of the Radar Contact Re-
port and Message Forms as well as in the plotting of radar contacts. A Staff Solution 
was issued for comparison with the student solutions; the reference was again the 
Maneuver Rules, along with Radar Bulletin No. 1A. In the Special Situation, Blue 
fast battleship BB-58 was steaming in company with a force of cruisers and destroy-
ers, all organized as Task Group 45.2. They were in a Night Cruising Disposition 
and were assigned as the long-range surface radar guard (BB-58 was equipped with 
an SG-3 surface-search radar). The OTC was in one of the cruisers and considered 
contact with enemy surface units probable. The course of the formation was 000, 
speed was twenty-two knots. The wind was from the northeast at Force 1, the sea 
was smooth, visibility was normal, and radar conditions were normal.
Contact with three groups of unidentified surface vessels occurred sometime 
before 1900, at which time the OTC directed BB-58 to report the course, speed, 
and probable composition of each group at three-minute intervals. The students 
plotted the track of their own ships and of the contacts on Tactical Data Plotting 
Sheet 1925. The Radar Contact Forms presented BB-58 but not the plots of the 
other ships. Course, speed, and probable composition of each group for contacts 
at 1903, 1906, and 1909 were required, as was the text of a very-high-frequency 
(VHF) voice-radio message from BB-58 to the OTC at 1910. This radio message, 
written on a Message Form, reported the estimate made from the data obtained by 
1909. In addition, the students were to provide a copy of a radio message from the 
OTC—Commander, TG 45.2—to Commander, Task Force 45, reporting the situa-
tion and the OTC’s intended action. Commander, Task Force 45 was at a base five 
hundred miles distant. (Pages 18–19.)
Exercise 5
Exercise 5 was really two exercises in one, both being torpedo-firing problems de-
signed to acquaint students with the use of Torpedo Fire Cards and the Torpedo 
Fire Form. Exercise 5 also familiarized students with the solution of torpedo-fire 
problems and with destroyer torpedo doctrine as given in the Manual of Destroyer 
Torpedo Control, Destroyer Tactical Bulletin No. 4-45. (Page 20.)
In Exercise 5(a), Vessel A was steaming on a course of 270 at twenty knots. A 
destroyer fired one Type G-2 torpedo at Vessel A when the latter’s target angle 
was 330 degrees and was at a maximum effective range. No range allowance was 
made, and the wind was from the northeast at Force 2, seas smooth. The students 
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Fig. 78 
Radar Contact Report, 
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Fig. 79 
Board Maneuver,  
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computed the target track, the target angle, the line of sight, the track of the tor-
pedo, the sight angle, the base torpedo course, and the track angle. All were to be 
shown in a diagram and properly labeled. In Exercise 5(b), Blue Destroyer Division 
191, consisting of four Sumner-class destroyers, fired a spread of forty Type G-1 
torpedoes at Purple BATDIV 1—battleships BB-1 and BB-2, identical to the U.S. 
South Dakota class. DESDIV 191, which was under effective fire from the Purple 
battleships’ secondary batteries, was on course 225 at twenty-seven knots, before 
changing course to 180. The torpedoes were fired in the expectation that the tar-
gets would not maneuver, and the Base Torpedo Course Plan was used. The unit of 
spread was one degree, and the point of aim was the Purple battleships themselves. 
Continuing Exercise 5(b), students now figured the torpedo depth setting, the 
torpedo speed to be used, and the base torpedo course. Using the Maneuver Rules, 
they also worked out the estimated number of hits on the Purple battleships and 
drew diagrams showing target track and torpedo spread as well as showing the 
limits of the division’s spread. They were additionally to plot the position of the 
torpedoes at the end of each move and record a Torpedo Fire Form for DESDIV 
191’s attack by the end of the move. (Pages 20–21.) 
Fig. 80 
Maneuver Message Form,  
Exercise 4
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Exercise 6 and the Concluding Exercise
Exercise 6 consisted of two problems in plotting smoke screens. In Exercise 6(a), 
a division of four destroyers in column at intervals of three hundred yards was 
steaming on a course of 270 at fifteen knots. The wind was from the southwest at 
Force 3, the seas were smooth, and smoke would lie. All ships commenced mak-
ing smoke at the beginning of Move 1. They continued this operation in Moves 
2, 3, 4, and 5 while the student plotted the track of the destroyer division and the 
smoke for the five moves. In Exercise 6(b), Purple DESDIV 12, four destroyers also 
Fig. 81 
Exercises 5 and 6 Work 
Sheet
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identical with those of the Sumner class, changed course to 315 in Move 1 and fired 
torpedoes. In Move 2, DESDIV 12 changed course to 045; in Move 3, it turned to 
090 degrees and commenced making smoke, which it continued to do in Moves 4 
and 5. The wind was now from the northeast at Force 4, the seas were now moder-
ate, but smoke would still lie. Students plotted the smoke made by Purple Destroyer 
Division 12 for Moves 3, 4, and 5. The track of the division had been given to them 
on the Plotting Sheet; they added the curved shape of the smoke at the beginning 
of emission in Move 3. (Pages 21–22.)
About a month later, the senior class of June 1947 was posed the same set of ex-
ercises, with the same organization, reference materials, and purposes. There were 
some minor changes, however. In Exercise 2, the Director of the Maneuver decided 
Fig. 82 
Exercises 5 and 6 Staff 
Solutions
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that ships steaming in courses between 000 and 090 degrees would suffer reduction 
in speed because of sea conditions—battleships and cruisers by one knot, destroy-
ers by three. The maximum speed allowed for destroyers was thirty-two knots. 
The Director also decided that ships steaming in the same course patterns would 
see their Fire Effect Multiplier, M, reduced 0.1 also because of sea conditions. Re-
ductions other than that caused by Above Water Damage would be decided by the 
Director at the “appropriate” time.* With the conclusion of these exercises, the stu-
dents moved on to the first Operations Problem of their academic year. 
* “Board Maneuver Exercises,” 4 October 1946, pp. 1–23, esp. p. 9, folder 2586, box 135, RG 4, NHC. 

VIII Operations Problem 1J
Blue, September 1946
In early September 1946, the junior class of June 1947 was issued with Opera-tions Problem 1J, a tactical Chart and Board Maneuver involving two opposing task forces in a theater of operations of “limited extent.” The problem began on 
20 September with student officers drawing the Statement of the Problem, going 
through an orientation, and attending a lecture in the auditorium in Pringle Hall. 
In accordance with Admiral Smith’s instructions, the students worked on the prob-
lem until 27 September when, after another lecture, they began preparations for 
the maneuver the next day. The maneuver commenced on 30 September and con-
tinued until 8 October, when the students drew the Staff Solution and prepared for 
the Maneuver Critique, which took place on the 9th. The objectives of the problem 
were to have students make a tactical Estimate of the Situation, formulate a Battle 
Plan, and fight a day surface action. Another was to demonstrate the capabilities, 
limitations, and tactical employment of Blue ships and carrier-based aircraft and 
to bring out the hydrographic and meteorological features of the northern Pacific.1 
The Blue Statement: General and Special Situations
Under the General Situation, Blue and Purple were at war, their offensive actions 
thus far consisting of offensive and reconnaissance submarine patrols and a “sus-
tained” land-based-air offensive by Purple. There had been no change in the pos-
session or occupation of Pacific bases. In the Special Situation, the Blue Pacific 
Fleet was based at Pearl Harbor. Fleet Admiral CD, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific 
Fleet (not played by a student officer), organized Task Force 21, or the Alaskan 
Defense Force, from the Pacific Fleet, under the command of Admiral BA, Com-
mander, Battleship Squadron (COMBATRON) 1. TF 21 consisted of two fleet car-
riers under Rear Admiral BD, organized as Carrier Division 7. TF 21 also contained 
two fast battleships (Battleship Division 1, under Rear Admiral BX), two additional 
fast battleships, organized as Battleship Division 2 under Rear Admiral BE, and two 
battle cruisers under Rear Admiral BF (Cruiser Division 4). 
There were additionally four light cruisers of CRUDIV 17 under Rear Admi-
ral BG and nine destroyers under Captain B-2, Destroyer Squadron 4. This latter 
squadron was divided into a group of five destroyers as Destroyer Division 41 and 
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four as DESDIV 42. Captain B-3 commanded an additional nine destroyers or-
ganized into DESRON 12, comprising five in DESDIV 121 and the other four in 
DESDIV 122. Another nine destroyers were under Captain B-4 as DESRON 21, 
within which five made up DESDIV 211 and four DESDIV 212. Blue destroyers 
had wakeless torpedoes with a range of forty thousand yards at thirty-two knots, or 
eighteen thousand yards at forty-six knots. (Pages 1, 6). 
As to airpower, TF 21’s fleet carriers each had fifty-seven fighter planes on 
board; CV-39’s planes were forty-five F8F Bearcat fighters organized into two 
fighter squadrons; CV-37’s air group consisted of forty-five F4U Corsair fighters, 
also organized into two squadrons. Each carrier also had four F6F Hellcat fighters 
as photographic reconnaissance planes and eight additional Hellcat night fighters 
attached to these fighter squadrons. There were also two attack squadrons on fleet 
carrier CV-39, with twenty-four SB2C Helldiver and nineteen TBM Avenger attack 
planes, five of the latter constituting a carrier tactical electronics warfare squadron 
(VA[Q]), another four a squadron of carrier airborne early warning aircraft. Fleet 
carrier CV-37 had the same number, types, and composition of attack planes, but 
all organized into just one attack squadron. Each of the battleship division’s units 
also had four SC-1 observation planes, as did those of CRUDIV 4, while CRUDIV 
17 had eight. (Page 7.)
Blue land-based air forces and airfields in the Aleutians and western Alaska 
had been neutralized by the Purple air offensive. In addition, Blue intelligence re-
ports indicated that Purple had assembled a joint expeditionary force at Avacha 
Bay. It was apparently composed of two combat divisions and an amphibious force 
that included gunfire support groups made up of gunboats and rocket-firing ships. 
According to Blue intelligence, there was also a Purple Covering Force at Kashi-
wabara Bay, consisting of two to three fleet carriers of the Essex class, four to five 
fast battleships of the South Dakota and North Carolina classes, three to five heavy 
cruisers of the Baltimore class, three to four light cruisers of the Cleveland class, 
and three squadrons of destroyers comparable to Blue’s latest types and equipped 
with long-range torpedoes. These reports were considered “excellent” in reliability. 
Admiral BA (Cdr. 
William Kirkpatrick, 
USNR)
Rear Admiral BX 
(Col. Hallett Edson, 
USA)
Rear Admiral BD (Lt. 
Col. Richard Leary, 
USAAF) 
Rear Admiral BF 
(Cdr. George Dalton, 
USN) 
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Other “reliable” observation reports, however, indicated that Purple land-based air 
forces in the North Pacific had been reduced to “impotency” by the heavy losses 
incurred in their recent offensive. (Pages 1–2.)
Fleet Admiral CD had issued a Fleet Operation Plan, dated 20 July, that was to 
take effect upon receipt by Admiral BA. The Fleet Operation Plan assigned Admiral 
BA the tasks of preventing Purple from establishing forces ashore in the Aleutians 
and of exploiting every opportunity to bring Purple surface combatant forces in the 
northwest Pacific into “decisive” action. Admiral BA was aware that air reconnais-
sance from Pearl Harbor indicated that Purple submarines in unknown numbers 
were operating to the north of Hawaii. In addition, Admiral BA was told that neither 
carrier- nor land-based air replacements or surface reinforcements would be avail-
able to the Alaskan Defense Force for sixty days. Blue submarines were conduct-
ing reconnaissance patrols off Kamchatka and Attu and on the Cape Kamchatka– 
Cape Wrangell Line, but they were not present in sufficient strength to be used of-
fensively, and their early reinforcement was “impracticable.” However, it was not 
expected that Purple losses in land-based air strength could be made good for sixty 
days either. The rest of the Blue Pacific Fleet—less the Alaskan Defense Force—was 
to contain the Purple Pacific Fleet, less the Purple forces that were currently based in 
Kamchatka and the Kuriles. Finally, it was pointed out to Admiral BA that the Blue 
Pacific Fleet’s Service Squadron 6, Task Unit 11.2.2, would provide logistical support 
to TF 21. Moreover, fuel and aviation gasoline sufficient for the Alaskan Defense 
Force were available at Dutch Harbor and Unalaska. (Pages 2–3.)
For purposes of the maneuver, it was reported that at 0600 on 28 July, TF 21 
rendezvoused with TU 11.2.2 and fueled on a southwesterly course. Just prior to 
completing refueling, the Commander, Task Force 21 received a message from the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet stating that Purple troops had landed on 
Attu but that the Purple Covering Force was not present. Upon completion of fuel-
ing at latitude 44° N, longitude 178°15ʹ E, CTF 21 ordered Commander, Task Unit 
(CTU) 11.2.2 to operate to the eastward of 180 degrees east and south of 42 degrees 
north while awaiting orders. TF 21 then proceeded at twenty knots to Point X-ray, 
Rear Admiral BG (Lt. 
Col. Stephen Downey, 
USA) 
Captain B-3 (Cdr. 
Garrett Coleman, 
USN)
Captain B-2 (Cdr. 
Robert Webber, USN) 
Captain B-4 (Lt. Cdr. 
Frederick Taeusch, 
USN)
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latitude 47°31ʹ N, longitude 173°40ʹ E. At 0200 on 29 July at Point X-ray, CTF 21 
launched a reinforced search with bearings limited to between 330 and 020 degrees 
true out to a distance of 335 miles for the purpose of discovering the Purple Cover-
ing Force. At 0300, CTF 21 launched a day combat air patrol of twelve planes and 
landed eight night fighters. (Page 3.) 
At 0355, CTF 21 received a contact report from one of the search planes at 
52°36ʹ N, 171°30ʹ E on an enemy force composed of two fleet carriers, four to five 
fast battleships, eight or nine cruisers, and about thirty destroyers. At 0400 on 29 
July, when Task Force 21 was at 48°10ʹ N, 173°25ʹ E, the search plane reported that 
reduced visibility prevented amplification. The weather in the vicinity of TF 21 was 
wind from the southwest at Force 3, sea moderate from the southwest, and visibility 
variable from three to nine miles. Cloud cover was six-tenths, with the top of the 
cover at four thousand feet and the bottom at 1,500 feet. Sunrise had been at 0300 
and sunset would be at 2100. The first move was to take place between 0400 and 
0700 on 29 July. (Pages 3–4.)
As for Student Requirements, CTF 21 included an annex to his Operation Plan, 
laying down several battle plans covering various contingencies. One of these battle 
plans envisioned a situation approximating the one confronting him now. On that 
basis, the student officers submitted Admiral BA’s Estimate of the Situation at 0400 
on 29 July as well as their Solutions to the Problem. The students utilized data pre-
viously compiled, considered, and carried in the Running Estimate as well as all 
information received as of 0400 on 29 July. The students then provided a typewritten 
copy of CTF 21’s modified Battle Plan as well as the Cruising, Approach, and Battle 
Dispositions for TF 21. They also supplied a Communication Plan written to speci-
fication from Section E of the Maneuver Rules, and the number and location of any 
airborne-early-warning planes and any radar pickets that were to be employed as of 
0400 on 29 July. In addition, the student officers designated the day combat air pa-
trol and night fighters landed at 0300 on 29 July, providing flimsies and Flight Forms 
covering all aircraft airborne by 0400 on 29 July. Flimsies covering the movement 
of surface forces and aircraft launched during Move 1 and associated Flight Forms 
were also prepared, using Strategic Plotting Chart No. 22. (Pages 4–5.)
The Blue Chart Maneuver
About two weeks later (in game time), Admiral BA had created a Task Organi-
zation for the Alaskan Defense Force. Rear Admiral BX’s Battleship Divisions 1 
and 2 would constitute the Battleline, while Rear Admiral BF’s Cruiser Division 4 
and Destroyer Division 42 would be the Center Force. Captain BGA’s light cruisers 
CL-91 and CL-101, along with Destroyer Squadron 12, would constitute the Right 
Flank Force, and Rear Admiral BG’s Cruiser Division 17 (less light cruisers CL-91 
and CL-101) and Destroyer Squadron 21 would make up the Left Flank Force. 
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Rounding out the Task Organization would be Rear Admiral 
BD’s Carrier Group, consisting of CARDIV 7 and DESRON 4 
(less DESDIV 42). 
After reviewing the General Situation and the disposition 
of enemy forces (including the possibility of a third Purple 
aircraft carrier at Kashiwabara Bay), Admiral BA noted his as-
sumptions. He assumed that the Purple surface force that was 
reported southwest of Attu was engaged in supporting and cov-
ering the Purple landing force and that Purple would employ 
air search to the “maximum practicable extent” to locate and 
track the Alaskan Defense Force. He also assumed that Purple would employ long-
range air strikes against his force to the maximum extent permitted by weather 
conditions. Admiral BA thought that Purple submarines might be encountered and 
that Purple would accept a surface engagement to protect its landing force at Attu. 
In regard to this surface engagement, Admiral BA took for granted that Purple 
would attempt to engage at under thirty thousand yards, that the action would take 
place during the day, that visibility would be low, and that aircraft operations would 
still be “practicable.” BA asserted that his force would destroy the Purple Covering 
Force by successive air attacks followed by “major action” preparatory to destroying 
the Purple amphibious forces landing at Attu. Air and surface forces would ensure 
the full destruction of that amphibious force in order to prevent Purple from estab-
lishing forces ashore in the Aleutians.2 
Admiral BA detailed what each component would accomplish. His battle line 
was initially to engage the enemy battle line at a maximum range of forty thou-
sand yards. It was to close rapidly and maintain “extreme ranges” of thirty-four to 
thirty-five thousand yards until the rate and volume of enemy fire were reduced or 
ineffective. At this time, the Blue battle line would close rapidly to moderate ranges 
of twenty-one to twenty-five thousand yards. The battle line would provide its own 
Air Spot and battle-line Inner Anti-Submarine Patrol. There were no specific roles 
for the Center Force or the Right Flank Force, but the Left Flank Force was to pro-
tect the Blue battle line from Purple light-force attacks.3 Prior to the engagement of 
the battle lines, the Blue battle cruisers would operate offensively against the Purple 
light forces at initial ranges of twenty-nine to thirty-one thousand yards and exploit 
“every opportunity” to destroy or damage them. Blue destroyers were also to make 
torpedo attacks on the Purple battle line when directed by the Officer in Tactical 
Command. The Left Flank Force too would furnish its own Air Spot and Inner 
Anti-Submarine Patrol. Finally, the Carrier Group would locate and track the Pur-
ple air and surface forces. It would endeavor to destroy these forces by “successive” 
air attacks, with the priority of targets being the Purple aircraft carriers, then the 
Captain BGA (Lt. 
Cdr. John Aymond, 
USN) 
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battleships, heavy cruisers, light cruisers, and destroyers. These 
air attacks would commence at the maximum radius for the 
Blue aircraft. If visibility prohibited attacking priority targets, 
the aircraft were to select and destroy targets of opportunity. 
The Carrier Group was also to furnish its own antisubmarine 
patrol as well as its own combat air patrol and the combat air 
patrol for the battle line. To ensure its safety, it was to operate 
on the disengaged side of the battle line upon deployment.4
In addition, all ships and planes were to report mines and 
submarines sighted. Destroyers and antisubmarine patrol 
planes were ordered to attack submarines “vigorously,” continuing these attacks 
until threatened surface units were “well clear” of the danger zone or the subma-
rines had been “positively” destroyed. All ships and planes were to be prepared to 
attack and destroy Purple amphibious forces in Massacre Bay of Attu Island when 
directed by the OTC. They were also told that prior to deployment they were to 
follow the movement of the Blue carriers during flight operations. The direction 
to deploy would be signaled, and the Operation Plan was to take effect upon that 
signal. The Communication Plan was Commander, Battleship Squadron 1 Com-
munication Plan X-ray (which is detailed below). All units were to use Zone Mike 
(minus 12) time. Fighter direction responsibility was placed in fleet carrier CV-39 
and fast battleship BB-61, with CV-37 and BB-63 as their Relief Fighter Direction 
ships, respectively. In the Cruising and Approach Dispositions, additional fighter 
direction was assigned to designated cruisers and picket destroyers. All units were 
to use Cruising Disposition 6-R, Approach Disposition 6-N (or 6-V, as signaled), 
and then Battle Disposition 6. CTF 21 was to be the Officer in Tactical Command in 
fast battleship BB-62; Rear Admiral BX, Commander, Battleship Division 1, in fast 
battleship BB-61, was second in command.5 For purposes of the Chart Maneuver 
phase of Operations Problem 1J, TF 21 was broken down into the Blue component 
commanders: CTF 21, his Chief of Staff, and Commanders, Battleships, Cruisers, 
and Destroyers. There were also room assignments for the Commander, Carri-
ers; his Chief of Staff (also Commander Coleman) and Operations Officer (also 
Lieutenant Commander Aymond); and Commanders, Carrier Air Groups (COMs 
CVG), fleet carriers CV-37 (also Commander Webber) and CV-39 (also Lieutenant 
Commander Taeusch). Per the Maneuver Rules, these assignments included sepa-
rate rooms when the Commanders, Carrier Air Groups were in the air and when 
they were on board ship. For purposes of the Board Maneuver, commanders were 
also designated for the Battleline, the Center Force, the Right Flank and Left Flank 
Forces, and the Carrier Group.6
Chief of Staff, Com-
mander, Task Force 
21 (Cdr. Thomas 
White, USN)
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The Alaskan Defense Force’s Communication Plan was in accordance with an 
actual Pacific Fleet plan, PAC-70 (B). As noted above, it was to take effect upon 
receipt by the component commands, and it entailed a “Fox Schedule” (or fleet 
broadcast, containing traffic variously addressed to all ships and commands as-
signed to “copy” it), derived from the 9th Fleet and designated NPG (F), and trans-
mitted from Radio San Francisco. It directed radio silence until contact with the 
enemy and designated Tactical Radio frequencies, both Primary and Secondary 
Voice as well as Primary and Secondary Continuous Wave  frequencies. There was 
also a General Warning Voice frequency, as well as an Air Spot frequency. The 
Air Search and Fighter Director frequencies also had Primary and Secondary des-
ignations; the Air Search frequency was continuous wave and the Fighter Direc-
tion frequency voice. The Air Attack Common and Task Force Combat Air Patrol 
Common frequencies were also both voice. Specific ships were designated for radar 
Identification Friend or Foe, radar countermeasures control, and silence. No con-
dition of radar silence would be imposed, and all ships and aircraft were to have 
their Identification Friend or Foe transponders on. In addition, guard ships were to 
have their interrogator-responder units on and ready for actuation at all times. Ra-
dar intercept guard ships were designated for certain frequencies; the OTC was to 
control jamming. The OTC would also control radio deception and radio intercept; 
deception was to be conducted in various frequencies by selected ships. The Com-
munication Plan was rounded out with codes for various standardized commands, 
voice call signs for each component commander, and authentication instructions 
for all units.7
Communication Plan X-ray followed these guidelines but added some addi-
tional details. X-ray was to become effective upon the execution of COMBATRON 
1’s Battle Plan No. 6-46. Functional circuits with radio frequencies were now giv-
en for Talk Between Ships, Emergency Tactical, and voice. There was also a Voice 
Command Channel for Task Group Commanders, Continuous Wave Dispatch and 
Maneuvering Signals for a Task Force Common frequency, and frequencies for 
Inter-Fighter Director and Aircraft Launching and Control nets. In addition, there 
were specific tactical and voice frequencies for the Battleline, Center Force, Right 
Flank Force, Left Flank Force, and Carrier Group. Also added were frequencies 
for airborne early warning control and strike control. When the Alaskan Defense 
Force formed into its Approach or Battle Dispositions, the senior officer of each 
task group could designate ships as radar, Identification Friend or Foe, or radar 
countermeasures control and silence guard ships. Also, when picket destroyers 
were stationed, the picket ship that was controlling fighter direction was to assume 
all air-search and identification guards (that is, responsibilities for monitoring cir-
cuits), and the standby destroyer would assume these duties for all surface-search 
and recognition guards. Moreover, it was ordered that nothing was to preclude any 
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ship from ensuring that any unreported contact was brought to the attention of the 
Officer in Tactical Command. The rest of X-ray outlined in more detail the codes 
to be used, the voice calls for the component forces and their individual ship units, 
and some additional details about radar jamming. In particular, all ships equipped 
for this type of jamming were to maintain their equipment in Standby Condition 
and be ready to jam when so directed.8 
The Blue Maneuver Staff
Rear Admiral Smith’s instructions listed the personnel assigned to the Maneuver 
Staff, giving a concrete sense of how these maneuvers were organized. In addition 
to a Director of the Maneuver, there was an Assistant Director and Chief Damage 
Computer. An officer was detailed to perform the role of Assistant Director for 
Blue, another officer that of Assistant Director for Purple; there were also an Air 
Umpire, a Communication Umpire, and the Historian. Further, there were Move 
Umpires and Force Damage Recorders for both Blue and Purple and, in the Chart 
Maneuver, a number of deputies to the Air Umpire. These latter assistants com-
prised an Aerial Combat Loss Computer, a Hit Computer, an Anti-Aircraft Loss 
Computer, and two Status Board Recorders. There were also an Operational Loss 
Computer, two Radar Contact Recorders, and two civilian Plotters. Additionally 
there were four Standby Damage Computers to assist the Air Umpire if necessary. 
For the Board Maneuver, there were Damage Computers for the Battleline, the De-
tached Wing and Center, the Right Flank Cruisers and Right Flank Destroyers, and 
the Left Flank Cruisers and Left Flank Destroyers. A civilian Plotter and two civil-
ian Assistant Plotters rounded out the Maneuver Staff for Operations Problem 1J.9
The Blue Staff Solution and Board Maneuver
In early October 1946, the Blue Staff Solution to Operations Problem 1J was issued. 
After repeating the General Situation about Blue and Purple losses in the area, the 
deployment of both forces, and the Purple movement toward Attu, it stated, in a 
Tactical Estimate of the Situation, that Admiral BA had been informed by Fleet 
Admiral CD, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, that Purple troops were 
landing on Attu but that the Purple Covering Force was not present. At 0355 on 
this day, Admiral BA received an aircraft contact report indicating the presence of 
a Purple combatant force 275 miles from his present position on a bearing of 344 
degrees from him and interposed between the Alaskan Defense Force and Attu. 
Admiral BA concluded that this was the Purple Covering Force. He understood his 
mission as preventing Purple from establishing forces ashore in the Aleutians by 
exploiting every opportunity to bring Purple surface combatant forces to decisive 
action in the northwest Pacific. He understood that by defeating the Purple Cov-
ering Force—which was in itself his secondary assignment—he would be accom-
plishing his primary mission, since Purple, lacking its Covering Force, would not 
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be able to get reinforcements and supplies to Attu from Kamchatka and the Kuriles. 
He deduced that he could interfere “most directly” by attacking Purple shipping in 
the transport area at Attu, but as long as the Purple Covering Force was deployed, it 
had to be his first target. If, for instance, he attacked the Purple Joint Expeditionary 
Force with his carrier aircraft without first disposing of the Purple Covering Force, 
he would lay his ships open to serious damage from Purple carrier aircraft, which 
in turn would prevent him from carrying out his subsequent tasks.10
In looking at the Situation and Courses of Action, Admiral BA analyzed the 
Objective of Enemy Forces, Relative Combat Power, the Characteristics of the The-
ater of Operations, Time, Space, and Logistics. Concerning the Objective of Enemy 
Forces—now that Purple had neutralized Blue Aleutian and Alaskan land-based 
air forces and had troops landing on Attu, and given the location of the Covering 
Force—its intention of seizing Attu either to use it as a base or to deny it to Blue was 
clear, as were his orders to prevent this. He then compared the combat power of the 
two forces. He had two sources of information on the Purple Covering Force: an in-
telligence report and the 0355 contact report. According to the intelligence report, 
Purple had two to three fleet carriers, four to five battleships, three to five heavy 
cruisers, three to four light cruisers, and three squadrons of destroyers. According 
to the contact report, there were two fleet carriers, four or five battleships, eight 
or nine cruisers, and “about” thirty destroyers. He took the best current estimate 
to be that of the contact report. Since the pilot could not make positive identifica-
tion of all of the Purple ships, Admiral BA surmised that the Covering Force had 
thirteen large ships in addition to the two fleet carriers. These thirteen ships com-
prised either four battleships and nine cruisers or five battleships and eight cruis-
ers. “To be on the safe side I will conclude that the enemy force contains 5 BBs and 
8 cruisers. On the basis of the intelligence report I will divide these cruisers evenly 
into 4 CAs and 4 CLs.” The intelligence report gave Purple a destroyer strength of 
three squadrons. Since a destroyer squadron normally consisted of two divisions of 
four destroyers each, plus a squadron leader, that implied a total of twenty-seven 
destroyers. The aircraft contact report gave “about thirty” destroyers, which com-
pared favorably with the intelligence report. Accordingly, Admiral BA was going to 
base his plans on a Purple destroyer strength of thirty ships. (Pages 3–4.)
He could now compare his own two fleet carriers, four battleships, two battle 
cruisers, four light cruisers, and twenty-seven destroyers with Purple’s, noting that 
he had no submarines for offensive use and was unsure on that point for Purple. 
In addition, he had very little information on Purple carrier aircraft, so he con-
sidered that Purple would have the same as he did—106 fighter planes, seventy 
attack planes, and twenty-six specialized aircraft. He knew, however, that Purple 
had twenty-six observation planes to his twenty. He also knew that neither he nor 
his Purple counterpart would get reinforcements in time to affect the existing 
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situation. He took the combat efficiency of the two sides’ personnel to be the same 
and then began comparing the combat efficiency of the various types of ships. 
(Pages 4–5.)
As for fleet carriers, each side had the same number, and he thought they were 
comparable in terms of class, maximum and sustained speeds, and armor. He also 
thought that the Purple carriers were the same age as his and had identical antiair-
craft weaponry. Accordingly, he surmised that Blue and Purple carrier strength was 
the same. When it came to the battleships, however, he was inferior in numbers by a 
ratio of four to five. Still, his battleships were heavier and had a four-knot speed ad-
vantage, and he had two battle cruisers to help offset Purple’s advantage. His battle 
cruisers were six knots faster than the Purple battleships, but Admiral BA knew 
he had only thirty-six sixteen-inch guns and thirteen twelve-inch guns to Purple’s 
forty-five sixteen-inch guns. His battleships outranged Purple’s by six thousand 
yards and his battle cruisers by one thousand yards, but the battle cruisers were 
lightly armored and no match, ship for ship, for the Purple battleships. Though 
penetrative ranges could vary by several thousand yards—depending on list, roll, 
yaw, and quality of armor—a consideration of theoretical penetrative ranges was 
of value in determining the “most probable” advantageous and disadvantageous 
ranges. He thought that his battleships were more resistant to penetration at ranges 
of eighteen to twenty-five thousand yards, given favorable target angles, while he 
thought that the Purple battleships were more resistant to penetration at ranges of 
twenty-three to twenty-eight thousand yards. His battle cruisers, he knew, were 
vulnerable to Purple battleship fire at all ranges while the Purple battleships were 
comparatively invulnerable to battle-cruiser fire except at ranges over thirty-one 
thousand yards or when presenting an end-on target angle at medium and short 
ranges. (Pages 5–7.)
Admiral BA had no heavy cruisers to match Purple’s four, but Purple’s heavy 
cruisers were, he asserted, no match for his two battle cruisers. For instance, his 
battle cruisers were one knot faster in maximum speed and their guns outranged 
those of the Purple heavy cruisers by seven thousand yards. With favorable target 
angles, penetration of his battle cruisers by Purple’s heavy cruisers could theoreti-
cally occur only at the extreme range of the Purple eight-inch guns. Theoretical 
penetration of the Purple heavy cruisers by his battle cruisers, in contrast, could 
occur at all ranges in excess of sixteen thousand yards. Purple and Blue were equal 
in the characteristics and numbers of light cruisers. Still, the Purple heavy cruisers 
outranged his light cruisers by four thousand yards and were superior ship to ship. 
As for destroyers, and having no more definite information, he assumed that the 
Purple destroyers were comparable to his DD-692 class and had ten torpedo tubes 
each. Since he was not sure how many destroyers had this many tubes, he assumed 
that all of them did. He also surmised that Blue and Purple destroyers had the same 
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characteristics in other respects, but since Purple was thought to have three de-
stroyers more than Blue, Admiral BA took the Purple commander to have a total of 
seventy-five torpedoes at his disposal. The guns on Blue’s light cruisers outranged 
those of the Purple destroyers by eight thousand yards. “Their fast shooting char-
acteristics and range of gunfire make them vastly superior to a DD target. However 
the DDs have a 1.5 knot speed advantage over the CLs.” (Pages 7–9.)
Summing up, Admiral BA noted that he had a speed advantage over Purple’s 
battleships as well as a six-thousand-yard range advantage in main batteries. His 
battleships were almost three years younger and had superior antiaircraft suites. 
Purple, however, had one more battleship than he did and nine more main-battery 
guns. BA’s battle cruisers’ main batteries outranged those of the Purple battleships 
by a thousand yards and had a six-knot speed advantage but were vulnerable to 
the Purple battleships at nearly all ranges. The Blue battle cruisers, however, were 
superior to Purple’s heavy cruisers in terms of speed, main-battery range, armor, 
“life” (i.e., age), and antiaircraft defense, but Purple had four heavy cruisers to 
none for Blue. In addition, Purple probably outnumbered Blue by three destroy-
ers, and Blue was probably inferior in numbers of observation planes. Though 
inferior in numbers of battleships, Admiral BA took his speed advantage as al-
lowing him to select the range at which the engagement was fought. Given the 
theoretical penetrative range bands and the effect of target angles, he thought that 
in a battle-line engagement he would be “wise” to exploit any advantage at moder-
ate ranges under twenty-three thousand yards while presenting a forty-five-degree 
target angle. 
To get that close to the Purple battle line, he would have to compensate for 
Purple’s numerical superiority in battleships by air or light-force torpedo attack on 
Purple’s battleships. He also thought it might be possible to exploit his gun-range 
advantage to inflict damage at extreme range before closing with Purple. He took 
his main advantage over Purple to be his two battle cruisers. He thought that these 
ships could “handle” all four of Purple’s heavy cruisers and should be able to de-
stroy Purple’s light forces unless Purple opposed them with a “Detached Wing” of 
battleships. If his battle cruisers could destroy the Purple light forces, they would be 
able to bring their main batteries to bear on the Purple battle line. Moreover, even 
if the Purple battleships were not damaged by air or light-force torpedo attack, he 
thought, his battle cruisers could be maneuvered ahead of the Purple battle line 
in order to “cap the T.” He could then close with his battleships and concentrate 
thirty-six sixteen-inch and eighteen twelve-inch guns on the enemy. Even if Purple 
opposed his battle cruisers with a Detached Wing of battleships, this would work 
to Admiral BA’s advantage since his battle line would immediately become superior 
to Purple’s and he could close to “decisive” range. Overall, then, and aside from 
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Purple’s probable superiority in destroyers and torpedoes, Admiral BA took the 
two forces to be “about” equal. (Pages 10–11.) 
Turning to the weather, Admiral BA asserted that conditions in the Aleutians 
were the most unpredictable in the world. Winds up to ninety miles an hour were 
commonplace, as were generally bad weather and “howling” storms. Temperature 
ranged from 5 to 80 degrees Fahrenheit, and overcast was persistent, with occa-
sional breaks over isolated areas. There were also conditions of fog and low ceil-
ings. Clear weather typically extended only over expanses of twenty miles; clear 
weather over larger areas was seldom encountered, though the northern coastlines 
had “far better” weather than the southern ones. He also noted that southerly winds 
indicated the approach of cyclones accompanied by low ceilings; northerly winds 
followed the cyclones. In July, there was fog 25 to 70 percent of the time. Fog and 
mist could persist for days, and the fog could become quite thick. Still, he said, fog 
rarely exceeded four thousand feet and was often thin, lying close to the water less 
than a hundred feet in height. Average cloud cover in the area was eight months out 
of the year, however; 60 percent of the time, the area experienced winds from the 
southwest at speeds up to Force 3. The average wind was ten knots, but there could 
be moderate gales of Force 7. There was also minimal rainfall ten to fifteen days a 
month; average air temperature was just over 48 degrees Fahrenheit, sea tempera-
ture just over 47 degrees. (Page 12.)
Given this weather, Admiral BA considered flying conditions hazardous and 
assumed that the weather would “greatly” hinder aerial search operations. As of 
0400 on 29 July, however, the forecast indicated weather suitable for flying, though 
cloud cover was six-tenths, with cloud layer from 1,500 to four thousand feet and 
visibility variable from three to nine miles. “AEW [airborne early warning] planes 
will be of great value in tracking enemy movements if the visibility decreases.” In 
addition, he took dive-bombing to be “feasible” only if his planes could find open-
ings in the overcast. These attack aircraft, therefore, had to be prepared to employ 
glide-bombing techniques. In contrast, his torpedo planes would be suitable for 
the situation; in fact, he surmised, they could exploit the overcast cover prior to 
commencing their runs. Also, since he did not think that photographic missions 
had much chance of success, he was going to employ six of his eight photographic 
reconnaissance planes as fighters. He added that the use of radar by both ships 
and planes would be “essential.” This meant, however, that the main-battery range 
superiority in his battleships would be negated by the need to employ Radar Spot. 
Plane Spot, he was hopeful, would help in this regard. Since Purple was subjected 
to these same radar limitations, Admiral BA saw the damaging of Purple battleship 
radars as an excellent objective for his carrier aircraft. (Page 13.)
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Although both forces were equipped with long-range torpedoes, he did not 
think their longer ranges would be of much use, given visibility conditions. If the 
torpedoes were fired outside of eighteen thousand yards, the fire-control data, es-
pecially bearings, would only be approximate. At ranges in excess of visibility, fire 
control would have to be based on radar information and the effectiveness of tor-
pedo fire would be greatly reduced. He took it as probable, therefore, that torpe-
does would be fired at ranges under eighteen thousand yards and with high speed 
settings. (Page 13.)
Since sunrise was at 0300 and sunset at 2100, there would be “ample” time for a 
daylight engagement. At 0400 on 29 July, Admiral BA assessed, Purple forces bore 
344 degrees true at a distance of 275 miles from his position and were approxi-
mately fifty miles from Attu. The course and speed of the enemy force, however, 
were unknown. From his present position, Attu bore 357 degrees and was 280 miles 
away, the extreme range of his carrier aircraft. His location with respect to Attu 
would force an action by Purple. Therefore, Admiral BA intended at 0405 to turn 
his force into the wind and launch aircraft. He anticipated that Purple would do 
the same and that the forces would then close each other at a relative speed of forty 
knots. This would place them within about forty thousand yards of each other by 
1100. In view of the proximity of Attu to the Purple forces, he expected the island 
to be of use as an emergency landing field for aircraft in distress. Given the climate, 
he took it that his pilots would have a much better chance of surviving on Attu, in 
spite of the Purple landing, than if they ditched at sea. (Pages 13–14.)
In terms of the effectiveness of logistics support in relation to bases, facilities, 
and supplies, Admiral BA cited Avacha Bay and Kashiwabara Bay as locations 
that were 480 miles and six hundred miles, respectively, from Purple’s 0400 re-
ported position. Both of these Purple bases were understood to be well stocked and 
equipped for the replenishment of fuel and supplies and to be able to handle emer-
gency repairs to battle-damaged ships. Admiral BA had TU 11.2.2 assigned to him 
for logistical support; it was currently operating east of 180 degrees east and south 
of 42 degrees north. The Blue base at Dutch Harbor had fuel and aviation gasoline 
sufficient for his needs, but it was approximately 850 miles from his 0400 position. 
Admiral BA, however, had refueled Task Force 21 on the morning of 28 July and 
had supplies in ample quantities. In addition, Kiska, which was 475 miles from his 
0400 position, was equipped to handle emergency repairs; damaged ships were to 
be escorted to Kiska as the situation permitted. Given that logistics were sufficient 
on both sides, Admiral BA did not consider them to represent a critical factor in the 
present operation. (Pages 14–15.)
Admiral BA proposed to seize the initiative and set the pace rather than conform 
to Purple’s. He therefore first addressed his own Course of Action and only then 
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Purple’s capabilities that might prevent him from accomplishing his mission, rather 
than vice versa. His mission was the destruction of the reported Purple forces, and 
he had several ways to accomplish it. Purple forces could be destroyed by aircraft 
bombs, torpedoes, rockets, or guns, or by surface-ship gun and torpedo attacks. He 
considered that he was equal to Purple in carrier aircraft and probably in destroyer 
strength, as well as “somewhat” superior in heavy-ship gunfire, given his speed and 
range advantages. He also thought that he could get in the first air strike; if he was 
lucky enough to catch Purple with its planes still on board, he might, by repeated 
air attacks, complete the destruction of Purple by air alone. However, he did not 
think that he could surprise Purple to this extent and therefore assumed that an air 
strike would merely be a preliminary to a surface engagement. Also, since he could 
not deploy his destroyers with much hope of success if they were not supported by 
heavy gunfire, he surmised that his best Course of Action was to damage Purple 
by air and complete the destruction of the Purple Covering Force by heavy gunfire 
and destroyer torpedo attacks. (Pages 15–16.)
Turning to enemy capabilities, he took the Purple Covering Force’s mission to 
be preventing his interference with the Purple Joint Expeditionary Force’s landing 
on Attu. The Purple Covering Force might retire from the area. It could alterna-
tively retire during daylight and return to attempt to disable the Blue force in a 
night action, then drive it off in a daylight air and surface action. Finally, it could 
try to destroy Blue by a daylight combined air and surface action. Admiral BA did 
not think his aggressive enemy likely to simply retire. Nor did he think that Purple 
would fight a retiring engagement, given the position of Blue and Purple forces 
relative to Attu, since that would expose the Purple amphibious force. As for the 
last possibility, Admiral BA did not intend to be driven off by Purple and inferred 
that Purple would consider the attempt not very feasible. Given that destroying the 
Blue Alaskan Defense Force was Purple’s most suitable method for achieving its 
objective, Admiral BA took it as the most probable enemy action. (Page 16.)
In light of these probable courses of action by his force and Purple’s, Admiral BA 
set out a detailed analysis, first looking at air strike capability, while again assum-
ing that weather would permit flight operations. He had to ensure that the loading 
of his aircraft would permit them to reach the target and return. Helldiver bomb-
ers could carry torpedoes, but it was doubtful that they could make a round-trip 
so loaded. Therefore, he was going to arm his forty-eight Helldiver bombers with 
bombs and his twenty-two Avenger bombers with torpedoes. He had three “sys-
tems” of air strikes available. One was a combined, coordinated strike comprising 
all of his carrier attack aircraft, one was a two-strike attack, and one was a series of 
repeated strikes. Whereas it would take approximately ninety minutes for strikes 
to reach Purple and the possibility of surprising the Purple force was remote, he 
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did not think there was any advantage in sending off “deck loads” of aircraft (i.e., 
the fraction of his aircraft that could be spotted on flight decks at once) as soon as 
they were launched in the hope of finding Purple with some of his planes on deck, 
as was the method in a two-strike system. Admiral BA considered it better to wait 
until he had all of his attack planes in the air so they could proceed in one strike; 
just before arriving at the target, however, they would divide into two groups and 
attack from two different directions in order to saturate Purple’s air and ship de-
fenses, as well as to achieve maximum damage. Accordingly, he did not consider 
repeated strikes applicable in this situation. However, his returning planes could 
refuel, rearm, and strike again, and in this way he hoped to maintain “unrelenting” 
pressure on Purple’s forces, depending on the condition of his carriers following an 
enemy air strike. (Pages 17–18.)
Admiral BA listed his priority of targets as the Purple fleet carriers, then damage 
to at least one Purple fast battleship, followed by damage to the Purple battle line’s 
radar capability. He had to be certain that the Purple carriers had been so damaged 
that they were incapable of operating aircraft before his attack planes shifted to 
another target. The complete destruction of the fleet carriers was not considered 
necessary, only that they be made nonoperational and set up for complete destruc-
tion later. For this purpose, he thought that thousand-pound GP bombs would 
be the most suitable weapon. To damage a Purple battleship, he thought his best 
weapon the aerial torpedo, especially as the weather would favor its use. Thousand- 
pound bombs not needed to damage the carrier flight decks would be used to de-
stroy the Purple battle line’s radar; the Air Coordinator would decide when to shift 
the attack planes from the Purple carriers to the battleships. Once successful in 
these tasks, Admiral BA would order his attack planes to select targets of oppor-
tunity. He also surmised that radar-jamming planes could be used in conjunction 
while his planes were at the target; jamming was not to be employed, however, 
unless specifically ordered by him. Conversely to all this, BA thought that Purple’s 
logical targets for its carrier attack aircraft were the Blue fleet carriers, then the bat-
tleships, and finally the battle cruisers. He anticipated that the Purple commander 
too would execute one large strike, possibly preceded by a “fast bomber” strike. To 
counter this, Admiral BA planned to assume a defensive antiaircraft disposition 
with his surface ships as well as employ high speeds and “radical” maneuvers as the 
situation dictated. By compromising on the number of fighter planes detailed to ac-
company his air strike, he thought he could maintain a strong combat air patrol. In 
addition, by making maximum use of his airborne early-warning planes and radar 
pickets, Admiral BA expected to detect incoming raids in time to take defensive 
actions. (Pages 18–19.)
At this point, BA explored the advantages of day versus night actions. All previ-
ous night engagements with which he was familiar appeared to him to have relied 
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on the “chance factor” to an extent out of all proportion to the strength of the forces 
involved. Since he considered his present force at least equal and possibly superior 
to Purple’s, he did not want to gamble on a night action, of which the results could 
be so unpredictable. He had concluded that Purple too was unlikely to wait for 
a night action if the Blue Alaskan Defense Force proceeded toward Attu. Should 
Purple, however, decide on a night action, Admiral BA assumed he would be able 
to turn to avoid general action during the night and engage the Purple Covering 
Force during daylight the following day. In the meantime, BA would seize the op-
portunity to destroy the Purple Joint Expeditionary Force at Attu. His expectation, 
therefore, was to fight a day surface action. In order to exploit his speed advantage, 
he needed to select, with respect to wind and sea, a deployment course that did 
not impair this speed advantage. Such a course would have to permit him to steam 
downwind and allow his light forces on both flanks to execute attacks with the wind 
and sea on the quarter or astern. Such a course was not suitable for carrier flight op-
erations, but it could be taken as soon as the air phase of the engagement was over. 
He foresaw that his fleet carriers, if not disabled by then, would be able to render 
assistance at some distance from the battle lines. With the wind and sea from the 
southwest, he would deploy on a northerly course. He would then have the choice 
between a “normal action” and a “reverse action” (i.e., the battle lines steaming in 
the same direction or in opposite directions, respectively). Purple would be forced 
to deploy in the same direction to prevent being outflanked by Blue and Blue’s get-
ting at the Purple transports at Attu. A normal action would also best allow him 
to get in a light-force torpedo attack with his Van. However, he did not want to be 
bound to one plan. If he was able to force an early Purple deployment, as he hoped, 
he could dispose of his Center Forces to the Van or to the Rear, or both—whichever 
course he considered most advantageous—and accept either a reverse or a normal 
action. (Pages 19–20.)
Having damaged the Purple battle line to the extent of destroying its radar, by 
either air attack or destroyer torpedo attack, Admiral BA would close with his bat-
tleships. The other possibility for offsetting the Purple battleships’ superiority in 
number of ships—aside, that is, from exploiting the Blue battleships’ speed and 
gun range—was deployment of the Blue battle cruisers in his battle line. He did not, 
however, consider this proper since the battle cruisers were so vulnerable to battle-
ship fire; in addition, his light forces would be deprived of an element that could 
handle the Purple heavy cruisers. He hoped later in the engagement, however, to 
use the battle cruisers’ main batteries against the Purple battleships. Once he closed 
with the Purple battle line following the air strikes, he would engage its battleships 
at extreme range. Once his destroyers carried out their torpedo attack, he assumed 
he would be able to close with his battle line to moderate ranges under twenty-three 
thousand yards and destroy Purple. (Page 20.) 
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As to light forces, he had twenty-seven destroyers, all but nine of them identi-
cal. These nine differed from the rest only in that they carried five torpedo tubes 
instead of ten. It was logical, therefore, to assign these latter ships to defensive tasks 
and the others to the Van for attack. Some destroyers, however, would have to be 
detailed to protect the carriers when they proceeded to the disengaged side. He saw 
his light cruisers as best deployed defensively, in support of his destroyers. Purple, 
of course, had thirty destroyers, though these too would have to be divided among 
screening the Purple fleet carriers, defending the Rear and the Van, and constitut-
ing an attack element. He knew that the Purple commander would need at least 
four destroyers to screen his fleet carriers and thought he would then probably 
dispose of two-thirds of the remaining twenty-six in the Van and one-third in the 
Rear. Purple could evenly divide its destroyers between Van and Rear, but such a 
deployment would not provide sufficient force in either for an effective attack force. 
Another possibility would be for Purple to put all of his destroyers in the Van, but 
this would leave his Rear too dangerously exposed to an attack by Blue Rear forces. 
Such a deployment could also be an attraction for a reverse action by Blue. Since 
Admiral BA did not think a reverse action probable, he saw Purple deploying four 
destroyers to his carriers, nine more to his Rear, and the remaining seventeen to his 
Van. (Page 21.)
Admiral BA surmised that the Purple heavy cruisers would probably be used as 
a counter to the Blue battle cruisers and would lead the Purple light forces during 
the approach. On deployment, he assumed, the Purple heavy cruisers would be 
sent to the Van and the four light cruisers used as defensive support, with two in 
the Van and two in the Rear. No other disposition of the Purple cruisers on deploy-
ment appeared likely to Admiral BA since Purple would not achieve concentration 
of force in either Van or Rear but weaken both. BA considered that his own battle 
cruisers would prove decisive in the surface engagement. He therefore thought 
about exploiting their capabilities—to outrange and outlast any Purple ships except 
the battleships—to the maximum by designating them as a Detached Wing to op-
erate with the Center, help drive back the Purple light forces, and force Purple to 
deploy prematurely. If Purple tried to forestall this move by putting one or more of 
his battleships in his Center Force, Blue could seize this opportunity to press home 
an early destroyer torpedo attack and damage one or more of the Purple battleships 
that Admiral BA considered so important. (Pages 21–22.)
To do so, Admiral BA would have to place one squadron and one division of de-
stroyers in the Center during the approach. He also needed to be prepared to shift 
one destroyer division to the Rear upon deployment. This latter decision would 
depend on Purple’s battle disposition. If this action was required, BA assumed, he 
could direct the move by signal. Following the Blue deployment, BA’s battle cruisers 
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would destroy enemy heavy units in Purple’s Van and support the Blue destroyer 
attack on the battleships. He saw this use of the battle cruisers as “feasible” unless 
Purple placed a Detached Wing of one or more battleships in his Van, in which 
case, as already noted, the Purple Force would at the same time be negating its 
numerical superiority in the battle line. The result would be that BA could imme-
diately close with the Blue battle line and engage at gun ranges under twenty-three 
thousand yards. 
Following the destruction of the Purple Van heavy units, the Blue battle cruisers 
could operate ahead of the Purple battle line and concentrate fire on the battleships. 
Admiral BA could then detach his battle cruisers to attack the Purple transports at 
Attu, should the situation warrant. From the above comparison of alternatives and 
the means for accomplishing them, Admiral BA considered his Course of Action 
to be suitable and feasible. He expected major losses but also considered such loss-
es acceptable if he could destroy the Purple Covering Force. Having summarized 
that the Alaskan Defense Force would destroy the Purple Covering Force by early 
and repeated air attacks, a daylight surface engagement at moderate ranges under 
twenty-three thousand yards, and light-force torpedo attacks to assist in preventing 
Purple from establishing forces ashore in the Aleutians, Admiral BA proceeded to 
prepare his task organization and assign the various tasks for his Battle Plan. (Pages 
22–23.)
Admiral BA focused first on the protection of his force when in the Cruising 
Disposition. He knew that Purple submarines of an unknown number were at sea 
conducting offensive reconnaissance patrols; he saw these as a constant threat. 
He also saw air attack as “imminent.” Therefore, while the Alaskan Defense Force 
was in Cruising Disposition, it needed to defend itself from air attack and enemy 
snoopers by means of night fighters, a low combat air patrol, and a radar-picket 
combat air patrol. In addition, the Alaskan Defense Force had to locate and report 
the enemy’s location, movements, and composition by means of aircraft search, 
using a combination of day fighters, night fighters, and AEW aircraft. Destroyers 
—eight in number—would also fulfill roles as radar pickets and “radar guards” to 
detect and report on enemy air and surface units; the other nineteen destroyers 
would be employed in an antisubmarine screen, and fighter or attack planes would 
carry out antisubmarine patrols. (Page 24.)
The next set of tasks entailed his forty-eight Helldiver bombers destroying the 
flight decks of Purple’s fleet carriers and then destroying the radar capability of the 
Purple battle line. At the same time, his twenty-two Avenger bombers armed with 
torpedoes would disable at least one Purple battleship, while his ten electronic-
warfare planes would jam Purple radars when directed by the OTC. Forty-eight 
of his Bearcat and Corsair fighters would provide a high-cover force of sixteen 
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fighters, a bomber escort of another sixteen fighters, and a torpedo escort with the 
final sixteen fighter planes. As noted earlier, these planes would proceed as one 
combined strike, dividing near the target. (Pages 24–25.)
Admiral BA concluded that one of the requirements for Blue success was dam-
age to or destruction of one Purple battleship before the two battle lines engaged 
at decisive ranges. To this end, he assigned his battle cruisers and light forces cer-
tain tasks. His Center—the two battle cruisers of CRUDIV 4 and the thirteen de-
stroyers of DESRON 4 and DESDIV 212, all under Rear Admiral BF—would drive 
back the Purple Center Force and force an early deployment. It would then attack 
the Purple battleships with torpedoes, if the battleships were present in the Purple 
Center Force. On deployment, Admiral BF’s battle cruisers would form the De-
tached Wing and the rest of his forces would join the Blue Alaskan Defense Force in 
the Van. The Right Flank Group—the two light cruisers from Cruiser Division 17 
and the five destroyers of DESRON 12 (less DESDIV 122), all under Rear Admiral 
BG—would attack the Purple battle line with torpedoes when a favorable oppor-
tunity presented itself (this was later changed to attack upon order from the OTC). 
The Right Flank Group was also to defend the Blue battle line from Purple light-
force torpedo attacks. The Left Flank Group—the two remaining light cruisers 
from CRUDIV 17 and the five destroyers of DESRON 21 (less DESDIV 212), under 
Captain C-9—would also participate in these torpedo attacks and the defense of 
the Blue battle line. When the Carrier Group—the two fleet carriers of CARDIV 7, 
under Rear Admiral BD—detached to continue providing defense against Purple 
air attack and support the light forces and battleships on the disengaged side with 
Air Spot, it was to be escorted by the four destroyers of Destroyer Division 122. 
(Pages 25 and 27–28.)
When the Detached Wing of two battle cruisers deployed, it was to support the 
Blue Van forces by engaging the heavy units in the Purple Van. Upon the destruc-
tion of these heavy units, the Detached Wing was to concentrate its main-battery 
fire on the Purple battle line and then prepare to attack the Purple Joint Expedi-
tionary Force at Attu. Admiral BA’s battle line of four battleships from Battleship 
Divisions 1 and 2, under Rear Admiral BX, would then destroy the Purple battle 
line by engaging initially at extreme ranges. When directed by the Officer in Tacti-
cal Command and upon the completion of the light-force torpedo attacks, the Blue 
battle line would close rapidly and engage at moderate ranges under twenty-three 
thousand yards. All units were to use Zone Mike time for communications; CTF 
21 was the OTC in fast battleship BB-62; Rear Admiral BX, in fast battleship BB-
61, was the second in command. The Blue Alaskan Defense Force was to employ 
Cruising Disposition 21-R, Approach Disposition 21-AD, and Battle Disposition 
21-M. (Pages 25–28.) 
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Fig. 90 
Blue Staff Solution, Ap-
proach Disposition 21-AD
Fig. 91 
Blue Staff Solution, Battle 
Disposition 21-M
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Just as his Solution to the Problem was nearly identical to the Blue Statement 
of the Problem, so Admiral BA’s Communication Plan was virtually the same, but 
with some details added.11 The communications were now in accordance with the 
Blue Pacific Command instead of a particular Pacific Fleet communication plan. 
In addition, radio silence and radio security were to include the use of visual com-
munications in lieu of radio whenever possible. Radar was unrestricted now, but 
all ships and aircraft were to keep their Identification Friend or Foe transponders 
energized at all times and restrict their interrogators to emergency use, unless they 
were recognition guard ships. Further, all ships with two Talk Between Ships sys-
tems were to have both the Task Force Common and Task Group systems set up. 
Task Group Commanders were to relay information received on the Task Force 
Common Circuit to ships in their task groups guarding only the Task Group Cir-
cuit; and all ships were to guard the Very High Frequency Fleet Common Circuit. 
There were also now special code words for such actions as “Attack,” “Attack with 
Torpedoes,” “Aircraft,” “Retire,” “Affirmative,” and “Negative,” as well as voice calls 
for the Officer in Tactical Command and the various commanders.12 
N O T E S 1 “Operations Problem 1J: The Blue Statement,” 10 
September 1946, p. 1, Schedule of Events, folder 
2602, box 138, RG 4, NHC. Subsequent page refer-
ences, until the next endnote, are to this source.
 2 “Operations Problem 1J: Blue—Section A,” 27 
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4, NHC. 
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the battle of Midway, the Japanese Aleutians Force 
under Vice Adm. Hosogaya Moshiro attacked U.S. 
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ships as possible. Theobald planned then to use 
his five cruisers and four destroyers to engage the 
remaining Japanese surface forces with gunfire. The 
plan did not work, however, because of the weather 
and the lack of antiship strike capability among the 
Army pilots; Craig Symonds, The Battle of Midway 
(New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2011), pp. 199, 
201–202. A reverse action, with battle lines moving 
in opposite directions and chasing the enemies’ tails, 
was believed to offer significant advantages for the 
U.S. Navy, because the Japanese were expected to 
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moved away from them, their effectiveness would 
be reduced; Trent Hone, “U.S. Navy Surface Battle 
Doctrine and Victory in the Pacific,” NWCR 62, no. 
1 (Winter 2009), pp. 70–71. 




IX Operations Problem 1J
Purple, October 1946 
The Purple Statement began as had the Blue Statement, with the Schedule of Events related by Admiral Smith. The Scope of the Problem was also obviously the same, as were the Objectives and the General Situation. In 
the Special Situation, the Purple 8th Fleet, under Admiral PQ (no designated stu-
dent officer), was based on the Kamchatka Peninsula and in the Kuriles. Its major 
components were its Amphibious Force at Avacha Bay and its Covering Force at 
Kashiwabara Bay. The latter, designated Task Force 81, was under the command of 
Vice Admiral PS, who was also Commander, Battleship Squadron 2. 
The Purple Statement and Situation
Task Force 81 was composed of two fleet carriers under Rear Admiral PV, orga-
nized as Carrier Division 5; three fast battleships organized into Battleship Division 
3 and commanded by Rear Admiral PL; and two additional fast battleships orga-
nized into BATDIV 4, under Rear Admiral PR. TF 81 also had four heavy cruisers 
under Rear Admiral PT organized as Cruiser Division 2, four light cruisers under 
Rear Admiral PZ organized as Cruiser Division 14, and twenty-seven destroyers. 
Nine of these destroyers, those of Destroyer Squadron 7 under Captain P-5, were 
broken down into Destroyer Division 71 (five destroyers) and DESDIV 72 (four). 
Another nine destroyers were in DESRON 9 under Captain P-6, with five ships in 
DESDIV 91 and the other four in DESDIV 92. The final nine destroyers made up 
DESRON 17 under Captain P-8, five destroyers in Destroyer Division 171 and four 
in DESDIV 172. Purple destroyers had torpedoes with ranges of forty thousand 
yards at thirty-two knots or eighteen thousand yards at forty-six knots. Like the 
Blue destroyers’ torpedoes, Purple destroyer torpedoes did not leave wakes. Purple 
airpower matched Blue’s almost to a tee, except that Purple had four attack squad-
rons between its two carriers instead of three and twenty-six observation planes on 
its battleships and cruisers to Blue’s twenty.1
Vice Admiral PS acknowledged that Purple land-based air forces had been re-
duced to impotence by their recent air offensive. He also understood that the Blue 
Pacific Fleet, based at Pearl Harbor, had organized a task force for operations in the 
northwest Pacific. This force was apparently composed of two to three fleet carriers 
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of the Essex class. In addition, there were five to seven fast battleships and battle 
cruisers, of which three ships were definitely Iowa-class battleships and two were 
Alaska-class battle cruisers. The Blue force also had three to four light cruisers of 
the Cleveland class, and there were believed to be three squadrons of destroyers of 
the latest fleet type, which could carry long-range torpedoes. Admiral PS further 
understood that Blue land-based air forces and airfields in the Aleutians and west-
ern Alaska had been completely neutralized by the recent Purple air offensive.2
Commander, Purple 8th Fleet issued a Fleet Operation Plan, dated 10 July and 
to take effect upon receipt. The Purple 8th Fleet was to seize, occupy, defend, and 
develop Attu as an advanced air base for further operations against Blue bases in the 
eastern Aleutians. TF 81, the Covering Force, was to prevent Blue naval forces from 
interfering with the landing operations of the Purple Joint Expeditionary Force on 
Attu. All Purple forces were also to exploit every opportunity to destroy Blue naval 
forces encountered in the northwest Pacific, north of 40 degrees north latitude and 
west of 170 degrees west longitude. D-Day was designated as 28 July. Commander, 
8th Fleet’s Operation Plan included additional information for Vice Admiral PS: 
that Attu was weakly defended by a Blue garrison of about five thousand troops; 
that there were now no Blue air bases operational in the western Aleutians; that 
the Blue Pacific Fleet was at Pearl Harbor as of 9 July; and that Blue submarines in 
unknown strength were operating off Kamchatka and the western Aleutians. 
Rear Admiral PR (Lt. 
Cdr. Emmett Bonner, 
USN) 
Vice Admiral PS 
(Cdr. David Richard-
son, USN)
Rear Admiral PV 
(Col. Robert Mason, 
USAAF) 
Rear Admiral PL (Lt. 
Col. Miles Thompson, 
USA) 
Captain P-6 (Cdr. 
Harry Foley, USN) 
Rear Admiral PT 
(Cdr. Robert Rynd, 
USN) 
Rear Admiral PZ 
(Cdr. Harry Marvin-
Smith, USNR) 
Captain P-5 (Cdr. 
George Miller, USN)
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In addition, Purple submarines were on reconnaissance patrols on the line of 45 
degrees north latitude between longitudes 165 east and 175 west, as well as in the 
Hawaiian area, but they were not in sufficient strength for offensive use. Admiral 
PS was told that neither carrier- nor land-based air replacements would be avail-
able for sixty days. Admiral PS assumed, therefore, that there would be no strong 
land-based air opposition prior to or during the Assault Phase against Attu. PS also 
assumed (correctly) that Blue land-based air losses in Alaska and the Aleutians 
could not be replaced for sixty days and that the greater part of the Blue submarine 
force would continue to operate against Purple supply lines in the Far East. He 
further assumed that the Blue Pacific Fleet would continue to operate south of 40 
degrees north latitude and was insufficiently powerful to assure timely reinforce-
ment of the Blue Northwest Pacific Force.3
At 0030, 29 July—the 8th Fleet, including TF 81, having sortied from its bases 
on 26 July in accordance with the Operation Plan and the Joint Expeditionary Force 
having landed troops on Attu at 0510 on 28 July—while cruising to the southwest 
of Attu, Commander, Task Force 81 intercepted a contact report from a Purple 
submarine on a large enemy group of ships, including aircraft carriers, other large 
vessels, and destroyers, proceeding at twenty knots on a northerly course at latitude 
46°53ʹ N, longitude 173°57ʹ E. At 0200, at 52°54ʹ N, 171°00ʹ E, CTF 81 launched a 
reinforced search between bearings 140 and 180 out to 340 miles to locate the Blue 
force. Admiral PS also launched twelve day-combat planes at 0300 as he landed 
eight night fighters. Fifty-five minutes later, he received another contact report, 
this time from one of the search planes, that an enemy force of two fleet carriers, 
six fast battleships or battle cruisers, four cruisers, and about thirty destroyers had 
been spotted at 48°10ʹ N, 173°25ʹ E. Five minutes later, when TF 81 was at 52°36ʹ 
N, 171°30ʹ E, the same plane reported that reduced visibility prevented amplifica-
tion of the initial contact report. 
Meteorological conditions, of course, were the same for the Blue force, as was 
information given about the situation at the time of the first move. Student Require-
ments for Purple were the same as for Blue: an Estimate of the Situation as of 0400 
on 29 July; the Solution to the Problem; and CTF 81’s typed Battle Plan. The latter 
also supplied Cruising, Approach, and Battle Dispositions; a Communication Plan; 
the location of his airborne warning aircraft and radar pickets; and his day-combat 
air patrol and night-fighter dispositions. Just as for Blue, flimsies and Aircraft Flight 
Forms were to cover all surface and air force movements during Move 1.4
The Purple Chart Maneuver
In preparation for the Chart Maneuver, students were informed that Cruising Dis-
position 5-R was a “normal” carrier-force, day or night, high-visibility disposition. 
It was considered suitable for defense against air attack while affording “reason-
able” protection against submarine attack. The Guide was to be in the battleship 
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at the center, about which any rotation of the axis was to be conducted. Station 
assignments could be varied by the Officer in Tactical Command to suit existing 
conditions, and the screening ships would be stationed in accordance with Part III 
of USF 10B (a real-world reference). Plane-guard destroyers were to be assigned by 
the Screen Commander when ordered by the OTC. Searches, patrols, and offen-
sive air operations would also be ordered by the OTC. If emergency deployments 
were ordered, the heavy ships would be deployed in the Van, the aircraft carriers 
would retire to the disengaged side, and the Screen would divide as designated by 
the Screen Commander. All sonar-equipped ships, except for fighter-direction de-
stroyers, were to stand continuous echo-ranging watches unless otherwise directed. 
These ships were to use acoustic equipment in accordance with current doctrine. 
Battleship- and cruiser-based aircraft would be kept in Condition II readiness, 
loaded with depth bombs. Exceptions would be planes designated as lifeguards. 
Finally, antisubmarine patrols would be launched only on the instructions of the 
Officer in Tactical Command.5
At the same time, Vice Admiral PS developed his Battle Plan. Admiral PS’s task 
organization was slightly different from Blue’s in that he separated out his fleet 
flagship, fast battleship BB-60, under Captain PI (also Lieutenant Colonel Thomp-
son, USA, junior class of 1946–47), from the rest of the Covering Force. His battle 
line, under Rear Admiral PL, consisted of Battleship Division 3 (less BB-60) and 
light cruisers CL-55 and CL-57. His Center Force, under Rear Admiral PR, was 
made up of BATDIV 4 and light cruisers CL-56 and CL-58, while his Right Flank 
Force, under Rear Admiral PT, consisted of heavy cruisers CA-122 and CA-123, 
DESRON 7 (less DD-725 and DD-770), and DESDIV 171. The Left Flank Force, 
under Captain LM, comprised heavy cruisers CA-124 and CA-
132, DESRON 9 (less DD-730 and DD-731), and DESDIV 172. 
The Carrier Group, under Rear Admiral PV, was made up of 
CARDIV 5 and destroyers DD-725, -730, -731, and -770. In 
his General Situation, Admiral PS noted that “nearly equal” 
Blue forces were approaching Attu in “order to foil Purple Am-
phibious landing operations in progress.” Blue had two to three 
Essex-class carriers in Hawaiian waters, along with five to seven 
battleships and battle cruisers—two of which he was certain 
were of the Iowa class and two definitely of the Alaska class. He 
noted three to four Cleveland-class light cruisers and the estimated three squadrons 
of modern destroyers carrying long-range torpedoes. Since the Purple Joint Expe-
ditionary Force was scheduled to capture Attu on D-Day, 28 July, he understood 
his task was to have his Covering Force destroy or drive off the Blue “sea forces” 
and reduce enemy air forces by “early and repeated” carrier air attacks as well as by 
daylight surface engagement. The ultimate objective of this action was to destroy or 
drive off Blue forces attempting to interfere with the Attu operation.6
Captain LM (Lt. 
Cdr. Willard Howell, 
USN) 
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His instructions as to precisely how his units were to operate began with his fleet 
flagship, which would join BATDIV 3 in the battle line for the fleet engagement. 
His battle line was to engage the Blue battle line at extreme ranges, which meant 
between twenty-two and twenty-five thousand yards. The Purple battle line was to 
close as rapidly as possible to this range, continuing in to under twenty-two thou-
sand yards when the rate and volume of Blue fire had been reduced. As with the 
Blue Alaskan Defense Force, the Purple battle line was to supply its own Air Spot 
and Anti-Submarine Warfare Patrol. The Center Force was similarly to engage the 
Blue Center Force at extreme ranges, in order to force Blue to deploy, moving to the 
flank toward which the heavy units of Blue’s Center Force would have to deploy. 
The Purple Center Force was then to fall back on the Purple battle line and take 
position in case the Blue battle line was encountered. Purple’s light cruisers were to 
provide protection for the Center from Blue destroyer attacks. Following deploy-
ment and when ordered by Admiral PS, the Center was to join the light cruisers of 
the battle line and protect the Purple battle line from destroyer attacks.7 While the 
Right Flank held its position, the Left Flank was to have its destroyers—supported 
by its cruisers—make torpedo attacks against the enemy battle line as well as against 
the Blue battle cruisers and heavy cruisers when directed to do so by the OTC. 
The Carrier Group was given the most detailed orders of the component forces. 
It was to destroy enemy air and surface forces by repeated air strikes, employing 
maximum forces with weapon loads sized to ensure they reached the enemy main 
force. The Carrier Group was to make “concentrated” air attacks against enemy air-
craft carriers and destroyers until Blue carrier flight operations had ceased. It was 
then to deliver repeated air strikes against Blue ships, the priorities being the fleet 
carriers and destroyers and then the battleships and light cruisers. Simultaneously, 
the Carrier Group was to furnish TF 81 with combat air patrols. During the surface 
engagement, the Carrier Group was to take station on the disengaged side of the 
formation with its own destroyers, when directed to do so by the OTC, and coor-
dinate torpedo and bombing attacks on the Blue battle line. The Carrier Group was 
to provide its own combat air patrol and AEW aircraft and keep the OTC informed 
of the situation in the target area.8
The direction of deployment of Task Force 81 would be as signaled. It was fur-
ther ordered that all planes that were armed with depth charges and all destroyers 
making contact with submarines attack their targets “vigorously.” Prior to forming 
for the Approach Disposition, all ships were to follow the movements of the carri-
ers during flight operations. The Purple Battle Plan, like its Blue counterpart, was 
also to be considered in effect upon signal. Additionally, damaged ships that were 
incapable of further action were to proceed to Kashiwabara Bay. For communica-
tions, all units were to use TF 81 Communication Plan Able and use Zone Mike 
time (minus 12). 
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Fig. 96 
Purple Battle Disposition 1
Fig. 97 
Purple Battle Disposition 2
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Cruising Disposition 5-R was to be employed, as was either Approach Disposi-
tion 1, 2, or 3, upon signal. Battle Disposition 1, 2, or 3 would also be signaled. The 
Officer in Tactical Command was Commander, Task Force 81 in fast battleship BB-
60. Rear Admiral PL, Commander, Battleline, was designated second in command.9
For purposes of the Board Maneuver, TF 81 was broken down into its compo-
nent commands, just as the Blue Alaskan Defense Force had been. Student officers 
and members of the Maneuver Staff were assigned to play the roles of Commander, 
Task Force 81; his Chief of Staff; the Commander, Purple 
Battleline; Commanders, Battleline Battleships and Cruisers; 
Commanders, Center, Right Flank, Left Flank, and Carrier 
Groups; and their subordinate commanders. In the Chart Ma-
neuver, component forces were broken down somewhat dif-
ferently; roles were played as Commander, TF 81; his Chief of 
Staff; Commanders, Battleships, Cruisers, and Destroyers; and 
the Commander, Carriers, along with his Chief of Staff (also 
Commander Rynd), his Operations Officer (also Lieutenant 
Commander Bonner), and the two Air Group Commanders (also Commanders 
Foley and Howell). Just as with the Blue Air Group Commanders, the Purple Com-
manders, Carrier Air Groups would be in different rooms when they were in the air 
versus when they were on their carriers.10
Also not surprisingly, the Purple Communication Plan Able was an almost ex-
act match with Blue’s, with the exception that the Fox Schedule was transmitted 
from Radio Amchatka. Rules concerning radio silence and categories of radio fre-
quencies were the same, though the radio call signs were based more on ships’ hull 
numbers than were Blue’s. Responsibilities for radar Identification Friend or Foe, 
Radar Countermeasures Control, and silence were also assigned to certain ships 
and radar guard ships, fighter-direction ships, and radar intercept guard ships were 
listed. Ships were also designated for radio intercept and deception; radar jamming 
and radio deception were again under the control of the OTC. Guard ships, like 
their Blue counterparts, were to have interrogator-responder units on, and all ships 
and aircraft were also to have their Identification Friend or Foe transponders on. In 
addition, there was an authentication table and system.11 
The Purple Maneuver Staff 
In addition to the Director of the Maneuver, who was played by Capt. Donald Evans 
(see chapter 1), an instructor for the junior class, there was an Assistant Director 
and Chief Damage Computer—Cdr. Dale Mayberry, an instructor for the same 
class (see chapter 1)—as well as Assistant Directors for Blue and Purple, Cdr. James 
Reed (chapter 1) and Lt. Cdr. Valenti Holzapfel (chapter 1), respectively, both also 
instructors for the junior class. The Assistant Director for Purple was also the Air 
Umpire; there was a Communication Umpire and a Historian, respectively Lt. Cdr. 
Cdr. Albert Church, 
USN 
 150 BLUE VERSUS PURPLE
Cdr. Raleigh Kirkpat-
rick, USN 




Cdr. Robert Morton, 
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Lt. Col. Frank Street, 
USA
Cdr. William Rogers, 
USN
Lt. Col. Lee Wallace, 
USA
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James Curran, a reservist who was an instructor in the Department of Intelligence 
(chapter 1), and Cdr. Raleigh Kirkpatrick, another instructor for the junior class. 
Additionally, there were Move Umpires for Blue and Purple—Cdrs. Alan Nibbs 
and Kenneth Loveland, respectively, both junior-class students—and Force Dam-
age Recorders for Blue and Purple, Lt. Col. Lee Wallace and Cdr. James Owers, 
respectively, also both junior-class students. 
In Phase I, the Chart Maneuver, there were Assistants to the Air Umpire. These 
consisted of an Aerial Combat Loss Computer, played by Col. Harry Hawthorne; 
a Hit Computer, a role filled by Col. Salvatore Manzo; an Anti-Aircraft Loss Com-
puter, played by Cdr. Robert Morton; two Status Board Recorders, Cdr. Carl Si-
monsen for Blue and Cdr. Norman Gillette for Purple; and the Operational Loss 
Computer, Lt. Cdr. James Ramage. 
Further, there were two Radar Contact Recorders, Cdr. Edward Baldridge for 
Blue and Cdr. Oscar Lundgren for Purple; two civilian draftsmen serving as War 
Gaming Plotters from the Department of Tactics, John Lawton and Frederick Wag-
ner; and four Standby Damage Computers, Cdr. Edward Bridewell, Cdr. George 
O’Connell, Cdr. William Rogers, and Lt. Col. Frank Street.
With the exception of the civilians, all of these were junior-class students. Phase 
II, the Board Maneuver, saw Blue and Purple Damage Computers for the battle 
lines, the Detached Wings and Centers, the Right Flank cruisers, the Right Flank 
destroyers, the Left Flank cruisers, and the Left Flank destroyers played by the offi-
cers and civilians noted above, with the exception that in Phase II draftsman Adele 
DeMarco from the Department of Tactics served as an Assistant Plotter.12
The Purple Staff Solution and Board Maneuver
In the Purple Staff Solution to the Problem, Vice Admiral PS cited his orders from 
Commander, 8th Fleet to prevent Blue naval forces from interfering with the land-
ing operations of the Purple Joint Expeditionary Force on Attu and to exploit “ev-
ery opportunity to destroy Blue naval forces encountered in the Northwest Pacific 
north of latitude 40 degrees North and west of longitude 170 degrees West.” He 
understood Commander, 8th Fleet’s General Plan intent as to seize, occupy, defend, 
and develop Attu in order to provide an advanced air base for further operations 
against Blue bases in the eastern Aleutians. He knew that a Blue force comparable in 
size to Purple TF 81 had been located 275 miles southeast and was in a position to 
strike Purple amphibious forces at Attu by air within two hours. This enemy force 
was within air-striking distance of his force as well, and intelligence indicated that 
it contained all the combatant units organized by Blue for its operations. Any inter-
ference with Purple landing operations would come from this force; even if there 
was a second Blue force in the area, this larger one would be his major target. By 
destroying the Blue force just sighted, he would be able to prevent Blue interference 
with Purple landing operations and destroy the Blue naval forces encountered.13
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Vice Admiral PS began his Estimate of the Situation with a general summary of 
events since 26 July.14 Admiral PS confirmed that TF 81 consisted, aside from as-
signed aircraft, of two fleet carriers, five fast battleships, four heavy and four light 
cruisers, and twenty-seven destroyers, all steaming in Circular Disposition 81-R. 
The Purple 8th Fleet Joint Expeditionary Force was in the process of seizing Attu 
and Purple submarines were on reconnaissance patrols on the line of 45 degrees 
north latitude between longitudes 165 east and 175 west, in the Hawaiian area. 
They were not, however, in numbers that could be used offensively, and Admiral 
PS could not expect air or surface reinforcements. Based on intelligence estimates 
and the contact report he had just received, Admiral PS assumed that the Blue 
force consisted of two Essex-class fleet carriers, three Iowa-class fast battleships, 
two Alaska-class battle cruisers, another battleship or battle cruiser, four Cleveland-
class light cruisers, and twenty-seven destroyers of either the Sumner or Gearing 
class. Purple had designated this force the Blue Northwest Pacific Force and knew 
that the Blue Pacific Fleet itself was still in Hawaiian waters on 9 July. Blue subma-
rines in unknown numbers were operating off Kamchatka and in the western Aleu-
tians, but no other Blue force was believed to be in the area. Commander, Purple 
8th Fleet had also made the assumption that the Blue Pacific Fleet would not be able 
to reinforce quickly the Blue Northwest Pacific Fleet. It was further assumed that 
Blue submarines operating in the area had detected and reported the movements 
of the 8th Fleet, including Task Force 81 and the assault on Attu. Since the 8th Fleet 
was invading Blue territory and since the Blue force’s composition was unsuited for 
seizing a base, Admiral PS deduced that the mission of the Blue Northwest Pacific 
Fleet was to destroy the Purple naval forces engaged in the amphibious assault on 
Attu and prevent the establishment of a Purple base on that island. (Pages 2–3.)
Like Admiral BA, Admiral PS compared the relative combat power of the two 
forces. He compared carriers, battleships, battle cruisers, heavy cruisers, light cruis-
ers, destroyers, and carrier aircraft by such characteristics as number, maximum 
and sustained speeds, age, main battery and range, and automatic (i.e., 40 mm and 
20 mm) weapons. Numbers of planes were compared on the carriers and other 
surface ships, as were the torpedoes on the destroyers. Since each side had two fleet 
carriers of comparable classes, Admiral PS thought it probable that Blue aircraft 
strength was equal to his, which was a total of 202 carrier and twenty-six observa-
tion planes. Also, since he did not have any information to the contrary, he also 
assumed that Blue personnel were equal to Purple’s in terms of combat efficiency. 
Neither side could rely on land-based airpower, and he saw the two sides evenly 
matched in fleet carriers, light cruisers, and destroyers. He knew that Blue battle-
ships and battle cruisers had a greater gun range than his battleships. He also knew 
that the Blue ships had a four- or five-knot speed advantage and could command 
somewhere between twenty-seven and thirty-six sixteen-inch guns, as well as 
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somewhere between eighteen and twenty-seven twelve-inch guns. Aside from the 
weather, operating ability would greatly depend on “radar efficiency.” (Pages 4–7.)
PS thought Blue’s disadvantage of one or two battleships was offset by his two, 
possibly three, battle cruisers. In the worst case, Admiral PS thought, Blue might 
have four battleships and two battle cruisers. He also noted that the Blue battleships 
were heavier and faster than his own but had no firepower advantage. Admiral PS 
had forty-five sixteen-inch guns to match the potential mixes the Blue commander 
had. Though Blue could outrange Purple by six thousand yards, PS did not think 
the Blue guns would be very accurate at extreme ranges. In addition, the Blue battle 
cruisers were “comparatively” lightly armored and no match for his battleships, 
ship for ship. Though penetrative ranges might vary by several thousand yards, 
depending on list, roll, yaw, and the quality of armor, he felt that theoretical pen-
etrative ranges would be of value in determining probable advantageous ranges. 
Accordingly, he argued that his ships were more resistant to penetration at favor-
able target angles of twenty-three to twenty-eight thousand yards and that Blue’s 
battleships were more resistant at eighteen to twenty-five thousand. He also argued 
that Blue battle cruisers were vulnerable to Purple battleship fire at “nearly all” 
ranges but could seldom be penetrated by eight-inch gun at extreme ranges, at 
which eight-inch fire was “relatively” ineffective. Therefore, he saw Purple’s battle-
ships as “comparatively” invulnerable to the twelve-inch guns on Blue’s battle cruis-
ers, except at ranges over thirty-one thousand yards or when presenting end-on or 
broadside target angles at medium or short ranges. (Page 7.)
While noting that he had four heavy cruisers to Blue having none, Admiral PS 
admitted that his heavy cruisers would be “relatively ineffective” against the Blue 
battleships and battle cruisers, albeit “extremely” effective against Blue’s light cruis-
ers. He saw his four light cruisers as more resistant than Blue’s to penetration at 
ranges of thirteen to nineteen thousand yards. He also knew, however, that Blue’s 
battle cruisers would “somewhat” offset his superiority in heavy cruisers. As for 
destroyers, though he did not know the exact number Blue had, he thought that 
the destroyer forces appeared evenly matched. He also argued that in spite of the 
four-to-five-knot speed advantage in Blue’s battleships, Blue might have difficulty 
maintaining that high speed for sustained periods because destroyers would be un-
able to maintain station. He did not know how many torpedoes the Blue destroyers 
carried, but he knew he was inferior in battleship speed and maximum range. Still, 
he saw his battleships and heavy cruisers as either superior, equal, or in the worst 
case only “slightly” inferior to Blue’s heavy forces. He assumed that Blue would use 
his battle cruisers as a Detached Wing, to which he could oppose only his “infe-
rior” heavy cruisers—and he would have to, or see his forces on that flank driven 
back on the Purple battle line for support. In general, though, as he wrote, “If I can 
come to grips with Blue I should be superior or at worst equal in over-all fighting 
 154 BLUE VERSUS PURPLE
strength.” His best ranges for battle-line engagement were twenty-five to twenty-
eight thousand yards; he knew that Blue’s speed advantage had to be overcome by 
some means. (Pages 7–8.)
Given the positions of the two forces by this time, Admiral PS deduced that the 
Blue Northwest Pacific Fleet was within two hours’ steaming of air-strike distance 
against Attu. Since neither side could receive reinforcements and the Blue force 
was 2,500 miles from Pearl Harbor, PS thought, he could use Attu as a refuge for 
damaged ships and an emergency ditching area for aircraft. He assumed that Blue 
had refueled at sea, given his distance from his bases, and that the Blue commander 
could similarly use Kiska as a ditching area for his planes. Tying in with all of this, 
of course, was weather. Like Admiral BA, he noted how poor the weather gener-
ally was and that it could “influence the coming action considerably.” He thought 
that the wind would be favorable to him, however, since Blue would be forced to 
steam away from Attu to conduct flight operations, although Blue aircraft would 
have a tailwind en route to their objective during an initial air strike. Admiral PS’s 
force would have a headwind on their initial strike and would face the additional 
problem of having to cover the amphibious landings on Attu. Given the overcast, 
fog, and unpredictable conditions, PS also decided to use his observation planes 
to report on weather in addition to their tactical scouting functions. Admiral PS 
concluded that in order to ensure victory, he had to cut down the speed of the Blue 
battle line and reduce the effectiveness of Blue’s battle cruisers. (Pages 8–10.)
As for Blue’s possible Courses of Action, Admiral PS argued that the only 
known restrictions were that the Blue force could not be reinforced and that Blue 
land-based air had been neutralized in the Aleutians. Blue’s possible actions were, 
first, to engage the Purple Covering Force with aircraft and surface ships in an ef-
fort to destroy or drive it off and then destroy the Purple Joint Expeditionary Force 
at Attu. Blue could also engage his force with aircraft and surface ships while the 
Blue Detached Wing evaded TF 81 and destroyed the Purple amphibious forces. 
The Blue commander could likewise try to avoid the Purple Covering Force, use a 
strong combat air patrol for defense, and use his remaining aircraft for an air strike 
on the Purple Joint Expeditionary Force. Finally, Blue might strike the Purple car-
riers and avoid a surface action upon completion of his air attacks on Attu while 
preparing for a night surface action on 29 July or a day surface action on the 30th. 
Admiral PS noted the weather, the task of covering the Joint Expeditionary Force, 
and his own lack of reinforcement as the constraints on his own Courses of Action. 
(Page 11.)
One Course of Action was destroying the Blue Northwest Pacific Fleet by air 
while avoiding a surface action, but he did not think that it would be possible for 
him to destroy it completely, given his air strength. It would be possible by air 
strikes, he thought, only to knock out the Blue fleet carriers, reduce the speed of 
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Blue’s battleships, and damage its battle cruisers, so he rejected this Course of Ac-
tion as infeasible. The next possibility was to destroy the enemy force by air attacks 
and daylight surface engagement—“Preliminary destruction by air strikes followed 
by a daylight surface engagement appears to be suitable and feasible.” Last was the 
idea of attacking the enemy force by day and then avoiding a surface engagement 
until night. He did not think, however, that there was any advantage in a night sur-
face engagement, especially since it gave Blue time to close in on Attu and strike the 
Joint Expeditionary Force by air; this Course of Action was also rejected. The only 
Course of Action, therefore, was to destroy the Blue Northwest Pacific Fleet by a 
combination of air strikes and daylight surface battle. (Pages 11–12.)
Admiral PS asserted that he had tested his chosen Course of Action against the 
enemy’s capabilities and still saw his decision as suitable, feasible, and acceptable as 
to costs. He thought this because with “adequate” warning he could detach part of 
his surface or air forces to destroy Blue units attempting an end run. Some of the 
enemy alternatives entailed divided air strength; Admiral PS assumed that such a 
situation would make his task of destroying the Blue Northwest Pacific Fleet easier. 
If, however, Blue decided to fight a night surface engagement, he knew he would 
have to revise his Estimate of the Situation. Accordingly, his decision was that TF 81 
would destroy the Blue Northwest Pacific Fleet by “early and repeated” air attacks 
and a daylight surface engagement in order to prevent its interference with landing 
operations by the Purple Joint Expeditionary Force on Attu. (Page 12.)
Since his “Complementary Military Problem” was to destroy the Blue North-
west Pacific Fleet, Vice Admiral PS looked again at the assumptions he had made 
on the basis of relative combat power. He now had to consider the most advanta-
geous use of his ships and aircraft. When it came to his aircraft, his first consid-
eration was to ensure that he hit Blue first. He thought he could best ensure that 
by a fighter-bomber attack designed to put the enemy carrier decks out of action. 
Since he considered the coming air battle to be an “all out” engagement between 
the two carrier task forces, he was going to follow his fighter-bomber strike with a 
full-air-group strike. He opted for this (instead of a deck-load strike) so as to be 
sure none of his own planes remained on board while his carriers were under at-
tack. He also thought that the use of a full-air-group strike would saturate Blue’s 
antiaircraft fire. With these advantages, however, he had to accept the disadvantage 
of steaming for a longer period into the wind, thus decreasing his opportunities for 
defensive maneuvering should his carriers come under attack. His actions after the 
initial air strikes would depend on how much damage his carriers had received and 
also on the damage his planes inflicted on Blue’s carriers. (Pages 13–14.) 
In the air strike, radar-countermeasures aircraft would precede so as to simulate 
a raiding force and draw off enemy fighters while the air group approached from 
another direction. Radar-countermeasures aircraft would also accompany the air 
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group to jam Blue fire-control radars. These aircraft were also going to be used to 
track the Blue force, should conditions for visual or radar tracking be unfavorable. 
Admiral PS also wanted the radar-countermeasures aircraft to jam enemy surface 
force radars as he directed. Additionally, photo planes would accompany the strike 
to obtain damage-assessment photographs and AEW aircraft would be on station 
as well. The best tactical use of the latter appeared to be stationing one of them over 
the Purple Covering Force, one sixty miles out in the probable direction of attack 
by the Blue aircraft, and one or more to track the Blue Northwest Pacific Fleet it-
self. Given the high peak power of its radar, the airborne early-warning aircraft, he 
surmised, should be able to track the Blue force out of range of Blue fighter direc-
tion and report both enemy positions and movement by continuous-wave radio. 
Admiral PS knew he had to provide “sufficient” protection for his carriers, with a 
strong combat air patrol. He also had to schedule planes for antisubmarine patrols 
as well as Air Spot for his surface forces. Since weather could be an important fac-
tor, he would station weather-reporting planes in the probable areas of operation. 
In addition, all planes on station were ordered to make periodic weather reports. As 
of 0400 on 29 July, he had twelve fighters aloft as a day combat air patrol, as well as 
six search planes and two airborne early-warning aircraft in the air. In addition, his 
carrier decks were spotted with armed and fueled planes. (Pages 14–15.)
As for the Blue battleships and battle cruisers, Admiral PS assumed the worst 
case of Blue having four battleships and two battle cruisers instead of three of each. 
The most probable use for the battle cruisers was, he thought, in the Center of the 
Blue formation during the approach and in the Van, or operating as a Detached 
Wing after Blue’s deployment. The only way he thought he could counter these 
positions and moves was to use one or two of his battleships against the Blue battle 
cruisers until the latter’s Fire Effect was reduced. As soon as his assigned battle-
ships had dealt with the Blue battle cruisers, they would rejoin his battle line and 
concentrate their fire on the leading Blue battleship. While cruising or when enemy 
aircraft were attacking, his battleships would be used for antiaircraft defense. Since 
his own heavy cruisers could not stand up against Blue’s battle cruisers, it was also 
going to be necessary to reinforce them with one or two battleships. “Two CAs 
concentrating on one CB should work out successfully.” Tentatively, he would also 
use two heavy cruisers in the Center Force as well as one each in the Right Flank 
and Left Flank Forces. If Blue attempted a reverse action, it would be advantageous 
for him to have one heavy cruiser in the Rear. The heavy cruisers in the Van and the 
Rear would assist the light forces when they attacked. (Page 15.) 
The light forces he found evenly matched. By splitting his light forces three ways, 
Admiral PS thought, he could be prepared for any allocation of light forces that 
Blue might make. His light forces would be given freedom to exploit any favorable 
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opportunity for a torpedo attack but no such attack would be made until the Blue 
battle line was under fire from his own battleships. Also, the light forces that were 
assigned as defense elements would be used to defend the Purple battle line against 
Blue light force attacks as well as be prepared to exchange stations with the de-
stroyers assigned to offensive tasks after those ships had expended all their torpe-
does. The light forces could also be used for feint attacks on the Blue battle line. 
While cruising, light cruisers and destroyers were to form the antiaircraft screen; 
the destroyers would also be employed as an antisubmarine screen as well as radar 
pickets. After deployment, the 710-class destroyers would be assigned to escort the 
fleet carriers as necessary, depending on the operational state of the carriers by that 
time. (Pages 15–16.)
In his consideration of surface tactics to destroy the Blue Northwest Pacific 
Fleet, Vice Admiral PS first had to ensure that he kept TF 81 interposed between 
the Blue force and Attu so as to prevent the Blue force from making an end run 
with its superior speed. He also had to take into account the effect of wind and 
sea on the speed of the Blue battleships, the use of aircraft, and the employment 
of light forces. Additionally, he needed to assess Blue’s speed advantage, use of his 
battle cruisers, visibility, and maximum-range advantage. As to the type of action 
to be fought, he had to choose between normal, reverse, and retirement actions. 
Since Admiral PS desired to close the range, a retirement action would not be to his 
advantage: “I must not let the enemy maneuver into position so that he can fight a 
retirement action towards Attu.” With superior speed, a Blue reverse action might 
enable the Blue Northwest Pacific Fleet to circle the rear of Purple Task Force 81. In 
order to prevent Blue from fighting a reverse action, Admiral PS surmised, he had 
to make his Rear strong enough to make the option “unattractive” to Blue. Since he 
had a stronger battle line and he desired a decisive action, it appeared to him that 
a normal action would be best. Still, he thought he could fight a reverse action for 
short periods of time and then reverse to a normal action in time to prevent Blue 
from getting at Attu. (Page 16.)
Given the necessity of keeping his force interposed between Attu and the Blue 
Northwest Pacific Fleet, Admiral PS thought that, in general, he had to conform to 
Blue’s movements as to deployment course. The best deployment course for TF 81 
would be into the wind and sea, as this would reduce the enemy’s maximum useful 
speed, take Blue away from Attu, and facilitate Purple air operations. If he deployed 
to the south or southwest, there was no assurance that Blue would follow. If the 
general bearing line of the two forces on the approach was roughly north–south, 
Admiral PS would favor deployment to the west, as this would also reduce the en-
emy’s maximum useful speed. PS wanted to attempt to gain the windward position, 
since his light forces would then have both the wind and sea with them in attacking. 
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He thought that these factors would allow those forces to get into their attack posi-
tions more quickly and that the windward position would permit a more effective 
use of smoke screens. (Pages 16–17.)
Admiral PS thought that he should close to twenty-five to thirty thousand yards 
for the best results, avoiding the eighteen-to-twenty-three-thousand-yard zone. He 
did not think that Blue would desire to remain at extreme ranges because of the 
poor return on ammunition expended and the poor visibility, necessitating Radar 
Spot or indirect fire with Plane Spot. Either of these would give lower Fire Effect 
than would closer ranges. He knew, however, that he would be able to close the 
range only if he was able to slow down the Blue battle line with an air attack, the sea 
reduced Blue’s maximum speed, or the Blue commander decided himself to close 
the range. The presence of Blue battle cruisers made the use of a Purple Detached 
Wing “almost” mandatory. Admiral PS knew he had to use a battleship to form 
a Detached Wing on the approach and station this unit so as to counter a Blue 
Detached Wing. He planned on forming his Detached Wing with one battleship 
and two heavy cruisers, though he was not going to “tie down” the heavy cruisers 
by having them operate in formation with the battleship. That, he argued, would 
deprive them of full use of their capabilities. 
While his battleship engaged one Blue battle cruiser with six of its guns and the 
other with its remaining three, the second battle cruiser could be taken under fire 
by the heavy cruisers, thus giving the second Blue battle cruiser a “multiplicity” of 
targets. As to his light forces, he thought that the best distribution in a normal ac-
tion would be with two-thirds of these forces in the Van and one-third in the Rear. 
He knew that the distribution of Blue’s light forces might change the allocation of 
the Purple light forces, but he concluded that a normal action with a Detached 
Wing on a deployment course within the southern semicircle, northwest to south-
east, at a range of twenty-five to thirty thousand yards was his best tactical option. 
(Pages 17–18.) 
PS focused on four factors that would influence his air tactics. One was the rela-
tive distance between the Blue and Purple forces, while another was the movement 
of the two forces after they launched their aircraft. In addition, the combat radii of 
the aircraft mattered, as did weather conditions. As of 0400 on 29 July, with the two 
forces 275 miles apart, Admiral PS assumed that Blue had detected his force and 
had been in contact since at least TF 81 had discovered the Blue Northwest Pacific 
Fleet. As for aircraft combat radii, the Bearcat fighter had a radius of three hundred 
miles if loaded with a belly tank and two thousand-pound bombs. The Helldiver 
bomber had a range of 230 miles if loaded with a torpedo and 245 miles with one 
two-thousand-pound or two thousand-pound bombs. If a Helldiver bomber had 
one thousand-pound bomb and a drop tank, its range was 335 miles; the Avenger 
bomber had a range of 425 miles with two wing tanks and one torpedo. If the Blue 
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force headed south after launching aircraft, it would be out of range of Admiral PS’s 
Helldivers that were loaded with torpedoes or two-thousand-pound bombs. Blue 
had to advance to the north to accomplish his mission, but Admiral PS thought that 
the Blue commander could momentarily head south until certain that the Purple 
air attacks had failed. The same situation also applied to Blue if Admiral PS headed 
north. (Page 18.)
However, Admiral PS had available AEW aircraft that he thought would pro-
vide “excellent” information as to enemy movements. Although he would like to 
have loaded all of his Helldivers with torpedoes, he could not, because he needed 
some attack planes armed with bombs to be carrying out strikes at the same time as 
the attack planes armed with torpedoes as a way to saturate Blue’s antiaircraft de-
fenses. None of the above, moreover, would affect his initial fighter-bomber strike 
with Bearcat fighters loaded with two thousand-pound bombs each. A compro-
mise load for the attack-plane strike, however, had to be devised. There would be 
thirty Helldiver bombers loaded with one thousand-pound bomb each, in addition 
to drop tanks; eighteen more Helldiver bombers loaded with torpedoes; twenty-
two Avenger bombers with torpedoes and wing tanks; and twenty-one escorting 
fighters. Should information from tracking aircraft indicate that Blue had turned 
away, the eighteen Helldiver bombers with torpedoes would be recalled in order 
to prevent their loss. The remaining aircraft, he thought, had sufficient combat 
radii to cover that contingency. He also surmised that his TF 81, after launching 
two strikes, would turn away and maintain a distance of 275 miles from Blue until 
the enemy carriers were hit. This would prevent Blue from utilizing the maximum 
loading on his planes. Admiral PS’s subsequent maneuvers would depend on the 
damage suffered by Blue and received by Purple. He further noted that weather 
conditions in Blue’s vicinity might preclude dive- and glide bombing, so Purple 
planes had to be prepared to make the best attack possible under the existing condi-
tions. (Pages 18–19.) 
For the “Concept of the Battle Plan” section of his analysis, Vice Admiral PS 
reiterated that the enemy force just sighted was formidable, had equality in air and 
light forces, and was superior in the speed and gun range of its heavy forces. In 
order to ensure victory, Admiral PS knew he had to gain control of the air first; he 
saw a high-speed strike to put Blue’s carrier decks out of action as essential for 
gaining air control. A heavy attack plane strike would finish off the fighter-
bombers’ strike mission if necessary; then the Blue battleships could be slowed 
with an aerial torpedo strike. The third priority for his air group was the destruc-
tion of Blue’s battle cruisers. (Page 19.)
He was then going to approach Blue with a strong Center Force, including one 
battleship and two heavy cruisers to deal with Blue’s battle cruisers should they be 
in the Blue Center on the approach. The Purple Center would attempt to “hurry, 
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hamper or force the 
deployment of the en-
emy.” Since his battle-
ship in the Detached 
Wing would have no 
speed advantage over 
the Blue battle line, he 
thought it might be 
necessary upon de-
ployment for the Pur-
ple battle line to slow 
or reverse course in 
order to permit his De-
tached Wing to attain 
its station in his Van. 
At this point, the Pur-
ple battle line would 
close in for a normal 
action at ranges be-
tween twenty-five and 
thirty thousand yards 
to destroy the Blue 
battle line by gunfire. 
Again, he thought that 
his best deployment 
course was within the 
southern semicircle, 
between northwest 
and southeast, so as to 
keep between the Blue 
Northwest Pacific Fleet and Attu. He assumed Blue would employ its battle cruis-
ers as a Detached Wing in its Center on the approach and then in the Van upon 
deployment. Since his own heavy cruisers were no match for the Blue battle cruis-
ers, two of the heavy cruisers would be accompanied by the battleship in the Purple 
Detached Wing. His Detached Wing would also be in his Center on the approach 
and would maneuver thereafter as necessary to counter the operations of the Blue 
Detached Wing. If Blue did not deploy a Detached Wing, the Purple battleship 
would join the Purple battle line upon deployment, while the heavy cruisers would 
join the Van. (Pages 19–20.)
Fig. 98 
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Vice Admiral PS was going to station a heavy cruiser, two light cruisers, and five 
destroyers on each flank during the approach. On deployment, the heavy and light 
cruisers in the Van would attack simultaneously with the destroyers, on signal. If 
the Detached Wing was operating in the Van, the Van would consist of one battle-
ship, three heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and fourteen destroyers. The light 
forces would then seize opportunities that might present themselves for torpedo 
attacks after the Blue battle line came under Purple main-battery fire. If the air 
strikes had slowed the enemy force and the gunfire action was progressing “favor-
ably,” Admiral PS thought that the light-force attack might not even be necessary. 
He stressed, however, that every effort had to be made to deny information about 
the Purple force to Blue: “This is all-important to the ultimate victory.” He thought 
this aim could be accomplished by taking advantage of local weather conditions, 
such as keeping TF 81 in areas of bad weather during air attacks and while be-
ing shadowed. In addition, covertness could be accomplished by destroying Blue 
snoopers and spotting planes, employing radar jamming on known frequencies, 
and observing strict communications discipline. Damage inflicted on the enemy by 
Purple air attacks and on Purple TF 81 by Blue’s air attacks might also necessitate a 
change in the Battle Plan. (Page 20.)
In devising the tasks for his Battle Plan and creating his task organization, Ad-
miral PS divided “Cruising Tasks” and “Battle Tasks” by unit type. His carrier, or 
“Air,” forces, comprising the two fleet carriers of CARDIV 5 and the four destroyers 
of Destroyer Division 172, were under the command of Rear Admiral PV. The car-
rier aircraft were to defend Task Force 81 from enemy air attack and provide infor-
mation on the enemy as well as furnish a thirty-plane combat air patrol. A further 
seven specialized planes would take part in airborne early-warning, search, and 
contact-scouting operations. In addition, nine fighter planes and thirty-six fighter- 
bombers would put the Blue carriers out of action. Another twenty-one fighters 
and seventy attack planes would inflict maximum damage on the Blue surface 
force, slowing its battle line with torpedo attacks and destroying its battle cruisers. 
The priority of targets here was to be the battleships, then the battle cruisers, and 
finally the light cruisers. Air was also to obtain and maintain air control before 
contact with the enemy and then support the light-force attacks, on deployment, 
by striking Blue light forces with rocket attacks, as directed by the OTC. The carrier 
aircraft were additionally to protect Purple spotting planes and destroy Blue’s spot-
ting planes, as well as have smoke tanks ready for use. (Pages 21–26.) 
Admiral PS’s observation planes were to furnish antisubmarine patrols and 
weather planes. Eight of these planes would scout, another thirteen would provide 
Air Spot, and the remaining five would provide the antisubmarine patrols. The bat-
tleships and cruisers that launched these planes would provide antiaircraft screens 
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for the carriers and radar guards as assigned, while the destroyers would also pro-
vide part of the antiaircraft screen, serve as radar guards and pickets, and provide 
antisubmarine sound screens. The battleships would be organized into the battle 
line, four battleships from Battleship Divisions 3 and 4 under the command of Rear 
Admiral PL. The battle line was ordered to destroy the Blue battle line by normal 
action between twenty-five and thirty thousand yards in which it provided its own 
Air Spot. Its secondary mission was to support the light forces engaged in the tor-
pedo attacks on the Blue battle line. The Detached Wing of one battleship and two 
heavy cruisers was under the command of Rear Admiral PR. On the approach, it was 
ordered to take station in the Center and drive back the Blue Center Force, thereby 
forcing a Blue deployment. It was also to coordinate the operations of the Center 
and upon deployment 
to destroy the Blue De-
tached Wing and then 
support the Purple light 
forces. (Pages 21–26.)
The Center was com-
manded by Captain P-5 
and consisted of thir-
teen destroyers, from 
Destroyer Squadron 7 
plus DESDIV 92. This 
force was to defend the 
area ahead between the 
forces on its own flanks 
against attacks by Blue 
light forces, aircraft, and 
submarines, as directed 
by the commander of 
the Detached Wing. On 
deployment, DESRON 
7 would join the Van, 
while DESDIV 92 would 
join the Rear. The Left 
Flank was under Rear 
Admiral PZ and consist-
ed of one heavy cruiser, 
two light cruisers, and 
the five destroyers of Destroyer Division 171. It had no particular tasks assigned. 
The Right Flank, under Rear Admiral PT, however, was to attack the Blue battle line 
Fig. 99 
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with torpedoes when a 
favorable opportunity 
arose and at the discre-
tion of the flank com-
manders. The forces in 
the Rear were also to 
feint torpedo attacks 
as ordered by the Van 
commander. The Right 
Flank Force was then to 
defend the Purple bat-
tle line from Blue light-
force torpedo attacks, 
furnish its own Air 
Spot, and make smoke 
as directed by the flank 
commanders. To carry 
out its tasks, the Right 
Flank had been given 
a heavy cruiser, a light 
cruiser, and the five de-
stroyers from DESDIV 
91. (Pages 21–26.) 
As to his dispositions, Admiral PS’s primary consideration in the Cruising Dis-
position was defense against air attack, with submarines a secondary consider-
ation. He also wanted his Cruising Disposition to facilitate air operations in order 
to launch his air strikes on Blue. Since Cruising Disposition 81-R best met these 
requirements, Admiral PS’s orders were for TF 81 to employ that formation during 
its early approach. When it came to the Approach Disposition, he would signal this 
formation only when “reasonably” secure from enemy air attack. Due to variable 
visibility and the fact that Blue and Purple deployment directions were uncertain, 
he thought it was best to split his light forces three ways, keeping his destroyer 
squadrons and divisions together as much as possible. Since Approach Disposition 
81-A fit this tactical situation, he would use it, with modifications if conditions war-
ranted. He was anticipating all this when he cautioned his units to be ready to go 
straight from their Cruising to Battle Dispositions, specifically Battle Disposition 
81-B, which best fit a normal action (to be consistent with earlier renditions of this) 
with a preponderance of light forces in the Van plus the employment of a Detached 
Wing, as necessary or desirable. The Battle Plan was to go in effect upon receipt, 
with CTF 81 in fast battleship BB-60 as the OTC and Rear Admiral PL in BB-58 
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as the second in com-
mand. (Pages 21–26.) 
The Purple Commu-
nication Plan mirrored 
Blue’s exactly in terms of 
categories, effective date, 
frequencies and circuits, 
code words, and voice 
calls. (Pages 27–30.)
The Critique
Several days later, a 
Critique of Operations 
Problem 1J was held in 
the Maneuver Room of 
Luce Hall for both Blue 
and Purple. While the 
dialogue of the Critique 
was not recorded, its for-
mat and organization 
provide some sense of 
what the Naval War Col-
lege Staff thought was 
important for the stu-
dent officers in the lessons of the exercises and maneuvers. Student officers gave 
five-minute presentations on the indicated portions of their own and the staff ’s 
solutions. Staff comment followed “when and as appropriate.” Students for both 
Blue and Purple were assigned to talk about the “Estimate of the Mission,” with 
Commander Bridewell presenting for Blue and Commander Lundgren present-
ing for Purple. In addition, there was an “Estimate of the Situation.” These lat-
ter discussions were further broken down into Blue and Purple presentations on 
“Relative Combat Power Considerations,” presented by Commander Simonsen 
for Blue and Commander Gillette for Purple; “Other than Relative Combat Power,” 
with Colonel Manzo presenting for Blue and Colonel Hawthorne presenting for 
Purple; “Enemy Capabilities,” presented by Commander Morton for Blue and Lieu-
tenant Commander Ramage for Purple; and “Own Courses of Action,” with Lieu-
tenant Colonel Wallace for Blue and Commander Owers for Purple. Then were 
the presentations “Analysis of Opposing Courses of Action,” by Commander Bal-
dridge and Lieutenant Commander Taeusch for Blue and Commander O’Connell 
for Purple, and “Comparisons of Own Courses of Action and the Decision,” by 
Commander Rogers for Blue and Lieutenant Colonel Street for Purple. These were 
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followed by “Complimentary Problems,” with Commander Nibbs and Lieutenant 
Colonel Downey presenting for Blue and Commanders Loveland, Marvin-Smith, 
and Miller for Purple; “Battle Plan,” delivered by Commander White for Blue and 
Commander Church for Purple; “Dispositions,” by Commander Rogers for Blue 
and Lieutenant Colonel Street for Purple; and “Communication Plans,” analyzed 
by Lieutenant Commander Curran (see chapter 1). A summary by Captain Evans 
(chapter 1) was also included.15
The Critique included an analysis of the Air Action, which comprised the Chart 
Maneuver. Here, the analysis included pre sentations on the “OTC’s Plan and the 
General Execution ofthe Air Action,” with Commander Kirkpatrick presenting for 
Blue and Commander Richardson for Purple. There was also a category on air op-
erations in general, delivered by Lieutenant Colonel Leary for Blue and Colonel 
Mason for Purple, and a summary by the Air Umpire (Lieutenant Commander 
Holzapfel) and his assistants on the “Use of Search Planes, the Use of Airborne 
Early Warning Planes and Pickets, Strikes, Interceptions, Anti-Aircraft Fire, Dam-
age to Ships, and Operational Losses.” Officers involved here included Colonels 
Hawthorne and Manzo, Commanders Morton, Gillette, Simonsen, Lundgren, Bal-
dridge, Bridewell, O’Connell, and Rogers, Lieutenant Colonel Street, and Lieuten-
ant Commander Ramage, along with Mr. Lawton and Mr. Wagner. This phase also 
entailed a discussion of communications by Lieutenant Commander Curran as well 
as a conclusion by Captain Evans and Commander Raleigh Kirkpatrick before pre-
sentations on the surface action—which constituted the Board Maneuver—began.16
Here, the categories included the “Officer in Tactical Command’s Plans”— 
analyzed by Commander Kirkpatrick for Blue and Commander Richardson for 
Purple—and then the action. This latter category broke down into “Approach” 
and “Deployment,” explored by Kirkpatrick and Richardson again; “Center Force 
Action,” critiqued by Commander Dalton for Blue and Lieutenant Commander 
Bonner for Purple; “Battle Line Action,” carried out by Colonel Edson for Blue 
and Lieutenant Colonel Thompson for Purple; “Detached Wing Action,” analyzed 
by Dalton and Bonner again; “Light Forces in the Van,” delivered by Commander 
Coleman, Commander Webber, and Lieutenant Commander Aymond for Blue, 
with Commander Foley, Commander Marvin-Smith, and Lieutenant Commander 
Howell looking at Purple’s role; and “Light Forces in the Rear,” explored by Lieu-
tenant Colonel Downey and Lieutenant Commander Taeusch for Blue, and Com-
manders Rynd and Miller for Purple. Thereafter was a talk on the “Officer in Tacti-
cal Command’s Future Intentions,” with Commanders Kirkpatrick and Richardson 
again fulfilling this role, and then a summary that focused on “Damage,” “Fire 
Control,” and “Radar,” analyzed by Commanders Mayberry and Owers with Lieu-
tenant Colonel Wallace, respectively; “Ship Handling,” explored by Commanders 
Loveland and Nibbs; “Communications,” by Lieutenant Commander Curran; “Blue 
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Operations,” looked at by Commander Reed (see chapter 1); and “Purple Opera-
tions,” looked at by Lieutenant Commander Holzapfel, followed by “Conclusion to 
the Critique” by Captain Evans.17


X Operations Problem 2
Purple, September–October 1946 
Operations Problem 2 was the next maneuver. Its purpose for the senior class of June 1947 was to give practice to students in making an Estimate of the Situation, to prepare directives from that Estimate, and to study the char-
acteristics of the North Pacific theater of operations. In addition, students would 
get practice in dealing with different types of aircraft and ships. Finally, students 
would execute a planned action by means of a Chart Maneuver.1 On 26 September, 
Rear Admiral Smith provided students with the Detail of the Maneuver Staff—that 
is, staff personnel assignments. For Operations Problem 2, there was to be a Direc-
tor of the Maneuver, Capt. Einar Johnson, an instructor in the Naval War College’s 
Department of Strategy. Two other instructors from the same department, Capt. 
Harry McIllhenny and Cdr. Frank Acker, were the Assistant Directors and Plotting 
Officers for odd- and even-numbered moves, respectively. An additional instructor 
from the Department of Strategy, Capt. Paul Crosley (see chapter 1), was the Move 
Umpire for Blue and Purple, with Capt. Richard Dole (an instructor in the Naval 
War College’s Department of Correspondence Courses) as the Assistant Move Um-
pire for Blue and Capt. Dashiell Madeira (a student in the June 1947 senior class), 
as the same for Purple. Cdr. Henry Haskell, a reservist and an instructor in the 
Naval War College’s Department of Intelligence, was the Communication Umpire 
for Blue and Purple. Commander Haskell’s Assistant Communication Umpire for 
Blue was Capt. Edwin Taylor, a student in the June 1947 senior class, and the Assis-
tant Communication Umpire for Purple was another senior student, Capt. William 
Outerbridge. The Air Umpire was Capt. George Montgomery, an instructor in the 
Naval War College’s Department of Strategy. He had two Assistant Air Umpires, 
Cdr. Lauren Johnson, an instructor in the Naval War College’s Department of Tac-
tics (see chapter 1), and Capt. George Van Deurs, a student in the June 1947 senior 
class. Finally, the Maneuver Staff comprised a Damage Umpire, Captain Johnson; 
a Plotter, draftsman Charles Ward; and three additional draftsmen from the same 
section and department, Mr. Wilson and Philip Gaudet as the Assistant Plotters, 
and one Mr. Scannevin as the Historian.2
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The Purple Statement: The General Situation 
In the General Situation, relations between Purple and Blue had deteriorated “con-
siderably” since the defeat of Germany and Japan in 1945, and there was little hope 
of bettering those relations. Purple’s aim was “naturally” to better its position in 
world affairs, provide for its “natural” expansion, and ensure its future security. 
Understanding that it would be looked on with suspicion by other powers, Purple 
was nevertheless willing to accept war to advance and protect its interests: “Blue 
and Purple have not declared war, but the implications are plain.” The General Situ-
ation also illustrated that Blue was now in possession of the Japanese home islands, 
the Ryukyus, and Korea south of 38 degrees north latitude. Purple, of course, was 
occupying Sakhalin, the Kuriles, and Korea above 38 degrees north. Purple had 
withdrawn from Manchuria, but its effective encirclement gave it “virtual” control 
of that province. (Page 3.)
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Blue naval forces in the Pacific had been strengthened, and the Blue Army had 
been brought to full strength. In addition, Blue had activated its principal bases in 
the Aleutians as well as its minor bases, and Blue land-based airplanes had been 
seen over the Kurile Islands. Blue bases in the Aleutians were “adequately” equipped 
with the latest types of radars, antiaircraft batteries, communications equipment, 
ground-control equipment, and “FIDO” (fog intensive disposal, or dispersal, equip-
ment, for clearing fog from in front of moving equipment and vessels). Blue bases 
in Alaska and the Aleutians included a naval air station at Sitka that could accom-
modate thirty carrier-type planes. The base had only a limited seaplane capability, 
but seaplanes could be tended at nearby Juneau. There was also an airfield and 
seaplane area at Skagway, a naval auxiliary air facility at Yakutat, and another naval 
auxiliary air facility at Annette Island. Kodiak Naval Air Station also had a naval 
operating base and a submarine base. The naval air station housed three airstrips 
between five and six thousand feet long, all of them able to handle the heaviest 
aircraft. These fields could accommodate thirty fighters and twenty naval patrol 
planes in Normal Conditions, while 280 fighters, 144 naval patrol planes, and ten 
very-long-range aircraft could be accommodated under Emergency Conditions. 
For purposes of the maneuver, there would be ten fighters, sixteen naval patrol 
bombers, and five very-long-range aircraft at Kodiak under Normal Conditions, 
136 fighters and seventy-six naval patrol bombers under Emergency Conditions. 
The submarine base had complete facilities, and the harbor had facilities of twelve 
berths for destroyers or ships under five hundred feet length, or three for cruisers 
or ships over five hundred feet. (Pages 1–2.)
At Cold Bay, Alaska, Purple noted, Blue had an airstrip of 7,500 feet and another 
of five thousand, the larger of which could handle B-29 Superfortress very heavy 
bombers. These facilities could also park fifteen Navy transport planes, ten fighters, 
and five naval patrol planes. Cold Bay had no seaplane facilities, and its only har-
bor facilities were five mooring buoys, but seaplanes could take off and land there. 
Dutch Harbor had an airstrip of 4,300 feet, but local conditions restricted the size 
of the planes that could operate there to PBY Catalina naval patrol bombers and 
R4D transport planes. The field could, however, take twenty-four fighters under 
Normal Conditions and forty-eight under Emergency Conditions, and it could ac-
commodate twenty-four PBM Mariners. Its harbor could also handle battleships, 
heavy and light cruisers, and destroyers. For Operations Problem 2, Dutch Harbor 
would have nine fighters and nine naval patrol bombers during Normal Conditions 
and eighteen of each type under Emergency Conditions. (Pages 2–3.)
The Blue base on Unalaska also had a Navy fueling base on nearby Akutan Is-
land, a Navy auxiliary air facility at Otter Point, a seaplane anchorage at St. Law-
rence, and an emergency land-based and seaplane area at Sand Point. Adak had a 
naval air station with four airstrips, varying in length from 5,277 to 7,800 feet, that 
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could handle Catalinas, R5D transport planes (larger than the R4D), and Superfor-
tresses. It also had limited seaplane facilities for six naval patrol bombers and could 
handle between 435 and 612 fighters during Normal and Emergency Conditions, 
respectively, 275 to 340 naval patrol bombers, and between ninety-five and 116 
very-long-range aircraft. During the maneuver, however, there would be 210 fight-
ers, 130 naval patrol planes, and thirty-six very-long-range aircraft during Normal 
Conditions. During Emergency Conditions, Adak would have 315 fighters, 172 
naval patrol bombers, and fifty-four very-long-range aircraft. Adak had unlimited 
anchorage for all classes of ships, while Amchitka only had buoys for three cruis-
ers. Amchitka had airfields between 5,255 and 10,220 feet in length that could take 
Superfortresses or other planes up to forty-five thousand pounds in weight, as well 
as between 150 and 250 naval patrol bombers (Normal and Emergency Conditions, 
respectively). For purposes of Operations Problem 2, though, Amchitka would 
have fifty fighters, fifty naval patrol bombers, and a hundred very-long-range air-
craft during Normal Conditions, a hundred fighters, a hundred naval patrol bomb-
ers, and 150 very-long-range aircraft in emergencies. (Pages 3–4.)
Map 6
North Pacific Ocean: 
Eastern Part
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The Blue base at Tanaga had one airstrip of five-thousand-foot length that could 
handle aircraft up to sixty thousand pounds in weight but had limited service fa-
cilities. It could take five Catalinas or five PB4Y-2 Privateer naval patrol bombers, 
but it only had limited harbor facilities, usable for small craft of less than twenty- 
foot draft. Sand Bay had unlimited seaplane tender facilities and four square miles 
of anchorage for all classes of ships but no land-plane area. There was also a Navy 
auxiliary air facility at Atka, a Navy fuel base and emergency seaplane area at Great 
Sitkin; a weather station and emergency seaplane area at Kanaga; and a ship an-
chorage, emergency landing field, and emergency seaplane area at Kiska. Attu had a 
naval air station and a naval submarine base. Its airstrips numbered two, both 6,500 
feet in length, that could take airplanes weighing sixty-four thousand pounds. 
Attu had a seaplane area in Casco Bay, though seaplanes larger than PBM Mari-
ners could not be accommodated. Attu could, however, handle 192 fighters and 
ninety-six naval patrol bombers under Normal Conditions, 480 fighters and 240 
naval patrol bombers under Emergency Conditions. For the Chart Maneuver, the 
strength at the air base would be forty-eight fighters and seventy-two naval patrol 
Map 7
North Pacific Ocean: 
Middle Part
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bombers under Normal Conditions, 120 fighters and 180 naval patrol bombers 
in emergency. Its harbor facilities were also significant, with seven cruiser buoys, 
thirty-five destroyer anchorages, and twenty-one additional berths for battleships 
or cruisers along with aviation gasoline, fuel oil, and diesel oil available from shore 
tanks, which delivered the fuel by barge. (Pages 4–5.)
Shemya also had airstrips, three between 5,400 and ten thousand feet in length 
that could handle Superfortresses, though the shortest runway could do so only in 
emergencies and the second-shortest only for staging purposes. Shemya could han-
dle between 108 and 150 fighters, seventy-two to a hundred naval patrol planes, and 
ninety-six to a hundred very-long-range aircraft, the numbers again depending on 
Normal or Emergency Conditions. During the maneuver, air strength at Shemya 
would be twenty-seven fighters, eighteen naval patrol bombers, and twenty-four 
very-long-range aircraft under Normal Conditions. Under Emergency Conditions, 
this air strength would be fifty-four fighters, thirty-six naval patrol bombers, and 
forty-eight very-long-range aircraft. Its harbor facilities could accommodate any 
ship that could operate in waters between eleven and fourteen fathoms deep. There 
was an emergency seaplane area at Aggatu and both an emergency seaplane area and 
weather station at Buldir. Purple’s summation of Blue’s facilities ended with LORAN 
(long-range radio aid to navigation) stations at Dutch Harbor, Adak, Amchitka, 
Attu, and Unimak. There were also direction-finding radio stations at Sitka, Kodiak, 
Dutch Harbor, Adak, Amchitka, and Attu, as well as high-power radio stations at 
Kodiak, Dutch Harbor, and Adak and radar stations at Sitka, Kodiak, Dutch Harbor, 
Adak, Amchitka, Attu, Shemya, Cold Bay, Tanaga, and Sand Bay. (Page 5.)
Purple had a “very good” naval and air base under construction at Petropav-
lovsk (today Petropavlovsk-Kamchatka), on Avacha Bay, but it was not yet ready to 
support operations. Until then, protection of the area rested on afloat forces. There 
was, however, at Vladivostok an “excellent” air and naval base that was capable of 
supporting major operations. Vladivostok was the base of the Purple 3rd Fleet, 
which was operating in the waters adjacent to the Kurile Islands. As of 1 June, 
the 3rd Fleet had been concentrated around Vladivostok for logistics and training 
exercises in anticipation of extended operations, and all of its ships were on forty-
eight-hour readiness. When Admiral PA assumed command of the Purple Pacific 
Fleet, one of his missions was to maintain control of the sea approaches to Purple 
territory north of 44 degrees north latitude and west of 170 east longitude. This 
control would assist in the protection of Purple “Asiatic” territory and islands; it 
had been approved by the Chief of the Purple Naval Staff (not played by a student 
officer). To date, Admiral PA’s immediate tasks were to patrol the waters adjacent 
to the Kuriles, Kamchatka, Sakhalin, and the Siberian coast against Blue submarine 
and air reconnaissance as well as Blue surprise attacks by air and sea. (Page 6.)
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The Special Situation
As of 1 June, the Purple Special Situation amounted to the re-
ceipt by Admiral PA of a dispatch from the Chief of the Purple 
Naval Staff informing him that “fairly reliable” sources indicated 
a Blue expeditionary force was being organized in Puget Sound. 
This force included about twenty attack transports (APAs) and 
twenty attack cargo ships (AKAs), to be escorted by two prewar, 
modernized battleships of the Maryland class, two light cruisers, 
two or three escort carriers of the Block Island class, about twenty- 
five destroyers, and several minesweepers. This force was reported as making prep-
arations to depart on “distant service” early in June; its destination, according to 
their crews (presumably by way of undercover agents ashore), was somewhere in the 
Aleutians. Some of the attack cargo ships might be tankers or service ships. Purple 
had arranged to get “timely” information on the departure of the force, and it was 
known that the Blue Commander-in-Chief had constituted a new task force from 
units of the Blue Fleet. This latter force probably comprised four to five heavy cruis-
ers, three light cruisers, five or more fleet carriers, and twenty-five destroyers, all 
of the latest type. This force, Admiral PA was told, had not yet been formed and its 
units were still operating within task force organizations to which they had been 
previously assigned. However, the disposition of the Blue Fleet in the Central Pacific 
was such that this task force could concentrate and be ready for distant operations 
on very short notice if it took on fuel and supplies at Pearl Harbor before depart-
ing. Admiral PA’s specific orders were now to prevent the establishment of a Blue 
advanced base west of 170 east and above 44 degrees north, as well as to continue 
his current operations until he was informed of the departure of the Blue forces or 
otherwise directed. (Pages 6–7.) 
Purple’s Pacific Fleet was significant. Admiral PA flew his flag in a heavy cruis-
er. Rear Admiral PB had command of two battle cruisers, organized as Cruiser 
Division 1. Rear Admiral PC commanded CRUDIV 2, three heavy cruisers that 
included Admiral PA’s flagship. Another three heavy cruisers were organized as 
CRUDIV 3, with Rear Admiral PD in command; CRUDIV 4 consisted of four light 
cruisers under Rear Admiral PE (Rear Admiral PE, Commander, Cruiser Division 
[COMCRUDIV] 4 [played by the same student as Admiral PD]). There were also two 
light and two escort carriers under Rear Admiral PF, as Carrier Division 1. The light 
carriers each had two fighter squadrons and one attack-plane squadron, with one of 
the fighter squadrons consisting of eighteen Bearcat fighters and the other of twelve 
Hellcats. There were also six Hellcat night fighters assigned to each light carrier. 
Each light carrier’s attack-plane squadron consisted of six Helldivers and six Aveng-
er night-attack planes. The escort carriers each had one fighter squadron and one 
Admiral PA (Capt. 
Russell Smith, USN) 
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attack-plane squadron, the fighters consisting of eight Fireballs and eight Hellcat 
night fighters, while the attack-plane squadrons each had twelve Avenger bomb-
ers. The cruiser divisions also carried observation planes, four in CRUDIV 1, six 
each in CRUDIVs 2 and 3, and eight in CRUDIV 4. Carrier-based plane and crew 
replacements were available at any Kurile Island Air Base by ferry flights from 
Vladivostok within thirty-six hours after receipt of request by Commander, Far 
East Naval District in Vladi vostok. Admiral PA was warned, however, that the total 
number of planes in service at any one time could not be increased. (Pages 8–9.) 
Commodore PG was to command Destroyer Squadron 1, a light-cruiser flagship 
and fifteen destroyers organized into three divisions of five ships each. Commo-
dore PH commanded Destroyer Squadron 2, with an identical composition and or-
ganization. Commodore PI led Task Force 39, the Service Force, which consisted of 
Commodore PL’s Service Squadron 1, six oilers evenly divided as Service Divisions 
2 and 3. There was also Mine Squadron 1, commanded by Commodore PR, consist-
ing of one light minelayer (DM) as the flagship, four destroyer-minesweepers (as 
Mine Division 1), and six minesweepers (Mine Divisions 2 and 3). Concerning the 
Purple surface and air forces, student officers were given comparisons of Purple ship 
types to Blue’s—for instance, Purple battle cruisers were similar to the Blue Alaska-
class battle cruisers, while Purple’s heavy cruisers were similar to Blue’s Baltimore- 
class units. Purple light cruisers were comparable to the Blue Cleveland class, and 
Purple light carriers were similar in capabilities to the Blue Saipan class. In the 
same way, Purple’s escort carriers compared to Blue’s Commencement Bay class, 
and its destroyers were like Blue’s Gearing class. Purple oilers were seen as simi-
lar to Blue’s Cimarron class, its submarine tenders (ASs) to Blue’s Fulton class, 
its light minelayers to Blue’s Robert H. Smith class, its destroyer-minesweepers 
to Blue’s Ellyson class, and its minesweepers to Blue’s Heed class. (Page 9.)
The Purple Submarine Force was commanded by Rear Admiral PJ. At his dis-
posal were two submarine squadrons, each of which had four submarines orga-
nized into two divisions per squadron; there was also a submarine tender for each 
squadron flagship. As of 1 June, Admiral PJ was at Fleet Headquarters in Vladi-
vostok, as was the flagship of Submarine Squadron 1. Submarine Squadron 2’s 
flagship was at Kashiwabara Bay, while the boats of Submarine Division 1 were in 
overhaul at Vladivostok and were not scheduled to depart to patrol in the Aleu-
tians until 10 June. SUBDIV 2 was already on patrol in the Aleutians but was 
due for three weeks of maintenance in Vladivostok when relieved by SUBDIV 1. 
SUBDIV 3 was training in the vicinity of Kashiwabara Bay and was scheduled to 
relieve SUBDIV 1 on 10 July; SUBDIV 4, which was also training in the vicinity of 
Kashiwabara Bay and had completed overhauls on 31 May, would relieve SUBDIV 
3 on 10 August. All of these submarines were capable of speeds of six, nine, twenty, 
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and twenty-five knots on diesel engines with schnorchels and were able to oper-
ate submerged on batteries or hydrogen-peroxide engines, and on the surface with 
diesel engines. Endurance using these four types of propulsion was two, one, six, 
and two hundred hours, respectively, and cruising radius was twelve, ninety, ninety, 
and thirty thousand miles, respectively. These boats had six torpedo tubes in the 
bow, carried eighteen torpedoes, and could substitute two mines for each torpedo. 
Use of the schnorchel obliged them to have to operate at periscope depth. The sub-
marines undergoing maintenance or training were on forty-eight hours’ notice for 
operations. Therefore, any plan made by Admiral PA had to consider this time lag 
between issuance of his orders and the actual beginning of the operation. (Page 10.)
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Rear Admiral PK was Commander, North Pacific Air Command, with Head-
quarters, Fleet Air at Kashiwabara. At Vladivostok, Commodore PL led Fleet Air 
Wing 10, three seaplane tenders with six naval patrol plane squadrons, four of the 
squadrons each having nine Mariners and the other two squadrons having six 
Catalinas. At Matsuwa, Commodore PM led Fleet Air Wing 20, four naval patrol 
plane squadrons and two fighter squadrons. The patrol squadrons were equipped 
with two squadrons of fifteen Privateers each, a squadron of twelve Harpoon naval 
patrol bombers, and a squadron of six Catalinas. The fighters consisted of thirty 
Hellcats, twenty-four of them day fighters and six night fighters. At Paramushiru, 
Commodore PN led Fleet Air Wing 30. This unit had two squadrons of eighteen 
Privateers, one squadron of eighteen Harpoons, and a squadron of six Catalinas. It 
also had two squadrons of thirty-six Hellcat day fighters, one squadron of twenty-
four Hellcat day fighters, and two squadrons of Hellcat night fighters, one with 
twenty-four planes and the other with thirty-six. (Page 11.)
The North Pacific Air Command consisted of three additional air wings. Fleet 
Air Wing 40 was based at Shimushu and was commanded by Commodore PO. It 
consisted of fifty-four Harpoons in three squadrons of eighteen each, one squadron 
of six Catalinas, a squadron of thirty-six Hellcat day fighters, and two squadrons 
of Hellcat night fighters, with twenty-four planes in each squadron. Fleet Air Wing 
50 was commanded by Commodore PP and was based at Shikuka. It consisted of 
two squadrons of Privateers with eighteen planes between them, one squadron of 
six Catalinas, one squadron of twenty-four Hellcat day fighters, and one squadron 
of twelve Hellcat night fighters. The final air wing, Fleet Air Wing 60, based in 
Etorofu, was commanded by Commodore PQ and had a squadron of twelve Priva-
teers, one of six Catalinas, one of twelve Hellcat day fighters, and one of six Hellcat 
night fighters. These aircraft were at the above locations as of 1 June and could be 
redeployed on that date as desired. All of these fields were equipped with radar 
and communications and were “well-defended” by antiaircraft batteries. In addi-
tion, the airfields were capable of servicing planes up to their operating capacities, 
except in landing-only and emergency-landing areas; shore-based air facilities at 
Avacha Bay, however, were not going to be ready for operations on 1 June. Land-
based planes—like the carrier-based planes—and their crews could be replaced by 
ferry flights from Vladivostok within thirty-six hours after the receipt of request by 
the Commander, Far East Naval District, but the total number of planes in service 
at any one time could not be increased. (Pages 11–12.) 
Purple air and naval bases were extensive, in addition to the construction still 
going on at Vladivostok. Purple had in the Kuriles and Sakhalin naval bases and 
stations that were well equipped and stocked with fuel and supplies for any ship 
that could use their harbors. Kamchatka’s bases and stations were now less well 
equipped and supplied to support ships but they would be fully operational after 
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1 August, as would their airfields. The Kuriles and Sakhalin were well defended by 
coastal and antiaircraft batteries and had radars and direction finders. In the Ku-
riles, on Shimushu Island were five airfields, including an emergency dry-weather 
landing field at Bettobu and a seaplane base at the same field; Shimushu could 
service fifteen naval patrol bombers, but only in the summer. Imai Saki also had an 
emergency dry-weather landing field, Kataoka had two runways that could handle 
forty-five fighters and sixty naval patrol bombers, and Miyoshino had two runways 
at an Army-controlled field that could service forty fighters and thirty naval patrol 
bombers. Paramushiru Island had four airfields. Kashiwabara had a runway and 
facilities that could handle sixty fighters and forty naval patrol planes, while thirty 
fighters and twenty naval patrol planes could be serviced at Suribachi. Suribachi 
Bay also had a seaplane base for tender-based planes but no shore facilities; Kurabu 
had two runways that could accommodate forty-five fighters and sixty naval patrol 
planes. A final airfield on Paramushiru, not mentioned above, could handle forty 
fighters and thirty naval patrol planes. (Pages 12–13.)
On Matsuwa Island were two runways; the island served as the primary air de-
fense station for the central Kuriles and as the shuttle point for aircraft from the south 
and west. It had a capacity of thirty fighters and forty naval patrol bombers. Etorofu 
Island also had two airfields, Tennei (with two airstrips that could handle thirty-
six fighters and twenty-four naval patrol bombers) and Rubetsu (an emergency- 
only landing field). Kunashiri and Shikotan Islands were also emergency landing 
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fields, but on Kamchatka there were extensive air facilities. Kalakhtyrka Lake had a 
seaplane base, hangars, aprons, and ramps for eighteen flying boats. Petropavlovsk 
had a seaplane base, for eighteen flying boats, as did Tarinski Bay. That field also 
had a land-plane base, three airstrips that could take sixty naval patrol bombers. 
Another field, Bolsheretsk, could take forty-eight fighters, as could Khayryuzovo 
and Staraya Tarya. The air base at Cape Lopatka could handle thirty-six fighters, 
as could the bases at Pauzhatka and Zheltovski. The base at Kurilskoye Lake could 
take forty-eight naval patrol planes. There were incomplete facilities at Ust Kam-
chatka and Korf Bay, each of which would be able to take eighteen flying boats 
when finished. (Pages 13–15.)
Sakhalin Island’s air facilities were also extensive, at least in number. The base 
at Alexandrovsk had an emergency landing field, a seaplane base for nine small 
flying boats, and a capacity of forty-eight fighters. In addition, the air base at Bay-
dukov Island had a seaplane base—this one for six small flying boats—as well as 
Map 8
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an emergency landing 
field. At Chaivo Bay, 
the seaplane base could 
take fifteen flying 
boats, while the large 
facility at Moskalvo 
had a seaplane base 
that could take twenty-
five flying boats and a 
large airfield that could 
accommodate sixty 
naval patrol bombers. 
The base at Nogliki 
was merely an emer-
gency landing base, 
but the two fields at 
Okha could handle 
sixty-six fighters be-
tween them. Okha also 
had a seaplane base 
that could service 
twenty flying boats; 
Pilevo and Pogranich-
noye were both emer-
gency landing fields. 
Viakhtu could accom-
modate eighteen fight-
ers and twenty flying 
boats. There were al - 
so air bases at Iketsuki, Konotoro, Nairo, Otomari, Shikuka, and Toro with very 
modest facilities. (Pages 15–16.)
There were extensive anchorages in the Kuriles as well. Though Kataoka Bay had 
a limited capacity, Kashiwabara Bay had a pipeline leading to storage tanks ashore, 
extensive warehouses, minor repair facilities, and nine piers for ships of lengths 
from a hundred to five hundred feet. There was also an eight-hundred-yard berth 
and two five-hundred-yard berths; the whole complex, along with Kataoka, 
was considered a major fleet anchorage. Kakumabetsu Bay had warehouses and 
boat-repair facilities ashore, was well protected, and had a five-hundred-yard berth 
and two of eight hundred yards. Musashi Bay had nine thousand-yard berths, two 
eight-hundred-yard ones, and another nine berths that were five hundred yards 
Map 9
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long. Suribachi Bay had two eight-hundred-yard berths and five of five hundred 
yards, as well as four large piers and numerous warehouses and underground stor-
age facilities. Araido Island had a five-hundred-yard berth, a small-boat anchor-
age, and boat-repair facilities. Onnekotan Island had a small-vessel anchorage at 
Otomari Cove, but Otome Bay on Shasukotan Island had berths of a thousand 
yards long, two eight hundred yards, and two five hundred yards. Additionally, 
Matsuwa Island had a thousand-yard berth and two eight-hundred-yard berths, 
along with three of five hundred yards, oil storage and warehouses, and two piers, 
all at Yamato Bay. Shimushiru Island’s Buroton Bay could take only small vessels up 
to a thousand tons, but Tsurigane Bay on Uruppu Island had nine thousand-yard, 
three eight-hundred-yard, and seven five-hundred-yard berths, constituting a de-
stroyer, submarine, and seaplane base, respectively. Futagoshima Bay and Tokotan 
Bay both had good anchorages but were exposed to weather. (Pages 17–18.)
Etorofu Island’s Bira Sentai Bay had an unlimited anchorage but was open to the 
north. On the same island, Hitokappu Bay—where the Japanese First Air Fleet had 
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deployed for its attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941—was a major fleet anchorage for 
battleships, carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and all classes of auxiliaries, with twelve 
thousand-yard and three eight-hundred-yard berths. Also on Etorofu, Moyoro Bay 
had nine thousand-yard berths, and Rubetsu Bay had forty-three thousand-yard, 
five eight-hundred-yard, and eighteen five-hundred-yard berths. Kunashiri Island’s 
Tomari Bay and Furukamappu Bay could accommodate only small craft, but Shi-
kotan Island’s sheltered Shakotan Harbor had a 450-yard berth in the inner harbor, 
as well as a thousand-yard berth and an eight-hundred-yard berth in the outer har-
bor. Matsugahama Bay had a small but good harbor that boasted a submarine base.
On Kamchatka, Avacha Bay had a large harbor for all classes of ships. Korf Bay 
had a modest but good harbor and was “well sheltered” for seaplanes and subma-
rines operating from tenders. Ust Kamchatka had a small harbor, but it was un-
protected; Kruger Bay had three five-hundred and six four-hundred-yard berths for 
ships. Sakhalin, Alexandrovsk, Moskalvo, Viakhtu, and Rogati Roads all had open 
roadsteads. Mosiya Bay was a partially sheltered anchorage with limited space, while 
Kazakevicha Bay and Agnevo Roads were both open roadsteads. Pilevo Bay, par-
tially sheltered, was for small craft; Kitanayoshi Anchorage, Ushiro Bay, Nodasan 
Roads, Porotomari Roads, and Tokombo Roads were open roadsteads. There were 
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a small, partially shel-
tered harbor for small 
craft at Mauka Cove, 
an unlimited anchor-
age at Otomari (which 
was part of Aniwa Bay, 
on the southern end 
of Sakhalin), and un-
limited anchorages in 
the northern part of 
Taraika Bay. Sakhalin 
further offered unpro-
tected anchorages on 
its east coast at Luniski 
Roads, Nabiliski Roads, 
Niski Roads, Chaivo 
and Kyakrvo Anchor-
ages, Urkt Roads, and 
Kuegda Roads. (Pages 
18–21.)
Admiral PA was 
supplied with the 
characteristics of Blue 
atomic bombs. These, 
he was told, could be 
handled like any other 
ammunition but car-
ried only by very-long-
range heavy bombers 
like the Superfortress. 
It was assumed that 
a Blue atomic bomb 
would cause 100 percent damage out to five hundred yards, thereafter less damage 
in increments down to 10 percent at a radius of 4,500 to five thousand yards, and 
no damage outside five thousand. 
Student officers completed Admiral PA’s Estimate of the Situation and Comple-
tion of the Plan. They also had to prepare—in typescript—Admiral PA’s directive 
as well as submit, in pencil, various annexes to the Operation Plan. These included 
a Movement Plan, including routes and rendezvous; an Intelligence Plan; a Search 
Plan, both air and surface; a Communication Plan; a Logistics Plan for fuel oil 
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and aviation gasoline; and a Mine Plan. Student of-
ficers also provided typed copies of directives cov-
ering the preliminary deployment of forces. (Pages 
21–24.) The students drew the Statement of the 
Problem on 17 September, completed the Estimate 
of the Situation and the Decision by Friday, 20 Sep-
tember, and completed the details of the Operation 
Plan by Tuesday the 24th. 
The rough draft of the Operation Plan was 
completed the next day, and the day after that a 
“smooth” copy was delivered to Room 206. Stu-
dents then drew copies of the Operation Plans and 
were detailed as Subordinate Commanders for the 
Chart Maneuver. On 27 September, the Estimate 
of the Situation was conducted from the perspec-
tive of the Subordinate Commander and necessary 
plans would be prepared from the Estimate. By 
30 September, a smooth copy of the Subordinate 
Commander’s Operation Plan was delivered to 
Room 206. The first day of October was used for 
Chart Maneuver preparations, while the maneu-
ver itself was conducted from 2 October until the 
morning of 8 October. The afternoon of the 8th, as well as 9 October, was for the 
Critiques of the Plans and the Chart Maneuver. (Pages 24–25.)
The Purple Staff Solution
In early October, the Purple Staff Solution to Operations Problem 2 was issued. 
In the Estimate of the Situation, Admiral PA cited his “incentive to action” as a 
dispatch from the Chief of the Purple Naval Staff, received on 1 June, that ordered 
him to prevent the establishment of a Blue advanced base in Kamchatka as well 
as maintain control of the sea approaches to Purple’s territory and protect its Asi-
atic territory and islands. He was also to continue his current operations until in-
formed of the departure of Blue forces. He was not to concern himself with either 
Purple or Blue operations in Japan, the Ryukyus, or the Asian continent. He re-
viewed the situation: Blue naval forces were being strengthened in the Pacific, the 
Blue Army was being brought up to strength in prep aration for war, Blue bases 
were being activated in the Aleutians, Blue land-based planes were patrolling 
over the Kuriles, and there was a probability of Blue submarines patrolling the wa-
ters he was ordered to control. He additionally reviewed the concentration of the 
Blue Expeditionary Force at Puget Sound, the Blue Covering Force at Pearl Harbor, 
the probable strength of each, and his anticipation of “timely” information on the 
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embarkation dates for these forces. Finally, he noted that the Purple Pacific Fleet 
at Vladivostok had just completed a long training cycle—with the exception of one 
submarine division, on patrol in the Aleutians—and could be ready for operations 
in forty-eight hours.3
Admiral PA then sought to deduce the Blue mission in terms of effect on his 
own potential Courses of Action. Admiral PA surmised from the Blue preparations 
that the enemy was preparing for a major amphibious landing and that Purple was 
the obvious target but that the remoteness of Blue’s primary bases from the Purple 
bases that it was planning to hit was a disadvantage. Therefore, the establishment 
of a Blue advanced base west of the Aleutians was the probable objective of the Blue 
Expeditionary Force at the initiation of hostilities; PA’s orders were to prevent this 
extension of Blue control in the western Pacific. Admiral PA next assumed that the 
Blue Expeditionary Force would depart sometime in early June in conjunction with 
the Blue Covering Force in the Central Pacific. He also assumed that “Blue will seek 
early advantage through the employment of atomic bombs.” (Pages 2–4.)
In addition to Blue’s Expeditionary Force and Covering Force, he knew, Blue 
had submarines operating in his area, in unknown numbers; a chain of both strong 
and minor naval and air bases in the Aleutians; land-based air assets that also includ- 
ed Superfortress heavy bombers, in unknown numbers; and an unknown num-
ber of atomic bombs. Reviewing his own forces and bases in the Kuriles–Sakha-
lin–Vladivostok area, he noted that his bases on Kamchatka—particularly the one 
at Petropavlovsk—would not be fully operational or protected until 1 August. In a 
detailed comparison of Purple and Blue Forces, he had 324 fighters (not shipborne), 
compared with his estimate of Blue’s 750; 258 naval patrol bombers, compared with 
five hundred; and no very-long-range or transport aircraft, compared with Blue’s 
250 and one hundred, respectively. These numbers represented what Admiral PA 
thought would be maximums for Blue throughout its Aleutian bases. Though Blue’s 
land-based planes were formidable and superior to his North Pacific Air Forces, PA 
thought, most were for defense, patrol, and search. Moreover, located so far from 
Purple bases as they were, he did not consider them decisive in attacks on his bases, 
except for the very-long-range aircraft. He was concerned, however, that the Blue 
planes would seriously impede the ability of his own planes to strike Blue’s bases, 
especially given the large number of Blue night fighters, which could operate in 
poor visibility. (Pages 4–5.)
He was also concerned that Blue very-long-range aircraft could strike his bas-
es, probably in flights of up to two hundred against the Kuriles–Kamchatka area 
and up to fifty against the Sakhalin area. He was especially concerned that these 
Blue planes could carry atomic bombs: “They offer an extremely serious threat to 
my forces in that their logical targets are the bases I depend upon for my logistic 
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support.” In spite of his fighter and ground defenses, Admiral PA did not expect 
to achieve “measurable” success against Blue’s raids on the Purple air bases. At the 
very least, he knew, he had to keep his forces dispersed, both among airfields and at 
each base. He also knew that since he could not expect the total number of aircraft 
to increase, any operation had to be planned with the present numbers. Still, he 
thought that he could locate Blue’s surface forces somewhere between eight hun-
dred and a thousand miles from his bases and that Blue—once within the combat 
radius of his fighters—would suffer “heavily.” Accordingly, he intended to subject 
Blue to fighter attacks at the same time that he was undertaking surface action 
against the Blue Covering and Expeditionary Forces. (Pages 5–6.)
As to fleet-borne air forces, Admiral PA noted Purple’s seventy-six fighters to 
Blue’s 175, twenty-eight night fighters to an estimated one hundred, thirty-six at-
tack planes to three hundred, twelve night-attack planes to an estimated 130, and 
twenty-eight observation planes to thirty-nine. Admiral PA was assuming that Blue 
had six fleet carriers and three escort carriers. Given Blue superiority in, especially, 
night fighters, Admiral PA further assumed he had to apply attrition tactics as soon 
as Blue came within range of his shore-based fighters. With his fleet and land-based 
planes combined, however, he had 230 fighters compared with Blue’s 175, 148 
night fighters to Blue’s estimated hundred, thirty-six attack planes to Blue’s three 
hundred, two hundred night-attack planes to Blue’s estimated 130, and twenty- 
eight observation planes to Blue’s thirty-nine. His two hundred night-attack planes 
included 188 naval patrol bombers that had radar and could be loaded for attack 
missions. He took into account that not all of his fighters would be employable, 
since they were land based and might not be able to get at the Blue naval forces. He 
further acknowledged that his observation planes—on his battleships and cruisers 
—were not valuable except as spotters. He did have the advantage of secure bases 
and superiority in numbers, if facing Blue’s only fleet-based air forces. Blue, how-
ever, had the advantages of greater numbers of attack planes as well as high mo-
bility and degree of concentration. Nevertheless, Blue’s fleet carriers were highly 
vulnerable to Admiral PA, and their destruction was “clearly” “vitally” important. 
(Pages 6–7.) 
From the tabulation (figure 103) of Blue and Purple surface combatant charac-
teristics, it was evident to Admiral PA that Blue held decided advantage in carrier 
strength and that this strength had to be reduced as early as possible. PA thought 
that his submarines might be the solution here. In addition, while Purple had two 
battle cruisers, it had no battleships, while Blue had no battle cruisers but had two 
“battlewagons.” In cruiser strength, Purple had superiority in numbers of ships and 
in gun power, except for automatic weapons, where he thought the two sides were 
evenly matched. Destroyer strength also favored Blue, in a five-to-three ratio, but 
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Blue also had to project and protect an expeditionary force. Blue additionally had 
a six-to-one superiority in aerial torpedoes, as well as what PA thought was a slight 
edge in surface-combatant torpedo strength. (Pages 7, 10.) 
As for submarines, Admiral PA found it difficult to compare the two sides’ char-
acteristics. He had sixteen modern, high-speed submarines and two tenders. Lack-
ing better information, he assumed that Blue had 
the same, as well as up to two hundred World War 
II–vintage submarines. He therefore had to take ev-
ery possible precaution against submarine attack. 
He knew that Blue transport and cargo ships, like 
his own, had heavy antiaircraft firepower and that 
aircraft attacking them had to expect opposition. The presence of these ships in the 
Blue Expeditionary Force, however, should restrict the speed of the Expeditionary 
Force to about twelve knots, and Blue had to protect them from submarine, air, 
and surface attack. He estimated that the Blue Expeditionary Force could embark 
about thirty-eight thousand troops, either at Puget Sound, in the Aleutians, or at a 
Central Pacific base. From a survey of Purple bases and territory, he surmised that 
these troops would be superior in number and equipment to the forces at any one 
of the bases that he thought might be an immediate Blue objective. “However, this 
superiority cannot be asserted unless they are landed—it is my job to prevent their 
landing and thus eliminate any question of superiority in troops.” (Pages 10–11.) 
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Admiral PA looked at the influence of relative distances on combat power and 
operations. Purple forces were located with the Pacific Fleet—less its submarines—
at or near Vladivostok, while the Purple Pacific Submarine Force had four boats 
in overhaul at Vladivostok, along with one submarine tender. Another submarine 
tender was at Kashiwabara Bay, as were the eight boats training, and four boats 
were on Aleutian patrol. The North Pacific Air Forces had four wings of planes in 
the Kuriles, one at Vladivostok, and one at Shikuka. Blue forces included the Ex-
peditionary Force in the Puget Sound area and the Striking Force at or near Pearl 
Harbor. He did not know the location of the Blue Submarine Force but assumed 
that Blue boats were on patrol in the Kuriles–Kamchatka area. Blue, he knew, also 
had very-long-range planes, up to fifty based at Shemya and Adak each, up to 150 
at Amchitka, and up to ten at Kodiak. Atomic bombs were “probably” stored at 
some or all of these bases. From the considerable distances by which the opposing 
forces were separated, he deduced that Blue objectives for bases had to be in the 
Kuriles–Sakhalin–Kamchatka area, including potentially the Komandorskis. 
One of Blue’s major problems, however, PA asserted, was that of distance itself 
—its Expeditionary 
Force had to travel be-
tween 1,700 and two 
thousand miles before 
even reaching an Aleu-
tian base. Once there, 
it would still be 1,200 
to 1,400 miles from its 
probable base objec-
tives, while the Blue 
Striking Force at Pearl 
Harbor was some three 
thousand miles from 
them. In contrast, his 
forces, though scat-
tered, were within easy 
concentration range, 
with the surface forces 
at Vladivostok and the 
majority of his subma-
rines and air wings in 
or near the Kuriles. All of this indicated to him the value of early detection of Blue’s 
movements as well as the prolonged period he would have in which to conduct 
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be serious enough to cause Blue to return to base and assume the defensive. (Pages 
11–14.)
Admiral PA next sought to analyze in greater detail the probable Blue objectives, 
offering a “reasoned estimate” rather than any degree of certainty, a probability 
pattern by which to position his forces. Given what he saw as the “comparatively 
small” size of the Blue Expeditionary Force, he concluded that it was not designed 
to seize an objective near a very large enemy base—such as Vladivostok—from 
where Purple land-based air could continually mount air raids of such strength 
as to nullify the value of any base seized. Further, it appeared to him that Blue 
could not risk forcing the Sea of Okhotsk without first securing a base in either 
Kamchatka, the Komandorskis, or the Kuriles, to which he therefore narrowed his 
consideration. Kamchatka had only one initial area that seemed worth seizing for 
development as an operating base—Avacha Bay, where Purple was developing the 
Petropavlovsk base. The only other potential base sites, Ust Kamchatka and Korf 
Bay, he found unacceptable for several reasons. First, Korf Bay in the extreme north 
represented a loss in distance relative to logical Purple targets as compared with 
Attu, which was already in Blue’s possession. In addition, from November to May, 
it was frozen over almost entirely. Ust Kamchatka in the Gulf of Kamchatka was 
closer to logical Purple targets than Attu but only by some two hundred miles. Ice 
was again a problem from November to May, and in May there was drifting ice 
from the Bering Sea. (Pages 14–15.)
Avacha Bay would not be well defended until 1 August, and Blue could hit it well 
before then. It also offered the best harbor facilities in Kamchatka and had suit-
able landing beaches if the harbor facilities were destroyed. Further, it contained 
Petropavlovsk, the political, economic, and military center of the Kamchatka Pen-
insula. Its sheltered harbor had a deepwater entrance and the adjacent level terrain 
was suitable for air operations. The climate was not what he would call attractive 
but was less severe than elsewhere in Kamchatka; summer temperatures ranged 
from 50 to 60 degrees Fahrenheit, average night temperatures in the lower forties. 
While Petropavlovsk was “somewhat” icebound from December to April, the an-
chorage was rarely frozen over completely and icebreakers got through in February 
and March. Unlike most of Kamchatka, Petropavlovsk offered conditions favor-
able for air operations during most of the year. In general, PA thought, Avacha 
Bay was the most important airplane, seaplane, and naval base on Kamchatka. It 
was also, however, halfway between Dutch Harbor and Vladivostok, within fighter 
range of Purple’s base at Kashiwabara Bay and the numerous airstrips and facilities 
at Paramushiru and Shimushu, and within fighter range of the Komandorskis. Ad-
miral PA also knew, however, that Avacha Bay was only just within fighter range of 
Matsuwa, Purple’s primary air defense station for the central Kuriles, and outside 
fighter range from the other major Purple air bases in the Kuriles and Sakhalin. 
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Still, Blue possession of Avacha Bay would isolate and neutralize the Komandorskis 
and could put Blue four hundred miles closer than did Attu to the Purple targets it 
wanted to hit. (Pages 15–16.)
As for the Komandorskis, Bering and Copper Islands were large but mountain-
ous. They had several small anchorages but these were poor and storms would 
force ships out to sea. However, these islands were ice-free the year round, except 
for some drift ice in January and February. The climate was tolerable, albeit marked 
by heavy snow in the winter and fog and rain in the summer. At Nikolski, on the 
northwest coast of Bering Island, there was a fair anchorage for about twenty ships, 
but westerly winds caused heavy swells. Two level sections ashore appeared “ac-
ceptable” to modest air-base development, so Bering Island was a potential target 
for Blue. About 1,100 miles from Dutch Harbor and 1,600 from Vladivostok, it was 
within fighter range of Blue’s Attu base and of Purple’s Korf Bay, Ust Kamchatka, 
and Avacha Bay bases. If Purple held the base on Bering Island, it and Blue’s Attu 
would oppose each other on a one-to-one basis. A Blue base on Bering, though, 
would face land-based fighter attack from possibly three directions and have to 
distribute its own efforts over two or three simultaneous targets, depending on 
the weather. Bering Island was outside the fighter range of the Purple bases in the 
Kuriles–Sakhalin area and occupied a commanding position with respect to the 
southwestern entrance to the Bering Sea. On average and compared with Attu, the 
Komandorskis represented an advance for Blue of about two hundred miles relative 
to its future Purple targets. For these reasons, he found the Komandorskis to be a 
possible Blue target but not as probable as Avacha Bay. (Pages 16–17.)
In the Kuriles, Admiral PA knew, Blue would not see many worthwhile objec-
tives. Onnekotan, Shasukotan, and Matsuwa Islands had beaches suitable for land-
ing operations but were “extremely limited” by topography as sites for airfields. 
Matsuwa was already a Purple base but only had two airfields, neither of which 
could handle Blue’s Superfortresses; between them, they could handle only a total 
of seventy fighter and naval patrol bombers. Onnekotan had only a small-ship an-
chorage, and Shasukotan, like Matsuwa, had a harbor with only one large, two me-
dium, and two small berths for ships. Rejecting these three, he next looked at Shi-
mushiru and Uruppu, which had suitable landing beaches but were likewise limited 
by topography in terms of air-base development. The former had an anchorage in 
Buroton Bay, but only for ships up to a thousand tons. The latter had nine large, 
three medium, and seven small berths but had proved practical for Purple only for 
destroyers and smaller ships. Rejecting these as well, he turned to Kunashiri and 
Shikotan. The former had several potential land-plane base sites but an anchorage 
usable only for small craft; the latter could anchor no more than five large ships 
and offered what he saw as “meager” potential as an aircraft base. He rejected these 
locations as probable Blue objectives. (Pages 17–18.)
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That left two major possibilities in the Kuriles, Kashiwabara Bay and Etorofu. 
Admiral PA knew that Kashiwabara, a well sheltered bay, offered a major fleet an-
chorage and had been heavily developed by the Japanese. Paramushiru, flanking 
Kashiwabara Bay, had a number of beaches accessible to attack by sea, and both 
Paramushiru and Shimushu offered ready-built airfields, air bases, and seaplane 
bases. A strong Blue base there would “practically” control the entrance to the 
Okhotsk Sea. It did have “considerable” drift ice through January, February, and 
March and dense fog from April to September. Mean temperatures ranged from 26 
to 52 degrees Fahrenheit in August; snow and rain had to be expected about two-
thirds of the year. Still, Kashiwabara Bay was equidistant by air from Dutch Harbor 
and Vladivostok, within fighter range of Avacha Bay, Matsuwa, and Buroton Bay, 
and outside the fighter range of southern Kurile and Sakhalin bases. If successfully 
established as a Blue base, it could dominate the northern and central Kuriles and 
could even prevent Purple from getting Avacha Bay onto a “useful” footing. More-
over, Kashiwabara Bay bypassed the Komandorskis, which Blue could then neu-
tralize from Attu. On average, compared with Attu, Kashiwabara Bay would mean 
an advance of some six hundred miles relative to future Purple targets, the most of 
all the bases he had analyzed so far. (Pages 18–19.)
Etorofu also had a “suitable” major fleet anchorage. A large island about 125 
miles long and twenty-five miles wide at its widest point, Etorofu had excellent 
landing beaches; airfields had already been built there, and a southern portion of 
the island was adaptable to constructing more. The island also possessed a lake large 
enough to accommodate seaplanes. As in the northern Kuriles, fast ice formed in 
most bays and sheltered areas from January to March or April. Fog was even more 
prevalent than in the northern Kuriles, and temperatures were low, about like those 
at Paramushiru. Again, it had the “weather handicap” that was common to the en-
tire Kamchatka–Kurile region but this problem did not entirely eliminate it as a 
potential base site for Blue. It was 1,800 miles from Dutch Harbor but only seven 
hundred by air from Vladivostok. It was within fighter range of Matsuwa and Buro-
ton Bay, as well as of Shikuku, and Otomari on Sakhalin Island. Additionally, it was 
the only base he had tentatively accepted as worth analysis that was within fighter 
range of the Sakhalin bases; it was liable to attack from four Purple bases whose 
bombers could enjoy fighter escort. Blue’s lines of communication and supply to 
this base would be flanked by Purple forces in the northern Kuriles, the Komandor-
skis, and Kamchatka. Etorofu, however, also dominated the southern and central 
Kuriles and was outside fighter range of the northern Kuriles. Compared with Attu, 
Etorofu would furnish Blue an advance of seven to eight hundred miles relative to 
various Purple targets, though relative distance was actually unchanged vis-à-vis a 
few Purple bases to its north. (Pages 19–20.)
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Before trying to project Blue’s probable Aleutian destination, he first wanted 
to assure himself that it was reasonable to expect Blue to stage in the Aleutians as 
a preliminary to seizing an advanced base at all. Blue, in fact, had several possible 
alternatives. The Blue commander might embark all troops and supplies at Puget 
Sound and proceed directly to the ultimate objective. Admiral PA, however, did not 
think that he would do so because of the distances and logistical complications. Al-
ternatively, Blue might sweep southward and pick up troops in the Central Pacific; 
in this scenario, it would be using, in a cold-weather operation, troops trained in 
and acclimatized to warm weather. Still, he wanted to devise a search plan that took 
both of these contingencies into account. As for Blue’s likely Aleutian objective 
or destination, he limited his analysis to bases that offered adequate anchorages, 
ample logistical facilities, and air protection. Aside from their inferiority compared 
with Dutch Harbor, both Kodiak and Adak were not close enough to Blue’s ultimate 
objective to be useful as stopovers. He also rejected Cold Bay because it had not 
been developed as a major base, and he rejected Amchitka because of limited har-
bor facilities. Attu, another major Blue base, had adequate anchorage and logistics 
but he assigned it a low probability as Blue’s destination because as Blue’s western-
most existing base, it would have poorer air protection than one nearer the central 
Aleutians and a ship assemblage that would be more liable to detection by Purple 
patrol planes. In addition, the Blue commander, who might have atomic bombs on 
board, might hesitate to concentrate his shipping in harbor needlessly to westward 
when he could just as easily choose a safer base and get the same services for his 
force. (Pages 20–21.) 
Adak offered the Blue commander all necessary facilities and was centrally lo-
cated in the Aleutians chain. It had its own “considerable” air strength and could 
count on protection from Amchitka, Attu, and Dutch Harbor; Amchitka, in partic-
ular, was only about two hundred miles distant and could provide strong support. 
PA thought accordingly that Adak had a high probability as the Blue “stop” in the 
Aleutians. Dutch Harbor remained for consideration, however, since it was Blue’s 
primary base in the eastern Aleutians. It had ample anchorage and logistical facili-
ties but its land-based air force was inferior to Adak’s, and it was more remote from 
supporting air bases than was Adak. Compared with Adak, it increased by three 
to four hundred miles the distance from the Aleutians to the final objective. He 
therefore saw Dutch Harbor as only a “medium” probability as the Blue stopover 
in the Aleutians. He thought, however, that Blue might split his force between two 
Aleutians bases and reconcentrate after departing the chain. (Pages 21–22.)
For the critical leg from the Aleutians to the final objective, Admiral PA saw the 
Blue Expeditionary Force leaving from Adak and Dutch Harbor to head north of 
the Aleutians and directly to its destination. The Blue forces could also head south 
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of the Aleutians before turning to their objective or they could follow an evasive 
course either north or south. He thought the latter the least probable because it put 
additional logistical demands on the Blue Expeditionary Force and it would mean 
keeping Blue’s troops at sea in—probably—poor weather longer than necessary, 
thus deteriorating their health and vigor for the impending assault. However, Ad-
miral PA also noted that if headed for Avacha Bay, Blue might send his convoy far 
to the north and so attempt to avoid detection. His searches, therefore, had to cover 
this contingency as well. PA thought the first and second possibilities of routes were 
equally satisfactory in imposing minimal logistical problems for the Blue Expedi-
tionary Force. The first promised more effective weather cover in the Bering Sea. 
Both permitted land-based air cover against submarines all the way to the target 
and land-based fighter aid as well, except for the last three or four hundred miles, 
depending on the final Blue destination. (Pages 22–23.)
From the intelligence available, PA thought that the Blue Striking Force would 
assemble at Pearl Harbor and be definitively committed to the operation as soon as 
it left there. He now considered the final Blue objective to be any Purple bases in 
and about the Kuriles–Kamchatka area that could oppose the Blue Expeditionary 
Force from the time it left a Blue base until it completed its amphibious landing. 
Given all of this analysis, he considered that the Blue Striking Force might take 
any of five tracks from Pearl Harbor. First, he thought it might proceed directly to 
an Aleutian base from Pearl Harbor, then head north of the Aleutians to the final 
objective; this route might entail a far northerly sweep and an approach to the fi-
nal objective from the northeast. Second, the Blue Striking Force might head from 
Pearl Harbor to an Aleutian base and then pass south of the Aleutians to the final 
objective. Third, it might steam from Pearl straight through the Aleutians before 
heading to the final objective; this route would again lend itself to a sweep to the 
far north and an approach on the objective from the northeast. Fourth would be a 
route west from Pearl Harbor then to the final objective from the south; the fifth 
and last possibility he analyzed was directly from Pearl Harbor to the final objective 
itself. (Pages 23–24.)
In comparing these possible routes, he felt that the element of surprise would be 
a major factor influencing Blue’s selection, since attack by the Blue Striking Force 
might be the first blow Purple received and it could be made devastating. Either 
of the first two possibilities listed would be desirable from a logistical perspective 
since Blue would have to steam about a thousand miles from the last base before it 
reached striking distance of Purple. Of these possibilities, Admiral PA chose Dutch 
Harbor as the most logical. Adak was a “fair possibility,” but Dutch Harbor was 
far enough east to contribute to Blue’s achieving surprise. The first course offered 
better possibilities for weather cover but both permitted land-based air cover—
not very important for the Blue Striking Force but critical for the Expeditionary 
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Force. In this phase, however, Admiral PA assumed that the Blue Striking Force 
commander would want complete mobility and minimal ties to land-based air. He 
did not think that the third course was very probable since Blue would then arrive 
within striking distance of Purple having steamed over three thousand miles from 
its last base and would have been subjected to the same intensity of Purple searches 
as in the first two possibilities. The fourth possible course to the objective would 
mean arrival within striking distance of Purple after having steamed about 3,500 
miles; it therefore appeared even more unlikely to Admiral PA. He retained it in his 
analysis, however, with a low probability since Blue might try this for deception. 
The fifth course would entail combat after Blue steamed about 2,400 miles since its 
last replenishment. This was logistically preferable to the fourth potential course 
but it would not offer as much chance of surprise since Blue had to assume Purple 
would know about its departure from Pearl Harbor. Also, neither of the final two 
possibilities took advantage of weather cover to the north of the Aleutians so he 
thought both had a low probability of adoption by Blue. Accordingly, Admiral PA 
bet on Blue’s pursuing either of the first two possible courses to the final objective, 
with the first—proceeding directly to an Aleutian base from Pearl Harbor, then 
heading north of the Aleutians to the final objective—being more probable. (Pages 
24–25.)
Admiral PA’s next analysis was the “Combat Efficiency of Personnel.” He thought 
that both forces were about equal in that respect, with a “high order” of person-
nel efficiency. Blue had the advantage of “invaluable” large-scale combat training 
and operational experience in the Pacific theater of operations during the Second 
World War but Admiral PA thought that this might make Blue overconfident, 
gauging Purple’s personnel as “second-rate.” Purple, he thought, had built up from 
its victory in the war and the communist indoctrination of its armed forces gave it a 
“virile” cult of invincibility, a culture that he argued was “superior to the easy-going 
easy-living way of the capitalist society.” Of vital importance to him was that his 
forces were hardened and “thoroughly acclimatized” to the rigors of cold-weather 
operations, while most of Blue’s were not. As for material, Purple, he argued, should 
enjoy superiority since every item had been tested and proven over long periods of 
time in cold weather. In addition, Purple would operate from its own bases while 
Blue would have a long voyage on which afloat repairs would be limited by weather 
and available repair facilities. (Pages 25–26.)
Admiral PA did not anticipate any Purple reinforcements beyond carrier- and 
land-based planes on a thirty-six-hour-delay basis. Moreover, he expected these 
reinforcements to be able only to bring his forces up to their original strength. In 
addition, he could replace aircraft losses at one base only by drawing from other 
bases. Once Blue left his Aleutian bases, however, it would have no reinforcements 
of any kind in the operation. In terms of logistics, Purple would have close at hand 
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well-stocked bases that were, in turn, supplied by interior lines to the Purple home-
land. Six oilers, two submarine tenders, and three seaplane tenders supplemented 
the base facilities available to Purple. In contrast, Blue had to carry everything 
along needed for combat power, equipment, and sustenance. Replenishments, to 
reach Blue, had to travel a long supply line that was exposed to submarine and air 
attack. Damaged Purple ships had a good chance of getting back to base, while Blue 
cripples would be in an “extremely precarious” position. Admiral PA summarized 
“Political Considerations” by asserting that Blue and Purple were mutually suspi-
cious of each other’s intentions and sincerity. The Purple masses, he argued, were 
convinced that capitalism had to be eliminated and would support any military 
action by their government. The Blue populace he saw as difficult to lead into sup-
porting war; he thought that an initial victory by Purple forces might cause “seri-
ous dissension” among Blue political factions. He further pointed out that Purple 
agents in Blue territory had gained power in political, labor, and publicity organiza-
tions and could aggravate any internal strife that might follow an early Blue defeat. 
However, in view of Blue’s success in intelligence gathering during the world war, 
and despite Purple countermeasures, PA assumed that Blue would have “reason-
ably” accurate information on Purple strengths and dispositions at the beginning 
of the operation. (Pages 26–27.)
As to the characteristics of the theater of operations—which he took to be be-
tween 40 degrees and 61 degrees north latitude, bounded on the west by the Kurile– 
Kamchatka chain and extending east about a thousand miles—Admiral PA did 
not think that its hydrography had any unusual aspects. The open sea was free of 
dangers to navigation, charts were adequate, and the general movements of water 
masses were controlled by the Kamchatka Current. This stream flowed from its 
departure from the Japan Current at about 38 degrees north latitude in a north-
northeasterly direction. One part of it continued easterly along the southern side 
of the Kuriles and just before reaching the American coast divided into a branch 
toward the north (into the Gulf of Alaska) and a branch to the south (along the west 
coast of the United States, where it became the California Current). The second 
part of the Kamchatka Current turned north and entered the Bering Sea, followed 
along the northern side of the Aleutians, and circled to the Bering Sea counter-
clockwise. In the Bering Sea, this current was further cooled and flowed south to 
reach the northern islands of Japan. He thought it noteworthy that while some of 
the water that flowed into the Bering Sea around the Aleutians contributed in the 
summer to the current that flowed north through the Bering Strait, the major flow 
turned around and ran back south along the coast of Kamchatka. Velocities were 
in the range of one-quarter to one knot, depending on the force and direction of 
the wind. The currents through the passes in the Kuriles and the Aleutians, while 
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influenced by the winds, were predominantly tidal and could reach eight knots or 
more, especially in narrows. (Pages 27–28.)
In terms of topography, the theater was predominantly mountainous. There 
were many areas suitable for airfields but no extensive plains or plateaus. Rocky 
coastlines were well protected by such natural defenses as steep cliffs, outlying 
rocks, and the kelp that fouled so much of the Kuriles; they did not, however, have 
to be considered for purposes of this operation and he had already discussed po-
tential base sites. Weather, of course, was vital, given its potential to restrict opera-
tions. In general, the weather in the Kurile–Kamchatka–Aleutian area was bad and 
unpredictable. Rain, mist, fog, and falling snow were to be found in all seasons of 
the year, with fog predominating in the summer months and snow in the winter. 
The weather conditions at one spot were no evidence of what to expect for another 
spot just a few miles away. Summer weather meant temperatures of about 50 de-
grees Fahrenheit but there would be fog 35 to 75 percent of the time. In the Kuriles, 
over half of the days of June, July, and August were foggy. The fog originated to the 
south and east of Kamchatka through the movement of moisture-laden air from 
the south into contact with the cold air moving out from the Siberian High and 
with prevailing southwesterly winds, which carried it to the Aleutians. Several days 
of north or northwesterly winds were required to drive the fog south and dissipate 
it, a condition that he said seldom occurred. (Pages 28–29.) Rarely did sky covered 
by clouds become less than 70 percent in the Kuriles; the probability of a clear sky 
was only about 20 percent, though clear periods lasting eight to ten hours might 
come at any time. Cloud ceilings were low, from about one to two thousand feet, 
higher in the winter. Serious icing occurred at flying levels at all times of the year, 
less in winter than in summer. Gales during the summer were uncommon but not 
unknown. Smooth seas were to be anticipated except in local storm areas. 
PA foresaw several specific impacts on operations because of weather. First, air 
operations would be “materially hindered” by fog, generally poor visibility, cloudi-
ness, low ceilings, icing, and rugged topography. This was the general standard 
that he expected but there would be certain local exceptions; at Petropavlovsk, for 
instance, conditions were “comparatively favorable.” Low clouds and poor visibility 
obviously offered the Blue forces better prospects of achieving surprise in the sum-
mer than in any other season. Parachute operations, however, would be extremely 
hazardous and Blue had to refuel its ships in the open sea. He noted that there was 
no “truly dark” period; twilight lasted from sunset to sunrise at 50 degrees north 
latitude from 2 June to 12 July. (Pages 29–30.) 
In reference to facilities and fixed defenses, Admiral PA pointed out that Blue air 
bases in the Aleutians were “adequately” equipped with the latest types of radars, 
antiaircraft batteries, communications equipment, ground-controlled-approach 
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equipment, and fog disposal/dispersal equipment. The Aleutian bases also had 
LORAN, direction-finding equipment, high-power radio equipment, and radar 
stations. Purple, for its part, had a major and well defended operating base at Vladi-
vostok. In addition, Purple’s naval bases and stations in the Kuriles and Sakhalin 
were well equipped and stocked as well as defended by coastal and antiaircraft bat-
teries, radar, and direction finders. Until 1 August, however, Kamchatka bases and 
stations would have to depend on forces afloat for their own protection. Kamchatka 
airfields could be used but they would not be able to service planes before 1 August. 
In the related area of communications, primary reliance was being placed on radio 
by both Purple and Blue. Aircraft delivery could also be employed by both sides 
but was subject to the weather. Blue had radio stations at Kodiak, Dutch Harbor, 
Adak, and Pearl Harbor, and in the continental United States. Purple had similarly 
“satisfactory” facilities, extending from Vladivostok through major bases in the 
Kuriles and Sakhalin. Communications, he thought, were satisfactory for both 
sides. (Pages 30–31.) 
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XI Operations Problem 2
More Purple, September–October 1946
Admiral PA saw as Blue’s “Strength Factors” the ability to choose the ob-jective and the route to the objective. Blue could also choose the time of the operation and had available its Aleutian base complex. In addition, 
because of the characteristic low clouds, poor visibility, and frequent fog, Blue had 
a good chance of achieving surprise. 
The Purple Staff Solution: Strength and Weakness Factors
Admiral PA assumed that Blue had high-speed submarines, atomic bombs, and 
very long-range bombers. Its mobility and concentration of airpower were great 
because so much of Blue’s airpower was carrier based and because of its superior-
ity in attack planes that could be committed at the critical period of the operation. 
Moreover, Blue had a six-to-one superiority in planes that could launch aerial tor-
pedoes and a slight torpedo superiority on its surface ships. This was combined 
with its two battleships and a five-to-three superiority in destroyer numbers, guns, 
and torpedoes. Blue’s “Weakness Factors,” however, were the possibility that poor 
weather would nullify its air superiority at critical periods; the vulnerability of 
much of its airpower, because it was carrier based; and a restriction on the Blue 
Covering Force’s freedom of action, which had to protect the slow Blue Expedition-
ary Force. Blue also had the disadvantages of long lines of supply and the unavail-
ability of immediate reinforcement.*
Purple’s Strength Factors included freedom to choose the method of attack on 
the Blue Force and the ability to remain concentrated. In addition, Admiral PA’s 
forces were operating from “comparatively” short, interior lines of supply, had air-
craft replacements available within thirty-six hours, and had personnel and mate-
rial that were better acclimated than Blue’s to the operating area. He also saw ad-
vantages in the nightlong twilight, which would favor searches and attrition tactics 
if Blue was located early enough, and in superiority in fighter strength that could 
be engaged at the critical stage. Admiral PA further noted his own high-speed 
submarines, his two battle cruisers, and his superiority in cruiser numbers and 
* Senior Class of June 1947, “Operations Problem 2: The Purple Staff Solution,” 8 October 1946, pp. 32–33, folder 
2603-B, box 138, RG 4, NHC. All subsequent page references in this chapter are to this source.
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weapons—with the exception of automatic weapons. Moreover, he did not have a 
convoy to protect, and his ships, if damaged, had a better chance of getting back to 
a base than did Blue’s. His Weakness Factors were the possibility that poor weather 
would curtail the employment of his air strength at critical times and the fact that 
Blue land-based air forces could seriously damage the search aircraft he needed to 
locate the Blue force. He also could not expect reinforcements, except replacement 
aircraft. Of all of these factors, the one that really stood out to him was the weather. 
He intended never to lose sight of its central importance as he considered his mis-
sion, the relative combat power of the two forces, the other conditions in the theater 
of action, the acceptability of costs, and the ability of planes to fly with operational 
losses. While he could not answer these questions until operations actually began, 
he was certain that his forces had to be “alert at all times to take advantage of the 
vagaries of the weather, and to anticipate similar action by Blue.” (Pages 32–33.)
Admiral PA thought that his assigned mission narrowed his consideration of 
Blue’s possible objective to the area west of 170 degrees east longitude and north of 
44 degrees north latitude. He did not think that he was restricted to this operating 
area, but other factors limited Blue’s capabilities. First, Vladivostok was remote from 
Blue’s bases and so strongly held that it might be considered invulnerable. He also 
did not think that Blue would attempt to seize a base west of the Kuriles–Kamchatka 
line, since such a base would be highly vulnerable to Purple attack and too difficult 
to supply. Again, the Blue Covering Force was limited by its obligation to protect the 
Blue Expeditionary Force and Blue’s unavailability to reinforcement would proba-
bly restrict the Blue commander as to the types of risks he would be willing to take. 
Given all of this, Admiral PA thought that Blue could have its Expeditionary Force 
evade major Purple forces and seize its objective while the Blue Striking Force (the 
Covering Force combined with Blue’s land-based air assets that were within range) 
acted independently to contain any threatening major Purple forces. Blue could also 
have its Expeditionary Force and Striking Force concentrate prior to leaving Blue- 
controlled waters, make the passage together, and seize the objective while de-
stroying or driving off the Purple forces they encountered. The Blue Striking Force 
could, alternatively, isolate the objective by fast carrier- and land-based air while 
the Expeditionary Force seized the objective and the Striking Force suppressed 
Purple’s perimeter air bases. Finally, Admiral PA thought, Blue could attempt a 
combination of these tactics. (Pages 33–34.)
Courses of Action 
To Admiral PA, the first potential Blue option entailed several “questionable” fea-
tures. First, Blue would need “extremely” good luck and prolonged bad weather 
to evade the searches that PA intended to maintain. The division of Blue forces 
might permit Purple, in fact, to place its entire strength against the Blue Expedi-
tionary Force, especially in the bad weather, which might restrict or preclude flight 
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operations. Given these risks, Admiral PA assumed, Blue would not pursue the first 
option. The second option had the “seeming” advantage of maximum concentra-
tion of striking power and on-the-spot protection of the transports. In addition, 
losses per attack were likely to be less when forces were concentrated and more 
strength was on hand to protect cripples. The disadvantage, however, was that the 
Blue Expeditionary Force would have to accept the full brunt of Purple’s strength, 
as would the Blue Striking Force during the entire passage to the objective: “I doubt 
that the Expeditionary Force could survive it.” In addition, Blue would be using its 
Striking Force as a defensive guard rather than the offensive force that it was meant 
to be. Admiral PA rejected the second option as unviable. (Pages 34–35.)
The third option—to isolate the objective by fast carrier- and land-based air 
while the Expeditionary Force seized the objective and the Striking Force sup-
pressed Purple’s perimeter air bases—he saw as conforming to a pattern that Blue 
had found to be of “immense value” in World War II. It permitted the Blue Strik-
ing Force constant readiness for action, “extreme” mobility, and a great degree of 
freedom of action from the Expeditionary Force’s movements. The Striking Force, 
under this option, could hit where and when it wanted to without concern for the 
safety of the Expeditionary Force. The latter force would be out of the zone of ac-
tive operations and under the protection of Blue land-based air forces. When the 
Expeditionary Force finally came to the objective, Purple’s strength would have 
been considerably reduced, presumably enough that Blue could get its transports 
through. Admiral PA saw Blue expecting to isolate the objective by destructive air 
attacks on the objective and bases within supporting range of it. Admiral PA also 
assumed that Blue knew Purple air forces could be provided with replacements but 
that this resource could be nullified by rendering their transit bases inoperable. 
He thought this third option highly likely, perhaps combined with elements of the 
other two. For instance, the Blue Expeditionary Force might or might not follow 
evasive courses once it left the Aleutians. Also, the Blue Striking Force might con-
centrate enough to provide close air support to the Expeditionary Force between 
the latter’s Aleutian bases and the objective. In general, though, he saw Blue pursu-
ing the third option. (Pages 35–36.)
Given Blue’s need to seize and establish a base that would allow it to extend its 
control in the western Pacific, the forces this would take, and the need to get those 
forces to the objective with acceptable losses in a Purple-dominated area, Blue 
needed a powerful enough striking force to thrust itself into the area prior to the 
Expeditionary Force’s arrival and destroy or neutralize the bulk of Purple’s forces. 
Therefore, Admiral PA took the Blue Striking Force to be his own first objective; it 
would venture into his operational area first. Moreover, if he was able to defeat it 
decisively, he assumed, he would not have to deal with the Expeditionary Force. If, 
however, Blue was able to neutralize Purple airpower and bring the Expeditionary 
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Force into the operational area, that latter would become his primary objective, and 
he would engage the Blue Striking Force only as needed to get at the Expeditionary 
Force. 
His orders called for a “vigorous” offensive, but he took into account the limi-
tations on his capabilities. Since his forces did not include amphibious units, he 
could not attack Blue’s territory so as to throw Blue back on the defensive. His land-
based air forces were also limited by their locations and the geographic nature of 
the operational area. His surface forces were of such limited strength that he had to 
keep them concentrated for mutual support when action became probable. If, for 
instance, he dispatched surface scouts, he could not let them get far from his main 
force. In addition, he could not lose sight of the dependence of the Avacha Bay base 
on his forces for protection until 1 August. Still, he argued that the possibility of 
offensive air strikes on Blue bases had to be exploited. However, since Purple and 
Blue were not yet at war, there was a question about how far into Blue waters Admi-
ral PA could go in an initial offensive action. In any case, until he received orders to 
execute his plan, he could take no offensive action. Nevertheless, he could station 
submarines off Pearl Harbor to get him accurate data on the Blue Striking Force. If 
the Blue Expeditionary Force departed Puget Sound before the Striking Force left 
Hawaii, he thought, his plan could be executed “in time to permit our sinking Blue 
carriers departing from Pearl Harbor.” Given all the above restrictions, his Course 
of Action was going to be to reduce Blue strength by repeated attrition attacks on 
the Striking and Expeditionary Forces; to destroy the Blue Striking Force by air, 
surface, and submarine attacks; to do the same to the Blue Expeditionary Force; 
and to reduce Blue’s strategic western Aleutian bases by land-based and fleet air 
attacks. (Pages 36–38.)
Looking now at the practicality of his Course of Action, Admiral PA asserted 
that attrition attacks on the two Blue forces would depend on early success in lo-
cating them as well as on “well reasoned” or lucky mining and stationing of his 
submarines. Attrition attacks, he knew, would have to be primarily delivered by air 
and submarine, but he saw them as a practicable, if partial, solution to his problem. 
As for destroying the Blue Striking Force, he thought it vital that he attempt this de-
struction when his land-based air forces could be effective since this was his major 
weapon. Entirely aside from the distances involved, he felt that World War II was 
so recent that he could not “Pearl Harbor” the Blue Striking Force at one of Blue’s 
Aleutian bases (i.e., attack it without warning before the declaration of hostilities), 
and he could not risk his surface forces attacking Blue beyond coverage from his 
land-based air forces. He knew that the farther east he got, the poorer his chances of 
success, because he would have available less power from his land-based air forces, 
less search and attrition capability from his six fleet air wings, reduced time for his 
submarines to carry out attrition strikes, and longer supply lines for his surface 
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forces, all of which would give Blue air and submarine forces greater opportunities. 
However, it was Blue that had to venture forth, and these handicaps would accrue 
to it; Admiral PA thought Blue’s moves would permit him to use his full land-based 
air strength. He would keep his surface forces close to their bases—one of which 
was Blue’s probable objective—and concentrated. He would also strengthen the 
air defenses and air warning systems at his bases. He saw all of these measures as 
within his capabilities. (Pages 38–39.)
If he had to engage the Blue Expeditionary Force, its destruction would accom-
plish his mission. If he destroyed the Blue Striking Force, he would not have to 
engage the Expeditionary Force, which would withdraw. If, however, he failed to 
destroy the Striking Force and Blue thought him sufficiently damaged and neutral-
ized, Blue might think that its Expeditionary Force had a reasonably good chance 
of accomplishing its mission. His own best bet would be to conduct attrition attacks 
on the Blue Expeditionary Force when it was closest to his bases; all would depend 
on the amount of damage the Blue Striking Force inflicted on him. He saw this part 
of his mission as practical but foresaw that it would inflict a heavy cost. Also practi-
cal was the reduction of Blue’s western Aleutian bases by air attacks; but strikes on 
the eastern Aleutian bases would be less so given their distance from his air bases. 
Enemy opposition he saw as likely to be “intense” but not enough to prevent him 
from inflicting damage. If he was able to reduce Blue’s bases, that would degrade 
Blue’s search and strike capability available to support the Striking and Expedition-
ary Forces. (Page 40.)
Admiral PA now focused on his submarine dispositions. He ordered Rear Ad-
miral PJ, Commander, Pacific Fleet Submarine Force, to maintain two submarines 
on patrol in the Aleutians off the approaches to Dutch Harbor and to detach the 
other two currently on patrol there. Upon arrival at their base, these submarines 
were to take on maximum supplies and personnel, even to the extent of cannibal-
izing parts from other boats. They were then to proceed to stations off Pearl Harbor 
to observe the Blue carrier forces departing Hawaii. The submarines were to avoid 
detection, merely observing and reporting unless attacked. They were then to trail 
the fast carrier forces. (Pages 40–41.) 
In any attempt to reduce Blue strength by attrition attacks, PA’s primary weap-
ons would be aircraft and submarines. His land-based air forces were distributed 
over a number of “well separated” bases and could search as far as a thousand miles. 
He expected heavy air losses in his attrition attacks given the strong air elements 
in the Blue Striking Force, but he accepted these losses as necessary. He recognized 
that his fleet-based air was weak and had to be tied to his land-based air, except 
for surprise strikes on Blue bases. In view of the weakness of his fleet-based air, he 
did not plan on using it in attrition attacks until the Blue Striking Force had been 
considerably “cut down.” Also, his submarines were few in number. They were fast, 
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however; had “tremendous” endurance; would be comparatively safe from destruc-
tion given their long submergence times; and had the capacity to destroy as many 
as six major targets each. They would be decisive, provided that they were posi-
tioned so as to intercept the Blue forces when located: “Since they will be observing 
off Pearl Harbor, Dutch Harbor, and Adak, I hope for immediate warning of enemy 
sortie and extremely early attrition.” (Pages 42–43.)
His primary targets would be the Blue fleet carriers, and he was hoping to de-
stroy two or three of them before the Blue Striking Force got into a position to 
launch fighter-escorted strikes on the Purple air bases. He did not think that much 
attrition could be inflicted on the Blue Expeditionary Force before it departed the 
Aleutians but after that he expected to inflict heavy damage on that force, know-
ing at that point where it was departing from. Purple submarines with high speed 
would also have great advantages in tracking and attacking these units, especially 
the transports, his main targets in the Expeditionary Force. He expected to de-
stroy at least half the transports before the Expeditionary Force came within fighter 
range of his bases. The key, however, was either to destroy or to drive off the Blue 
Striking Force first. Though this meant great risk, the survival of his force and the 
accomplishment of his mission meant forcing an early confrontation with this force 
and, if not destroying it, damaging it to such an extent that it became impotent and 
was forced to retire. (Page 43.)
He did not expect an opportunity to execute this task until and unless his at-
tempt to destroy the Blue Striking Force had failed. At this point, he assumed, he 
would have suffered heavy damage and his air forces would be, temporarily at least, 
“extremely weak.” He would then have to depend chiefly on submarine attacks and 
long-range, unescorted, small-scale air attacks. In this case, Blue might reach the 
landing phase before Purple could inflict decisive damage, unless the Blue Strik-
ing Force’s air assets had been “tremendously” reduced and Purple’s fleet units 
remained “relatively” undamaged. He saw his strikes on the western Aleutian air 
bases by his land-based and fleet air forces as putting “highly desirable” restrictions 
on Blue, in that the latter depended so heavily on Adak for the replenishment of 
its forces. Blue sea forces also depended heavily on the western Aleutian bases for 
air support, especially those at Attu, Shemya, Amchitka, and Tanaga. Admiral PA 
further thought that his search and observation would be more satisfactory as he 
weakened Blue’s base of air support. However, he also knew that his land-based air 
forces would have to conduct many missions without fighter escort, though his 
sea forces could give some fighter and attack support to the land-based air strikes 
against Attu and Shemya. These sea forces could remain under Purple land-based 
fighter cover, but he was under no illusion about losses in planes and crews. He 
nevertheless thought the results would justify them. (Page 44.) 
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PA now contemplated the complementary problems that had to be solved—a 
Search Plan, the Combat Employment of Air and Surface Units, a Movement Plan, 
a Mining Plan, a Logistics Plan, the Task Organization and Tasks, and a Commu-
nication Plan. On the basis of his assumption that Blue would continue to send re-
connaissance planes over his bases and that Blue needed to be denied information 
about them, Admiral PA ordered Rear Admiral PK, Commander, North Pacific Air 
Command, to require effectively and immediately any foreign planes detected over 
Purple bases or territory to land for examination. Planes unwilling to comply were 
to be shot down. Commander, North Pacific Air Command was also to implement 
“suitable” defense and examination measures, while units at sea were to report all 
suspect plane contacts. The exceptions were Purple submarines at sea, which had 
more specific orders to carry out. (Pages 44–46.)
The Solution of the Problem
Admiral PA first considered his Search Plan, which would determine such other as-
pects of the campaign as the Movement Plan and the Logistics Plan. His operations 
would comprise two phases, Search and Destruction. They would overlap, and the 
second phase would not be successful unless the first was. His Search Phase would 
provide him with the intelligence needed to destroy the Blue force. His signal to ex-
ecute his Operation Plan would be receipt of information that the Blue Striking and 
Expeditionary Forces had left their bases. Because this information might come 
from his submarines, he wanted his Communication Plan to pay particular atten-
tion to rapid contact with all units—especially the submarines—when it came time 
to broadcast the order to execute the Operation Plan. In addition, he understood 
that his search had to obtain for him information on the enemy force’s strength, 
disposition, course, speed, and destination, not merely to locate it. The Search Plan 
was also predicated on the idea that the Blue Striking Force would enter the op-
erational area first, while the Expeditionary Force would hold back under the air 
cover from the Aleutian bases until the Striking Force had considerably weakened 
Purple’s bases and forces. (Page 47.)
Admiral PA estimated that the Striking Force’s most probable route from Pearl 
Harbor to the Aleutian bases was via Dutch Harbor or Adak (stopping briefly) 
and then north of the chain to the Blue objective. This might include a “far north-
erly” sweep ending with an approach to the final objective from the northeastward. 
Another possible route for the Blue Striking Force would be from Hawaii to the 
Aleutians and then south of the archipelago to the final objective, again with a brief 
stop at one of the Aleutian Islands (see below for the Komandorskis). The Striking 
Force, of course, might also steam straight to its objective from Pearl Harbor or 
leave Hawaii on a westerly course and approach the objective from the south. The 
most probable route of the Expeditionary Force would be from Puget Sound to 
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the Aleutians, then to the objective, passing north or south of the Aleutians chain. 
The Expeditionary Force alternatively might head from Puget Sound to the Cen-
tral Pacific and then on to its objective, or even directly from Puget Sound to the 
objective. He did not think, however, the last two routes very likely. He saw the 
Blue Striking Force then attempting to reduce or neutralize the Purple bases at 
Paramushiru, Shimushu, and Avacha Bay as well as the air bases supporting them. 
The Expeditionary Force, he thought, would have Paramushiru and Shimushu as 
its first objective, then Avacha Bay, Etorofu, and the Komandorski Islands, in that 
order. He did not, however, think that the last two locations were likely objectives. 
(Pages 47–48.)
Since the Striking Force was so powerful, locating it early was critical. At about 
twenty knots, the Striking Force could reach either the Aleutians or PA’s thousand-
mile operational area in about four days; the Expeditionary Force would require 
about six or seven days. To search for these forces, he had 248 naval patrol planes, 
two light and two escort carriers, two battle cruisers, six heavy and six light cruis-
ers, thirty destroyers, and sixteen high-speed submarines. His naval patrol planes 
were all radar equipped, able to search with “fair effectiveness” in any weather in 
which they could fly. Since the weather would be generally poor, he knew, these 
planes would usually be able to fly and search by radar alone. His thirty-six Mariner 
naval patrol bombers could be either land or tender based and had a search radius 
of 1,050 miles, while his forty-two Catalinas, also land or tender based, had a radius 
of about 880 miles. His ninety-six Privateers had a search radius of 970 miles but 
were only land based, as were his eighty-four Harpoons, which had a radius of 750 
miles. He could operate from his three seaplane tenders only the fifty-four planes 
they could service; his land-based planes would have to take on four missions to 
every one that was carried out by the tender-based planes. (Pages 49–50.) 
PA found the Gulf of Kamchatka to be desirable for bases for seaplane-tender 
operations for a number of reasons. It would permit him to conduct extended 
searches of the northern part of the area he had to cover, something not possible 
from his land bases. In addition, for bombing purposes, planes from the gulf would 
have a trip to Adak of eight hundred miles, as compared with over nine hundred 
from Avacha Bay and a thousand from the Kashiwabara Bay area. Furthermore, 
the Gulf of Kamchatka was usable in the summer. It would also allow these units to 
have antisubmarine as well as fighter protection (all to be marked on a chart in an 
appendix to the Search Plan). There were risks, however, to exposing the tenders 
and their support units. He thought, though, that these ships could be provided 
fighter cover; also, if he detected the Blue forces early, the tenders could retire to 
Avacha Bay, where they could continue their searches under fighter cover from 
the Paramushiru area. Or he could at that point retire the seaplane tenders to rear 
areas and continue his searches with land-based planes only. Meanwhile, Fleet Air 
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Wing 10 was the logical choice for this assignment; he ordered it to a tender-based 
group in the Gulf of Kamchatka, warning it of the probability that the tender would 
be pulled back once the Blue Striking Force was located. He left Commodore PL, 
COMFAIRWING 10, as much freedom of action as possible in searching the ar-
eas he had delineated. Search-area boundaries had been selected so as to maximize 
ranges in the northern sectors, where he saw the weather offering the maximum 
concealment for surprise strikes. To compensate, however, for the possibility of a 
“high speed” strike by the Blue Striking Force coming directly from Pearl Harbor or 
from the south, he established a submarine line. (Pages 50–51.)
As for his surface forces, the Purple escort carriers (built on auxiliary- or 
merchant-type hulls) were slow, so Admiral PA would detach them as a Service 
Force Air Support Group. His light carriers, however (having cruiser-type hulls and 
propulsion plants), would participate as a source of combat air cover, as an anti-
submarine patrol force, and as a messenger service for the Seaplane Tender Group. 
Because the weather would probably handicap air operations, he was going to 
divide his surface search assets into two groups, HAMMER and SICKLE, leaving 
their organization, stationing, and other details to Commander, Fleet Attack Force, 
Rear Admiral PB, who was going to command the bulk of PA’s fleet units. PB would 
manage the critical 
matter of concentrating 
the combatant surface 
forces and, through 
him, PA could order 
any surface searches 
desired by PA him-
self or his Air Group 
Commander. How-
ever, he did not want 
his two battle cruis-
ers or their screen-
ing units employed in 
surface searches; these 
units were to be held in 
Kashiwabara Bay, un-
der continuous land-
based air cover, until it 
was necessary to con-
centrate the Purple Pa-
cific Fleet for action. He further ordered his Surface Force Commander to furnish 
fighter cover to the naval patrol planes when needed. (Page 51.)
Fig. 106
Submarine Patrol Lines, 
Purple Staff Solution
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Turning to his sub-
marines, he had four 
on patrol in the Aleu-
tians. Two of these had 
orders to proceed to 
Dutch Harbor, and the 
other two were being 
diverted to Pearl Har-
bor. Four more subma-
rines were in overhaul 
until 10 June, and eight 
additional were train-
ing around Kashi-
wabara Bay; he had 
worked out a rotation 
schedule for their em-
ployment. Each of his four submarine divisions had four submarines. The two 
boats of Submarine Division 1 that were overhauling in Vladivostok would depart 
on the 10th, top off fuel from tenders in the Kuriles, and then proceed to their 
patrol stations, arriving off Dutch Harbor and Adak, respectively, by 17 June. The 
four units of SUBDIV 2 that were off Dutch Harbor and en route to Pearl on 4 
June would return to Vladivostok by 17 June for refit. The eight boats of SUBDIVs 
3 and 4 would continue training at Kashiwabara Bay until “Jump Day,” the day 
that Admiral PA’s Operation Plan was executed. On Jump Day, SUBDIVs 3 and 4 
would proceed to their patrol and picket stations. (Pages 51–52.)
All six fleet air wings—comprising both land- and tender-based air units—were 
under Rear Admiral PK as part of the Air Strike Force. The Air Strike Force, in turn, 
would be divided into the Land-Based Air Group and the Kamchatka Group. The 
Land-Based Air Group was to consist of Fleet Air Wings 20 through 60, inclusive, 
as well as two submarines for radar-picket duty; it would be under Commodore 
PM. The Kamchatka Group, under Commodore PL, would comprise the three sea-
plane tenders, one escort carrier and three destroyers (escort carrier CVL-2 and 
destroyers DD-4, -5, and -6), and Fleet Air Wing 10, as well as one light carrier and 
three destroyers from the Fleet Attack Force. (The latter units would not return 
to the Fleet Attack Force until Admiral PA was certain that a surface engagement 
was imminent.) In general, the tasks of the Air Strike Force would be to search and 
patrol in accordance with the Search Plan; report, track, and develop (i.e., collect 
maximum possible information about) any contacts; and provide search and rescue 
services. It was also to establish and maintain a seaplane tender base at the Gulf 
Fig. 107
Purple Submarine Force 
rotation schedule, Opera-
tions Problem 2
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of Kamchatka as well as conduct photoreconnaissance of bases designated in the 
Search Plan. (Page 52.) 
The Submarine Force would be under the command of Rear Admiral PJ. Com-
prising fourteen submarines and two submarine tenders after two boats were de-
tached as radar pickets, the Submarine Force was to patrol off Pearl Harbor, Dutch 
Harbor, and Adak to cover probable approach routes and detect and report on Blue 
forces. Its primary initial mission was to make contact reports, but once this was 
accomplished the mission became the destruction of Blue forces encountered. The 
submarines were to patrol along patrol lines designated above, making amplifying 
reports when able to do so without jeopardizing their primary mission. One sub-
marine tender would be based at Vladivostok for refits, the other at Kashiwabara 
to conduct repairs and training. However, when Submarine Divisions 3 and 4 de-
parted for their stations two days after Jump Day (Jump Day+2), the second tender 
would proceed to Taraika Bay in Sakhalin and serve as a base for refits and repairs. 
Admiral PA designated the target priorities for the submarines as carriers, trans-
ports and cargo ships, battleships, tankers, and then other combatant ships. (Page 
53.) 
When possible, submarine stations would be “staggered” in depth to increase 
the possibility of contacts. The patrol lines for SUBDIVs 3 and 4—less one boat 
each for radar-picket duty—would be CASTOR and POISON; radar-picket stations 
would be assigned by Commander, Air Strike Force. One likely patrol line was be-
tween the Gulf of Kamchatka and Attu, three hundred miles long. Another would 
be between Kashiwabara and Attu, four to five hundred miles, positioned to fur-
nish aircraft warnings and intercept ships. The submarine protecting Kashiwabara 
could be backed up if desired by radar-picket destroyers under land-based fighter 
cover. (Pages 53–54.)
The Surface Search Groups would patrol their assigned stations, conduct the 
searches ordered, and maintain readiness for rapid concentration on the Battle 
Cruiser Group, requesting fighter cover for the naval patrol planes. 
Admiral PA understood that all of these search measures would put his com-
mand under “strenuous use,” but he also knew these actions would provide early 
and accurate intelligence on Blue that was so vital to the destruction of those forces. 
His own headquarters would be ashore at Kashiwabara Bay, where he would have 
communication facilities and be closer to the hub of search operations than if he 
were at sea. This arrangement would also allow him to be in immediate contact 
with Commander, Air Strike Force. (Page 54.) 
Admiral PA’s 250-odd planes were more than enough to carry out searches, 
leaving plenty for strike operations. He planned initial air strikes on Attu, Shemya, 
Amchitka, and Adak–Tanaga. These strikes would commence as soon as the Blue 
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forces had been located by his search units in accordance with a schedule devised by 
Commander, Air Strike Force, Admiral PA’s second in command for the operation. 
In general, air strikes on Blue’s bases would be without fighter cover, though fight-
ers could be furnished from carriers if that did not mean exposing the carriers too 
much. Regardless, however, Attu and Shemya were his primary targets since these 
bases were so close to his proposed tender base. Once the Blue Striking Force was 
within effective range, Purple’s land-based air units would concentrate on destroy-
ing it with bombs, torpedoes, and rockets. Details of this plan would be prepared 
by Commander, Air Strike Force, who was to allocate his land-based fighters; set up 
and maintain emergency capacity air defenses at Paramushiru, Shimushu, Avacha 
Bay, Matsuwa, Etorofu, and Sakhalin Island; set up a replacement system for planes 
and personnel; and be responsible for the air defense of the Purple bases. (Page 55.)
Commander, Air Strike Force would be assisted in the latter task by the two sub-
marines assigned to radar-picket duty. In addition, the Kamchatka Group would 
have about fifty fighter planes in addition to those fighters from light and escort 
carriers, a total of about a hundred planes, which Admiral PA thought adequate 
given that the Seaplane Tender Group would retire to Avacha Bay once the Blue 
Striking Force had been located, since the enemy could then be tracked from land 
bases. He understood that the Tender Group could have a strong fighter cover from 
Kashiwabara, but that was six hours’ flight time distant, during which the tenders 
would be under their original land-based fighters as well as those from the Pur-
ple carriers; he was willing to accept this risk to his naval patrol planes in order 
to obtain the maximum possible warning of the Blue Striking Force’s approach, 
if from the north. Early detection would allow him to exploit the capabilities of 
his high-speed submarines and ideally eliminate half or more of the Blue carriers. 
His Air Strike Force, after completing its searches, would destroy the Blue Strik-
ing Force with bombs, torpedoes, rockets, and guns at the earliest opportunity. It 
was then to attack the Blue Expeditionary Force in the same manner, destroy any 
Blue submarines and aircraft encountered, and defend Purple’s bases in the Kuriles, 
Kamchatka, and Sakhalin from air attack. The Air Strike Force was to control and 
coordinate all the Purple air strikes against the Aleutian bases and provide antisub-
marine protection for the Gulf of Kamchatka. (Pages 55–57.)
Surface forces were organized into the Fleet Attack Force, under Rear Admiral PB 
—two light carriers, two battle cruisers, six heavy and six light cruisers, and twenty- 
four destroyers. This “fast, strong” group, with its own air cover that was to be sup-
plemented by land-based air, would be supplemented further by the Kamchatka 
Group (one escort carrier and three destroyers), a Service Force (whose six oilers 
were protected by one escort carrier and three destroyers), and the one light carrier 
and three destroyers now detailed to the Air Strike Force. Admiral PA thought that a 
surface engagement was not inevitable but that an early air action was.
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Strikes on the Blue Aleutian bases would allow him to relieve Commander, Fleet 
Attack Force of the task of the air strikes on these bases by Jump Day+4 and ensure 
the latter force’s readiness to act against Blue surface forces. He expected the Fleet 
Attack Force to face a Blue Striking Force of six fleet carriers, five heavy cruis-
ers, three light cruisers, and twenty-five destroyers, as well as three escort carri-
ers, two battleships, two light cruisers, and twenty-five more destroyers in the Blue 
Expeditionary Force. Before Purple Fleet Attack Force and the Blue Striking Force 
had closed to gun range, he expected his attrition strikes to have reduced Blue air 
strength by half or more. But if the Blue Striking Force reduced Purple land-based 
air considerably, a surface engagement was probable. In it, he expected Purple to 
have a great advantage in speed but this meant that the Fleet Attack Force had to be 
ready for a surface engagement with all or part of the Blue Striking Force, all or part 
of the Blue Expeditionary Force, or some combination of both forces, minus only 
the destroyers protecting the Blue Expeditionary Force’s transports. (Pages 57–58.) 
One solution was to tie in the two Surface Search Groups as flank forces when the 
Fleet Attack Force concentrated for its surface engagement. 
Commander, Fleet Attack Force was to be supported by Commander, Air Strike 
Force, who was to provide fighter cover to surface forces within 250 miles of the 
fleet air wing shore bases. In fact, any commander needing shore-based fighter 
cover was to request it from the Air Strike Force. The Fleet Attack Force would 
provide antisubmarine surface patrols to the Tender Group at Kashiwabara Bay. 
(Pages 58–59.)
The operation could be implemented any time after 10 June. It was necessary 
to get his Seaplane Tender Group and its fighter support as near to the Gulf of 
Kamchatka as possible to take the forty-eight-hour time lag into account. This 
could be done by redeploying Fleet Air Wing 10 to Paramushiru and basing its 
necessary support units there for training instead of at Vladivostok. He therefore 
ordered Commander, North Pacific Air Command; Commander, Carrier Divi-
sion (COMCARDIV) 1; COMDESRON 1; and Commander, Mine Squadron 1 
to carry out the movements involved. Commander, North Pacific Air Command 
was to send Fleet Air Wing 10 to Paramushiru and two seaplane tenders to Suri-
bachi Bay before 10 June and be prepared for extended operations. Commander, 
North Pacific Air Command, at his discretion, could also redeploy the naval patrol 
bombers of Fleet Air Wing 30. COMCARDIV 1 was to ready and train his two 
light carriers and three escort carriers for extended operations in the Okhotsk 
Sea south of latitude 53. After 10 June, COMCARDIV 1 was to base his unit at 
Kashiwabara Bay and await further orders. COMDESRON 1 was to detach six 
of his destroyers, half to Commander, North Pacific Air Command and half to 
COMCARDIV 1. Commander, Mine Squadron 1 was to ready one light minelayer 
and two destroyer-minesweepers for extended operations and have them report to 
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Commander, Fleet Air Wing 10 at Paramushiru no later than 10 June for training. 
(Pages 60–61.)
Admiral PA was concerned about the dispersal of forces against a major surprise 
attack by Blue before he executed his plan. For that reason, he wanted to retire 
his submarines in training and their tender to a base such as Uruppu, over three 
hundred miles farther from the Blue air bases than Kashiwabara. Such a move, 
however, would add a day’s run to Patrol Line CASTOR, a cost that he considered 
unacceptable in view of the fact that the Blue Striking Force—if bound for Dutch 
Harbor—would arrive in four to five and a half days. Purple submarines from 
Kashiwabara, restricted by their two-day readiness notice, could reach their patrol 
line only on Jump Day+5 or +5½. Therefore, he decided to leave his submarines 
and their tender at Kashiwabara until Jump Day+2 in a bay well separated from the 
submarine group and under strong land-based air cover. (Page 61.)
By Jump Day, Commander, Air Strike Force would have issued his Search Plan 
and effected the necessary redeployment of his aircraft. Tender-based air was to be 
based by Jump Day—with its tenders, supporting carriers, destroyers, and mine-
sweepers—at Paramushiru. Seaplane tenders and supporting units were given forty- 
eight hours’ notice to leave Vladivostok for Paramushiru, ready for extended opera-
tions upon arrival. PA’s Movement Plan called for their departure on Jump Day+1 
from Paramushiru to the Gulf of Kamchatka, a move he did not expect to take more 
than a day and a half at fifteen knots. 
On Jump Day, he would have eight submarines training at Kashiwabara Bay and 
another eight either at or en route to or from their patrol stations. The eight sub-
marines training at Kashiwabara would be dispatched for patrol on Jump Day+2, 
at which time he would retire their tender and its escorts to Taraika Bay, near 
Shikuka on Sakhalin Island. Use of this bay for refits would save his boats over a five- 
hundred-mile transit each way as compared with Vladivostok. Taraika, in fact, was 
over a thousand miles from the nearest Blue base, would have local fighter protec-
tion from Alexandrovsk, and would enjoy the entire Kuriles chain for perimeter 
defense and warning. The tender would, however, need antisubmarine protection, 
for which he was considering minesweepers. However, submarines needing ex-
tended refits because of battle damage or operational casualties would still have 
to be repaired back at Vladivostok. These plans would have to be modified if the 
Operation Plan was not executed prior to SUBDIV 3’s departure for patrol in early 
July. (Pages 61–62.)
The Fleet Attack Force would by this time have its Surface Search Groups at sea, 
with the remainder at Kashiwabara Bay. The Fleet Attack Force was to be ready for 
departure from Vladivostok on Jump Day+2 for Kashiwabara Bay, a three-day run 
at fifteen knots. It would be accompanied by minesweeping and possibly logistical 
units, but the light carrier and three destroyers under Commander, Fleet Attack 
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Force would be detached for operations in the Okhotsk Sea. Admiral PA was go-
ing to have the Service Force (one escort carrier, three destroyers, and six oilers 
under Commodore PI) brought forward from Vladivostok to Aniwa Bay, Sakhalin, 
except for units detached to travel with the Fleet Attack Force to Kashiwabara or 
independently to the Gulf of Kamchatka. Aniwa Bay was about 1,200 miles from 
the nearest Blue air base and could get fighter protection from Etorofu or Alexan-
drovsk. In addition, its position west of the Kuriles, he thought, would give “ample” 
warning for impending air raids. The Mine Force, comprising the light minelayer, 
four destroyer-minesweepers, and twelve minesweepers, would also be ready to 
depart from Vladivostok on Jump Day+2. The light minelayer and two destroyer-
minesweepers had already been assigned to the Seaplane Tender Group, while the 
other units would be routed to Kashiwabara Bay, Taraika Bay, and Aniwa Bay. Fi-
nally, the Movement Plan required Commander, Fleet Attack Force to consult with 
Commander, Air Strike Force about rendezvous points, operating areas, fueling 
areas, routes between bases, and other details, and then issue orders. (Page 62–63.)
Admiral PA’s Mine Plan was considered under two headings, minelaying and 
minesweeping. Minelaying fell into two categories as well, offensive and defensive. 
His potential minelaying facilities were the six fleet air wings, the two light and two 
escort carriers, the sixteen submarines, and the light minelayer. He did not plan on 
using his submarines for minelaying, since there were so few and their high speed 
gave them more offensive value carrying torpedoes. Moreover, torpedoes gave his 
submarines a defensive capability that mines did not. He also did not plan on us-
ing his surface units for offensive mining, because they would almost certainly be 
destroyed before they could reach offensive mining positions. That left his fleet air 
wings and carrier air groups. The ninety-six Privateer and thirty-six Mariner naval 
patrol bombers appeared best suited to offensive mining. Each could carry as many 
as eight thousand-pound or four two-thousand-pound mines. At a “reasonable” 
hazard in endurance, these planes could lay mines out to a 650-mile radius, which 
would allow them to reach Attu, Shemya, and Kiska. With only four mines per 
plane, the naval patrol bombers could reach Amchitka and Adak, though the cost 
would be excessive because of the heavy defenses there. Precise timing would allow 
for some carrier support in operations against Attu and Shemya, but at consider-
able risk. (Pages 64–65.)
To mine the Blue bases at Adak and Amchitka, he would have to resort to carrier 
air, but on a day with good visibility and using both light carriers, his fighters would 
be outnumbered as much as five to one. In poor visibility, he would be limited to 
twelve night fighters that could lay a total of twelve mines, which he did not think 
worthwhile. He speculated about using jet-assisted takeoff to launch naval patrol 
bombers from his carriers so as to extend their range, but he did not think that was 
technically feasible. In the end, he thought, a compromise was necessary between 
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the cover afforded by poor visibility and the good visibility required for accurate 
mining. Admiral PA concluded that offensive minelaying near and at the extreme 
western Aleutian bases was practical for the fleet air wings, and he assigned this 
mission to Commander, Air Strike Force. For defensive mining and minesweeping, 
he decided to employ his light minelayer for the former and all of his destroyer-
minesweepers and minesweepers for the latter. The light minelayer was a high-
speed unit that could lay a full load of mines accurately in one day, as well as take on 
board another full load. These operations would require a mine base ashore, which 
would be Kashiwabara Bay. (Page 65.)
In view of the numerous entrances through the Kuriles into the Okhotsk Sea—
some of them over a thousand fathoms deep—as well as the limited forces he could 
use for mining and patrolling access points that were not mined, Admiral PA de-
cided to limit defensive mining to his ship bases as protection against submarines. 
The light minelayer and two of the destroyer-minesweepers at Paramushiru could, 
upon execution of the plan, make a high-speed run to the Gulf of Kamchatka, sweep 
and buoy a channel, and then plant a defensive minefield. The light minelayer 
could then return to Kashiwabara and plant defensive mines there, in conjunction 
with the sweeping and buoying of channels by the two destroyer-minesweepers 
arriving from Vladivostok with or preceding the Fleet Attack Force. The light 
minelayer could then plant defensive minefields at Aniwa Bay and Taraika Bay, 
where PA thought immediate protection was less urgent. Commodore PR, Com-
mander, Mine Force, whose command would comprise Mine Squadron 1, also had 
to allot his minesweepers among the four bases employed in the operation and to 
issue the necessary movement plans for passage from Vladivostok. He would place 
his headquarters at Kashiwabara Bay so as to be in close contact with Admiral PA. 
Finally, Commander, Mine Force would evaluate all reports on mines and keep all 
commands informed. (Page 66.) 
Admiral PA’s Logistics Plan focused on fuel and aviation gasoline. He did not 
have a critical problem, because his bases would be so near his operations and he 
had short, interior lines of supply. He did, however, have to make do with what he 
now had. The Kurile and Sakhalin naval bases and stations, especially Kashiwabara 
Bay and Hitokappu Bay, were well equipped and stocked with fuel and supplies for 
any ship that could use the harbors there. Three of his task forces could be elimi-
nated as potentially posing logistics problems. The Submarine Force would take all 
services from tenders, which in turn could exchange places with the Vladivostok 
tender. When required, fuel could also be sent via tanker. The Service Force was 
obviously self-sustaining. The Mine Force, being supported by a variety of bases, 
would fuel where located and would cause little drain on the local facilities. The 
other task forces, the Air Strike Force and the Fleet Attack Force, would both be 
fully loaded on arrival at Kashiwabara Bay and the Gulf of Kamchatka, respectively. 
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The Air Strike Force would have to replenish itself periodically at or near the Gulf 
of Kamchatka, especially with fuel for the Kamchatka Group’s surface units. There 
would also be a need to replenish aviation gasoline used by the tender-based and 
carrier-based planes as well as by the land-based fighters at Khayryuzovo on the 
Kamchatka Peninsula. Diesel fuel for minesweepers would have to be taken into 
account, though he thought it could be supplied by the seaplane tenders in the Gulf 
of Kamchatka. (Page 67.)
Admiral PA assumed that a tanker arriving at the Gulf of Kamchatka every fif-
teen days could take care of “average expected” needs; the schedule could be ad-
justed readily as conditions required since he had short, well-covered lines of sup-
ply. He would use two tankers, to allow even more frequent arrivals, about every 
ten or twelve days. Whatever fuel Kamchatka could not take would be off-loaded 
at Kuriles bases as feasible for returning to Vladivostok. This arrangement would 
leave him with four tankers to care for the Fleet Attack Force and the Fleet Air 
Wing units at the Kurile–Sakhalin bases, supplemented by partial loads from tank-
ers en route from Kamchatka to Vladivostok. This arrangement appeared ample 
since fleet units would not all be operating twenty-four hours a day and the tankers 
would have shorter runs to the Kurile bases than to the Gulf of Kamchatka. The 
Service Force, even when fueling at sea, could expect to be within land-based fight-
er range at all times, though he had assigned one escort carrier and three destroyers 
to protect it and, if circumstances required, he would assign additional escort units. 
His Movement Plan directed Commander, Service Force to sail from Vladivostok 
on Jump Day+2 and es-
tablish a base at Aniwa 
Bay, Sakhalin, shift-
ing his flag (i.e., his 
headquarters on board 
ship) as necessary. In 
the event of tanker 
losses and a lack of re-
placements, Admiral 
PA would have well 
stocked bases to draw 
on for a considerable 
period by the rotation 
of units to port. (Pages 
68–69.) All large ships 
were to be prepared to refuel destroyers and other small ships. On or about 1 Au-
gust, when logistics became available at Avacha Bay, units would base there.
Fig. 108
Appendix 1, Logistics Plan, 
Purple Staff Solution, 
Operations Problem 2
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Kamchatka fighters and Catalinas were to fly from Paramushiru to Khayryu-
zovo prior to Jump Day with small maintenance crews and necessary equipment. 
Some of these supplies and equipment could be dropped by parachute, while the 
rest could be landed since naval patrol bombers could use its three-thousand-foot-
long runways. On Jump Day, forty-eight fighters would be flown there from Para-
mushiru; the 6,700 gallons of aviation gasoline they required could be carried by 
four to seven naval patrol bombers. Refueling would be difficult up to 1 August but 
the added fighter protection for the Kamchatka Group would be valuable. In ad-
dition, he planned to have personnel relieved often. This plan required setting an 
additional task for the Air Strike Force, which was to establish and supply by air a 
Fighter Plane Group at Khayryuzovo. (Page 69.) 
Admiral PA had only a “skeleton” outline for his task organization so as to allow 
task force commanders maximum flexibility. About 5 June, members of his staff 
would fly to Kashiwabara Bay, organize the base facilities there to fit the pattern 
he wanted, and handle preliminary coordination with Commander, North Pacific 
Air. On Jump Day, he would transfer to Kashiwabara as his base. Commander, Air 
Strike Force was designated as his second in command since that officer would 
control the major search instrument and combat weapon, the fleet air wings. By re-
maining at Kashiwabara with the Air Strike Force Commander, Admiral PA hoped 
to attain optimum flexibility in the coordination of his various groups. However, 
Commander, Air Strike Force would remain “well separated” from him to reduce 
the possibility of an air raid eliminating both of them at once. He code-named 
his operation BLUEPILL. (Page 72.) Admiral PA now repeated and summarized the 
tasks, detailed above, of his major subordinates. (Pages 73–74.)
Fig. 109
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Whenever Commander, Air Strike Force and Commander, Fleet Attack Force 
were engaged in coordinated action, the former would control. Surface force com-
manders were to be ready to take defensive measures at sea against atomic bomb 
attacks and to effect maximum practicable dispersal in harbor. Commander, Air 
Strike Force would request fighter support for the naval patrol bombers from Com-
mander, Fleet Attack Force but only when the forces assigned to the former were 
unable to provide the needed support. Commander, Purple Pacific Fleet would also 
be involved in these cases. Task force commanders desiring shore-based fighter 
cover for surface and submarine units at sea would notify Commander, Air Strike 
Force twenty-four hours in advance. Shore-based and fleet-based aircraft that were 
lost could be replaced within thirty-six hours by dispatch request to Commander, 
Far East Naval District. (Pages 74–75.) 
All forces were to be alert to take advantage of the weather and anticipate similar 
efforts by Blue. Related to this, task forces, groups, units, and aircraft were ordered 
to break radio silence and report by priority-precedence message indications of 
gale-force winds, heavy swells, or storms that could affect operations. Units were 
not to break radio silence, however, if that would impair operations in progress. 
Admiral PA would establish a major radio-intelligence center at Kashiwabara and 
assign additional communication personnel to it. In view of the possibility of heavy 
damage to the Kashiwabara facilities, a relief organization at Etorofu would be ca-
pable of taking over the entire communications system. Special provisions would 
be made for submarine broadcasts that repeated messages day and night. (Pages 
75–76.) 
A special “repeat-back” schedule was also going to be run between Kashiwabara 
and Vladivostok to permit the reception of messages by all units at sea without the 
need to receipt for them. PA attempted to ensure that procedures for contact and 
amplifying reports were “absolutely” clear. He prioritized traffic related to aircraft 
replacement, weather data, and submarines. Also of concern was radio silence for 
ships at sea, the assignment of zone times in messages, and the use of planes to de-
liver messages so that radio transmissions could be avoided. (Page 76.)
For the Board Maneuver, Admiral PA divided Rear Admiral PK’s Air Strike 
Force into the Land-Based Air Group under Commodore PM and the Kamchatka 
Group under Commodore PL. The Land-Based Air Group comprised Fleet Air 
Wings 20, 30, 40, 50, and 60, with 210 naval patrol bombers, 193 day fighters, 126 
night fighters, and two submarines among them. The Kamchatka Group was to 
comprise one of the light carriers, one of the escort carriers, all three seaplane tend- 
ers, six destroyers, and the forty-eight naval patrol bombers of Fleet Air Wing 10. 
Rear Admiral PJ’s Submarine Force was to consist of the other fourteen submarines 
assigned to the Purple Pacific Fleet, along with their two submarine tenders. Com-
modore PR’s Mine Force was the light minelayer, four destroyer-minesweepers, 
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and twelve minesweepers noted above in connection with the Mine Plan. Commo-
dore PI’s Service Force comprised the second of Admiral PA’s escort carriers, three 
additional destroyers, and the six oilers. The main body was Rear Admiral PB’s 
Fleet Attack Force of two light carriers, two battle cruisers, six heavy and six light 
cruisers, and twenty-four destroyers. (Page 77.)
As of 5 June, there were no known Blue mines in Purple areas of operation. 
Given the Purple assumption that Blue would see an early advantage in the use of 
atomic bombs, Admiral PA also warned ships to effect maximum practical disper-
sal while in harbor. (Pages 78–80.) 
As soon as was practicable after receipt of the Operation Plan, the Air Strike 
Force would effect preliminary redeployment of aircraft and equipment, including 
establishing its air groups in southern and central Kamchatka. Commencing on 
Jump Day, it was to search twice daily in the areas delimited in Appendix 1 to Annex 
A of the Operation Plan. When necessary on strike days or for other reasons—even 
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when there was authorization to reduce the extent and number of searches— 
Commander, Purple Pacific Fleet was to be advised of any such reductions. 
Whenever circumstances permitted, search ranges were to be extended as de-
lineated in Appendix 1. Single-plane searches were to be made twice daily of the 
Komandorski Islands, once daily up the east coast of Kamchatka south of 57 de-
grees north, and once daily of the Kurile Islands. Negative results were not to be 
reported. Daily photoreconnaissance of the Aleutians as far east as 175 degrees 
west longitude was to be undertaken as feasible, with priority targets in the order 
of Adak, Amchitka, Attu, and Shemya. These results were to be reported. (Page 81.)
Upon execution of the Operation Plan, Submarine Division 1 would depart for 
patrol—on 10 June, or sooner if able. Two units were to proceed to patrol off Dutch 
Harbor, relieving the two boats already there. On Jump Day+2, SUBDIVs 3 and 4—
each less one boat—would proceed to Patrol Lines CASTOR and POISON, with three 
submarines on each line. On Jump Day+2, the two radar-picket submarines would 
also report to Commander, Air Strike Force for duty. The Fleet Attack Force would 
initially operate to the east of the Kurile Islands between latitudes 52° and 49° N 
and within 250 miles from 50°30ʹ N, 156° E. It would also organize Surface Search 
Groups HAMMER and SICKLE and be prepared to conduct searches as ordered by 
Commander, Purple Pacific Fleet. All units were to advise Commander, Purple Pa-
cific Fleet whenever it was considered that the searches conducted were providing 
less than 75 percent probability of detection of the large Blue surface forces. Upon 
initial contact with the Blue Striking Force, Commander, Air Strike Force was to 
be prepared to retire the Kamchatka Group to Avacha Bay or to the rear and from 
there continue his searches to the maximum feasible ranges. Appendix 2 of the 
Operation Plan contained the geographical limits of the potential submarine patrol 
lines. Task force commanders were to submit their implementing plans by 8 June. 
(Pages 81–82.)
Admiral PA directed no unit movements prior to Operation BLUEPILL except 
those noted in the Search Plan. He did, however, detail that when SUBDIVs 3 and 
4 departed for their patrol and picket duties, submarine tender AS-3, escorted by 
one destroyer, would leave for Taraika Bay on Sakhalin to carry out submarine re-
fits until further orders. Submarine tender AS-2 would remain at Vladivostok until 
further orders. The Fleet Attack Force would base such units as it deemed advis-
able at Kashiwabara Bay under “maximum practicable readiness” for getting under 
way. Prior to departure from Vladivostok, and not later than Jump Day+1, it would 
direct COMCARDIV 1 to detach escort carrier CVE-4 and COMDESRON 2 to 
detach destroyers DD-16, -17, and -18 to Commander, Service Force. The Service 
Force—less the units detached for logistical purposes—was to proceed on Jump 
Day+2 from Vladivostok for Aniwa Bay, Sakhalin, staying there until it received 
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further orders. The Mine Force, less its units detached for implementing the Mine 
Plan, was to proceed on Jump Day+2 to Kashiwabara Bay and remain until further 
orders. (Page 84.)
On Jump Day, all task force commanders would commence final loading and 
preparations for “extended war service.” On the same day, they would complete any 
aircraft preparation needed for extended war service. If practicable on the same 
day—but not later than Jump Day+1—Commander, Air Strike Force would dis-
patch light minelayer DM-1 and his two destroyer-minesweepers from temporary 
duty at Paramushiru to the Gulf of Kamchatka at maximum sustained speed with 
orders to buoy and sweep a channel as well as plant the minefields detailed in the 
Mine Plan. At this point, DM-1 would return to Kashiwabara Bay and report to 
Commander, Kamchatka Group. Also on Jump Day+1, Commander, Air Strike 
Force would detach one destroyer from the Kamchatka Group to the commanding 
officer of submarine tender AS-3 at Kashiwabara Bay to escort the submarine tender 
to Taraika Bay. Afterward, the destroyer would resume its duty with the Kamchatka 
Group. Not later than Jump Day+1, Commander, Mine Force and Commander, 
Service Force would report to Commander, Fleet Attack Force at Vladivostok to 
coordinate the passages of the three forces from Vladivostok to their forward areas 
and to ensure the adequacy of sweeping services. (Page 85.)
After consultation with and the approval of Commander, Air Strike Force, 
Commander, Fleet Attack Force would define and promulgate to all task force 
commanders and to Commander, Purple Pacific Fleet appropriate rendezvous 
points, operating and fueling areas, routes between bases, and other necessary de-
tails relating to movements, no later than 8 June. Purple Pacific Fleet Sortie Plan 
No. 3-4 remained effective; changes about swept channels would be broadcast by 
Commander, Mine Force. During BLUEPILL, Commander, Air Strike Force would 
be at Fleet Air Headquarters at Kashiwabara, while Commander, Submarine Force 
would be at Vladivostok. The Deputy Commander, Submarine Force would be at 
Purple Pacific Fleet Headquarters at Kashiwabara; Commander, Fleet Attack Force 
would be with his units at sea. Commander, Service Force would be at Aniwa Bay 
upon the initial arrival of the Service Force units from Vladivostok. Commander, 
Mine Force would be at the Purple Pacific Fleet Headquarters at Kashiwabara Bay 
upon the arrival of his units from Vladivostok. (Page 85.)
In his Logistics Plan, Admiral PA reiterated that Commander, Service Force’s 
mission was to deliver fuel, diesel, and aviation gasoline to the forces engaged in 
BLUEPILL; he was also to prepare and promulgate schedules of delivery as soon as 
possible after the receipt of estimates (which were to submitted to Admiral PA by 
7 June, with fueling times and rendezvous points, for the period of Jump Day to 
Jump Day+30). Task force commanders were to keep the Service Force informed of 
all changes in those requirements and of any requirements beyond Jump Day+30. 
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Task force commanders were as far as practicable to maintain fuel, diesel, and 
aviation-gasoline levels near full capacity. Sixty percent of full capacity was the low-
est authorized level, except for tender aviation gasoline, which could drop to 40 
percent. All forces engaged in Operation BLUEPILL were authorized to draw on any 
available base facilities as necessary, but no unit was to take fuel, diesel, or aviation 
gasoline unnecessarily. (Page 86.)
Offensive mining was to be limited to aircraft under Commander, Air Strike 
Force. Defensive mining would be confined to the protection of ships at bases 
against submarine attack. Initially, four bases—the Gulf of Kamchatka, Kashi-
wabara Bay, Aniwa Bay, and Taraika Bay—would be so mined. The senior Mine 
Force officer at each base would provide antisubmarine surface patrol units as di-
rected by the Senior Officer Present Afloat (SOPA). Commander, Mine Force was 
also to submit by 8 June to Commander, Purple Pacific Fleet detailed charts of the 
proposed minefields to be planted by his units. Commander, Purple Pacific Fleet 
would disseminate these charts to all task force commanders; Commander, Mine 
Force would communicate any deviations from these charts to Commander, Purple 
Pacific Fleet as well as to the task force commanders. (Page 87.) 
Upon completion of planting the minefields at Kamchatka and Kashiwabara, 
the Mine Force would supplement the Kamchatka minefields, proceed to plant 
fields at Aniwa Bay and Taraika Bay, and then provide minesweeping and chan-
nel buoy services at these two bays prior to the arrival of fleet units. The Senior 
Officer Present Afloat at each base would also control the frequency and limits of 
mine sweeps, but there would be at the minimum sweeps preceding the entry or 
sortie of all fleet units larger than destroyers as well as one daily sweep whether 
or not entries or sorties occurred. Upon request, Commander, Mine Force would 
also furnish minesweeping service to all task force commanders during Opera-
tion BLUEPILL. Commander, Purple Pacific Fleet would process the charts of mine 
plants submitted by Commander, Mine Force and distribute them by 10 June to all 
task force commanders. (Pages 87–88.)
Mining itself was to take place in specific ways. In the Kamchatka area, mines 
were to be laid in the channel to the anchorage area in two legs and 1,200 yards 
apart. The median line of the inner leg was to run 350 degrees true from Point 
OBOE, which was 56°03ʹ N, 162°14ʹ E, and terminate at Point ROGER, 56°07.5ʹ N, 
162°13ʹ E. The median line of the outer leg was to run 110 degrees true from Point 
OBOE and terminate at Point X-RAY—at 56°02ʹ N, 162°21ʹ E—and at the channel 
entrance to seaward. Minefields were to be planted on each side of the channel as 
well. In the eastern sector, the minefield was to be bounded on the southeast by a 
line running from the northeast corner of the outer channel leg in a direction 080 
degrees true and extending to the five-fathom curve, or about six hundred yards 
offshore where the five-fathom curve was closer than that. The minefield was to be 
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bounded on the northwest by a line parallel to the southeast line and three miles 
distant from it to the northeast. This line was also to extend from the eastern side 
of the channel to the five-fathom curve, six hundred yards offshore. The minefield 
was to be bounded on the southwest by that portion of the right-hand limit of the 
outer channel as viewed from seaward, which was intercepted by the two minefield 
lines noted above. On the northeast, the minefield was to be bounded by a line 
joining the northeastern extremities of the first two minefield lines. (Page 89.)
The western sector of the Kamchatka area minefield was to be bounded on the 
north by a line running from the southwest corner of the outer leg channel in the 
direction 270 degrees true to the five-fathom curve, or a point about six hundred 
yards offshore. This minefield was going to be bounded on the northeast by the en-
tire length of the left-hand limit of the outer-channel leg as viewed from seaward. It 
was also bounded on the southwest by a line running from the southeast corner of 
the outer channel leg in the direction 200 degrees true for a distance of three miles. 
It was bounded on the south and southwest by a broken line paralleling the above 
minefields, also at a distance of three miles from them to the south and southwest. 
The minefields in both the eastern and western sectors were to be planted in two 
stages, the first as soon as possible after the execution of BLUEPILL using one full 
load of a light minelayer, the second as soon as possible after the completion of the 
Kashiwabara plant. (Pages 89–90.)
In the Kashiwabara area, the minefield was to be laid in the channel to the an-
chorage area, also in two legs and about 1,200 yards apart. The median line of 
the inner leg was to run 310 degrees true from Point PETER, which was 50°30ʹ N, 
156°27ʹ E, and terminate at Point WILLIAM, 50°33.9ʹ N, 156°19.8ʹ E. The median 
line of the outer leg of the minefield was to run 180 degrees true from PETER and 
terminate at Point X-RAY—50°26ʹ N, 156°27ʹ E, at the channel entrance from sea-
ward. The northern entrance to the anchorage was also to be mined in the vicin-
ity of 50°45ʹ N, 156°10ʹ E in order to effect complete closure. Minefields on the 
channel sides were also to be planted. The eastern sector of this minefield was to 
be bounded on the south by a line running from the eastern corner of the channel 
entrance—six hundred yards east of Point X-RAY—in the direction of 090 degrees 
true for three miles. On the east, the minefield was to be bounded by a line running 
from the eastern extremity of the above line of mines in the direction of 000 de-
grees true for twelve miles. The minefield was also to be bounded on the north by 
a line running from the northern extremity of the second line of mines 310 degrees 
true up to the five-fathom curve, or a point about six hundred yards offshore. On 
the west, the minefield was to be bounded by a broken line paralleling the above 
lines of mines, also at a distance of three miles from them in the channel direction. 
(Pages 90–91.)
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The western sector of this minefield was to be bounded on the south by a line 
running from the western corner of the channel entrance—six hundred yards west 
of Point X-RAY—in the direction 270 degrees true for a distance of twelve miles. 
It was to be bounded on the west by a line running from the western extremity of 
the line above in the direction 000 degrees true to the five-fathom curve or about 
six hundred yards offshore. The minefield was bounded in the north by a line run-
ning from the northern extremity of the line above in the direction 090 degrees 
true to the intersection with the western limit of the outer-channel leg of mines. 
On the east, the minefield was to be bounded by that portion of the western limit 
of the outer channel that was included in the eastern extremities of the lines noted 
above. All mine plants were to be made in accordance with standard doctrine for 
protection against submarines. Also—as concerned the Aniwa Bay and Taraika Bay 
areas—Commander, Mine Force, upon receipt of the Operation Plan, was to confer 
with Commander, Service Force and Commander, Submarine Force to ascertain 
their desires for the respective anchorages, prepare mine plans for them, and sub-
mit those plans not later than 10 June to Commander, Purple Pacific Fleet for ap-
proval and promulgation. (Pages 91–92.)
Admiral PA’s Communication Plan was to become effective upon receipt and 
was in accordance with Purple Standard Fleet Communication Plan PAC-70 (B). 
All commands were to preserve radio silence below sixty megacycles per second at 
staging and assembly points, except for warnings or defensive operations against 
the enemy. Visual communications were to be employed whenever possible; for 
purposes of communications security, all bases involved in BLUEPILL were to be 
considered as “advance bases and staging areas.” Fox (broadcast) Schedules were 
also established for the fleet, submarines, and Radio Kashiwabara, the last to be 
responsible for requesting corrections and repetitions. Authentications were pro-
vided and task force commanders and Officers in Tactical Command were to pre-
scribe the conditions for radio silence for the forces at sea. There was also a Port 
frequency provided as well as Talk Between Ships frequency assignments at both 
fleet and force levels for Task Forces 31, 32, 33, 34, and 35. All ships were accord-
ingly to have two sets of Talk Between Ships equipment but would use the Fleet 
frequency when not in company with other forces within the fleet. Additionally, 
there were task force, task group, and task unit circuits and there were frequencies 
for air-search and reconnaissance planes. Aircraft contact reports would be broad-
cast by shore stations to the fleet on its Fox Schedule and on the Operational Intel-
ligence Circuit. Aircraft required to communicate with independent early warning 
submarines were to use the Air-Sea Rescue frequencies. (Pages 93–94.)
Finally, submarine contact reports were to be made on specific channels, one 
each to Radio Vladivostok, Radio Etorofu, Radio Matsuwa, and Radio Kashiwabara. 
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These reports were to be broadcast to the 3rd Fleet on the Fox Schedules and the 
Operational Intelligence Circuits. The submarine Fox Schedules were to be repeat-
ed at least three times because of the necessity for the submarines to stay submerged 
most of the time in their operating areas except during short periods of darkness. 
There were also designated channels for early warning and independent fighter 
direction as well as the Air-Sea Rescue Channel. In addition to the radio call signs, 
the Officer in Tactical Command of each force was designated in control of the use 
of radar, radar countermeasures, and Identification Friend or Foe. OTCs were also 
responsible for tactical intercept and jamming plans, and the Senior Officer Present 
Afloat in each harbor would control communications. Radio Kashiwabara would 
be the main communications headquarters for Commander, 3rd Fleet, while Radio 
Etorofu was the relief station. Individual aircraft calls were to be composed of the 
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unit or base call followed by the type, letter, and number of the plane. For instance, 
a plane designated as 11-F-1 from light carrier CVL-1 had a call sign of “Jason Fox 
1.” “Jason” was the base or the ship, F (Fox) stood for the plane’s type (in this case a 
fighter), and the number of the plane was 1. The collective call for an aircraft unit 
would be formed by adding “Gang” to the basic call. Therefore, all fighters from 
light carrier CVL-1 would be addressed as “Jason Fox Gang,” while all fighters were 
known as “Fox Gang.” The unit leader’s call would be indicated by “Boss” preceding 
the unit call. (Pages 94–95, 99.) 
Fig. 111
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XII Operations Problem 2
Even More Purple, September–October 1946 
In late September 1946, Rear Admiral Smith issued an instruction, “Detail of Student Officers for the Solution of Task Force Commanders’ Problems,” with staff officers’ roles and identities. The roles played by the students give us an-
other indication of how the Operations Problems were played. For instance, the 
roles of Admiral PA’s Chief of Staff and Operations Officer were brought into the 
exercise, as were four Assistants for Planning to Rear Admiral PJ, Commander, Task 
Force 33, the Submarine Force. Admiral PJ’s Chief of Staff and Operations Offi-
cer were also detailed. In addition, eight Assistants for Planning for Rear Admiral 
PK, Commander, Task Force 35, the Fleet Air Force, were introduced, as were his 
Chief of Staff and Operations Officer; ten students played as Assistants for Planning 
to Rear Admiral PB, Commander, Task Force 37, the Striking Force, along with 
his Chief of Staff and Operations Officer; and Commodore PI, Commander, Task 
Force 39, the Service Force, had five students as Assistants for Planning in addition 
to his Chief of Staff (Commander Antrim—see chapter 1) and Operations Officer.1
For the Purple Chart Maneuver, Admiral Smith directed that these groups 
would, under the direction of students designated as student officer task force com-
manders, solve the Problem and draw up Operation Plans for the task forces to 
which they were assigned. These plans and annexes were to be in sufficient detail to 
carry out a Chart Maneuver according to Naval War College Maneuver Rules. (In a 
reminder that we are in 1946, he encouraged early submission in order that stencils 
could be cut and the necessary copies run off and distributed.) Final assignments of 
players and rooms were issued on 1 October, and the Chart Maneuver itself com-
menced at 0900 on 2 October.2
At this point, Admiral PA put forth his Operation Plan 2-46, again for review 
and with some additional details. “M-Day” would be the day that war was declared 
by the Purple homeland or that hostilities commenced. This event would be an-
nounced on the Fox Schedule; in any case, hostilities would be considered to exist 
if any Blue surface forces were discovered west of longitude 170 degrees east and 
north of latitude 44 degrees north. Should Purple territory be attacked by major 
surface forces, units were to operate in accordance with Battle Plan, Commander, 
Pacific Fleet Operation Plan 3-46. In addition, current tactical orders and doctrine 
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publications were effective, modified to allow for greater dispersion of forces. Ini-
tial movements were to be in accordance with the Operation Plan; later movements 
would be directed by the task force commanders themselves. Search and rescue 
operations were as prescribed in current tactical publications. All units were to 
conserve fuel since the availability of fleet oilers was limited; conservation was to 
be taken into consideration in speeds maintained and engineering conditions (e.g., 
number of boilers on line, use of auxiliary steaming) employed.3
Chief of Staff, Com-
mander, Purple Fleet 
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The General Concept to his Operation Plan reiterated that all the Purple bases 
except for Vladivostok were within reconnaissance range of Blue very-long-range 
aircraft. Blue possessed the atomic bomb and task force commanders were remind-
ed to disperse their forces in order to prevent “serious” losses. Task force com-
manders were initially to operate under a “conservative” policy in light of the re-
straints imposed by the defense of a fixed area and the superiority of Blue naval 
forces. It was of the “utmost” importance to discover the enemy as soon as possible, 
to strike the Blue carriers at the maximum distance possible with dive-bombers, 
and for the submarines to inflict the maximum damage on the Blue carriers just 
before the latter arrived at their initial launch points: “Control of the air can best 
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be accomplished by delivering blows at the CVs [carriers] while their planes are on 
board. This may be accomplished by VB [dive-]bombing and submarines attacks 
before the carriers arrive at a launching point.” The key to destroying the enemy 
carriers was repeated attacks at the extreme range of his dive-bombing squadrons, 
that is, more than three hundred miles, and the key to that, in turn, was not al-
lowing Blue to approach to within that range undetected. However, destruction of 
the Blue Striking Force was in itself only a prelude to the destruction of the Blue 
Expeditionary Force.4
Admiral PA ordered his subordinate commanders on 1 June to be prepared to 
get under way on signal at 2000 on the 3rd for extended operations in the Kurile 
Islands area and to report on board his flagship at 1500 on that day for a command 
Fig. 114
Purple Air Search Plan, 
Operations Problem 2
 PROBLEM 2: EVEN MORE PURPLE 233
conference. At the same time, he sent a message to Commander, Pacific Subma-
rine Force to continue Submarine Division 2’s patrol activity in the Aleutians un-
til relieved; SUBDIV 3 was to depart on 4 June to take its station by the 10th, its 
four submarines being stationed off Attu, Adak, Dutch Harbor, and Unimak Pass. 
While making reports on types, numbers, composition, and course of Blue ships, 
they were to avoid being detected or making any “warlike” acts east of 170 degrees 
east. Commander, Pacific Submarine Force was to have SUBDIV 2 overhauled in 
the Kuriles when it returned to base and have SUBDIV 1 back to the Kuriles by 9 
June for the same purpose. Admiral PA instructed Commander, North Pacific Air 
Command that the three seaplane tenders were to report to Commander, Cruiser 
Division 1 and be prepared to get under way at 2000 on 3 June for Paramushiru. 
Once there, the seaplane tenders would report to him for operational control.5
The Logistics Plan ordered immediate steps to ferry as much aviation gasoline 
and emergency supplies to the airfields and landing strips on southern Kamchatka 
as necessary for emergency use and dispersal of aircraft. At fields where no storage 
facilities were available, gasoline in fifty-gallon drums, to be hand pumped, was 
to be provided. Seaplane tender AV-1 had a thirty-day supply of aviation gaso-
line; operating from Ust Kamchatka, it would eliminate the necessity and undue 
risk of sending gasoline tankers north of Paramushiru more than once per month. 
Airfields were to keep their supplies of gasoline dispersed and be prepared to fuel 
planes in spite of damage to storage tanks. Maintenance crews were to be equipped 
and augmented such that any landing field that had been bombed could be put 
back into operation in thirty minutes. Along these lines, oilers, escort carriers, and 
tenders were to carry extra mines, depth charges, and fifty-gallon drums of gaso-
line from Vladivostok to the Paramushiru area. Finally, large ships were directed to 
refuel smaller ones and battle-damaged ships were to proceed—either on their own 
power or under tow—to the nearest ports where repair facilities were available.6
Admiral PA’s Communication Plan ordered that there be no point-to-point traf-
fic between Vladivostok, Paramushiru, and Alexandrovsk. All other bases were to 
preserve radio silence below thirty megacycles per second except for warnings or 
for defensive operations against the enemy. Purple bases were to use visual commu-
nications whenever possible. In addition, task force commanders and Officers in 
Tactical Command were to prescribe conditions of radio silence, and OTCs would 
control the use of radar, Identification Friend or Foe, and radar countermeasures. 
There were also Fox Schedules for the various commands as well as specific circuits 
for OTCs, task force commanders, and Commander, Purple 3rd Fleet.7 The task 
force commanders had both primary and secondary radio circuits and there were 
specific circuits for task force, task group, and task unit commanders. There were 
also specific Air and Submarine Operational Intelligence Circuits for contact re-
ports from aircraft and submarines. In addition, there were specific frequencies for 
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submarine contact reports as well as authenticator 
and call lists.8
Purple had a Joint Army–Navy–Air Force In-
telligence Center at Vladivostok, fully equipped to 
perform all the intelligence services for all forces in 
the North Pacific Ocean Area, including strategic, 
foreign, and operational intelligence. Information 
on Blue forces was being supplied in letter form in 
weekly estimates of enemy strength. In addition, 
there were daily intelligence bulletins, special UL-
TRA messages, and North Pacific Intelligence Bul-
letins Nos. 1–4.9 Admiral PA’s Joint Intelligence 
Center also put out bulletins of detailed informa-
tion on enemy equipment and armament as well 
as air target maps, charts, and terrain maps. Fleet 
Weather Central supplied meteorological data and 
tables on tidal data, daylight periods, sunrise, sun-
set, moonrise, and moonset. Special Information 
from Chief of Naval Staff messages had been passed 
to all task force and administrative commanders. 
Additionally, there was information from enemy 
prisoners and captured documents; radio intelli-
gence units attached to force commanders’ staffs; 
and radar countermeasures equipment. “Cryptoanalysis” units were also assigned 
to the Joint Intelligence Center, Vladivostok; PA was confident they would furnish 
“pertinent” information to those required to know. Reconnaissance and observa-
tion reports were to be made to the nearest base or task force, whose commanders 
were responsible for relay to Admiral PA.10 
In a series of messages, Rear Admiral PJ, Commander, Purple Submarine Force, 
assigned his various squadrons and divisions, as well as his two submarine tenders, 
to their patrol stations, routes, and duties. He formed the twelve boats of Subma-
rine Divisions 1, 2, and 4 into an Attack Group under Captain P-14, and the other 
four boats into a Patrol Group under Captain P-16 (Colonel Wood—see chapter 
1); the two tenders constituted a Training and Logistics Group under Captain P-13 
(also Colonel Wood). The Attack Group was to engage the Blue force as soon as 
its location was known. The submarines would cover the withdrawal of the Purple 
Striking Force if directed. The Patrol Group was also to strike Blue forces, but only 
after detecting and trailing them and reporting their location to the Attack Group. 
Rear Admiral PJ stressed accurate navigation to keep Purple submarine, air, and 
surface attacks on Blue coordinated. He was at Fleet Headquarters in Vladivostok, 
Fig. 115
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and Captain P-13, Commander, Training and Logistics Group, 
was second in command, embarked in AS-3.11
Admiral PJ’s Communication Plan emphasized submarines’ 
guarding their assigned radio frequencies, especially the Fox 
Schedule, times for reports, and voice frequencies for each di-
vision during “wolf-pack” operations. Very-high-frequency 
channels were to be used for coordination with surface ships 
and aircraft. Submarines were also to attach weather reports 
to their messages if possible. PJ’s Training and Logistics Plan 
instructed submarines to fuel alongside tenders singly and clear the bay as soon as 
possible. It was the responsibility of Commander, Training and Logistics Group to 
schedule refueling, training, upkeep, and overhauls so that the minimum number 
of submarines was concentrated in the harbor.12
Submarines en route to or from patrol were to use “economical” speed, using 
discretion as to zigzagging. Blue submarines could be expected in practically any 
part of the Pacific Ocean. With “efficient” use of lookouts and radar, however, it was 
normally safe to proceed on the surface in daytime in enemy-patrolled waters. In 
low visibility when on the surface, however, commanding officers were to ensure 
an especially alert radar watch since Blue could bomb by radar. Radios were to 
be used minimally; submarines were to withdraw from their patrol stations along 
their return routes to transmit essential information, with short summaries of pa-
trol results, position, and weather if time permitted. Admiral PJ ordered his boats 
to avoid contact with friendly forces, about which he would keep them informed.13
Captain P-14 (Cdr. 




Purple Forces, Operations 
Problem 2
 236 BLUE VERSUS PURPLE
Submarines leaving Paramushiru were to be escorted until dark on the day of de-
parture. They were to leave the tender’s commanding officer their estimated routes 
through Purple air-patrolled areas outside submarine operating zones; the tender 
was to forward this information to Commander, 3rd Fleet and Commander, North 
Pacific Air Command. Submarines were to keep accurate records of circumstances 
in which they found themselves and to take periscope photos of targets, harbors, 
facilities, and sinking ships—images that would get red frames in Moscow!14
For dawn attacks on carriers, submarines were to attain position at night, 
spreading upwind at intervals of not less than three miles along the bearing from 
which the wind was blowing, since the carriers would turn into the wind for dawn 
or predawn launches. When carriers were launching aircraft, the screening ships’ 
sound gear was likely to be ineffective; submarines were to take advantage of this 
factor. For night attacks on the carriers, submarines were to attain positions ahead 
of the enemy formation, in line normal to the enemy’s course and about three miles 
apart. At the first attack, Blue would probably turn, likely heading directly toward 
one end of the Purple submarine line while permitting the other to advance and 
encircle him.15 
Rear Admiral PK, Commander, Fleet Air Force and North Pacific Air Com-
mand, had Commodore PL commanding the Kamchatka Bay Group of two seaplane 
tend ers with eighteen of the PBM Mariner naval patrol bombers in two squadrons 
and twelve Hellcat fighters organized into a fighter division. Commodore PO com-
manded the Shimushu Group, which consisted of the Avacha Bay Fighter Unit of 
twenty-four Hellcat fighters and the Kataoka Bay Group. The latter comprised one 
seaplane tender with eighteen PBM Mariners in two squadrons, thirty-six Harpoon 
naval patrol bombers in two more squadrons, and eighteen Harpoons in a squad-
ron stationed at Kurilskoye Strip. This group was also composed of twenty-four 
Hellcat fighters in a squadron at the Cape Lopatka strip, thirty-six Hellcat fighters 
in an additional fighter squadron, and forty-eight Hellcat night fighters organized 
into two squadrons. Commodore PN commanded the Paramushiru Group, which 
consisted of a squadron of eighteen Liberator naval patrol bombers, a squadron 
of eighteen Harpoons, twelve Catalina naval patrol bombers organized into two 
squadrons, and two squadrons of Hellcat night fighters, for a total of sixty planes. 
Commodore PM’s Matsuwa Group consisted of a squadron of eighteen Catalinas, 
a squadron of twelve Harpoons, a squadron of twenty-four Hellcat fighters, and 
another squadron of six Hellcat night fighters. 
Commodore PQ’s Etorofu Group had twelve Catalinas organized into two 
squadrons, a squadron of nine Liberators, a squadron of twelve Hellcat fighters, 
and a squadron of six Hellcat night fighters. There was also Commodore PP’s 
Shikuka Unit, with twenty-four Liberators in two squadrons, as well as twenty-
four Hellcat fighters and twelve Hellcat night fighters, the latter in two squadrons. 
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Captain PPA’s Konotoro Unit of fifteen Liberators constituted 
one squadron. Captain PPB’s Moskalvo Unit of thirty Libera-
tors was organized in two squadrons, while Captain P-20’s Car-
rier Group of two escort carriers and four destroyers rounded 
out the organization.16 
Admiral PK ordered the Kamchatka Bay Group to locate, 
report, and track enemy forces in the area assigned to it, the 
Shimushu Group the same in its area. The Paramushiru Group 
was to search a third area and fly photographic reconnaissance 
of Shemya and Attu every third day. Commencing on 5 June, fifteen copies of these 
photos were to be forwarded by air to the Joint Intelligence Center, Vladivostok 
without delay. The Paramushiru Group was also to maintain a twenty-four-hour 
antisubmarine patrol over Onnekotan Strait and destroy any Blue submarines de-
tected. (Pages 2–3.)
The Matsuwa and Etorofu Groups were to locate, report, and track enemy forces 
in their respective areas, while the Sakhalin Group was to be prepared on short 
notice to reinforce the forward air groups. In addition, the Konotoro Unit was to 
maintain a twenty-four-hour antisubmarine patrol over La Perouse Strait and de-
stroy any Blue submarines detected while the Moskalvo Unit transported drummed 
gasoline. However, upon contact with the enemy, the latter was to cease its logistical 
activity and report to the Attack Groups at the forward bases for operations. The 
Carrier Group was to proceed in the general direction of the enemy once it received 
the initial contact report and report to Commander, Striking Force. Until then, it 
was to continue training west of Paramushiru. (Pages 3–4.) 
Each Attack Group was also to be composed of search units and attack units 
under a task group commander who would provide fighter protection for local 
bases and Purple shipping in the area. Task group commanders would also provide 
fighter cover for the Purple Striking Force within the limits of fighter range in their 
assigned areas and would be prepared to furnish antisubmarine patrols over fleet 
anchorages when requested. Admiral PK emphasized to his commanders that any 
task group making contact with a sizable Blue force within bombing range was to 
attack with all available planes and all other task groups were to be prepared to sup-
port it. The target priorities were Blue carriers, then battleships, attack transports, 
cruisers and destroyers, and finally targets of opportunity. (Pages 4–5.)
Commodore PL’s Fleet Air Wing 10 would deploy from Vladivostok, staging Pa-
trol Plane Squadrons VP-101 and VP-102 through Kataoka Bay with eighteen PBM 
Mariners. These squadrons would report to Commander, Task Group 35.1 for duty 
upon arrival. VP-103 and VP-104, totaling another eighteen Mariners, would re-
port to the same location and the same commander, as would the six Catalinas of 
VP-105. The latter squadron was directed to Tennei Field to fly missions out to a 
Captain P-20 (Lt. 
Col. George Shell, 
USMC) 
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hundred miles beyond the coast of Hokkaido. Another six Catalinas would be di-
rected to Matsuwa and would report on arrival to CTG 35.4. 
Commodore PM’s Fleet Air Wing 20 would also fly from Matsuwa, sending fif-
teen Privateer naval patrol bombers of VP-201 to Shikuka for duty with CTU 35.6.1 
and another fifteen of VP-202 to Konotoro to operate with CTG 35.6.2. At the 
same time, Commodore PN’s Fleet Air Wing 30 would redistribute its aircraft and 
tenders from Paramushiru. He would send the 1st Division of Fighter Squadron 
VF-302—twelve Hellcats—to the Ust Kamchatka airstrip, reporting to CTG 35.1. 
Another twenty-four Hellcat fighters from VF-302—less its 1st Division—would 
be sent to Staraya Tarya for duty with Task Unit 35.2.2, and twenty-four Hellcats 
from VF-303 would fly to the Cape Lopatka airfield to dispatch to CTG 35.2. At the 
same time, eighteen Privateers would be sent to Moskalvo for duty with TU 35.6.3. 
(Page 6.)
Fleet Air Wing 30 would sail seaplane tenders AV-1 and AVP-2 to Kamchatka 
Bay, there to report to Commander, Task Group 35.1. In addition, AVP-3—also 
after arrival at Paramushiru—would sail to Kataoka Bay to report to CTG 35.2 
for duty in TU 35.2.1. Fleet Air Wing 30 would provide fighter cover for AV-1 
and AVP-2 as practicable en route to Kamchatka Bay. AV-1 was to obtain anti-
submarine nets at Avacha Bay for use at Kamchatka Bay. At the same time, Com-
modore PO’s Fleet Air Wing 40 would fly eighteen Harpoons from VP-403 to the 
Kurilskoye Lake airstrip, where they would be based for purposes of dispersal. This 
squadron would also be at the disposal of CTG 35.2. Nine Privateers from VP-501 
were to be directed to Etorofu for duty with CTG 35.5, while six Catalinas from 
VP-503 would report to Matsuwa for operations with CTG 35.4. The last of these 
units was Commodore PQ’s Fleet Air Wing 60, whose VP-601 of twelve Privateers 
would fly from Etorofu to Moskalvo and, upon arrival, report to CTG 35.6 for duty 
with TU 35.6.3. (Page 7.)
Summarizing by area, at Ust Kamchatka were seaplane tenders AV-1 and AVP-2 
with twelve Hellcat fighters from VF-302, six Mariners from VP-101, and six more 
Mariners from VP-102. The tenders were expected to arrive there about 8 June; 
the first tanker would arrive about 18 June, others every fourteen days thereafter. 
Logistical estimates indicated that twelve naval patrol bombers per day could be 
supported in patrols out to four hundred miles for fifteen days and two fighters per 
day for twelve hours for fifteen days. 
Petropavlovsk would have a capacity of eighteen flying boats, with anoth-
er eighteen flying boats and sixty naval patrol bombers at Tarinski Bay. Staraya 
Tarya would have a capacity of forty-eight fighters. Commander, Fleet Air Wing 
30 would provide the maintenance crews and thirty men for each airfield as well 
as fly in spare parts and other necessities. Commander, Service Force would pick 
up at Vladivostok and deliver by tanker in the first trip to Avacha Bay ten portable 
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ten-thousand-gallon tanks for forwarding to the airfields in the area. Planes and 
stocks of fuel at all of these airfields were also to be dispersed and protected; tankers 
en route to Ust Kamchatka were to replenish every fourteen days. Every effort was 
also to be made to replenish the supply of fifty-gallon drums of aviation gasoline 
and lubricants. (Pages 8–9.)
Among the southern Kamchatka fields, Kurilskoye Lake had a capacity of eigh-
teen naval patrol bombers, with Pauzhatka and Zheltovski thirty-six fighters each. 
Commander, Fleet Air Force was to fly in forty drums of lubricants and a thousand 
drums of aviation gasoline to Kurilskoye Lake, Pauzhatka, and Cape Lopatka, and 
twenty drums of lubricants and five hundred drums of aviation gasoline to Zhel-
tovski. Six Catalinas from VP-404 would make four trips daily from Shimushu to 
bring supplies of aviation gasoline and lubricants as far above minimum require-
ments as possible. Six Catalinas from VP-204 would do the same from Paramushi-
ru. Eighteen Privateers from VP-302 and another twelve from VP-601 would make 
two trips daily from the northern Sakhalin bases. These two squadrons would also 
assist in the early buildup of aviation gasoline and lubricants but would be released 
upon the first report of combat. At the start of the air transportation operation, it 
was estimated that approximately seventy-five thousand gallons of gasoline and 
lubricants would be flown into the area daily. Daily consumption was not estimated 
to exceed twenty-five thousand gallons. (Pages 9–10.)
In the Paramushiru–Shimushu area was AVP-3, along with 102 naval patrol 
bombers and 180 fighters. A tender was to arrive at Kashiwabara about 6 June. 
Tankers were expected to deliver aviation gas and lubricants directly to local facili-
ties to the amount of 2.4 million gallons of aviation gasoline and 120,000 gallons 
of lubricants per month, which was the monthly expenditure estimate. Complete 
repair facilities were available at each field and fuel stowage was to be maintained 
to capacity by the Service Force. At Matsuwa, thirty-nine naval patrol bombers and 
thirty fighters were stationed, along with the same repair capacities; there was fuel 
stowage for a one-month expenditure of 1.2 million gallons of aviation gasoline and 
sixty thousand of lubricants. Etorofu similarly had twelve naval patrol bombers and 
eighteen fighters based; its monthly expenditure and capacity rates were 1.5 million 
gallons of aviation gasoline and seventy-five thousand of lubricants. (Page 10.)
The commanding officers of seaplane tenders AV-1, AVP-2, and AVP-3 were 
to obtain from Net Depot, Vladivostok an antitorpedo net each with the necessary 
installation equipment. The nets were to be used at all times when at anchor in 
the forward areas. Tenders, bases, and wings were to keep ammunition to autho-
rized capacity, fuel and lubricants to 60 percent of capacity, and aviation gasoline to 
(in an apparent change) 20 percent. They were additionally to keep dry provisions 
and general stores for 120 days, fresh provisions to maximum capacity, and aircraft 
spares for ninety days. Units under Rear Admiral PK’s command were required to 
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submit reports on the availability of spares. Shortcomings in these would reflect 
unfavorably on “administrative efficiency”! (Pages 10–11.)
Air search areas were to be searched twice daily, except for one that was to be 
searched only once daily. Searches were to commence from Paramushiru, Shi-
mushu, Matsuwa, and Etorofu on 5 June as well as from Kamchatka Bay as soon 
as possible. Contacts were to be maintained in order to provide accurate tracking 
information to all the task force commanders. Further, Admiral PK’s forces were to 
be prepared to strike enemy forces in the area and to keep dispersed and protected 
to the maximum extent consistent with the mission. Units were to utilize airstrips 
at Kurilskoye Lake, Cape Lopatka, and Staraya Tarya to relieve the congestions at 
the fields on Shimushu. In the designated Submarine Area, attacks on submarine 
contacts were prohibited. In the designated Surface Area, no surface forces were to 
be attacked unless recognized beyond doubt as hostile. Day and night recognition 
signals were provided to prevent attack by friendly forces. (Pages 12–13.)
In the event of contact with major enemy forces, the unit making the contact 
report would trail the enemy; the task group commander would then arrange ad-
ditional or relief search planes. Meanwhile, all other searches were to be continued 
unless by “express” orders of the force commander. A task group commander whose 
unit was reporting contact was to ready all available bombers for attack without 
further orders and take full advantage of twilight and low visibility in pressing an 
attack. The task group commander whose unit was carrying out the strike was to 
act personally as Target Coordinator, directing succeeding waves of Purple aircraft 
to the target; his plane was to be configured for maximum endurance, armed with 
machine guns only. When the Sakhalin task group commanders learned of contact 
with major Blue surface forces, they were to arm all naval patrol bomber squadrons 
and direct them to Matsuwa and Paramushiru for refueling as well as strike orders 
if the enemy force was located north of latitude 45 degrees north. If the enemy force 
had been located south of that latitude, two of the naval patrol bomber squadrons 
were to proceed to Etorofu and the two others to Matsuwa. All squadrons were to 
refuel at these locations and obtain strike orders. If the assigned fields were under 
attack, the planes were to proceed to the next adjacent field farther from enemy 
contact. (Page 14.)
The armament for the planes was eight armor-piercing bombs or two torpedoes 
for the Liberators, one torpedo for the Harpoons, and full gun ammunition for all 
planes. Casualties and enemy damage were to be reported “promptly” to the force 
commander; aircraft were to use any emergency field in case of damage. Identifica-
tion Friend or Foe equipment was to be turned off. In the strike itself, units were to 
attack simultaneously from as many widely separated directions as possible and not 
to fly over the target again after dropping their ordnance but to use the speed from 
their dives to clear the area. Upon completion of an attack, planes were to return, 
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refuel, and rearm for another strike; Admiral PK estimated that it would take nine-
teen minutes to rearm and refuel his heavy bombers. Task group commanders were 
ordered to launch additional strikes without further orders and then inform the 
task force commander. (Pages 14–14A.)
Rear Admiral PB’s Purple Striking Force included the Main Body, which con-
sisted of his own command of two battle cruisers, organized as Cruiser Division 1; 
the six heavy cruisers of CRUDIVs 2 and 3; and the four light cruisers of CRUDIV 
4, with light cruisers CL-5 and CL-6 attached. In addition, the Striking Force in-
cluded the two light carriers of Rear Admiral PF’s Carrier Division 1, designated 
the Air Group, and Commodore PG’s Screen Group, twenty-five destroyers from 
Destroyer Squadrons 1 and 2 (less Destroyer Division 6) and four destroyer- 
minesweepers from the Mine Division. (Pages 14–14A.) 
Admiral PB described in detail Cruising Disposition 1-C, an anti-atomic-
bomb disposition designed to afford antisubmarine and antiaircraft defense as 
well. The Formation Guide was designated as destroyer DD-25, occupying station 
0000 (the center) and any rotation of the formation was to be performed about the 
Fleet Center. Ships were to turn simultaneously to new courses, but the destroyer- 
minesweepers would retain their relative screening positions on the carriers. The 
direction of the Fleet Axis was also normally to be in the direction from which 
the enemy surface attack was most likely; it would not change for flight opera-
tions. When the OTC required pickets, the Screen Commander was to designate 
the required number of destroyers and station them out to twenty-five miles from 
the Fleet Center at positions bearing 045, 135, 225, and 315 degrees true. Cruising 
Disposition 1-C had been designed for “expeditious” change into Approach Dispo-
sition No. 1. (Page 14.) 
For emergency deployment, Cruiser Divisions 1 and 2 were to turn to a signaled 
deployment course and work gradually into column, with CRUDIV 1 in the Van, 
thereafter using course changes small enough to avoid blanketing fire (i.e., to keep 
ships out of each other’s firing arcs). Oilers and carriers were to turn to the recipro-
cal of the enemy bearing, steam until well clear, and then parallel the battle line or 
proceed as otherwise signaled. The destroyer-minesweepers were to accompany the 
light carriers; destroyer DD-26, temporarily assigned to the Striking Force, would 
accompany the carriers as an additional screen ship. All sonar-equipped ships were 
to stand continuous echo-ranging watch unless directed otherwise. The destroyer-
minesweepers screening the light carriers would also perform plane-guard duties, 
and the sonar-screen ships were to utilize sonics. (Page 14.)
When an air attack was considered imminent, Cruising Formation 1-CR, an 
antiaircraft defense formation, was to be assumed. This formation, which Admi-
ral PB felt could be assumed “readily,” was considered suitable for defense against 
both aircraft and submarines but was primarily for defense against carrier-based 
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aircraft. DD-25 was again the Guide on station 0000, and the formation would ro-
tate about the Center. Turns would again be simultaneous. Patrols, searches, strikes, 
and defensive measures were to be directed by the Officer in Tactical Command. 
(Pages 14–15.)
Two other formations might also be ordered. Cruising Disposition 2-C was 
another anti-atomic-bomb formation, with the task force in two groups, one the 
heavy combatant ships and the other the carriers, supported by the three light 
cruisers, destroyers, and destroyer-minesweepers. This formation was designed to 
give greater dispersion to the force as a whole and give greater flexibility tactically 
to each of the groups. These groups would be strategically concentrated yet tacti-
cally independent. The Guide for the combined formations was to be battle cruiser 
CB-1, those for each group CB-1 and light carrier CVL-1, respectively. Cruising 
Disposition 2-C permitted rapid deployment into either Approach or Battle Dispo-
sitions. (Page 16.)
Commodore PI, Commander, Service Force, had the Logistics Group of two 
escort carriers, the five destroyers of Destroyer Division 6, and the six oilers of 
Service Squadron 1. In addition, there was the Mine Group, under Commodore 
PR, which included the Minelaying Unit of one light minelayer and the four mine-
sweepers from Mine Division 3, as well as the Minesweeping Unit of eight mine-
sweepers from Mine Division 2. The Logistics Group was to furnish support for pe-
troleum products to the fleet at sea as well as to advanced seaplane and land-based 
planes. The Mine Group was to sweep mines as directed; both groups would have 
their headquarters at Kashiwabara. The Minelaying Unit was to conduct strategic 
mining operations as directed and be prepared to engage in tactical mining. The 
Minesweeping Unit was to allocate its minesweepers as directed by the task group 
commanders. The Commanders, Logistics and Mine Groups were responsible for 
refueling their ships, while Commander, Fleet Air Force was responsible for replen-
ishing aircraft, aviation material, and aviation personnel for the escort carriers. The 
primary source of supply for petroleum products was to be Moskalvo and Otomari 
in Sakhalin Island. Commodore PI designated Captain P-9—Commander, Logis-
tics Group—as his second in command, at Kashiwabara.17 
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XIII Operations Problem 2
The Blue Statement and Staff Solution, September–October 1946
The Blue Statement outlined the same four purposes of the problem as had Purple and the same General Situation in terms of Purple–Blue relations since the defeat of Germany and Japan. Blue too did not see much hope for 
improving these relations: “Her aggressive foreign policy has resulted in economic 
and political penetration and control of bordering countries. She has consistently 
and effectively blocked all efforts by the [United Nations] to compose differences, 
in which her own interests were not uppermost.” 
The Blue Statement of the Problem
It appeared that Purple was willing to accept war to maintain its stand. Accordingly, 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff had “been occupied with the making of plans to meet any 
emergency in the event of breakdown of diplomatic negotiations.” The General Situ-
ation spoke to Purple’s base complex in Kamchatka, especially Petropavlovsk, but 
also its new bases at Bolsheretsk, Ust Kamchatka, and Korf Bay. It dealt in the same 
detail with Purple’s development of former Orange bases in the Kuriles and Sakha-
lin, indicating that for purposes of the Chart Maneuver this information had been 
provided to both Blue and Purple and was not the result of intelligence collection.1
Intelligence, however, had told Blue that the Purple naval bases and airfields in 
the Kuriles and Sakhalin were well defended by coastal and antiaircraft batteries 
and by local defense craft, and were being equipped with “adequate” communica-
tions facilities. Purple bases in Kamchatka, however, were known not to be fully 
developed. Purple surface forces had been concentrating in Vladivostok since the 
first of the year and small forces of cruisers, destroyers, and “small” carriers had 
been operating in the Pacific north of 45 degrees north latitude. It was estimated 
that Purple had about four carriers, similar to Blue’s escort or light carriers. In ad-
dition, there were thought to be two “large, heavily gunned, armored” cruisers; four 
or five heavy and six light cruisers; thirty destroyers; and twenty new, long-range, 
high-speed submarines. Purple was also estimated to have a large number of naval 
patrol planes—both flying boats and land planes—and of land-based aircraft of 
all types. Pointing out that Purple surface ships and submarines resembled Blue’s 
types in terms of speed, radius, armament, and age, the General Situation surmised 
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that Purple was operating a limited number of heavy bombers, though Blue did 
not know anything about their characteristics. According to reports, these heavy 
bombers resembled Blue Privateer naval patrol bombers and Purple’s flying boats 
resembled Blue’s Catalina and Mariner naval patrol bombers. As far as Blue knew, 
Purple had no very-long-range heavy bombers. Purple’s land-based naval air fleet 
in the theater of operations was estimated to number about 150 medium and heavy 
bombers, 250 fighters, and fifty flying boats or seaplanes. “Purple is known to be 
sparing no expense to produce atomic bombs, but none has been produced so far.” 
(Page 12.)
Blue’s Special Situation as of 1 June listed the Blue North Pacific Force—including 
the 7th Fleet—as commanded by Vice Admiral BF and based in Puget Sound ex-
cept for some units of the Submarine Force and the Fleet Air Wings. In addition, 
Blue had been assembling and training an expeditionary force of two Marine Corps 
divisions. Now at Seattle or its vicinity, these units were obviously in excess of the 
requirements to defend Alaska and the Aleutians from Purple attacks but they 
were also the only expeditionary forces that would be assigned to Vice Admiral BF. 
Fig. 117
Student Officer Com-
manders, Blue North 
Pacific Force, Operations 
Problem 2
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Transport Squadrons were in Puget Sound, ready to sail to any 
designated port. No Marines or equipment were on board but 
the transports could be combat-loaded within five days of re-
ceiving the order. The Service Squadrons in Puget Sound were 
fully loaded and ready to sail on one day’s notice. On 1 June, 
Admiral BF returned from a conference with the Commander-
in-Chief of the Blue Pacific Fleet (not played by a student of-
ficer). The Joint Chiefs of Staff (no designated student officers) 
were planning an early invasion of Purple Asiatic territory in 
case of war with Purple. To make that invasion feasible, it was necessary first to 
seize a position in Kamchatka or the Kuriles as an advanced base. This seizure was 
to take place as soon as possible after the declaration of war; the selection of the 
position was to be made by Vice Admiral BF. It was thought that war with Purple 
was imminent and that the president could obtain a declaration of war anytime he 
desired. The declaration was to be put off, however, until Blue forces crossed the 
180th meridian en route to their objective. (Pages 12–13.)
In the General Plan, the Blue North Pacific Force was officially assigned the task 
of seizing a position suitable for an advanced base west of longitude 165 degrees 
east and north of latitude 46 degrees north. Admiral BF was also given amplify-
ing instructions to organize a Covering Force from units of the Blue 1st Fleet. The 
Covering Force would be under his command until his task was complete and it 
was to be ready in Pearl Harbor by 0000 local (Zebra) time on 5 June. The Blue Ex-
peditionary Force was to cross the 180th meridian en route to its objective at 0000 
Zebra time on 20 June, at which time “unrestricted” operations could commence if 
war had not already been declared. Vice Admiral BF’s orders stated that the prelim-
inary deployment of his forces could commence at any time after they were ready. 
After the seizure of the objective, a second force would follow for the development 
and garrisoning of the base but the responsibility for this phase of the operation 
was not his. He was warned that Purple agents in the “Blue Homeland had been 
ordered to spare no effort or expense to learn his intentions.” (Pages 13–14.)
Not surprisingly, given that Blue was the invading power, its forces were even 
greater than Purple’s. The Blue North Pacific Force, based at Puget Sound, included 
Admiral BF’s heavy cruiser flagship, equipped with airborne-early-warning (pre-
sumably, in modern terms, electronic-support measures) gear. Rear Admiral BC 
(Capt. William Ashford) commanded Battleship Division 5, consisting of two pre-
war modernized battleships, one of which also was equipped with airborne-early-
warning gear. Similarly equipped was one of the three escort carriers of Rear Ad-
miral BG’s CARDIV 19.
Rear Admiral BH (also Captain Ashford) commanded Cruiser Division 13’s three 
light cruisers while Captain B-11 (also Captain Ashford) led Destroyer Squadron 1, 
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composed of nine destroyers: the five ships of Destroyer Division 11 and the 
four radar-picket destroyers of Destroyer Division 12. Captain B-8 commanded 
DESRON 7, another nine ships similarly organized into DESDIVs 71 and 72; Cap-
tain B-10 led DESRON 13, ten ships, with five each assigned to DESDIVs 131 and 
132. Blue’s submarines consisted, first, of Submarine Squadron 98, commanded by 
Captain B-13, in a submarine tender as flagship, its ten boats organized into Subma-
rine Divisions 981 and 982, each division having five boats. Second, Captain B-14, 
at Kodiak, commanded Submarine Squadron 1, which also consisted of a subma-
rine tender flagship and ten boats, Submarine Divisions 11 and 12. Blue’s subma-
rines had operational characteristics that were identical to Purple’s. Also at Puget 
Sound was Amphibious Group 7, led by Rear Admiral BB, in an amphibious com-
mand ship (AGC). Amphibious Group 7 consisted of Transport Squadron 1, com-
manded by Commodore BI and consisting of twelve attack transports, six attack 
cargo ships, and six high-speed transports organized as Transport Divisions 11, 
12, 13, and 14. Commodore BJ commanded Transport Squadron 2 with the same 
number and types of ships and comprising Transport Divisions 21, 22, 23, and 24. 
Service forces consisted of Commodore BK’s Service Squadron 3. This in turn 
was broken down into Service Division 31, which consisted of eight attack cargo 
ships, two destroyer tenders, and two ammunition ships. Service Squadron 3 also 
consisted of Service Division 32 (six oilers) and Mine Squadron 1. Commanded 
by Captain B-23, the latter outfit had one minelayer as flagship, eight destroyer-
minesweepers, and six minesweepers. (Pages 15–16.) 
Blue’s three escort carriers each had one fighter and one attack squadron. Ac-
cordingly, on each carrier there were eight Fireball fighters, eight Hellcat night 
fighters, and two Hellcat photographic reconnaissance fighters. In addition, each 
air group had twelve Avenger attack planes. Battleship Division 5 had four obser-
vation planes and CRUDIV 13 had an additional six observation planes. Fleet Air 
Command, Aleutians, under Rear Admiral BL, was based at Puget Sound. Admi-
ral BL flew his flag in a seaplane tender; two additional seaplane tenders were as-
signed to Captain B-24’s Fleet Air Wing 1, also at Puget Sound. Fleet Air Wing 1 
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additionally consisted of four squadrons of naval patrol bombers, with nine Mari-
ners in each squadron. Fleet Air Wing 3, based in Amchitka and commanded by 
Captain B-25, consisted of another three squadrons of Privateers, with nine planes 
each; a squadron of six Catalinas; and six Superfortress heavy bombers from the 
404th Bombardment Group of the Army Air Forces’ Alaska Air Command and 
temporarily under the operational control of Fleet Air Command, Aleutians. Fleet 
Air Wing 3 also contained a squadron of sixteen Hellcat day fighters and another 
twenty Hellcat night fighters. (Pages 16–17.) 
Fleet Air Wing 5, on Adak, was commanded by Captain B-26. This unit had the 
same organization and composition of Catalinas and three Mariner squadrons, an 
attached squadron of Superfortresses, and the two squadrons of, respectively, day 
and night Hellcat fighters. Fleet Air Wing 7, based on Shemya under Captain B-27, 
consisted of two squadrons of Mariners, with nine planes each, and a squadron 
of six Catalinas, plus twelve Hellcat day fighters and twelve Hellcat night fighters. 
Only the Superfortresses could carry atomic bombs. As the players already knew, 
land-based airplane and aircrew replacements could be made available in Adak in 
thirty-six hours, but the total number of planes in service at any one time could not 
be increased. (Page 17.)
The Blue Covering Force, at Pearl Harbor, was commanded by Rear Admiral BA, 
who was also Commander, Carrier Division 2 and flew his flag in one of the four 
fleet carriers in that unit. One of the four fleet carriers was to conduct night opera-
tions. CARDIV 2 was complemented by CARDIV 3, commanded by Rear Admiral 
BM and consisting of two fleet carriers, one of which was also dedicated to night 
operations. Like the flagships at Puget Sound, all the fleet carriers were equipped 
with airborne-early-warning gear, though not all embarked airborne-early- 
warning aircraft. In addition, the Blue Covering Force had one escort carrier for 
anti submarine warfare. Two of CARDIV 2’s fleet carriers each had two fighter 
squadrons and two attack squadrons, each carrier carrying forty-one Bearcat fight-
ers, four Hellcat photographic reconnaissance fighters, and sixteen Hellcat night 
fighters. Each of the two carriers also had twenty-four Helldiver attack planes. 
One carrier was additionally equipped with eleven Avenger night-attack planes, 
five Avenger VA(Q) planes, and four Avenger carrier AEW planes. The second 
carrier had on board fifteen Avenger night-attack planes and five Avenger tacti-
cal electronic-warfare aircraft. One of the other fleet carriers of CARDIV 2 had 
fifty-five Bearcat fighters, twenty-eight Hellcat night fighters, four Hellcat photo-
graphic reconnaissance fighters, nine Avenger night-attack planes, four Avenger 
tactical electronic-warfare planes, and four Avenger AEW aircraft, all organized 
into three fighter and one attack squadrons. The fourth carrier of CARDIV 2, the 
night carrier, had two fighter and two attack squadrons, with forty-nine Hellcat 
night fighters and twenty-four Avenger attack planes between them. (Pages 17–19.) 
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Carrier Division 3’s two fleet carriers consisted, as mentioned, of a night car-
rier, also with two fighter and two attack squadrons, altogether forty-nine Hell-
cat night fighters and twenty-four Avenger attack planes. The day carrier also had 
two fighter and two attack squadrons, in all forty-one Bearcat fighters, four Hell-
cat photographic reconnaissance fighters, twelve Hellcat night fighters, twenty-
four Helldiver attack planes, fifteen Avenger night-attack planes, and five Avenger 
tactical electronic-warfare planes. The escort carrier had one fighter and one at-
tack squadron on board, eighteen Hellcat night fighters and twelve Avenger attack 
planes. (Page 19.)
As for surface warships, the Blue Covering Force consisted of the four heavy 
cruisers of Cruiser Division 1, under Rear Admiral BD, three of the ships based in 
Puget Sound and a fourth in Seattle. Rear Admiral BN (Col. Albert Cooley) com-
manded the two heavy cruisers of CRUDIV 3 and Rear Admiral BE (also Colonel 
Cooley) the three light cruisers of CRUDIV 15. Captain B-12 (Colonel Lyle—see 
chapter 1) commanded DESRON 3, eight radar-picket destroyers organized as 
DESDIVs 31 and 32, with four ships in each division. Captain B-9 (also Colonel 
Lyle) commanded DESRON 9, nine ships, five of them in DESDIV 91 and the oth-
er four in DESDIV 92. Captain B-29 (also Colonel Lyle) commanded DESRON 
15, another nine ships, with five destroyers in DESDIV 151 and four radar-picket 
destroyers in DESDIV 152. In addition, there were two antiaircraft cruisers; Es-
cort Division 1, with six destroyer escorts, under Commander B-15; and Escort 
Division 5, an additional four destroyer escorts, under Commander B-16 (also 
Commander Matter). The surface forces were rounded out with the auxiliaries of 
Service Division 33, six oilers under Captain B-31. These surface units also had 
observation planes, eight in CRUDIV 1, four in CRUDIV 3, and six in CRUDIV 
15. (Pages 18–19.)
Blue’s bases were “adequately” equipped with the latest types of radars, anti-
aircraft batteries, communications gear, and ground-control-approach equip-
ment. Blue’s information on its own bases in Alaska and the Aleutians mirrored 
the information that Purple had on them. For purposes of Operations Problem 2, 
Blue’s atomic bombs could be dropped only by Superfortresses equipped with four- 
thousand-pound-bomb racks. Bomb-damage-radius data were the same as was 
available to Purple, but it was revealed that the Blue Commander-in-Chief as of 1 
June had four atomic bombs at the Adak base. He could not, however, expect resup-
ply for several months. (Pages 19–28.)
The Blue Staff Solution to the Problem
On 10 September, the Blue Staff Solution was presented. Vice Admiral BF, Com-
mander, North Pacific Force and Commander, Blue 7th Fleet, had conferred with 
the Blue Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
about an early invasion of Purple Asiatic territory in case of war, for which purpose 
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he had to seize an advanced base either in the Kuriles or on the Kamchatka Penin-
sula as soon as possible after a declaration of war and when the invasion location 
was made known to him. He had the Blue Covering Force—organized from the 1st 
Fleet—under his command until these tasks were completed; the Blue Covering 
Force would be ready by 5 June.2
Admiral BF assessed the weather, climate, and hydrographic characteristics of 
the region. Hydrographic studies demonstrated that currents did not have any par-
ticular significance for the Operations Problems and that during the summer, the 
area was clear of drift ice except for some harbors in Kamchatka. (Pages 2–3.)
As to weather, snow should not be factor in July, or even much in June, but over 
half of the days in June, July, and August would be foggy. Matsuwa, for instance, 
was enveloped in fog every day during these three months, as were the southeastern 
shores on the lee sides of islands and landmasses. There could be two or three cold 
fronts per month aligned northeast–southwest and moving eastward and north of 
the islands. These fronts brought heavy rains. There were waves and swells from 
the southeast, a fifth of them between three and eight feet high. In August, aircraft 
operations were likely to be curtailed by fronts and fog. (Pages 3–4.)
In Kamchatka, summers were short, cool, damp, and cloudy. In addition, 
the mean position of the Pacific Polar Front was over Kamchatka and cyclonic 
storms there occurred at frequent intervals. At Petropavlovsk in July, for instance, 
visibility was less than six miles over a ten-day period. At Ust Bolsheretsk, the 
average number of foggy days was twenty-four in June and twenty-five in July. 
Therefore, air operations there would be hindered by clouds, rugged topography, 
low ceilings, poor visibility, and conditions favorable for icing. While conditions 
at Petropav lovsk were favorable most of the time, they were not representative 
of the entire peninsula. Low clouds were frequent over the Bering Sea and the 
Sea of Okhotsk, where air operations were again likely to be curtailed. Admi-
ral BF, in fact, thought close air support might be “negligible,” but that FIDO 
equipment permitted limited operations. He warned that weather predictions 
more than twenty-four hours in advance were no more than 60 percent reliable. 
(Pages 4–5.)
The Aleutians he placed in the semipermanent low pressure area, what he called 
the “breeding ground” of cyclone systems. Weather conditions would curtail flying 
from “time to time” but not prevent it for long periods, and fog disposal at these 
air bases would permit flying in foggy conditions. Carrier aircraft in the Aleutian 
Islands could be recovered provided that visibility was not less than six hundred 
yards and the ceiling was not under a hundred feet. Weather conditions, however, 
would be of major concern to the Officer in Tactical Command, who had to recov-
er his carrier- and cruiser-based aircraft before fog set in. Adverse weather might 
also force a few days’ postponement of offensive operations, but there would still 
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be sufficient favorable weather to permit successful operations. Given how major 
a factor weather was going to be, he stressed the importance of collecting weather 
information. (Pages 5–6.)
The base to be chosen as an advanced staging site needed to be near sea routes, 
route intersections, narrow passages, mouths of large rivers, and terminal points. 
The amount of shipping passing by, the ability to accommodate a large force, and 
the ability to permit the safe departure of a force at any given time also had to be 
considered. In addition, this base would need to provide continual support to the 
Blue forces until the mission on the Asian mainland was complete, and it needed 
to be protected from ground, sea, and air attacks. Selection of the advanced base 
thus would be heavily dependent on terrain features and “artificial” defenses such 
as fixed fortifications, antiaircraft batteries, airfields, minefields, nets, and radar 
installations. The base should also have shallow approaches to force hostile subma-
rines to or near the surface. (Pages 6–7.) 
Additionally, the base needed more than one entrance, well separated. An-
chorage depths needed to be about eight to twelve fathoms, and with deeper areas 
for floating dry docks. Anchorages also needed to be sheltered from the seas and 
strong winds, be free from excess currents, and have “reasonable” rises and falls of 
tide. The base also needed to be on ground that could be easily held from land at-
tack, and its entrances and approaches had to be capable of being mined and netted 
at their narrowest points. Admiral BF also saw the need for an entrance that was 
not a straight line from the sea to the anchorage, and for surrounding topography 
that was high close to the harbor (so as to preclude aerial torpedo attacks) and that 
could support good land, sea, and air defensive installations. The base, however, 
needed enough level terrain to accommodate personnel, dry docks, foundries, ma-
chine shops, warehouses, piers, and protected fuel and ammunition stowage. There 
additionally had to be suitable terrain nearby for airfields and sea- and land-based 
planes as well as close proximity to a supply of both skilled and unskilled labor, raw 
materials, an inland water supply, a “healthful” climate year-round, and adequate 
communications by cable, telegraph, telephone, and radio. (Pages 7–8.)
What then were the possible advanced bases west of 165 degrees east and above 
46 degrees north, his prescribed area of operations? According to Vice Admiral BF, 
there was no feasible base on the Sea of Okhotsk unless Blue established and main-
tained control of one or more passages between the Kurile Islands and controlled 
the air in that vicinity. Since this control would mean establishing an air base within 
easy range, no such site could be considered except possibly in the Kuriles. Harbors 
on the Kamchatka Peninsula and in the Kuriles, however, could be considered for 
an advanced base site. The harbors on Uruppu, Shimushiru, Matsuwa, Shasukotan, 
Onnekotan, and Araido Islands were either too small or too exposed. In addition, 
Purple sea and air bases on Paramushiru, Shimushu, and Kamchatka flanked the 
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great-circle sea routes, so islands in this part of the Kuriles were not suitable sites. 
In Shimushu and Paramushiru Islands, Kataoka Bay and Kashiwabara were within 
the mile-wide Paramushiru Strait that separated the two islands. Combined, they 
constituted a major fleet anchorage. Shimushu was a low, rolling island eighteen 
miles long and twelve miles wide, separated from Kamchatka by the seven-mile-
wide Shumusho Strait. The surface was a partially dissected plateau about four or 
five hundred feet high, its greatest elevation 624 feet. The coasts had steep cliffs 
about 150–500 feet high, and there was a great deal of well-drained land. Move-
ment anywhere on the island was possible. It had a Purple naval-aviation field, a 
seaplane base, and two dry-weather landing fields. (Pages 8–9.)
Paramushiru was the second-largest island and owing to its location, Vice Ad-
miral BF thought, the most important in the Kuriles. It had the largest population, 
extensive military installations, a fishing industry, and sulfur mines. Its military 
installations included four military airfields and a Purple Army and three Purple 
Navy fields, including the Purple Navy’s headquarters for its Naval Air Arm. In 
addition to Kataoka and Kashiwabara, small anchorages were located at Kakuma-
betsu Bay and Musashi Bay; Suribachi Bay was an open anchorage, except for a 
small harbor protected from the east by a breakwater. Paramu shiru was sixty miles 
long and twelve miles wide and was divided into 
three “well-defined” mountain units. To the north-
east, the area was mostly rugged, with peaks over 
three thousand feet in altitude and valleys with 
gentle slopes permitting cross-island movement. 
The southwestern mountains, the most formidable 
barrier on the island, included two active volca-
noes. The third section was a steep mass isolated 
from the southwestern mountains by a broad low-
land belt running southward from the north coast. 
Coastal and cross-island benches and lowlands of 
the southwestern third of the island had low slopes 
with many beaches, affording easy movement. BF 
did not know how many Purple troops were on 
Paramushiru and Shimushu but because of their 
strategic importance he expected their bases to be 
of recent and extensive development and with suf-
ficient garrisons—absent contrary information, he 
was going to assume so. He was also going to as-
sume that bases were well defended by coastal bat-
teries, antiaircraft batteries, and local air- and naval-defense craft, and that they 
had adequate communication facilities. (Pages 9–10.)
Fig. 118
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The Kamchatka Peninsula was 750 miles long and between eighty and three 
hundred miles wide; it terminated only seven miles from Shimushu. Lying between 
the Bering and Okhotsk Seas, it was rugged country with greatly varied topogra-
phy. It included marshy tundra on the west side of the peninsula; the vicinity of 
Petropavlovsk contained several airfields and afforded sites for several more. The 
Gulf of Kamchatka was never completely frozen, though it was often blocked by 
drift ice. It was packed with ice in February to March but usually clear by some-
time in April. However, there was still heavy drift ice in the Bering Sea until early 
June. The coast between Osyplakhtak and Mys Kamchatski was often free from ice 
when the rest of the gulf was solidly packed. Ust Kamchatka and Kruger Bay were 
the only two anchorages in the Gulf of Kamchatka; the former was a small, un-
protected harbor with three five-hundred-yard and six four-hundred-yard berths. 
Kruger Bay had the same facilities but offered the only sheltered anchorage in the 
gulf. Purple was understood to be developing air facilities at Ust Kamchatka; there 
was also an incomplete seaplane base there. The entire area was about three miles 
north of the great-circle routes from the Blue Mainland, four hundred air miles 
from Paramushiru, and the same distance from Attu. Vice Admiral BF thought it 
would be lightly defended because ice prevented the area from serving as a base 
during a considerable part of the year. (Pages 10–11.)
Avacha Bay had Petropavlovsk, “by far” the best port in Kamchatka. It was the 
only port in Kamchatka that could provide well-protected anchorage berths and 
landing facilities for oceangoing vessels, with a capacity of fifty thousand tons per 
month. Since it was also the capital of Kamchatka, it had good all-weather roads 
across the peninsula, though there were no other communications with Purple ter-
ritory except by sea. Petropavlovsk was not used as an anchorage, because of lim-
ited room, but it had eight wharves in the harbor, and there were six commercial 
wharves in the other parts of the bay. There might even be one or two dry docks 
of five-thousand-ton capacity there. Rakovaya Harbor, in the southeast portion of 
Avacha Bay, was reported to have two docks for ships of fifteen thousand tons and 
one capable of taking a forty-thousand-ton ship. Tarinskaya Harbor, also in the 
southeast portion, was a seaplane base; it was landlocked and so barges were need-
ed to land materials there. (Page 11.)
One great advantage of Avacha Bay, to Admiral BF, was that it was free from solid 
ice year-round except in narrows and coves, and much of that could be handled by 
icebreakers. Drift ice appeared by early June but should not interfere with the bay’s 
use as a base. Wind conditions were similar to those in the Kuriles, and the weather 
was generally good from June to October. Only July and August were snow-free, 
however, and the snow in March was sometimes more than ten feet deep. The en-
trance channel to Avacha Bay was thirty-six feet deep at low tide and forty-one feet 
at high tide. Harbors and anchorages could be protected by antisubmarine nets, 
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the bay approaches could be mined, and three beaches were suitable for landings. 
However, Purple had three seaplane bases, one fighter field, and one bomber field 
in the area; also, it would be necessary to inoculate Blue troops for typhus, plague, 
cholera, typhoid, paratyphoid, yellow fever, tetanus, and smallpox. Morzhovaya 
Bay, about sixty miles from Avacha Bay, was about four miles wide between Araali 
Cape and Morzhoui Island. It was surrounded by mountains more than two thou-
sand feet high, and there were no settlements in the vicinity. The depth of the wa-
ters was between nine and twenty-nine fathoms; it was free from ice in the summer 
and suitable for operating seaplanes from a tender. (Page 12.)
Admiral BF next looked at the Komandorski Islands, lying about 125 miles 
off of Kamchatka. These two, narrow, mountainous islands had lengths of thirty 
and forty-three miles and coasts almost entirely marked by steep slopes and cliffs. 
June, July, and August saw fourteen, fifteen, and eight days of fog, respectively, and 
cloudiness prevailed 75 percent of the time. Prevailing winds from the south pro-
duced a gale every month, but the islands were free from ice in the summer. Purple 
had developed a base at Nikolski, at the northern end of Bering Island, for air, sur-
face, and submarine operations. There was room there for twenty-five berths in ten 
to fourteen fathoms of water but no appreciable protection from westerly winds or 
seas. Heavy swells entered the anchorage during these westerly winds, which would 
make handling cargo difficult. Medni had no good anchorages or level stretches 
for airfields, and vessels could anchor only in small bays or coves. Still, Admiral BF 
wanted the Komandorskis reconnoitered for Purple activities and considered for 
use by Blue tender-based seaplanes. 
No sites south of Paramushiru would be suitable, because any would be flanked 
by Purple sea and air bases in Paramushiru, Shimushu, and Kamchatka. The 
Paramushiru-Shimushu site was too strongly defended to seize with his limited 
force. Avacha was the only base west of 165 degrees east and north of 46 degrees 
north that could provide well-sheltered anchorage berths and possessed “sufficient 
other” necessary characteristics to qualify as a suitable advanced base. Also, it was 
lightly defended. It was, therefore, his choice for seizure. (Pages 12–13.)
Vice Admiral BF had information that Purple was developing at Petropavlovsk 
what was to be a major air and naval base but was now still lightly defended. It was 
additionally reported that Purple was developing other auxiliary land- and seaplane 
stations on both coasts of the Kamchatka Peninsula, but little was known of them 
except that “considerable activity” was being noted at Bolsheretsk, Ust Kamchatka, 
and Korf Bay. There was a small seaplane base at Korf Bay and another at Ust Kam-
chatka, each capable of handling eighteen flying boats. Further, he knew of three 
airfields and three seaplane stations in the vicinity of Avacha Bay with a combined 
capacity of sixty naval patrol bombers, forty-eight fighter planes, and fifty-four fly-
ing boats; another forty-eight fighters could be accommodated at Khayryuzovo 
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and Bolsheretsk. The three fighters fields on Cape Lopatka had a total capacity of 
120 planes, while the two airfields on Shimushu could handle ninety naval patrol 
bombers and eighty-five fighters. The four fields on Paramushiru had room for 175 
fighters and 120 naval patrol bombers. When it had been under Japanese control, 
Shimushu had had four coastal-defense and about twenty dual-purpose guns. Ad-
ditionally, it had antiaircraft batteries concentrated about its airfields. Paramushiru 
had eighteen coastal-defense and thirty-four dual-purpose guns, again concen-
trated about the airfields and the headquarters area. Matsuwa had one airfield that 
could accommodate forty naval patrol bombers and thirty fighters, while Etorofu 
could take twenty-four naval patrol bombers and thirty-six fighters. Sakhalin had 
seven airfields and stations, but with unknown capacities. (Page 15.)
Vice Admiral BF had no information on enemy troop concentrations. In 1945, 
Purple had had an estimated twenty-five thousand troops in Kamchatka, an es-
timated 10,500 of which were in fixed defenses and the remainder—including a 
mountain regiment—mobile forces. The former Orange garrison for the entire 
Kuriles had been about ninety-nine thousand troops, too greatly separated to be 
mutually supporting except for Paramushiru and Shimushu. The Orange garrisons 
on these two islands had numbered about thirty-two thousand, of which ten thou-
sand were in the southern Paramushiru area. That island was “extremely” rugged, 
swampy in coastal areas, and had numerous streams that an advancing force would 
have to cross; movement of troops and equipment was difficult in many parts of the 
island and impossible in others. Given these conditions, he did not consider forces 
in northern and southern Paramushiru to be mutually supporting. His own two 
Marine Corps divisions in Seattle numbered about forty thousand men but would 
be sufficient only against a Purple force of no more than eleven to sixteen thousand 
strong. Cruisers, destroyers, and small carriers concentrated in Vladivostok were 
operating in the Pacific north of latitude 38 degrees but BF did not know the dispo-
sition of the Purple submarines or shore-based aircraft. 
The Blue 1st Fleet, less his flagship, the heavy cruiser CA-73, was in Pearl Har-
bor, and part of this fleet would constitute the Blue Covering Force. Blue had four 
atomic bombs at Kodiak Island, and he did not think that Purple had any of these 
new weapons. (Pages 16–17.)
Vice Admiral BF saw the Blue Strength Factors as having the initiative; fleet car-
riers that were superior to Purple’s light and escort carriers; and very-long-range 
aircraft that could carry the four atomic bombs. He also saw the Covering Force’s 
aircraft as numerically superior to Purple’s light-carrier airpower in a ratio of three 
to one, and he thought (as in fact Admiral PA assumed) that Blue air attacks could 
be concentrated to win temporary control of the air in small areas. Blue Weakness 
Factors, however, included land-based fighters that could not operate within 180 
miles of the Purple bases and naval patrol bombers that had to sacrifice part of 
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their payloads to reach some of the Purple bases. In addition, Blue fleet carriers had 
to withdraw from critical areas for replacement aircraft, fuel, and other logistical 
needs. The Blue forces also had no reinforcements, poor intelligence, and limita-
tions on carrier- and cruiser-based flight operations because of the fog that might 
impact both scouting and air attacks on Purple surface forces at critical times. (Pag-
es 20–21.)
Fig. 119
Relative Blue and Purple 
combat power
 PROBLEM 2: BLUE STATEMENT AND STAFF SOLUTION 259
To Admiral BF, Purple had only a couple of Weakness Factors: the prevalence 
of fog hindering effective searches in critical areas, and planes being mostly land 
based, negating the effective use of fighters more than three hundred miles out 
to sea. Purple had a number of Strength Factors, according to Admiral BF. These 
included land-based air forces in critical areas and the relative ease in replacing air-
craft losses within twenty-four hours. Admiral BF thought that Purple’s combined 
light-carrier and land-based fighters were about equal to the Blue Covering Force’s 
fighters and the Purple forces could replace these planes much more quickly than 
could Blue. Purple also had airfields equipped with fog intensive disposal equipment 
to facilitate the operation of aircraft, it had better knowledge about local weather 
and conditions, and its forces could follow weather fronts moving eastward. 
In addition, the high ground in the Avacha area facilitated low-level air attacks 
that could not be detected by shipboard radar. Vice Admiral BF thought he could 
partially nullify this advantage by establishing radar and fighter-direction stations 
in isolated places ashore. Still, there were other Purple advantages. For instance, 
Purple had numerous landing fields in critical areas (which permitted dispersing 
aircraft), alternative landing fields for use should carriers be damaged, and the op-
tion of operating carrier aircraft from land bases. All of this meant that there were 
ample fields within range of the Blue objective; Purple, he surmised, could deduce 
that objective with certainty and concentrate forces accordingly. Purple addition-
ally had superior surface forces in terms of cruisers and destroyers. Moreover, its 
combined surface forces were superior to the Blue Expeditionary Force in terms of 
numbers and speed of fleet carriers, carrier aircraft, heavy and light cruisers, and 
destroyers. Finally, Purple had more high-speed submarines than did Blue. (Pages 
20–21.) 
Given that Purple air strength in the northern Kuriles–southern Kamchatka 
area was about equal to what Blue could concentrate, it was vital for Blue to seize 
the initiative. Admiral BF presumed that Blue holding this initiative could turn 
equality into superiority through early, coordinated carrier- and land-based air 
attacks—including the use of atomic bombs. “Our superiority in carriers and car-
rier aircraft gives our Covering Force a considerable advantage over Purple’s mo-
bile force during weather which permits carrier flight operations.” His superiority 
in carrier aircraft was more than three to one. While his fleet carriers were at a 
speed disadvantage with respect to Purple’s light carriers, he had superiority in 
heavy ships, light cruisers, and destroyers when his surface forces were collected 
as the Covering Force. While Purple had a superiority of combined surface forces 
over the Blue Expeditionary Force, by itself, he could change the destroyer balance 
by employing his eight destroyer-minesweepers in the destroyer role, though this 
would reduce his convoy screen. Still, the loss of two or more of his fleet carriers or 
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severe flight-deck damage would greatly weaken his force, whereas similar damage 
to the Purple carriers would be of much less consequence for the enemy. Purple 
also had twenty submarines to his ten. These constituted a threat of “considerable 
magnitude” because of their long submerged-cruising range and their ability to 
make high-speed attacks. Blue did not yet have reliable antisubmarine detection 
devices or weapons developed but he could partially overcome this disadvantage 
by the use of a maximum number of screening vessels, “vigorous” offensive action, 
and improvised tactics, including the employment of submarines in his tactical 
organization. The Blue Covering Force, however, had to withdraw from the opera-
tional area to replenish its planes, refuel, and rearm because it was too small to ro-
tate units for replenishment. Purple, on the other hand, had considerable airpower 
and Admiral BF thought that Purple could reinforce its ground troops at Avacha by 
parachute, though it would be difficult to supply such forces given the Blue Cover-
ing Force’s power. (Pages 22–23.)
Vice Admiral BF could get no troop, ship, or aircraft reinforcements and did not 
know what reinforcements were available to Purple. He assumed that the Purple 
commander had no ship reinforcements but thought that Purple troops and planes 
that were in the theater but not in action could be shifted against Blue’s forces. This 
capability would depend on terrain and Admiral BF’s control of the air and seas. 
He also did not know about Purple’s logistics situation but he was going to assume 
it was adequate. Reviewing his replenishment assets, he concluded that he would 
have to figure out his Course of Action before he determined the adequacy of his 
logistics. He did not, however, have any hospital ships. In addition, transportation 
from Avacha would have to be in the ships of his transport squadrons until airfields 
there had been made ready for an air transport command. Purple, however, could 
evacuate by air if no other means were available, since its main bases were close at 
hand. (Pages 23–24.)
Looking at Purple’s potential capabilities, Admiral BF thought that Purple could 
concentrate its forces in the northern Kuriles–southern Kamchatka area to attempt 
to destroy the Blue surface forces as they came within three hundred miles. Purple 
surface forces could be supported by submarines and land-based air and coordinat-
ed action would allow the Purple commander to oppose Blue with superior forces, 
provided Purple detected Blue in time to concentrate. Alternatively, the Purple com-
mander could use his land-based air and submarines first to reduce Blue strength 
by mining, bombing bases, and attrition attacks on surface forces within and out-
side Purple territory. Purple’s third option was to reinforce Avacha with troops and 
defensive equipment to the point that the Blue Expeditionary Force would be too 
weak to seize it. This reinforcement, however, would have to take place by ship con-
voy as Blue could disrupt road communications between Bolsheretsk and Avacha. 
In addition, Purple could mass its submarines, land-based air, mine capability, and 
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combined surface forces to destroy the Blue Expeditionary Force. This plan would 
mean having to evade the Blue Covering Force, which might be possible given the 
adverse weather in the area. Another capability, of course, was to destroy the Blue 
Covering Force with combined Purple surface forces or so damage it that it could 
not support the amphibious assault. If Purple immobilized enough Blue carriers, 
the amphibious assault would not succeed. Last, Purple could invade the Aleutians, 
so one of Admiral BF’s tasks was to defend them. Such an attack might delay the 
Blue amphibious assault and allow Purple to reinforce Avacha but Admiral BF did 
not think he would have to respond to this possibility unless a Purple offensive 
toward the Aleutians really did materialize. (Pages 24–25.)
Avacha Bay was the most logical Blue objective—Admiral BF had the initiative, 
and he could strike without warning after 0000 Zebra time on 20 June. He saw the 
fleet carriers in his Covering Force striking the Purple bases, withdrawing, replen-
ishing, and returning by the time the Expeditionary Force approached the critical 
area. He also, however, had to protect the latter en route to the objective area as 
well as provide direct air support during the landings. His General Plan of Action 
was to do all of this by keeping Purple constantly on the defensive through vigor-
ous offensive action. More specifically, Admiral BF could neutralize the Purple air 
bases, destroy Purple shipping in the area, photograph the landing beaches for the 
Expeditionary Force, and then retire to replenish. Then he could return to keep the 
Purple air bases neutralized and destroy enemy aircraft, submarines, and surface 
ships before they could threaten the Expeditionary Force as it approached, cap-
tured, and then defended Avacha Bay. Lastly, he could attempt to capture, occupy, 
and defend Avacha in one phase. In this case, air strikes would be delayed until 
D‒2 or D‒1 (two days, or one, respectively, before the attack), and there would be 
no replenishment without the retirement of one group of carriers. (Pages 25–26.)
Blue Course of Action One, then, provided for attacks on Purple that he thought 
would so weaken the enemy that approach and landing operations could succeed. 
Better and more timely photographic reconnaissance of the landing areas would 
also be possible, as would replenishment. These operations would allow more ad-
equate coverage of the Expeditionary Force by Blue land-based air in the Aleutians 
and enable the Covering Force to interpose itself between the Expeditionary Force 
and Purple surface forces as the former approached Avacha. Blue Course of Action 
Two would consist of about two days of carrier- and land-based air strikes. It had 
a number of disadvantages. First, there could be no replenishment of forces until 
after the landings had been made. Neutralization of Purple air installations would 
be more difficult because there would be fewer strikes with a smaller number of 
aircraft since the Covering Force would have to provide fighter protection to the 
Expeditionary Force. There would additionally be a delay in photographic recon-
naissance of the landing areas. Initial operations would allow Purple to deduce 
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where the landings were to occur. Still, he reasoned, the advantage of neutralizing 
Purple’s air bases, timely reconnaissance of landing beaches, and early opportunity 
to destroy Purple surface forces outweighed the disadvantage of giving the objec-
tive away to Purple. He was confident that he had forces sufficient to accomplish 
this mission. (Pages 26–27.)
Under Purple’s first assumed possible Course of Action, the Purple commander 
would deploy his land-based air forces to provide maximum striking power against 
Blue forces as they approached the southern Kamchatka or northern Kurile ar-
eas. He thought the Purple commander would keep his surface forces out of range 
of Blue carrier fighters until the carriers were within range of Purple’s land-based 
fighters. Purple could then make repeated, heavy air strikes to reduce Blue carrier 
strength and then destroy the transports when they were present or it could con-
tinue focusing on destroying the Blue Covering Force. 
Vice Admiral BF assumed that Purple’s tactics would include coordinated carrier- 
and land-based strikes in maximum numbers in an effort to saturate Blue fighters 
and antiaircraft fire. Submarines would also be used to the extent possible, with 
target priorities as the carriers, transports, cruisers, screening ships, oilers, and 
then other auxiliaries. The Blue Covering Force, however, could approach Para-
mushiru from the east or southeast, thereby reducing the number of Kamchatka- 
based fighters that could reach Blue forces and forcing the remainder to operate 
at longer ranges. Strikes could then also be made on the southern Kuriles. If Blue 
approached southern Kamchatka from the east, some of the Purple airfields in the 
Kuriles would be out of fighter range. If Blue could succeed in a surprise approach, 
it should be able to gain control of the air by temporarily immobilizing Purple 
fighters on fields out of range, maintaining a superior number of fighters in the 
area, destroying the Purple light carriers if the opportunity arose, and destroying 
Purple air facilities at the same time. Blue land-based bombers could also be used 
in these strikes. By destroying Purple aviation-fuel supplies, hangars, and ammuni-
tion dumps in southern Kamchatka, Blue could make these airfields “almost use-
less” to Purple for an extended period. One or both groups of the Blue Covering 
Force could then withdraw to replenish and then return to cover the approach of 
the Blue Expeditionary Force to the objective. Blue had to accomplish these strikes, 
however, without incurring loss to its carrier strength, lest it not have strength left 
to cover the amphibious landings. (Pages 27–28.)
Blue’s success against Purple Course of Action One would depend in large mea-
sure on its own ability to effect the surprise and failure of Purple to have its forces 
ready and disposed. Unless Blue could achieve surprise and use its atomic bombs 
to weaken Purple considerably, it might not have sufficient air strength to accom-
plish its mission. By aggressive offensive action, Admiral BF thought, Blue could 
destroy Purple shipping, aircraft, and installations so as to allow photographic 
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reconnaissance, location and clearance of minefields, and replenishment of forces. 
Even if Purple succeeded in limiting Blue successes here, however, BF thought he 
had the power to capture, occupy, and defend Avacha Bay, keeping Purple bases 
neutralized and destroying their air, surface, and submarine forces. Purple focus 
on destroying Blue forces with submarines and land-based airpower would result, 
he thought, in weaker Purple submarine forces in the critical area but would al-
low greater chances of striking Blue forces as they approached the critical area of 
operations. This Purple Course of Action, however, would require Blue to allocate 
more land-based air for defensive tasks and force it to take greater risks in send-
ing task units to operate independently outside the critical area. Admiral BF, how-
ever, could route his forces within supporting distance of his land-based air in the 
Aleutians and organize his task units to take the best advantage of escort carriers, 
destroyers, and destroyer-minesweepers. (Page 29.) 
If Purple tried to reinforce Avacha Bay by the movement of troops by sea and 
accomplished this by 0000 Zebra on 20 June, Blue would not be able to prevent 
it. After the Blue Covering Force arrived in the area, however, it would be strong 
enough to prevent further reinforcement of Avacha by sea. Blue would be able to 
defeat Purple in this scenario by neutralizing or destroying its ships, aircraft, and 
base installations, and Blue land-based air could be used to augment attacks on 
Purple reinforcement groups. If Purple tried to attack the Blue Expeditionary Force 
with coordinated strikes by submarines, aircraft, and surface ships, Blue would 
have to maintain “efficient” reconnaissance to locate the Purple combined surface 
forces in time to permit the Covering Force to defeat the Purple surface forces 
before they threatened the Expeditionary Force. He thought it possible that Purple 
would operate its combined force to the north or the south of the Aleutian chain in 
a position to strike the Expeditionary Force. Doing so, however, would expose it to 
attacks by Blue land-based air and Covering Force attacks without the support of 
Purple land-based fighters. This Course of Action by Purple might divert the Blue 
Covering Force from its preinvasion air strikes but Purple’s chance of destroying 
the Expeditionary Force would be small. It might delay the Blue landings, but at the 
loss of the Purple combined surface forces. (Page 30.)
If Purple attempted a surprise carrier air strike on the Blue Covering Force by 
its combined surface forces, followed by a surface action, Purple would have the 
advantage of weather fronts moving eastward behind which to approach and so 
achieve surprise. Purple in this scenario could also augment its attack with land-
based bombers, if conditions were favorable. If Purple succeeded in immobilizing 
three or more Blue carriers, Blue’s combined forces would be so weak that Purple 
could repel the invasion with its land-based air forces alone. In general, a carrier 
duel would be in Blue’s favor because of its superiority in carrier forces and its abil-
ity to augment those carrier forces with land-based air. If, however, bad weather 
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prevented carrier operations, Purple could strike with its surface forces. Vice Ad-
miral BF knew that he had to take adequate precautions against surprise attacks 
by Purple but also that he had ample planes to safeguard against surprise if he em-
ployed them properly. If Purple attempted to invade the Aleutians, Blue would have 
to prevent it if it constituted a major threat to Blue communications. Obviously, 
Blue amphibious operations could be delayed, but Admiral BF did not think that 
Purple had sufficient surface forces to attempt an amphibious operation in Blue 
territory. If Purple did, Blue reconnaissance would have to locate its forces to pre-
vent any occupation that could constitute a serious threat to Blue. (Pages 30–31.)
In the end, Admiral BF decided to pursue Blue Course of Action One. Accord-
ingly, he would in Phase One neutralize the Purple base in the northern Kuriles, 
destroy Purple bases and shipping in the southern Kamchatka Peninsula, and ex-
ploit favorable opportunities to destroy Purple surface forces in the area. He would 
then obtain information on installations and landing beaches in Avacha Bay by 
aerial and submarine observation as well as from photographic reconnaissance. 
Also, minefields would be located and destroyed. Phase One would conclude with 
retirement and replenishment of the Covering Force, which would then cover the 
approach of the Expeditionary Force. Phase Two would consist of the actual cap-
ture, occupation, and defense of Avacha Bay by destroying Purple aircraft, subma-
rines, and surface ships; covering and supporting the landing; and keeping neutral-
ized Purple air bases that were within effective range of Avacha. Favorable weather 
conditions would be exploited to the greatest extent possible. The seizure of Avacha 
Bay would provide an advanced Blue base for subsequent operations against Pur-
ple “Asiatic” territory. Vice Admiral BF now had to determine the details: routes, 
searches, and the employment of submarines; Fleet Air Command, Aleutians; the 
Covering Force; the Service Force; the Expeditionary Force; and special groups. 
Finally, he had to figure out logistics, movements, and task organization. (Pages 
31–32.) 
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XIV Operations Problem 2
The Blue Solution Continued, September–October 1946 
In his Solution of the Complementary Problems, Vice Admiral BF first tackled the routes his forces would take. He decided first to move the Expeditionary Force and the Service Force to Avacha Bay via Adak while his flagship and the 
Mine Force went via Attu. He was going to have his submarines top off in Attu en 
route to their patrol stations and the submarine tenders shift to various islands in 
the Aleutians. The Covering Force was to pass close to Attu to allow the flagship to 
join up. The shortest routes to Attu and Adak from Puget Sound and Kodiak were 
the great circles via Unimak Pass. He therefore figured that Unimak Pass was the 
best place for Purple submarines to deploy. Since he needed vital information that 
only his own submarines could provide, his own submarines would have to move 
by this route, especially since he considered them the best protection from Purple’s. 
By transiting Unimak Pass, the Mine Force might also give Purple submarines the 
impression that its task was to conduct an antisubmarine sweep in advance of a 
larger force. If the Main Body of the Expeditionary Force proceeded to Adak south 
of the Aleutians, it might escape detection prior to arrival at the staging point. 
This evasive route was 250 miles longer, but time was not pressing. In addition, the 
Covering Force did not need to penetrate the Aleutians should close support be 
necessary. After departing Adak, the Expeditionary Force was to proceed north of 
the chain to save eighty miles. The route for the Expeditionary Force also had the 
advantage that until ships passed Attu, attacking aircraft from Paramushiru had to 
pass over the Aleutians. He also determined that the Service Force at Pearl Harbor 
could proceed to Adak unless it was diverted by Commander, Covering Force.*
With respect to searches, the Purple–Blue international boundary ran from a 
point halfway between Saint Lawrence Island and Siberia to midway between Attu 
and Medni Islands. Purple might object to any search beyond this point prior to 
the initiation of hostilities but Admiral BF thought that security demanded that 
Blue locate any Purple surface force in a position to inflict serious damage. The 
* Senior Class of June 1947, “Operations Problem 2: The Blue Staff Solution,” 8 October 1946, p. 33, folder 2603-
C, box 138, RG 4, NHC. Subsequent in-text page references, until the next footnote, are to this source. 
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Purple surface force could do real damage to Blue 
forces and the Aleutian installations if it succeeded 
in making a surprise attack. Consequently, search-
ing to the Purple shoreline was required even prior 
to the commencement of hostilities; it could be ac-
complished by radar with flights to within seventy- 
five miles of the Purple coast. Any Purple pro-
tests, however, would have to be placated in order 
to avoid declaration of war prior to Blue’s initial 
strikes. (Page 36.)
Upon the initiation of hostilities, searches were 
to be extended to Kamchatka in order to recon-
noiter Korf Bay and Kruger Bay. Any Purple air-
craft and installations on the Komandorski Islands 
would have to be destroyed, and sea areas would 
have to be searched in order to locate and destroy 
Purple forces as well as to guard against surprise at-
tack by surface forces. BF wanted his initial searches 
to extend southwest to 38 degrees north as well as 
north and south of the Aleutians either to locate the 
Purple surface force or to provide reasonable assur-
ance that those forces were not present. Thereafter, 
he would reduce the searches north and south of 
the Aleutians, maintaining them between Attu and 
Kamchatka west of Cape Olyutorski and counter-
clockwise to a point south of the central Aleutians. 
The radius of the searches to the southwest and 
south of the Aleutians could also be reduced. 
In addition, as the Expeditionary Force moved 
to the west, the areas to be searched could be pro-
gressively reduced from the eastward up to the lon-
gitude of Amchitka. After the Purple surface force had been located, further reduc-
tions of the areas to be searched could also be made. He saw the conservation of 
search aircraft as very important, because their numbers were very limited and they 
were also needed for antisubmarine patrols, antishipping sweeps, weather flights, 
and bombing tasks. The present distribution of aircraft was neither efficient nor 
economical. He wanted to move Fleet Air Wing 1 and the three seaplane tenders 
to the Aleutians as early as practicable. Attu had a naval air station capable of sup-
porting a large number of land planes of the type assigned to Fleet Air Command, 
Aleutians. This redeployment of aircraft was required before commencement of 
Fig. 120
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search operations and would continue as conditions changed but he thought all this 
could be accomplished with ease. (Pages 36–37.)
Submarines were required to obtain vital information in areas that could not be 
subjected to aerial search. Purple forces in Kruger Bay and on the Komandorski 
Islands were the only shore-based forces north of Petropavlovsk that could offer an 
immediate threat. These areas, he thought, could be investigated to a limited extent 
before hostilities began by his submarines, which could also investigate minefields 
and check on air and sea activity in the vicinity of Avacha. His submarines could 
also investigate Purple air and sea activity around the Cape Lopatka–Shimushu–
Paramushiru area as well as, prior to the start of hostilities, the Kurile and Amphi-
trite Straits since the latter were the most likely routes from the Asian mainland to 
Avacha. Blue submarines were to report any sightings of Purple surface or expedi-
tionary forces. Single-ship movement, however, was not to be reported if it would 
jeopardize more-important missions. In addition, submarines could be used ad-
vantageously for such tasks as weather observation, lifeguard duty, radar picketing, 
and attacks on shipping. (Page 37.)
Some submarines would be required for weather observation as their primary 
mission. This was especially true for the Avacha–Paramushiru areas because the 
date for commencing operations depended on an accurate fair-weather forecast 
for a period of a day at Paramushiru and its vicinity, followed by about four days of 
fair weather in the area of Avacha Bay. Weather information in the western Aleu-
tians was of lesser importance but had to be given consideration in order to plan 
and conduct land-based air operations. Also, since he was short of destroyers, his 
submarines would have to be employed as radar pickets off Attu; early warning of 
Purple planes approaching the Aleutian bases was “most essential.” However, he 
surmised that he could get the best advantage out of his submarines by using them 
tactically. None of their roles were entirely tactical; the five submarines in the vicin-
ity of Paramushiru and the two at Avacha could be assigned to the Commander, 
Blue Covering Force on D–3 and D–1 days, respectively, for tactical uses but even 
they could also be employed as lifeguards, for weather observation, and as radar 
pickets. Since their scouting function was so vital, however, he was going to put 
all of his submarines to sea and move the submarine tenders westward. (Page 38.)
The priority tasks for submarines, after weather observation and reconnais-
sance, were the location of Purple mines in the Avacha area and then radar picket-
ing. Lifeguarding came next, then minelaying and the destruction of enemy ship-
ping. Weather observations were needed in the Sea of Okhotsk, the area to the east 
of the Kuriles, and the vicinities of Paramushiru and Avacha, where aircraft could 
not fly prior to hostilities. BF was going to employ seven boats in the Okhotsk Sea 
and one off Bolsheretsk, all with a primary mission of weather observation and a 
secondary mission of reconnaissance; another boat about fifteen miles off Cape 
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Elizabeth and Sakhalin with the same primary missions would have the added task 
of planting two mines off Cape Mary after hostilities commenced. Two boats would 
be in La Perouse Strait with a primary mission of reconnaissance and then second-
ary missions of weather observation, minelaying, and antishipping. Three more 
boats would have primary missions of weather observation between 48 and 51 de-
grees north latitude and 149 and 150 degrees east longitude. His final boat in the 
Okhotsk Sea would be within fifty miles to the west of Shimushu with a primary 
mission of weather observation, except during air strikes, when lifeguarding would 
be primary. It would also plant two mines in the Kurile Strait. (Pages 38–39.)
In the Kuriles, Admiral BF was going to station one submarine about four miles 
off the eastern entrance to Paramushiru Strait and another about fifteen miles east 
of Cape Lopatka. After hostilities commenced, the submarine off the Paramushiru 
Strait was to plant two mines. Also as of D–3, these boats would operate at the 
direction of Commander, Covering Force. The submarine stationed in Amphitrite 
Strait would also come under Commander, Covering Force’s operational control 
on D–3, as would the one eighty miles east of Cape Lopatka. This latter subma-
rine would have a tertiary mission of reporting on enemy air formations en route 
to Blue bases or surface forces. East of the Kuriles would be two submarines for 
weather observation and then lifeguard duty and reconnaissance. (Pages 39–40.) 
Admiral BF decided to station two boats off the Kamchatka Peninsula to recon-
noiter the entrance of Avacha Bay, locate minefields, observe defenses, and pho-
tograph beaches. One of these submarines would relay this information to a naval 
patrol plane a hundred miles east of Avacha at 1900 Zebra time on 17 June. These 
boats then were to observe Purple air activity and shipping, furnish weather reports 
when requested, and operate at the discretion of Commander, Covering Force from 
D–3 on. There would be one more submarine stationed off the entrance to Kruger 
Bay and one off the Komandorski Islands. Finally, as noted above, the two sub-
marines off Attu as radar pickets would be essential because of the need for early 
warning of Purple aircraft approaching the western Aleutians, in spite of the dis-
advantageous employment of submarines that this entailed in terms of destroying 
shipping. (Pages 40–41.)
Admiral BF thought that his use of such a large number of submarines was 
necessary to provide for adequate weather coverage as well as “reasonable” recon-
naissance and the location of mines. He argued that the planting of the few mines 
mentioned in restricted areas that were being used by Purple should cause the en-
emy to devote much effort toward minesweeping, and so the mines should have a 
high “nuisance” value. The Submarine Force, after its missions of weather observa-
tion, reconnaissance, mining, and airborne early warning, would destroy Purple 
shipping that was encountered. Moving the submarine tenders westward would 
maximize the number of days the submarines could remain on station by reducing 
 PROBLEM 2: THE BLUE SOLUTION CONTINUED 271
the transit time. Submarine tender AS-15 would be based at Amchitka, and Subma-
rine Squadrons 1 and 98 could arrive at Attu by 0400 on 7 June. These boats could 
refuel and arrive on station by 18 June, in time to carry out their tasks. SUBRON 
98, he thought, could best carry out its mission by being where enemy antisubma-
rine action was most probable. He planned to have Commander, Submarine Force 
establish his headquarters at Adak. (Pages 41–42.)
With respect to the employment of Fleet Air Command, Aleutians, Vice Admi-
ral BF first looked at Fleet Air Wings 1, 3, 5, and 7, stationed at Puget Sound, Am-
chitka, Adak, and Shemya, respectively. His shore air facilities could support five 
PBM Mariner naval patrol bombers at Attu, another six of these planes at Adak, and 
a further twenty-four at Dutch Harbor. Prior to the opening of hostilities, he was 
going to have two primary tasks for his shore- and tender-based aircraft. One was 
to search for the Purple surface force and conduct antisubmarine patrols against 
Purple submarines. The second task was to destroy submarines reconnoitering the 
Aleutian area, commencing on D–3; initial searches, he thought, would not require 
more than thirty-five aircraft for a 95 percent probability of sighting. The remain-
der of his available aircraft would be employed for antisubmarine patrols, antisub-
marine sweeps ahead of his own surface forces, weather flights, and utility. This 
initial search plan was designated “Search Plan A.” After it was completed, a search 
of lesser extent would be maintained to provide “continuing assurance” against sur-
prise attack on his surface forces or the Aleutian bases. This would be designated 
“Search Plan B” and the aircraft it freed from search missions would augment the 
planes assigned to antisubmarine patrol and utility, as well as bombing. As his sur-
face forces moved westward, the number of search planes needed to search with 95 
percent probability would progressively decrease. This search area would be lim-
ited in radius in the direction of the northern Kuriles and southern Kamchatka to 
avoid hostile acts prior to the beginning of war. But only one search flight per day 
was possible and additional security from surprise attack was required. Therefore, 
he needed a barrier patrol to augment the area search and cover the most likely 
Purple approach. Superfortresses could be used to transport the four atomic bombs 
from Kodiak to Adak and then on to Amchitka or Shemya, where they would be 
available for the patrols. (Pages 43–44.) 
Vice Admiral BF knew that the highly efficient submarines available to Purple 
were difficult to locate because of the short range at which the schnorchel could be 
sighted visually or detected by radar. Purple had twenty of these boats, and their 
high submerged speed and ability to attack while deeply submerged made them 
“most potent” weapons. BF saw aircraft and coordinated air-surface attacks as the 
most effective methods of locating and destroying these submarines; aircraft were 
most needed because a shortage of destroyers and destroyer escorts prevented him 
from assigning these ships to antisubmarine units. He planned, when the weather 
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permitted, on employing carrier aircraft for antisubmarine patrols to secure their 
ship formations; one escort carrier of the Expeditionary Force would conduct an-
tisubmarine sweeps ahead of that force. It would be necessary to augment such 
patrols ahead of the large surface formations with special sweeps by tender- and 
shore-based aircraft. Each of these flights would consist of three or four naval pa-
trol bombers, spaced closely enough to detect a schnorchel. The flights would sweep 
back and forth across the projected track of the formation, about a hundred miles 
ahead if the formation was maintaining its own antisubmarine patrol. Otherwise, 
the sweep flight would be deployed as the formation’s antisubmarine patrol. He 
additionally planned to have replacement aircraft with crews so that mobile and 
shore-based units could be moved westward and made readily available for use. 
(Page 44.)
Admiral BF’s Fleet Air Command had a total of eighteen Superfortress heavy 
bombers and seventy-two heavy, land-based naval patrol planes. As he noted above, 
an increasing number would be available for attack as Blue forces moved west. All 
ninety were capable of bombing Purple installations and forces in the Kurile and 
Kamchatka bases. He saw the Covering Force’s air strikes against the Purple bases as 
greatly assisted by coordinated, land-based air attacks on the enemy. He specifically 
wanted the four atomic bombs to be used to destroy Purple surface forces if those 
forces were located at anchor. He did not think, however, that was likely, because 
of Purple’s capability to scout for Blue forces and anticipate attacks, and he did not 
think that atomic bombs would be “most profitable” against surface forces at sea be-
cause of their ability to maneuver and disperse. Alternatively, should the Covering 
Force be threatened with a surface engagement, it probably would be advantageous 
to destroy one or more of Purple’s heavy ships in an atomic-bomb strike. 
The use of two or more of these bombs against Purple’s most important airfields 
would result in the complete elimination of those targets, both planes and facilities. 
Because of the strength of Purple fighters at these airfields, fighter cover would be 
necessary for the Superfortresses unless they were sent in under instrument condi-
tions to bomb by radar. Before he chose atomic-bomb targets, however, he wanted 
the air installations at Paramushiru and Shimushu reconnoitered, which could not 
be done until hostilities commenced. The initial strikes by his carrier aircraft would 
furnish this information, as well as on shipping in the Paramushiru Strait. Com-
mander, Covering Force would be in a position to coordinate these land-based and 
carrier-based air strikes, and the Superfortresses would stand by in the area so they 
could be furnished targets by voice radio and proceed when ordered by Command-
er, Covering Force. (Pages 44–45.) 
The use of the Komandorski Islands for air strikes against Blue, for search, and as 
a base for tenders had to be denied. Admiral BF thought that Fleet Air Command, 
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Aleutians could neutralize enemy strength in this area, as well as any Purple tend-
ers in Kruger or Korf Bay, without assistance from Blue’s carriers. He intended to 
have Fleet Air Command, Aleutians set up a weather unit on Attu and a standby 
unit on Adak. Provision also had to be made to use land-based planes for support 
and reconnaissance in the Avacha area; to furnish replacement aircraft and crews to 
mobile forces; and to collect photography and other intelligence from submarines 
and ensure it was distributed. Fleet Air Command, Aleutians was best suited for all 
these tasks. (Pages 45–46.)
Commencing at 0000 Zebra on 5 June, Fleet Air Command, Aleutians was to pa-
trol the Aleutian area for Purple submarines and broadcast warnings to the North 
Pacific Force. At 1800 Zebra on 7 June, it was to conduct air searches in accordance 
with Search Plan A and then daily searches in accordance with Search Plan B. Fur-
ther, it was to locate, track, and report Purple surface forces before hostilities com-
menced. After hostilities commenced, it was to assist other Blue forces in destroy-
ing Purple surface forces that were encountered and destroy Purple submarines 
that were threatening Blue forces. It was also to maintain an antisubmarine barrier 
patrol a hundred miles ahead of the Blue Expeditionary Force and Blue Service 
Force as well as provide an antisubmarine barrier patrol ahead of the Expeditionary 
Force while the latter was en route to Avacha Bay. While the Expeditionary Force 
was at Avacha Bay, Fleet Air Command, Aleutians would provide an antisubmarine 
patrol for that force; establish its headquarters and weather unit at Attu; establish 
the standby weather unit at Adak; and provide weather forecasts for the Kurile– 
Kamchatka–Aleutian area to the North Pacific Force. When hostilities commenced, 
Fleet Air Command, Aleutians would strike Purple tenders and air installations in 
the Komandorskis, the northern Kuriles, and southern Kamchatka as far north as 
Korf Bay. At Korf Bay itself and in the Komandorskis, strikes by Fleet Air Com-
mand, Aleutians would be coordinated with strikes from the Blue Covering Force’s 
carriers. All of these air strikes were to be directed, controlled, and coordinated by 
Commander, Covering Force. (Pages 46–48.)
As noted above, Fleet Air Command, Aleutians would then provide replace-
ment aircraft and crews to Blue’s mobile forces, provide direct air support for the 
assault on Avacha Bay, and provide photographic reconnaissance of that area. It 
would additionally establish fighter-direction stations in Kamchatka as requested 
by Commander, Blue Expeditionary Force; provide air units for operation from 
captured Avacha air facilities as requested by the same commander; and obtain 
photographs and information on minefields from Blue submarines a hundred 
miles east of Petropavlovsk at 1900 Zebra on 17 June. Finally, Fleet Air Command, 
Aleutians would provide search and rescue service for the Covering Force com-
mencing on D–3. Admiral BF was most concerned with ensuring that replacement 
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aircraft be ferried from the Aleutians area early and that the aircraft available be 
maintained in as large numbers as practicable in order to keep complements of 
operating aircraft filled. 
The Covering Force had to cover the other forces that were en route to their 
rendezvous and objective areas as well as provide its own scouting where searches 
by Fleet Air Command, Aleutians were not adequate. The Covering Force’s major 
task, however, was to isolate the objective area from interference by Purple. The 
initial strikes by the Covering Force would be delayed until forecasts permitted 
successful carrier air operations that could be supported by Blue land-based air 
forces. He tentatively assigned six fleet carriers, five heavy and three light cruisers, 
two antiaircraft cruisers, eighteen destroyers, and eight radar-picket destroyers to 
the Covering Force. He would join the Covering Force in his flagship at the fueling 
area off Attu before the initial carrier strikes, thereby adding a sixth heavy cruiser 
to the force. By coordination of his carrier-based and land-based air strikes, in-
cluding the use of the atomic bombs, he thought that the Purple air strength in the 
Kurile–southern Kamchatka area—which equaled his own air strength—could be 
so reduced that Blue would have air superiority. Commander, North Pacific Force 
would decide when the initial attacks were to be launched, primarily waiting until 
the weather gave Blue the greatest advantages. Commander, Covering Force would 
coordinate the strikes. (Page 49.)
The logistics for the Covering Force would be covered by what he called the 
“Special Fueling Group,” which would be under the control of Commander, Cover-
ing Force and would replenish fuel oil, aviation gasoline, bombs, and ammunition. 
The units of the Special Fueling Group—Service Division 33, Escort Divisions 1 
and 5, and escort carrier CVE-114—were at Pearl Harbor. He saw a great need for 
“expeditious” reservicing of the Covering Force after the initial air strikes; six at-
tack cargo ships and an ammunition ship would be included in the Service Group 
so as to permit simultaneous ammunition transfer. The Service Force itself, based 
at Attu, would also send a unit to the replenishment area to supply the Covering 
Force. (Pages 49–50.)
Since the two escort carriers assigned to the Expeditionary Force could not 
alone furnish adequate close air support and protect the Expeditionary Force from 
Purple attacks, the Covering Force had to take on the latter task also. In addition, 
the Covering Force had to provide photographic reconnaissance and surveillance 
of the Paramushiru–Shimushu and Avacha areas so as to augment the efforts by 
Fleet Air Command, Aleutians. Minesweeping operations at Avacha also had to 
be supported and protected from Purple air attack and the Covering Force was the 
only unit that could carry out this mission, though it might be opposed by Purple 
surface forces during its strikes. (Page 50.)
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In sequence, the Covering Force was first to cover the other Blue units en route 
to and at the objective. When hostilities commenced, it was to destroy Purple air 
bases in the northern Kuriles and southern Kamchatka and then surface forces in a 
position to threaten Blue forces. Commander, Covering Force would coordinate his 
strikes on enemy bases, defenses, and surface forces with those of Fleet Air Com-
mand, Aleutians, except for any operations controlled by the Air Support Control 
Unit (explained below). The Blue Covering Force would then provide direct air 
support to the landings at Avacha Bay as requested by Commander, Expeditionary 
Force; direct submarine operations in the Paramushiru and Avacha areas; and mine 
the eastern entrances to Paramushiru Strait, if Purple surface forces were present in 
that harbor at the commencement of hostilities. Admiral BF thought that the units 
that he had available were adequate to all these tasks, except for the Service Force 
units. (Pages 50–51.)
The problem with the Service Force was that his Special Fueling Group could 
not replenish bombs or large-caliber ammunition to the Covering Force. It could 
be made part of the Service Force at Attu, and the Service Force could itself meet 
the need. Also, if based at Attu, the Special Fueling Group would have the protec-
tion of the land-based air and harbor defenses while being sufficiently near the 
operating area for flexibility. The Service Force additionally had to support the Ex-
peditionary Force after the latter crossed the 180th meridian. The Service Force 
would then proceed to Adak with the Expeditionary Force, replenish at Great Sit-
kin, and continue on to Attu. It was then to remain at Attu until it departed for the 
replenishment area to service the Covering Force. (Page 52.)
All eight attack cargo ships and all eight oilers would be employed to expe-
dite replenishment. Two destroyer tenders, four oilers, and two ammunition ships 
would be left at Attu and eight attack cargo ships, eight oilers, eight destroyers, 
ten destroyer escorts, and two escort carriers would be sent to the fueling area. 
Increased protection from Purple air and submarine attacks would result from the 
extra escort ships and escort carriers. The Service Force would continue to support 
the Expeditionary Force and the Covering Force after the Special Fueling Group 
was released by Commander, Covering Force. Admiral BF was confident that with 
these arrangements, the number of ships was adequate to the task. (Page 52.)
Once the Expeditionary Force crossed the 180th meridian, the Expeditionary 
Force would proceed at its best speed, twelve knots, to the objective unless D-Day 
was delayed by weather. Any mines in the approaches had to be cleared before 
the initial bombardment and landings and the minesweeping units needed fighter 
cover. The Covering Force was going to provide this fighter protection on D–2. 
His assignment of an escort carrier and eight destroyers to the Service Force left 
two escort carriers and twenty destroyers for the Expeditionary Force, which he 
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thought would suffice along with the destroyer- 
minesweepers. The operation would also entail the 
tactical control of aircraft, fire support, transporta-
tion, and the landing of the troops. An Air Support 
Control Unit would be embarked in the amphibi-
ous flagship to exercise tactical control of aircraft in 
the target area. A Transport Group would have all 
the attack transports, attack cargo ships, and high-
speed transports under its control. (Pages 53–54.) 
The Expeditionary Troops would be embarked 
in these ships, with escort ships provided by the 
Support Group. The amphibious force flagship, 
twenty-four attack transports, twelve attack cargo 
ships, and twelve high-speed transports would ac-
tually land the troops—the two Marine Corps divi-
sions that would seize, occupy, and defend Avacha 
Bay. The Support Group was to drive off any en-
emy forces attempting to interfere with the move-
ment to the objective area or the landings. It was 
to provide fire support, close air support, and anti-
submarine patrols as well as to clear minefields. He 
had two prewar modernized battleships, two escort 
carriers, three light cruisers, twenty destroyers, 
one minelayer, eight destroyer-minesweepers, six 
minesweepers, and one seaplane tender for these 
tasks. As soon as the seaplane tender could operate 
PBM Mariners around Avacha, a squadron of these planes would be made available 
to Commander, Air Force, Aleutians. Admiral BF also ordered that if Morzhovaya 
Bay was undefended or could be cleared of mines, it was to be used for tender-
based seaplane antisubmarine patrols. The Expeditionary Force was to route and 
provide escorts for all shipping moving from the objective area. (Pages 54–55.)
BF’s flagship would operate with the Covering Force. He would move to Adak 
for conferences, then by air to conferences with his commanders at various bases in 
the Aleutians, rejoin his ship at Adak, and then with his flagship join the Covering 
Force at Attu. Leaving Puget Sound on 3 June and arriving at Adak on 9 June, he 
would refuel at the Covering Force’s rendezvous near Attu when that unit had been 
released by Commander, Blue North Pacific Force. Meanwhile, the Special Fueling 
Group would refuel the Covering Force en route to the Aleutians from Pearl Har-
bor, again upon arrival off Adak, and then again just prior to the initial strike. After 
the refueling off Adak, the Special Fueling Group would replenish itself at Great 
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Sitkin. After again refueling the Covering Force off 
Attu, it would join the Service Force at Attu and 
become part of it. (Page 56.)
All fueling from tankers by the Expeditionary 
Force was to be completed prior to crossing the 
180th meridian. The amphibious force flagship, 
ammunition ships, destroyer tenders, attack trans-
ports, and attack cargo ships all had enough fuel 
for the trip. At the two-thousand-mile mark, how-
ever, the two battleships would each need 239,000 
gallons of fuel oil, the three escort carriers would 
each need 133,000 gallons, the three light cruisers 
would each need 137,800 gallons, and the twenty- 
eight destroyers would each need 93,000 gal-
lons, for a total, according to the Staff Solution, of 
1,650,400 (actually 3,894,400) gallons of fuel. Each 
tanker carried almost three million gallons, so the 
supply was sufficient. After being refueled, the 
battleships and escort carriers would refuel the de-
stroyers as necessary until the first replenishment 
after the landings. By fueling at Adak, the Service 
Force would also be close to the fueling station at 
Great Sitkin. Each escort carrier had 159,000 gal-
lons of aviation gasoline on board, and each tanker 
823,000 gallons. Given the assistance of land-based 
air cover, Admiral BF did not foresee the escort 
carriers having any gasoline problem until after the 
landings. In addition, he thought he could shift his 
airplane and submarine tenders as far west as he 
wanted without any demands on his mobile fuel 
supply. (Page 58.)
The Covering Force could make Attu at thirty 
knots on less than sixteen million gallons and his 
tankers carried seventeen million. Since he was not 
pressed for time, the problem was where and when to refuel; Attu was the prime lo-
cation. The Covering Force Escort Group would not have any fuel or gasoline con-
cerns since it would be deployed with the tankers. Moreover, the Covering Force 
carriers had 1,753,410 gallons of aviation gasoline, enough to outlast their fuel oil. 
In addition, the aircraft tenders could replenish their supplies of aviation gasoline at 
Great Sitkin and Attu as well as receive a first replenishment from the Service Force 
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as that unit passed 
Kiska. Ammunition 
would be the real lim-
iting factor for this op-
eration. The air strikes 
by land-based air units 
would help the Cov-
ering Force conserve 
bombs; that would per-
mit five days of con-
tinuous bombing by 
the fleet carriers. Fuel 
at this point, however, 
would be “dangerous-
ly” low, so he had to 
provide for flexibility to allow the refueling of the Covering Force. (Pages 60–61.)
Since speed was essential in this operation, his Movement Plan called for the 
Expeditionary Force to have enough fuel to complete the run to the objective area 
without delay. The sustained speed of his attack cargo ships was fourteen and a half 
knots, but he could not expect them really to make more than twelve. By 1600 Ze-
bra on 22 June, sixty-four hours after crossing the 180th meridian, the Expedition-
ary Force was to be off the landing beaches leading to Petropavlovsk. This would 
give his forces a fast approach but too fast to allow more than a day and a half of 
strikes if he was to refuel and rearm the Covering Force so it could give maximum 
support to the landing. In order to maximize his freedom of action, he was going 
to reprovision the Expeditionary Force in the Aleutians. This would reduce the 
number of aircraft required for search by reducing the area to be covered and give 
his troops a chance to “stretch their legs.” The Expeditionary Force could be in 
Adak eight and a half days after departing Puget Sound but after crossing the 180th 
meridian it would have to regulate its speed in order to coordinate its movements 
with the Covering Force’s. (Page 62.)
Admiral BF’s eight destroyer-minesweepers could make a sustained speed of 
thirty-one knots, the six minesweepers fifteen and a half knots, the minelayer eigh-
teen knots, and the twelve high-speed transports also eighteen knots. In formation, 
these ships would all be limited to about thirteen knots. To arrive off the beaches 
forty-eight hours before the Expeditionary Force, the underwater demolition teams 
and the Mine Force had to cross the 180th meridian forty-three hours earlier. He 
could shift them to Attu in seven days and four hours in order to sortie from there 
forty hours before they were needed at Avacha. The longer he could have them at 
sea without being detected, the better. While this force was strong enough to beat 
Fig. 123
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off minor air attacks, aid from the Covering Force would be required to carry out 
the mission fully. If he shifted the underwater demolition teams and the mine craft 
to Attu, he would not need to divert the Covering Force. Moreover, by delaying the 
commitment of the minesweepers to the task, he could give his submarines more 
time to explore the minefields. Unfortunately, he had a communication problem 
with this aspect of his Movement Plan in that the nearest high-powered radio sta-
tion was in Adak. (Pages 62–63.)
Allowing twenty-four hours for refueling en route, the Covering Force could 
proceed to reach the vicinity of Attu at sixteen knots seven days after departing 
Pearl Harbor. At twenty knots, it could strike Petropavlovsk in twenty-one hours 
and Paramushiru in twenty-three and a half hours. At twenty-five knots, the Cov-
ering Force could cut these times to seventeen and twenty-one hours, respectively. 
Also, by being near Attu at the commencement of hostilities, the Covering Force 
could be in a position to defend the Aleutians should Purple attack before 20 June. 
It could also interpose itself between Purple and the Blue Expeditionary Force if 
weather prohibited reconnaissance. (Page 63.)
The Blue high-speed submarines in Seattle could be off Avacha Bay in ten days 
and ten hours at twelve knots. At twenty-five knots, they could be at Attu in a hun-
dred hours. Allowing twelve hours for fueling and assuming a six-knot speed of 
advance for the last 360 miles, the submarines could be off Kamchatka with a good 
fuel supply seven and a half days after leaving Seattle. At fourteen knots, his slower 
submarines could arrive at Attu a hundred hours after departing Kodiak. Constan-
tine Harbor in Amchitka, which was 765 miles from Petropavlovsk and 885 miles 
from Paramushiru, would provide the submarine tenders with an advanced base 
that BF thought would be secure from Purple land-based-air attack. The tender at 
Kodiak could also be escorted by the Blue Alaskan Sea Frontier Force (organized 
for coastal defense), and his other tender could move with the mine craft. In order 
to keep the tenders separated, he was going to put one in Adak and shift it to Attu 
after Avacha Bay had been seized. (Page 63.) 
Fleet Air Wing 7—which consisted of twenty-four fighters, six very-long-
range aircraft, eighteen land-based naval patrol bombers, and six seaplane-based 
naval patrol bombers—was on Shemya, which could also accommodate twelve 
more very-long-range aircraft and three additional fighters. Attu could handle 
forty-eight fighters and seventy-two land-based naval patrol bombers and had an 
ample seaplane base but could not take anything larger than Mariners. Amchitka 
had Fleet Air Wing 3 with thirty-six fighters, six very-long-range aircraft, twenty- 
seven land-based naval patrol bombers, and six seaplane-based naval patrol bomb-
ers, and it could take another fourteen fighters, seventeen naval patrol bombers, 
and ninety-four very-long-range aircraft. Adak’s Fleet Air Wing 5 had the same 
numbers and types of aircraft as at Amchitka and could accommodate up to 210 
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fighters, 130 naval patrol bombers, and thirty-six very-long-range aircraft. Finally, 
Fleet Air Wing 1 was at Puget Sound with thirty-six seaplane-based naval patrol 
bombers. (Page 63.)
Seaplane tender AVP-48, which had a capacity for twelve naval patrol bombers, 
was in Puget Sound, as were AV-7 and AV-13, each with a capacity for thirty naval 
patrol bombers. These ships could be shifted to Attu, Sand Bay, Adak, or Dutch 
Harbor. Admiral BF would have AV-7 accompany the Blue Expeditionary Force 
from Adak to Avacha. However, he wanted his initial air strikes against Purple to 
be as strong as possible and he still needed his land-based and tender-based air to 
search for and cover the Expeditionary Force. He compared the advantage of hav-
ing all the planes based within striking distance of the enemy versus the disadvan-
tage of a concentration providing a target worthy of great sacrifice by Purple. He 
accordingly sent the three seaplane tenders in Puget Sound forward immediately 
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since a tender was required to operate seaplanes from Attu, Kiska, and Adak. Since 
Dutch Harbor had facilities for twenty-four Mariners, Adak could take six, and 
Attu could handle five more, twenty-four planes of Fleet Air Wing 1 would depart 
for Dutch Harbor right away. The atomic bombs were all at Kodiak and could be 
lifted from there by the Superfortresses. (Page 64.)
Addressing his Task Organization for Operation Plan No. 17-46, Vice Admi-
ral BF thought the number of escort vessels barely adequate given their various 
antisubmarine and antiaircraft capabilities. He therefore organized two Special 
Groups. One was referred to as the Fleet Flagship, under the command of Cap-
tain B-36 (Captain Ashford—see chapter 13), and consisted of his heavy cruiser 
flagship and two escorting destroyers. The other was the Fueling Group of one 
escort carrier, ten destroyer escorts, and six oilers, all under Captain B-31 (Cap-
tain Ricketts—see chapter 13). Next was Rear Admiral BA’s Covering Force of six 
fleet carriers in Carrier Divisions 1 and 2; six heavy cruisers in Cruiser Divisions 
1 and 3; three light cruisers in CRUDIV 15; two attached antiaircraft cruisers; and 
the eighteen destroyers and eight radar-picket destroyers of Destroyer Squadrons 
3, 9, and 15. Rear Admiral BB was to command the Expeditionary Force, which 
consisted of Captain B-38’s Air Support Control Unit, as well as Rear Admiral BC’s 
Support Group, which comprised two prewar modernized battleships; Carrier Di-
vision 19’s two escort carriers; CRUDIV 13’s three light cruisers; DESRONs 1 and 
13, with sixteen destroyers and four radar-picket destroyers; and Mine Squadron 1, 
with the minelayer, the six minesweepers, and the eight destroyer-minesweepers. 
The Expeditionary Force also was to include Rear Admiral BB’s Transport Group, 
comprising the amphibious force flagship and Transport Squadrons 1 and 2, with 
their twenty-four attack transports, twelve attack cargo ships, and twelve high-
speed transports. The Expeditionary Force was rounded out by the Expedition-
ary Troops, two Marine Corps divisions commanded by Major General BO (not 
played by a designated student officer). There was, of course, Fleet Air Command, 
Aleutians, commanded by Rear Admiral BL and consisting of Fleet Air Wings 1, 3, 
5, and 7, with ninety-six fighter planes, 126 naval patrol bombers, eighteen very-
long-range aircraft, and three seaplane tenders. Captain B-13’s Submarine Force 
comprised two submarine tenders and twenty submarines of SUBRONs 1 and 98. 
Rounding out the entire organization was Commodore BK’s Service Force of two 
destroyer tenders, two ammunition ships, eight attack cargo ships, and six oilers, all 
from Service Squadron 3; one escort carrier; and eight destroyers from DESRON 
7. (Pages 67–69.)
The Blue Alaskan Sea Frontier would defend the Aleutian bases and maintain lo-
gistical services at those bases. The Operation Plan reiterated that BF would receive 
no assistance from Blue occupation forces in Japan or Korea. It repeated also that 
his force was to capture, occupy, and defend Avacha Bay immediately following the 
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outbreak of hostilities; destroy enemy air bases within effective supporting distance 
of Avacha; support amphibious assault operations on favorable landing beaches; 
and then provide an advanced base for support of subsequent operations against 
Purple’s Asian territory. (Pages 70–72.) 
The Operation Plan gave Commander, Covering Force discretion to employ 
the four atomic bombs as he saw fit. If it became necessary to postpone D-Day 
because of weather, all groups of forces were to delay their departure from port 
or retire along their previous tracks, refuel if advisable and possible, and resume 
forward movement on the basis of the new D-Day. Also, if the original D-Day was 
postponed, the initial strikes by the Blue Covering Force would be made on D–3, 
provided that weather conditions were favorable then; Commander, North Pacific 
Force would make the final decision. All commands were further ordered to avoid 
not only detection but any hostile acts, unless attacked; the commencement of 
hostilities was planned to coincide with the initial strike by the Covering Force 
and Commander, North Pacific Force would broadcast to all commands the date 
and time of the commencement of hostilities. All commands were to inform Com-
mander, North Pacific Force by operational priority message of any hostile acts by 
Purple forces. Meanwhile, all units were to enforce strict security measures and 
conserve fuel. As Commander, North Pacific Force and Commander, 7th Fleet, 
Vice Admiral BF would fly his flag in the heavy cruiser CA-73, while Rear Admiral 
BA, Commander, Covering Force, designated second in command, would fly his 
flag in fleet carrier CV-21. (Pages 72–74.) 
Under Air Search Plan A, Fleet Air Command, Aleutians would carry out 
searches to execute Operation Plan No. 17-46. On 7 June, it was to conduct air 
searches as soon after 1800 as conditions permitted. The searches were thought 
to have a 90 percent probability of detecting a large Purple formation by radar; 
the planes could also approach Purple territory to within seventy-five miles of the 
coast. Fleet Air Command, Aleutians was to avoid visual contact by Purple forces 
and avoid hostile acts prior to the commencement of hostilities, unless attacked. 
The command’s planes were not to fly over Purple territory; if hostilities opened 
before the search was made, the search was to be made as soon as possible. The 
search was to be extended to locate any large Purple forces off the east coast of the 
Kuriles and Kamchatka west of the 175th east meridian as well as at Korf Bay, Kru-
ger Bay, Avacha Bay, Paramushiru, Buroton Bay, and Hitokappu Bay. Prior to the 
opening of hostilities, aircraft were to report Purple submarines that were sighted 
after their return to base; if hostilities had commenced, the search planes were to 
report on submarines and then destroy them. These attacks, however, were to be 
limited in time to permit sufficient search for the large Purple surface force, which 
was the main target. (Pages 75–76.)
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In Air Search Plan B, an area search and barrier search were required in addition 
to the antisubmarine patrols called for by Operation Plan No. 17-46. The primary 
task was still to locate, report, and trail the large Purple surface force (while making 
weather observations), with a secondary task of detecting and reporting on Purple 
submarines and, after the commencement of hostilities, destroying them. Com-
mencing 10 June, Fleet Air Command, Aleutians was to provide a barrier patrol 
until the Covering Force carried out its initial strike. The barrier search area was 
between 53°20ʹ N, 161°30ʹ E and 48°00ʹ N, 162°20ʹ E. Planes were to be loaded 
for maximum endurance. It was thought that the barrier patrol would have a 95 
percent probability of detecting the Purple surface force. These patrols would be 
discontinued after the initial Blue strike had been made. Searches were also to be 
flown once daily between 245 and 295 degrees from Attu and, commencing on 
D–6, that sector was to be continuously searched by radar. There was thought to be 
a 95 percent probability of detecting the Purple forces. 
If contact was lost, the search was to resume until the Purple force was located 
again. For reasons previously explained, the searches would be decreased from the 
east as Blue forces moved westward and would be moved to areas necessary to pro-
tect against surprise attack. Prior to D–3, Purple submarines outside three hundred 
miles from the Blue Aleutian bases were also to be reported, and contact reports 
were to be made on Purple submarines within three hundred miles of those bases 
(the distinction between the two cases being left unclear). (Pages 77–78.) When 
requested, submarines were to be furnished with air escort when they were within 
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The Logistics Plan gave significant emphasis to keeping ships as fully fueled as 
possible because of the demands not only of operations but of the expected weather 
as well. (Pages 79–83.) There was also a focus on force and Special Group com-
manders’ ensuring they were fully supplied with antisubmarine weapons as well 
as, especially, anything needed for flight operations in low visibility. (Pages 84–89.)
A fairly detailed Movement Plan indicated how Vice Admiral BF was going to 
maneuver his forces for the coming battle. The Fleet Flagship would depart Puget 
Sound at 2000 on 3 June via Republic and Unimak Pass and proceed to Adak at 
sixteen knots, with an estimated time of arrival of 2300 on 9 June. It would depart 
Adak at 1200 on 14 June, rendezvous with the Covering Force at the fueling area off 
Adak at 2000 on 14 June, and return to Adak the next day after the command con-
ference. It would again depart Adak on 17 June at 1000 for the rendezvous with the 
Covering Force at the fueling area off Attu, proceeding there at twenty-five knots 
and arriving at 0200 on 18 June. The Fleet Flagship would join the Covering Force 
when ordered to by Commander, North Pacific Force. The Fueling Group would 
depart Pearl Harbor at 0800 on 8 June and proceed to Great Sitkin as directed by 
Commander, Covering Force. It would fuel the Covering Force en route and arrive 
at Great Sitkin at 2000 on 15 June. The Fueling Group was to depart Great Sitkin at 
0600 on 17 June and proceed to the fueling area off Attu at fifteen knots. It would 
leave the fueling area when released by Commander, Covering Force and proceed 
to Attu to join the Service Force. (Page 99.)
The Covering Force was to leave Pearl Harbor at 0800 on 8 June and proceed to 
the fueling area off Adak, arriving by 2000 on 14 June. It was to depart the fueling 
area at 0600 on 15 June for its position in the western Aleutians, then proceed to the 
fueling area off Attu designated by its commander, there to refuel by 1000 on the 
18th, which would be on time to launch its initial strikes on the northern Ku riles– 
southern Kamchatka bases at 1100 three days before the landing day (referred to 
in abbreviated form as “Love Dog,” for LD, in the phonetic alphabet of the time). If 
D-Day was postponed, the Covering Force would depart in time to strike at 0340 
on Love Dog–3 (i.e., minus three) in accordance with the current Operation Plan. 
The exception was the flagship, heavy cruiser CA-73, which would join the Cover-
ing Force at the fueling area off Attu prior to the initial strikes. The Expeditionary 
Force would also depart from Puget Sound at 1400 on 7 June at twelve knots with 
an estimated arrival at Adak at 1800 on 15 June. It would leave Adak at 0200 on the 
20th and cross the 180th meridian the next midnight. It would slow to eleven and a 
half knots to arrive at Avacha Bay at 0600 on the landing day. (Pages 99–100.) 
There were numerous exceptions to these movements. In particular, Mine Divi-
sion 9 was to depart Puget Sound at 2000 on 3 June. It was to proceed at thirteen 
knots and arrive at Attu at 1800 on 11 June. Mine Squadron 1—less Mine Divi-
sion 9—would leave Puget Sound at the same time and day and proceed at sixteen 
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knots to Unimak Pass by the same route, then increase speed to seventeen knots to 
arrive at Attu at 0100 on the 10th. Destroyer Division 132—less destroyer DD-872 
—would pass through Unimak Pass and escort seaplane tender AV-7, submarine 
tender AS-19, and CA-73 to Adak, while DD-763 and DD-764 would escort sea-
plane tender AVP-48 to Kiska, then return to Adak. All of these movements would 
be made at sixteen knots and between 9 and 11 June. The latter two destroyers 
would screen the entrance off Adak and rejoin the Expeditionary Force when it 
arrived at Adak on 15 June. Destroyers DD-765 and DD-871 would escort the flag-
ship, CA-73, until released off Attu to rejoin the Expeditionary Force. Seaplane 
tender AV-7 would also depart Adak for Avacha Bay in company with the Expedi-
tionary Force. (Page 100.)
Fleet Air Command, Aleutians would shift its air wings and squadrons to vari-
ous air bases in the Aleutians as required. Seaplane tenders AV-7, AV-13, and AVP-
48 would leave Puget Sound at 2000 on 3 June and proceed at sixteen knots via 
Unimak Pass, with AV-13 going to Attu by 0100 on 10 June, AV-7 entering Adak at 
2300 on the 9th, and AVP-48 proceeding to Kiska by 1300 on 10 June. These tend-
ers would shift to other Aleutian bases as the changing conditions dictated, except 
for AV-7, which would accompany the Expeditionary Force from Adak to Avacha. 
The Submarine Force’s movements, now repeated in detail, were to be as recounted 
above. The Service Force was to leave Puget Sound at 1400 on 7 June, proceed at 
twelve knots to Adak by 1800 on 15 June, and depart from there at 1800 on the 16th 
for Great Sitkin. It was to arrive there by 2200 on 16 June, leave again by 0900 on 
the 18th, and reach Attu at 1800 on 19 June, where it was to base itself to provide 
logistical support to the North Pacific Force as required. (Pages 100–101.)
Vice Admiral BF again warned his units that Purple forces could open hostilities 
without warning and that all units had to be ready for any eventuality. They were 
to avoid detection, if possible, as well as hostile acts prior to the commencement of 
hostilities. After the commencement of hostilities, any Purple forces encountered 
were to be destroyed. All specified routes were to be adhered to unless circum-
stances dictated deviation, and units scheduled to leave from the same base at the 
same time and speed were to steam in company. Exceptions to this were that Com-
mander, Covering Force would direct the movements of the Fueling Group until he 
released it. Also, submarines were to proceed independently to their patrol stations 
after their departure from Attu.*
* Ibid., p. 101. See also Senior Class of June 1947, “Operations Problem 2: The Blue Staff Solution,” 1 October 
1946, pp. 1–2, folder 2603-I, box 138, RG 4, NHC.

XV Operations Problem 2
More of the Blue Solution, September–October 1946 
Admiral Smith issued the Detail of Student Officers for Blue. Vice Admi-ral BF, Commander, North Pacific Force and Commander, 7th Fleet, had a Chief of Staff and an Operations Officer. There were also three Assis-
tants for Planning for Captain B-13, Commander, Submarine Force; six Assistants 
for Planning for Rear Admiral BA, Commander, Covering Force; six Assistants 
for Planning for Rear Admiral BL, Commander, Fleet Air Force; six Assistants for 
Planning for Rear Admiral BB, Commander, Expeditionary Force; and two Assis-
tants for Planning for Commodore BK, Commander, Service Force.1 
On 25 September, Commander, North Pacific Force sent Preliminary Move-
ment Orders to Commander, Amphibious Group 7 and Commander, Submarines, 
Pacific. Commander, Amphibious Group 7 was ordered to embark two Marine 
Corps divisions on 5 June for extended operations and to make preliminary plans 
to have all ships in his area depart about 10 June for the Aleutians area. Com-
mander, Submarines, Pacific was ordered to direct Submarine Squadron 1 to Adak 
when that unit was ready for deployment so that it could maintain an offensive 
patrol east of the main channels through the Kuriles. Commander, North Pacific 
Force wanted these submarines on their patrol stations as soon as possible; upon 
arrival, they would be provided mission details. Submarine Squadron 98 was also 
to head to Adak and from there to maintain an offensive patrol of three boats east 
of La Perouse Strait. These patrols too were to start as soon as possible, with details 
to follow once on station.2
Vice Admiral BF wanted pilots and crewmen—while in no way deviating from 
their primary mission of strikes—to endeavor by careful observation to supplant 
the present inadequate information concerning targets and defenses in areas over 
which they flew: “This information may be invaluable in the later stages of the war 
and especially for amphibious operations.” In particular, any and all flak informa-
tion would be of great value, particularly in reference to heavy guns and automatic 
weapons on Avacha Bay.3
 288 BLUE VERSUS PURPLE
Admiral BF now issued his formal Communication Plan, an exact mirror of Ad-
miral PA’s for the Purple Pacific Fleet in terms of categories about security, sched-
ules, circuits, and frequencies.4 BF also gave more details about the Movement Plan. 
The Covering Force was to depart Pearl Harbor on 6 June, arrive at Adak on the 
11th, depart Adak on 18 June, arrive at a rendezvous on 20 June to refuel its de-
stroyers, and then proceed to its aircraft-launching area. Arriving the same day 
(D–3), it would carry out air strikes on Paramushiru, also flying reconnaissance 
on that base as well as Shimushu and Avacha Bay. On 21 June (D–2), the Covering 
Force would strike Avacha Bay and carry out reconnaissance of the Purple airfields 
in the lower Kamchatka Peninsula. The next day, 22 June, D–1, would see the Cov-
ering Force bombard Avacha Bay again. On D-Day itself, 23 June, the Covering 
Force would again strike Paramushiru and Shimushu and also provide cover to the 
Expeditionary Force. The Expeditionary Force itself would have departed Seattle 
on 10 June, arrived at Dutch Harbor on the 16th, left Dutch Harbor two days later, 
and crossed the 180th meridian by the 20th, to arrive off Avacha Bay and conduct 
its amphibious landings at H-Hour on D-Day.5
Rear Admiral BA, as Commander, Blue Covering Force and Carrier Division 2, 
outlined his Task Organization and Operation Plan. He divided his forces into sev-
eral units, including the 1st and 2nd Fast Carrier Groups; the Service and Bombard-
ment Groups; and the 1st and 2nd Battle Groups (what would more recently have 
been called “surface action groups”). The 1st CARGRU, which he commanded, 
included three fleet carriers based around CARDIV 2, three heavy cruisers based 
around Cruiser Division 1, one light cruiser from CRUDIV 15, one antiaircraft 
cruiser, and thirteen destroyers from DESRON 9 and DESDIV 32. The 2nd CAR- 
GRU, which was commanded by Rear Admiral BM, also had three fleet carriers 
from CARDIV 3, two heavy cruisers from CRUDIV 3, two light cruisers, one anti-
aircraft cruiser, and another thirteen destroyers from DESRONs 3 and 15.6
The missions of the Blue Covering Force were to gain and maintain control of 
the air in the target areas, destroy Purple land-based aircraft and base installations, 
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and exploit the destruction of Purple submarine and surface forces. In addition, it 
would provide search and rescue in support of the capture and retention of Ava-
cha Bay. Admiral BA’s Operation Plan was to be effective at 1300 on 6 June, and 
unrestricted operations were to commence at 0000 hours on 20 June or upon the 
outbreak of hostilities, whichever was earlier. Rear Admiral BM was designated as 
the second in command; Admiral BA himself would sail in fleet carrier CV-21 with 
the 1st CARGRU. (Pages 1–3.) 
Pilots were to be briefed and then interrogated after action about Purple air 
installations, runways, and planes; antiaircraft, coastal, and automatic weapons; 
shipping, harbors, and shore facilities; troops, encampments, roads, traffic, and 
new construction; and damage. Photographic intelligence was to be collected on 
landing beach areas, bombardment areas, air installations, harbor facilities, stra-
tegic gun emplacements, known and suspected flak batteries, and damage. There 
was also to be damage assessment on the atomic-bomb targets at Paramushiru and 
Shimushu. Finally, he noted that the effects of the atomic bomb strikes might oblige 
the Covering Force to shift a portion of its strikes to adjacent areas. (Pages 4–5.)
Rear Admiral BA then outlined his Launching Areas, numbered One, Two, 
Three, and Four, between 50 and 53 degrees north latitude and 159 and 163 de-
grees east longitude. His Movement Plan was elaborate. At 1800 on 6 June, his units 
would depart Pearl Harbor and take a great-circle course to Adak at a speed of 14.4 
knots. The Covering Force was scheduled to arrive at Adak at 1600 on 12 June, 
passing through the Adak Strait. Task Groups 73.1, 73.3, and 73.2 would enter the 
strait in that order; units would be released south of Adak for independent passage 
through the strait to their assigned anchorages. Unit commanders would assign 
the order of passage of their ships and provide for effective destroyer protection of 
their own and adjacent units. At 2100 on 18 June, the Covering Force would depart 
Adak for Point X-RAY, 52°10ʹ N, 176°25ʹ W. The course was to be 275 true from 
Point X-RAY to Point YOKE, the latter ten miles north of the northern tip of Buldir 
Island. The Covering Force would steam on course 254 from Point YOKE to Point 
PACKARD (50°38ʹ N, 165°00ʹ E) at twenty-five and a half knots. Destroyers would 
be refueled in the vicinity of Point PACKARD from 0200 to 0600 on the 20th, and the 
Covering Force would proceed on course 287 to the center of Launching Area One, 
latitudes 50°45ʹ to 51°30ʹ N and longitudes 160° to 160°45ʹ E. (Page 6.)
At 1600 on 20 June, the Covering Force would arrive at Launching Area One 
and commence its air strike on Paramushiru as well as its reconnaissance and pho-
tography of Paramushiru, Shimushu, and Avacha Bay. The launching and recovery 
of these strikes were to be conducted at twenty-five knots, with other speeds and 
courses as necessary to remain in the area. At 1600 on 21 June, the Covering Force 
would arrive at Launching Area Two, latitudes 51°45ʹ to 52°30ʹ N and longitudes 
160°40ʹ to 161°20ʹ E. There, it would commence its air strike on Avacha Bay and 
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conduct its reconnaissance and photography of the bay and of the lower Kamchat-
ka airfields. If practicable, it would detach the Bombardment Group, which would 
start bombarding its targets in Avacha Bay by 1700 on 22 June. (Rear Admiral BD, 
Commander, Bombardment Group, noted that the minesweepers of the Expedi-
tionary Force might still be working at that time in or near the bombardment area.) 
At 1700 on the 22nd, the Covering Force would arrive at Launching Area Four, lati-
tudes 51°00ʹ to 51°45ʹ N and longitudes 159°15ʹ to 160° E. From here, an air strike 
would be launched against Avacha Bay to support the bombardment and cover the 
Expeditionary Force. The Bombardment Group would rejoin the Covering Force 
when released and the entire Covering Force would retire by 1600 on 23 June. It 
would draw eastward during the night and then return to Launching Area Four for 
strikes on Paramushiru and Shimushu. By 0600 on 24 June at the latest, the Cov-
ering Force would depart Launching Area Four at a speed of eighteen and a half 
knots to Point CADILLAC (52° N, 172° E) to rendezvous with Service Group 2 for 
refueling and loading ammunition. Other rendezvous points were FORD, DODGE, 
CHEVROLET, and PLYMOUTH, all between 49 and 53 north latitude and between 158 
and 172 east longitude. (Pages 6–7.)
En route from Pearl Harbor to Adak, the Covering Force would use Cruising 
Disposition 5-X from the Fast Carrier Task Force Instructions. TG 73.3 would oc-
cupy Station One and assume the Guide. TG 73.1 would take Station Two, while TG 
73.2 would take Station Three. Picket Stations 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 would be occupied by 
destroyers from the nearest task group. TG 73.3 would station pickets bearing 120, 
180, and 240 relative from the Guide at distances of twelve miles. Task Groups 73.1 
and 73.2 would use a modification of Cruising Disposition 5-LS, with destroyers on 
Screening Circle 6 and with one additional destroyer on each quarter. Disposition 
5-W would be used in restricted waters. For refueling, all units were to use Cruising 
Disposition 5-F at a speed of ten knots, with all the fleet carriers in the forward fuel-
ing line, then the ships of CRUDIV 15 in the second. CRUDIV 15’s ships would each 
fuel one destroyer and the fleet carriers would refuel the remainder, four each in 
most cases. After leaving Adak, the Covering Force was to employ Cruising Disposi-
tion 5-W. On strike days, however, two destroyers would be stationed by the north-
ern task group bearing 300 true at a distance of thirty miles from the center of that 
task group. A similar unit would be stationed on strike days by other task groups 
bearing 180 true at the same distance. Formations within the Covering Force’s task 
groups would be ordered by their commanders, normally Cruising Disposition 5-LS 
for low visibility and 5-R or 6-R for good visibility. These dispositions would be 
modified to suit the composition of the task groups and to place the antiaircraft 
cruiser near the task group’s center and near the fleet carriers. (Page 7.)
By the Air Strike Plan, battle carrier CVB-39 would furnish all combat air pa-
trols for Task Force 73, all antisubmarine patrols, photographic reconnaissance 
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over Avacha Bay, and the Search and Rescue Cover.7 At 0400 on 20 June, CVB-38 
would launch thirty-two fighters as a sweep, sixteen additional fighters as an escort, 
and twenty-four attack planes, along with the Target Coordinator in a fighter plane. 
The targets for this strike would be Kataoka, Miyoshino, Bettobu, Imalsami, and 
Cape Lopatka. With the same targets, CVB-33 would launch the same number and 
mix of aircraft. So too would CVB-37, with the difference that this third carrier 
would launch thirty-six fighters as its sweep, sixteen fighter escorts, thirty-nine at-
tack planes, three photographic reconnaissance fighters, and airborne early warn-
ing and tactical electronic warfare planes as required. Its targets were the same as 
the other two carriers. But CVB-36 would strike at Kakumabetsu, Suribachi, and 
Kurabu. This fourth carrier’s number and mix of strike aircraft would be the same 
as CVB-37’s and the 0900 and 1400 strikes would be the same as the 0400 strike 
from the other groups. (Pages 8–9.)
The next day, CVB-39 would again furnish the antisubmarine and combat 
air patrols as well as Search and Rescue Cover and photographic reconnaissance. 
CVB-33, -37, and -38 would have the same loads and planes but the targets would 
now be Bolsheretsk, Petropavlovsk, Staraya, Kalakhtyrka Lake, and Tarinski Bay. 
CVB-36 (duplicated by CVB-21) would also have the same loads and mix of planes 
as on the 20th, but now with targets at Kataoka, Miyoshino, Bettobu, Imalsami, 
Cape Lopatka, Kakumabetsu, Suribachi, and Kurabu. Target Coordinators were 
again designated. Subsequent strikes at 0900 and 1400 would again be conducted 
in the same manner. These mixes of planes, loads, and targets would continue on 
22 June at 0400, 0900, and 1400 as well as on 23 June, with the exception that on 
23 June there would be no fighter sweeps during the 0400 strike. Part of the Air 
Strike Plan entailed fighter cover over Avacha Bay. At 0200, fighters would launch, 
returning with the 0400 strike after being relieved on station. CVB-33 and CVB-
38 would each contribute thirty-two fighters to this mission, with CVB-37 add-
ing another thirty-six. At 0400, CVB-21 and CVB-36 would each launch another 
thirty-six fighters, which would also return upon relief. At 0830, the carriers would 
launch another flight similar to the 0200 group and at 1230 a flight similar to the 
0400 group. A final flight for the day would be launched at 1630, the same as the 
0830 group. All flights would return to their carriers after being relieved on station. 
(Pages 10–11.)
Rear Admiral BA, Commander, Covering Force and Carrier Division 2, now 
issued his Bombardment Plan. Admiral BD’s Bombardment Group was divided 
into the 1st Bombardment Unit, three heavy cruisers from CRUDIV 1, and the 2nd 
Bombardment Unit, the latter unit commanded by Captain B-9 and consisting of 
six destroyers from DESDIV 91. Units were to have special target maps of enemy 
positions and firing points. Minesweeping was to commence off Blue and Green 
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Beaches at 0400 on 23 June and be covered by the Bombardment Group while the 
Avacha Bay area itself would be bombarded by the Expeditionary Force on D-Day. 
On D–1, the 1st Bombardment Unit would destroy beach defenses according to 
schedule, destroy all radio and possible radar installations on inland high ground, 
and deliver counterbattery fire at enemy guns. (Page 19.) 
The 2nd Bombardment Unit, on the same day, would deliver close-range cover-
ing fire for minesweeping, according to schedule. It would also deliver counterbat-
tery fire against Purple’s guns, especially those in the rear of the beaches, and be 
prepared to “smoke” high ground inland of the beaches using white-phosphorus 
projectiles on request by the minesweeping commander. Ships were to use armor-
piercing and common projectiles only for direct fire against enemy emplacements 
and pillboxes. Individual ships assigned to fire at specific areas were also to be 
responsible for prompt counterbattery fire when minesweepers were taken under 
shore fire. Assigned targets were to be covered even if interruptions necessitated a 
reduction in volume. High-capacity projectiles were to be used for specified area 
and other targets. All ships were to use every opportunity to close the range and 
employ direct fire on pillboxes, dugouts, concrete shelters, and blockhouses. Har-
bor facilities, dock cranes, fuel tanks, and other assets that were to be converted 
to Blue use later on were to be left standing. Commander, Bombardment Group 
was to be embarked in heavy cruiser CA-74; Captain B-9 was second in command. 
(Pages 19–20.)
Rear Admiral BA’s Bombardment Plan was assigned for execution to Rear Ad-
miral BD’s TG 73.4, the Bombardment Group. TG 73.4 consisted of Rear Admiral 
BD’s own 1st Bombardment Unit, three heavy cruisers from Cruiser Division 1, 
as well as Captain B-9’s 2nd Bombardment Group, six destroyers from DESDIV 
91 plus destroyer DD-747. The Bombardment Group’s mission was to bombard 
Avacha Bay on D-Day; accordingly, special target maps had been issued to indicate 
enemy positions and firing points. The Bombardment Group was also to cover 
minesweeping that would commence off Blue and Green Beaches at 0400 on 23 
June. The bombardment mission itself would begin on D–1 in support of both the 
capture and retention of Avacha Bay. The 1st Bombardment Group, specifically, 
would destroy Purple beach defenses, including Points Daini and Venus, and all 
radio or possible radar installations on the high ground inland of Point Daini, and 
deliver counterbattery fire at enemy guns on Points Daini and Venus. The 2nd 
Bombardment Unit would maintain close-range covering fire for the minesweep-
ers; deliver counterbattery fire at the Purple guns—especially those to the rear of 
the beaches; and be prepared to smoke the high ground inland of the beaches using 
white phosphorus, on request. (Pages 19–20.)
Admiral BA’s Communication Plan stated that Commander, Covering Force 
could break radio silence if the circumstances dictated, but this was not to be 
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considered as lifting radio silence generally. Transmissions were still to be kept to 
an absolute minimum. The 1st and 2nd Carrier Task Groups, if operating together, 
would be governed by the same conditions; if operating singly, they would be gov-
erned by their respective OTCs. (Page 22.)
Certain ships were designated as Combat Information and Combat Information 
Relief Ships. On odd-numbered days, fleet carriers CV-21 and CV-37 would be des-
ignated as the Combat Information Center Ships, while CV-36 and CV-33 would be 
the reliefs. On even-numbered days, CV-21 and CV-37 would again be the Combat 
Information Center Ships, the reliefs being CV-39 and CV-38. All heavy cruisers, 
light cruisers, and destroyer-division flagships were to be ready to assume Combat 
Information Center guard ship duties if so ordered by Commander, Task Group 73.1 
or 73.2. When these two task groups were operating together, as they were expected 
to be the majority of the time, CV-21 would maintain continuous Combat Informa-
tion Center Guard and CV-37 would be the 1st Relief Combat Information Center 
guard ship. Fighter-direction ships were the same as the Combat Information Cen-
ter guard ships and with the same instructions. (Page 23.)
Concerning the radar guard ships, odd-numbered days would find CA-130 and 
CA-136 as Guard Able, CA-131 and CA-87 as Guard Baker, and CV-36 and CV-
33 as Guard Easy. On even-numbered days, Guard Able was to be heavy cruisers 
CA-74 and CA-75, Guard Baker was to be CA-67 and light cruiser CL-104, and 
Fig. 127
Blue Bombardment Group 
schedule of fires, D–1, 
Operations Problem 2
 296 BLUE VERSUS PURPLE
Guard Easy was to be CV-21 and CV-37. Radar Guards Fox and George would 
both be assigned by Commander, Destroyer Squadron 9 and COMDESRON 3 in 
order to provide 360 degrees of coverage for surface searches. Radar Guards Char-
lie, Hypo, and Item would be assigned by message from Commander, Task Force 
73 to fit changing circumstances. When two Fast Carrier Task Groups were operat-
ing singly, each Officer in Tactical Command would assign radar guards whenever 
required. Similarly, when it came to radar intercept guard ships, antiaircraft cruiser 
CLAA-95 and destroyer DD-742 would be the radar intercept guard ships on odd-
numbered days, while on even-numbered days it was to be CLAA-98 and destroyer 
DD-728. Radar-jamming guard ships were to be the light cruisers CL-67 and CL-
104 on odd-numbered days and the heavy cruisers CA-131 and CA-87 on even-
numbered days. COMDESRON 9, COMDESRON 3, and COMDESRON 15 would 
each detail two destroyers to be ready to act as radar pickets and would identify 
these ships to CTF 73, who would order them to designated positions whenever 
circumstances so required. (Pages 23–24.)
Aircraft Early Warning guard ships were designated as CV-21, -36, -38, -39, -37, 
and -33 for the days of 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 June, respectively; the Relief Aircraft 
Early Warning guard ships for those same days would be CV-39, -37, -33, -21, -36, 
and -38. After 10 June, these watches would repeat, starting with CV-21. If Fast 
Carrier Task Groups were separated by more than a hundred miles, each would 
arrange its own Aircraft Early Warning guard ships. (Page 24.)
All Task Force 73 ships were to guard the Fleet Fox Schedule beginning at 0000 
on D–10, except for unit commanders, who could make arrangements with their 
respective units. All ships were to guard the Force Talk Between Ships frequency 
at all times, except that the Service Group (Task Group 73.3) could use the guard 
ships arranged for it by CTG 73.3. The primary and secondary frequencies for 
the Task Force Commanders Circuit was to be guarded by the Force Flagship and 
monitored by the flagship of CTG 73.2. Whenever the Fast Carrier Task Groups 
were operating separately, this monitoring watch would be particularly impor-
tant. Fleet carriers were to guard the very-high-frequency nets, while heavy and 
light cruisers guarded their own Spotting frequencies. Commanders, Task Groups 
73.1 and 73.2 had Primary Air Search and Reconnaissance Plane frequencies to 
guard. The OTC would retransmit to task force and task group commanders any 
important information received, employing either visual or VHF methods. (Pages 
24–25.)
Commanders, Task Groups 73.1 and 73.2 were additionally to guard frequen-
cies, for receipt only, for Air and Submarine Operational Intelligence. CTF 73 would 
guard the Submarine Ship–Shore frequency or assign it locally, again as a receiver 
watch only. Special frequencies would also be set up and operated upon order of 
the OTC, specifically, Radar Reporting and Inter-Fighter-Direction Channels and 
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Radar Telling and Warning Nets. There were also Fire Support Group and Fire 
Support Unit frequencies established, one each for Fire Support Unit 1 and Fire 
Support Unit 2, as well as primary and secondary frequencies. All ships were to use 
“utmost” care in obtaining weather information given its importance to the cam-
paign and the fact that weather conditions were expected to be poor and fluctuat-
ing. Admiral BA also repeated “for emphasis” that the basic communications doc-
trine provided for utmost flexibility in communications; if a task group or task unit 
commander found that a new channel was needed, he could assign the frequency 
without delay. If time allowed, however, that commander was to state his needs and 
make “suitable” recommendations. 
Indicating how destroyers were to refuel at sea on 20 June from the carriers and 
cruisers as well as from Service Group 2 on 25 June, BA indicated that ammunition 
was also to be replenished at these times. Daily reports of fuel were to be made, 
but only by visual communications unless otherwise directed. Fuel and aviation 
gasoline were available from shore tanks and were to be delivered by barge at Attu; 
fueling bases were at Akutan and Great Sitkin. (Pages 25–27.)
Admiral BA’s Task Organization was built around the 1st and 2nd Battle Groups 
as well as a Carrier Group. The 1st Battle Group was commanded by Rear Admiral 
BD and consisted of three heavy cruisers from CRUDIV 1, a light cruiser from 
CRUDIV 15, and thirteen destroyers from Destroyer Squadron 9 and Destroy-
er Division 32. Rear Admiral BN, COMCRUDIV 3, commanded the 2nd Battle 
Group, which comprised two heavy cruisers from CRUDIV 3, the antiaircraft 
cruiser CLAA-51, and CL-87 from CRUDIV 15, as well as the thirteen destroyers 
of DESRONs 3 and 15, less DESDIV 32. Rear Admiral BA’s own Carrier Group 
consisted of the six fleet carriers from CARDIVs 2 and 3 and the antiaircraft cruis-
ers CLAA-95 and CLAA-98. His assumptions comprised three possible scenarios 
—Purple surface forces would be superior to his, equal or inferior, and tactically 
concentrated. He assumed that the Blue Expeditionary Force’s heavy ships might 
not be within supporting distance in case of an engagement but that no engage-
ment would be a tactical surprise to either side. He further assumed that Purple 
would close for a decisive engagement regardless of air superiority and would try 
to force a decision before Admiral BA could concentrate the Expeditionary Force’s 
heavy ships. He planned for two other scenarios: Case One, in which his air strik-
ing power was available; and Case Two, in which it was not because of weather, 
damage, or lack of ammunition, or for any other reason. In Case One, he would 
destroy the Purple forces by early and sustained air attack supported by surface 
gun and torpedo attacks. In Case Two, he would destroy the Purple forces by gun 
and torpedo attacks, preferably after concentrating with the heavy ships of the Ex-
peditionary Forces but alone if necessary to exploit an opportunity that presented 
itself. (Page 28.)
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In either case, the 1st and 2nd Battle Groups would interpose themselves be-
tween the enemy and the Carrier Group on lines of bearing about ninety degrees 
apart and at about equal ranges from the Purple forces. In Case One, the two bat-
tle groups would repel any Purple surface threat to the Carrier Group and attack 
with guns and torpedoes if a favorable opportunity developed. In Case Two, the 1st 
and 2nd Battle Groups would repel any Purple surface threat to the Carrier Group 
but would engage defensively only if the heavy ships of the Blue Expeditionary 
Force were within supporting distance. At the same time, the 1st and 2nd Battle 
Groups would maneuver to close with the heavy ships of the Expeditionary Force. 
If, however, these ships were not within supporting distance, the 1st and 2nd Battle 
Groups would “aggressively” engage with guns and torpedoes, pressing home their 
attacks regardless of the consequences. (Pages 28–29.)
In Case One, the Carrier Group would commence maximum air strikes on the 
enemy at the earliest possible moment and continue as long as it was out of Purple 
gunfire range. It would gain and hold its launching station on the unengaged side 
of the 1st and 2nd Battle Groups but within easy striking range of the Purple sur-
face force. In Case Two, the Carrier Group would remain outside Purple gun and 
torpedo range “at all costs” but within voice-radio distance of the 1st and 2nd Battle 
Groups if possible. It would also take station on the unengaged side of the 1st and 
2nd Battle Groups and, in either Case One or Two, maneuver at high speed for 
antisubmarine protection. Also in either Case One or Two, the three task groups 
were to maneuver independently, though Admiral BA emphasized the “alert” 
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cooperation and coordination that was required of all 
three task group commanders. Commanders, 2nd Battle 
Group and Carrier Group were to base their movements 
on those of the 1st Battle Group. Upon junction with the 
Expeditionary Force’s heavy ships, Commander, Blue 
North Pacific Force’s Battle Plan would become effec-
tive. At that time, if the Purple air threat was negligible, 
CLAA-95 and CLAA-98 would be directed to join the 
1st and 2nd Battle Groups. Commander, Covering Force 
was embarked in CV-21 with the Carrier Group, and 
Rear Admiral BM, Commander, Carrier Division 3, was 
designated second in command. 
At this point in the presentation, a telephone conver-
sation was simulated between Rear Admiral BA and Vice 
Admiral BF, Commander, Blue North Pacific Force, in 
which BA informed BF, Rear Admiral BB (Commander, 
Expeditionary Force and Amphibious Group 7), and 
Rear Admiral BC (Commander, Battleship Division 5) 
about these dispositions and his Battle Plan. (Page 29.) 
Fig. 128 
Maneuver messages, Blue 
Covering Force, Opera-
tions Problem 2
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known—incorporated the results of wartime combat 
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XVI Operations Problem 2
The Blue Solution Concluded, September–October 1946 
In these final phases of planning for the Blue Solution to Operations Problem 2, Rear Admiral BB, Commander, Expeditionary Force, came up with a num-ber of scenarios for his Battle Plan. In Case One, in which the Blue Covering 
Force was absent, he would have under his command—from his amphibious force 
flagship—Commodore BI’s Transport Group, comprising three transport units that 
were further subdivided into eight transport divisions and altogether included the 
twelve high-speed transports, twenty-four attack transports, and six attack cargo 
ships. Also under his command was Rear Admiral BG’s Carrier Group, three escort 
carriers, with Captain B-50’s (not played by a student officer) Carrier Screen Unit of 
the five destroyers from Destroyer Division 132 and three destroyer-minesweepers 
from Mine Division 7. In addition, there was Captain B-23’s Minesweeping Group 
of five destroyer-minesweepers, six minesweepers, and one minelayer, further sub-
divided into Minesweeping Unit 1 and Minesweeping Unit 2, with ships from Mine 
Divisions 5 and 9. The Expeditionary Troops would consist of two Marine divisions 
plus attached units, while Rear Admiral BC’s Expeditionary Striking Group was 
composed of his Battleline, two prewar modernized battleships from Battleship 
Division 5, and two destroyers. The Expeditionary Striking Group was composed 
of Captain CA’s Right Flank Force, one light cruiser and seven destroyers from 
Destroyer Squadron 7, along with Rear Admiral BH’s Center Force of one heavy 
cruiser, one light cruiser, and another seven destroyers, the latter from DESRON 
1. The Expeditionary Striking Group was rounded out by Captain CB’s Left Flank 
Force, another light cruiser and seven destroyers from DESRON 13.1
In Case Two, in which the Blue Covering Force was present, the Transport 
Group, the Carrier Group, the Minesweeping Group, and the Expeditionary Troops 
would assume the same dispositions as in Case One. Rear Admiral BC, however, 
would form a Combined Striking Group. Here, his battle line would consist again 
of the two prewar modernized battleships but would now additionally have the 
four destroyers of DESDIV 11. The Right Flank Force would now be commanded 
by Rear Admiral BD and consist of two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers from 
Cruiser Division 15, the nine destroyers from Destroyer Squadron 7, and three 
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additional destroyers from DESDIV 91. Rear Admiral BD would now also com-
mand the Center Force, composed of two heavy cruisers from CRUDIV 1, two light 
cruisers from CRUDIV 13, five destroyers from DESRON 1, and seven destroyers 
from DESRON 15. The Left Flank Force was to be commanded by Rear Admi-
ral BN, with two heavy cruisers from CRUDIV 3, two attached light cruisers, and 
seven destroyers from DESDIV 92. (Page 17.)
Case One assumed Purple forces to be equal or inferior to the Blue Expedition-
ary Striking Group, which would engage the Purple forces “decisively” and destroy 
them. In Case Two, in which Purple forces were superior to the Combined Striking 
Group, the latter was to interpose itself between Purple and the remainder of the 
Expeditionary Force. The Expeditionary Striking Group would fight a delaying ac-
tion on a course to concentrate with the Covering Force while staying out of deci-
sive gun range. Every opportunity that arose or could be created to destroy Purple 
units was to be exploited and, in case of contact with the Purple Main Body, the 
destruction of the Purple fleet would become the primary mission. In either Case 
One or Two, the Expeditionary or Combined Striking Group was to be prepared to 
fight a surface engagement using full radar control. Rear Admiral BB would be em-
barked in amphibious force flagship AGC-11, while Commander, Expeditionary 
Striking Group and Commander, Combined Striking Group would be embarked 
in prewar modernized battleship BB-48. (Page 18.)
Bombardment of the beach and the surrounding areas would be conducted by 
the Gunfire Support Group commencing at H-Hour minus 4 (“H minus four”) 
on D-Day. The preliminary bombardment of possible enemy strongpoints in the 
vicinities of Mayachnny, Sredni, and Stanitskogo areas were to be conducted on 
D–1 by units of the Covering Force. The Expeditionary Force’s bombardment 
was to be conducted in three phases. Phases One and Two would be controlled by 
Commander, Gunfire Support Group, while Phase Three would be controlled by 
Commander, Assault Group. These phases were to commence at H–4, H–2, and 
H-Hour, respectively, with specific geographic reference points for each phase. For 
example, Phase One would consist of gunnery runs between designated points, 
with lookout, fire-control, and gun positions on high ground as the priority targets. 
The battleships in particular were to destroy these gun positions with counterbat-
tery fire when located. Phase Two would consist of separate runs by Gunfire Sup-
port Units 1 and 2. Gunfire Support Unit 1 would make runs from a designated 
point for twelve thousand yards on 072 degrees true and the reverse course. It was 
also to cover the beach areas and probable gun positions in direct support of the 
landings on Red Beach. Gunfire Support Unit 2 would make runs from a different 
point for twelve thousand yards on course 008 degrees and reverse, covering the 
beach areas and probable gun positions in direct support of Green Beach. Finally, 
Phase Three would consist of area bombardments, counterbattery fire, and “call 
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fires” (no-notice requested missions) as directed by Commander, Assault Group. 
Commander, Assault Group would direct the shift of fire control from air or sur-
face ships to the shore fire-control party. (Page 19.) 
In his Cruising Plans, Rear Admiral BB outlined two plans, which he designated 
6C2 and 6C3. The two plans were primarily for defense against submarines, air-
craft, or both. Unless otherwise prescribed by the Officer in Tactical Command, 
the stations of the various units were as indicated in attached diagrams, showing 
circles with spacing of one mile and numbered one to seven. The Fleet Guide was to 
be the flagship of the Task Force Commander. When the battle line was not present, 
the Guide of the formation was the flagship of the Transport Squadrons. When the 
train (oilers, etc.) was not present, the aircraft carriers were to occupy the area that 
it normally occupied, except when launching or recovering aircraft. The destroy-
er screen was under the direct command of the senior destroyer squadron com-
mander, who was to occupy Station No. 1. Because of the extent of the formation, 
it would not be possible for the Screen Commander to exercise adequate control of 
the entire screen as rapidly as required. Therefore, Admiral BB designated a Dep-
uty Screen Commander, who would occupy Station No. 30, or the highest even- 
numbered station being occupied at any given time. Port and Starboard Screen As-
sistants would occupy stations on the beams of the formation. (Page 20.)
The object of BB’s Sortie Plan, known as 1V, was the security of the heavy ships 
when their movements were restricted (e.g., while leaving port and taking station 
after clearing restricted waters). His plan assumed that channels to deep water had 
been swept and buoyed, that antisubmarine patrols and air patrols had been estab-
lished, and that Blue submarines were well clear. In addition, it was assumed that 
Purple submarines—some deployed as minelayers—might be present off a port but 
that Purple surface forces would not be. (Page 21.)
His General Plan was to cover the sortie from port of the heavy ships by offen-
sive measures by the light forces. His destroyer squadrons would sortie from their 
fleet anchorage through swept channels first. Commander, Destroyer Squadron 1 
would pass through Point ABLE at minus 7.5 hours—that is, with reference to Zero 
Hour, 2330 Zebra—and proceed to Point BAKER, through which he would pass at 
minus 10 minutes. There, DESRON 1 was to establish offensive antisubmarine pa-
trols seaward out to twelve miles with DESRONs 7 and 13 on either side, north and 
south. The mine squadrons would pass through Point ABLE at minus 7.3 hours, pass 
through Point BAKER at minus 2 minutes, and establish an Inner Anti-Submarine 
Patrol on bearing 310 degrees true from BAKER. (Page 21.) 
Admiral BB’s heavy cruisers would pass through ABLE at minus 7 hours and 
BAKER at plus 10 minutes, and then turn to 310. His light cruisers would pass 
through ABLE at minus 6.9 hours, pass through BAKER at plus 16 minutes, and take 
station on the heavy ships ahead. The battleships would pass through Point ABLE at 
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minus 6.8 hours, pass through Point BAKER at plus 25 minutes, and then also set 
course to take station on the heavy ships ahead. The Force Flagship would pro-
ceed through Point ABLE at minus 6.6 hours and through Point BAKER at plus 35 
minutes before it set course for the same heavy ships. Amphibious Group 7 would 
pass through Point ABLE at minus 6.5 hours and Point BAKER at plus 45 minutes, 
and set course for its station with the heavy ships while the carriers would pass 
through Point ABLE at minus 5 hours, Point BAKER at plus 2.4 hours, and then take 
up their stations with these same ships. Sortie speed was ordered as twelve knots. 
(Pages 21–22.)
The fundamental difference between Cruising Dispositions 6C2 and 6C3 was 
what he called an “Eccentric Screen” employed in one of them to economize in the 
sonar screen and thereby free ships for use as radar pickets. Since the purpose of the 
Cruising Dispositions was to afford maximum protection from submarine attack, 
and because BB’s force was so large, no changes were to be made to effect greater 
mutual protection from aerial attack and the screen would not be reoriented for 
better concentration of antiaircraft fire. The Screening Plan was laid out to protect 
against a forty-five-knot torpedo fired at six thousand yards while the Expedition-
ary Force steamed at twelve knots. Screen Station No. 1 would lie on the Fleet Axis 
and in the Van, even-numbered stations to the left and odd to the right. In the Plan, 
red circles indicated stations to be left unoccupied if the number of screening ships 
that were available was reduced. (Page 23.)
The Sonar Screen was to be made up of destroyers and a limited number of 
destroyer-minesweepers, with the Inner Anti-Submarine Screen exclusively com-
posed of destroyer-minesweepers. All of these ships were to be under the command 
of the Screen Commander. The Flank Anti-Submarine Screens were to be made up 
of high-speed transports and minesweepers under the command of Commander, 
Train. The Screen Commander was to maintain the strength of the Sonar Screen 
at the maximum level consistent with the requirements for radar pickets. When it 
was necessary to reduce the number of screening ships, the entire screen would be 
drawn in. (Page 24.)
When ships of the screen departed or otherwise separated themselves from the 
screen, all others were to close up automatically. Ships sighting mines were to re-
port these sightings to the nearest heavy ship likely to be affected by it. Destroyers 
were to keep boilers on line for twenty-six knots at all times. (Pages 24–25.)
Rear Admiral BB also organized a Screening Group, under Captain B-11, con-
sisting of Screening Unit 1 (the nine destroyers from Destroyer Divisions 11 and 
12), Screening Unit 2 (the nine destroyers from DESDIVs 71 and 72), and Screening 
Unit 3 (five destroyers of DESRON 13). Rear Admiral BC’s Gunfire Support Group 
was divided into Gunfire Support Units 1 (the two prewar modernized battleships 
from Battle Division 5) and 2 (a heavy cruiser and the three light cruisers from 
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Cruiser Division 13). BC also commanded the Expeditionary Striking Group when 
it was formed—two battleships, a heavy cruiser, three light cruisers, and twenty-
three destroyers. Additionally, he commanded the Combined Striking Group when 
formed, consisting of the ships of the Expeditionary Striking Group plus three 
heavy cruisers from CRUDIV 1, the two heavy cruisers from CRUDIV 3, the three 
light cruisers from CRUDIV 15, and seventeen destroyers from DESRON 9.2
While the Expeditionary Force was still in port, its commander was the SOPA 
who therefore would coordinate all naval activities afloat, the debarkation of Major 
General BY’s (also referred to as “BO” and “XX” for other aspects of the planning) 
two Marine divisions, and the equipment and supplies for the assault troops. On 
D-Day, he would coordinate all tactical aircraft at the objective area commencing 
at H–4. The Transport Group would embark the troops, equipment, and supplies 
in landing boats, with Transport Unit 1 landing on Red Beach and Transport Unit 
2 on Green Beach at H-Hour. Transport Unit 3 was to carry out a demonstration 
off the entrance to Avacha Bay at H–1, reembark its troops, and then be held in 
reserve. During the landing, the Carrier Group was to destroy Purple air and naval 
forces that might attack the Expeditionary Force, furnish aircraft for close air sup-
port, coordinate and control aircraft for antisubmarine and combat air patrols, and 
coordinate screening and antisubmarine functions with Commander, Screening 
Group. The Minesweeping Group was to remove mines from the Red and Green 
Beach approaches, conduct salvage and towing, and clear the entrance to Avacha 
Bay. The Screening Group was to destroy Purple air, surface, and submarine forces 
that threatened the Expeditionary Force; send one Screening Unit to Commander, 
Gunfire Support Group for bombardment and call fires; and oppose threats from 
enemy naval forces. (Pages 2–3.)
The Gunfire Support Group was to carry out a preinvasion bombardment, de-
stroy Purple forces and defensive positions at the objective, destroy enemy air and 
naval forces, and otherwise assist Expeditionary Troops to the maximum practi-
cable extent. The Expeditionary Troops were to capture and hold Avacha Bay—
including the harbor entrances—at the earliest possible date. The Expeditionary 
Striking Group was to destroy Purple surface forces if those forces were equal or in-
ferior but conduct delaying actions if Purple was superior. The Combined Striking 
Group was similarly to oppose or delay and coordinate its air units with other Blue 
forces in the area. In addition, Admiral BB ordered that preliminary movements 
could be carried out but that no offensive operations would be carried out until 20 
June. Rear Admiral BB, Commander, Expeditionary Force, would be embarked in 
AGC-11, while Rear Admiral BC, Commander, Gunfire Support Group, was to be 
embarked in BB-48. (Pages 4–5.) 
Admiral BB’s Air Plan consisted of three phases of air support for the Expe-
ditionary Force. Phase One was to be the air support en route to the objective, 
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Phase Two was the Pre-Landing Aerial Bombardment, and Phase Three was the 
Air Support of Landing Troops. All three phases called for the air defense of the 
Expeditionary Force by antisubmarine and combat air patrols, air searches em-
bedded in the Air Plan and as directed, and such air services as transportation, 
air reconnaissance, and message communication. Phase One was divided into two 
legs. In the first leg, from Seattle to Dutch Harbor, antisubmarine patrols would be 
flown according to schedules provided in the Air Plan and according to Fleet Tacti-
cal Publication 223A, Anti-Submarine and Escort of Convoy Instructions. Carriers 
were to be assigned this duty by days; off-duty carriers were to keep eight fighters 
and four attack planes in Condition Twelve from sunrise to sunset and two night 
fighters in the same operational readiness from sunset to sunrise. On the second 
leg, from Dutch Harbor to Avacha Bay, antisubmarine and combat air patrols as 
well as searches would be flown in accordance with Air Schedule Baker, which was 
attached. The search, unless otherwise ordered, would cover a sector described as 
110 degree true to a distance of two hundred miles from the formation center.
Antisubmarine patrols would consist of six fighters and six attack planes in 
fighter and attack-plane teams, with each team covering a sixty-degree sector to 
a distance of twenty miles from the formation center and covering only the area 
outside the formation. Antisubmarine patrols were to be oriented to true north, 
with Sector No. 1 being 000 degrees true to 060 degrees true and the remaining 
sectors numbered consecutively clockwise. At 2100, each carrier was to put two 
night fighters in Condition One and maintain them until 0300 the following morn-
ing upon the completion of launching flights. Also, the carrier that launched the 
combat air patrol was to keep its deck prepared for landing cripples while the other 
carriers prepared their decks for the rapid launching of additional fighter planes. 
(Page 7.)
In Phase Two, the prelanding aerial bombardment was to consist of two carri-
ers furnishing full groups—less antisubmarine patrols—for the saturation bom-
bardment of the landing beaches, which was to commence at H–1 and last fifteen 
minutes. Combat air patrols were to be furnished by the Covering Force. Antisub-
marine patrols would consist of six attack planes flying singly and covering the 
Expeditionary Force on its exposed sea flanks. Phase Three was to consist of air 
support, each carrier furnishing four attack planes and eight fighter-bombers on 
a two-hour schedule to the Tactical Air Commander as ordered during daylight 
periods. Combat air patrols would be provided by the Covering Force, and anti-
submarine patrols would consist of six attack planes flying singly, with two planes 
from each carrier on a four-hour schedule. Air searches were to be conducted as 
ordered and each carrier would keep two night fighter planes in Condition Eleven 
from 2100 to 0300 each night. The Tactical Air Commander, embarked in the flag-
ship of the Commander, Expeditionary Force, would control all aircraft tactically 
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at the objective area from the time that aircraft reported into him after takeoff—or 
when arriving from other forces at the rendezvous points—until he released them 
to return to their parent carriers or other bases. Carrier captains would control 
their own planes prior to their reporting in and being relieved of this duty. The 
daily air schedules for the following day were also to be forwarded by the Tactical 
Air Commander to the carriers by message each evening. (Pages 7–8.) 
Antisubmarine patrols were assigned to one carrier each day: for 10, 11, 12, 13, 
14, and 15 June, escort carriers CVE-112, -115, -119, -112, -115, and -119, respec-
tively. The antisubmarine patrols were to take off each day at 0315, 0700, 1045, 
1430, and 1815 and land at 0715, 1100, 1445, 1830, and 2030. There were to be 
one attack plane assigned per patrol leg and three attack planes per patrol. Under 
Air Schedule Baker, there would be six flights throughout the day for combat air 
patrols, antisubmarine patrols, and searches. The first planes for these flights would 
be launched at 0300, 0630, 1000, 1200, 1330, and 1700, while the first planes to be 
recovered from these flights would land at 0645, 1015, 1345, 1500, 1715, and 2045. 
Duty 1 would consist of two flights of twelve fighters for the combat air patrol, 
along with two flights of six fighters and six attack planes each for the antisubma-
rine patrols. Duty 2 was to consist of one flight of twelve fighters for the combat air 
patrol, one flight of six fighters and six attack planes for the antisubmarine patrol, 
and two flights of eight fighters and eight attack planes for searches. Duty 3 com-
prised two flights of twelve fighters for the combat air patrols, with the two flights 
of six fighters and six attack planes repeated for the antisubmarine patrols and the 
one flight of eight fighters and eight attack planes for searches also repeated. Carri-
ers would be assigned these duties the previous night by message. (Page 9.)
Admiral BB’s Communication Plan called for radio silence down to thirty mega-
cycles per second at staging and assembly areas except for warnings or defensive 
operations. Visual communications were to be used whenever possible and radio 
silence was to be observed while at sea en route from Puget Sound. All units were 
also to observe radar, Identification Friend or Foe, and radar countermeasures 
silence. Ships designated as radar and Identification Friend or Foe guards were 
to maintain continuous twenty-four-hour watches following the departure from 
Puget Sound, and ships designated as radar countermeasures ships would emit 
only on the order of the OTC. In addition, radar intercept ships were to monitor 
and log continuously Purple transmissions; at the objective, they were also to guard 
Talk Between Ships and Task Force Common (apparently to detect intrusion by 
Purple). Numerous circuits and frequencies were established and guards assigned. 
(Pages 10–12.) Radio Call Signs for the Amphibious Landing were provided. For 
landing craft and other assault waves, Boat Commanders were to call by wave num-
ber, beach color, and beach number, while call signs for tenders would be formed 
by using the call “Holstein” followed by individual identification. 
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While en route, flag hoist and semaphore communications were to be used 
whenever possible but flashing lights were only to be employed for half an hour 
after sunrise until a half-hour before sunset. Filters and low-power lights were to 
be used as much as possible and visible light was not to be used for signaling during 
deep twilight. While at the objective, reports were to be made by visual commu-
nications or by messenger boat. Radio was not to be used except for “important” 
operational traffic or when visual or messenger communications could not be car-
ried out. Infrared signaling equipment could also be used when visual light was 
prohibited. (Pages 13–14.)
Rear Admiral BB’s Communications Plan included procedures for reporting 
reef and beach obstacles. The results of the minesweeping and underwater demo-
lition prior to 1000 on D-Day would be transmitted in full by Commander, Task 
Force 75 by radio cipher on Task Force Common. If later information of value was 
obtained after this, it would be broadcast by Commander, Task Force 75 on the 
Continuous Wave or Task Force Common frequencies as well as on Landing Craft, 
Infantry Common frequency. Plain-language reports to all ships present would 
also be sent, reporting items in sequence for each beach; if there was no informa-
tion on that beach, it would be omitted. These procedures also outlined ways to 
report entrances to paths cleared by the demolition teams. Specifically, these pro-
cedures entailed grid coordinates on 1/20,000 scale air and gunnery target maps of 
designated points and the distance in feet between remaining mines, the number of 
rows of mines, and the interval in feet between rows. The procedures also indicated 
whether there were buried, exposed, or remaining trip-wire mines. (Pages 14–15.)
Student officers were next provided with Advance Information for the Chart Ma-
neuver. This information included the time and day at which the maneuver would 
begin, the time and duration of the first move, the way that students were to express 
Maneuver Time, and the fact that previous reconnaissance had not yielded any 
information owing to bad weather. Admiral Smith instructed the student officers 
to complete the first move for the forces they were commanding prior to 0900 on 
2 October 1946. The tracks of all forces under way at this time were to be drawn 
on appropriate charts and flimsies made in accordance with the Maneuver Rules. 
The locations of forces not under way during Move 1 were also to be indicated. The 
state of the weather was to be given to each force, group, or unit commander, but 
only for the area in which his units were moving. Information on weather in the 
various areas was to be collected and disseminated by each side’s Commander-in-
Chief, but only as provided for in his plans. Forecasts were to be furnished to each 
Commander-in-Chief by the Director of the Maneuver from time to time. These 
forecasts were to vary in completeness and coverage, again in accordance with 
each Commander-in-Chief ’s plans for collecting information on which to base a 
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forecast, in terms of Meteorological Visibility; Assured Sonar Range; Percentage of 
Cloud Cover and Ceiling; Rain, Snow, and Ice Conditions; and Air Temperature.3
Student officers were especially cautioned to do all work in connection with 
the maneuver in the rooms assigned. Physically covering all their material when 
securing during the noon hour and at the end of the afternoon session was also 
suggested, as was avoiding receiving or giving out unauthorized information. They 
were also only to use designated Plotting Charts, ensure the completeness of data 
on the flimsies and forms, and ensure that the information entered on the Record 
of Move Form provided a brief and accurate history of all important events during 
the move. The Record of a Move was turned in when the flimsy for the following 
move was sent to the Master Plot. Accurate fuel records were to be kept in the pre-
scribed forms and available for inspection by the Maneuver Staff. Forms requested 
by the staff were to be sent by pneumatic tube. Finally, student officers were to use 
downtime between moves to plan for future moves and to progress their reading in 
preparation for their theses.4
N O T E S 1 Senior Class of June 1947, “Operations Problem 2: 
Blue—Section B, Annex D: Battle Plan,” 1 October 
1946, p. 16, folders 2603-P–U, box 138, RG 4, NHC. 
Subsequent pages references until the next endnote 
are to this source.
 2 Senior Class of June 1947, “Operations Problem 2: 
Blue—Section B, Annex D: Battle Plan,” 1 October 
1946, p. 1, folder 2603-R, box 138, RG 4, NHC. 
Subsequent pages references until the next endnote 
are to this source. 
 3 Senior Class of June 1947, “Operations Problem 
2: Advance Information for Chart Maneuver,” 1 
October 1946, pp. 1–2, folder 2603-H, box 138, RG 
4, NHC.
 4 Ibid., p. 2. 

XVII Operations Problem 2J
Blue, October–November 1946
In late October 1946, the junior class of June 1947 began preparing for Opera-tions Problem 2J. Between 8 and 25 November, Section A of the class drew up the Blue Statement of the Problem and Section B the Purple Statement. Over 
the next several days, each section created its Solution to the Problem while also 
attending lectures and presentations in the auditorium in Pringle Hall. The ma-
neuver itself commenced on 16 November and continued through the 22nd, along 
with several additional presentations. Students and staff prepared for and conduct-
ed the Critique from 23 to 25 November.1
In Operations Problem 2J, both Blue and Purple played out both a Chart Maneu-
ver (Phase One) and a Board Maneuver (Phase Two). The Maneuver Staff included 
a number of instructors from the junior class, including the Director of the Ma-
neuver, who was again Captain Evans (see chapter 1); Commander Mayberry (see 
chapter 1), who was the Assistant Director for Blue and the Chief Damage Com-
puter; Commander Reed (see chapter 1), who was the Assistant Director for Purple 
and the Submarine Umpire; Commander Kirkpatrick (see chapter 9), who was the 
Air Umpire; and Lieutenant Commander Holzapfel (see chapter 1), who was the 
Assistant Air Umpire. Lieutenant Commander Curran (see chapter 1), from the 
Department of Intelligence, was the Communication Umpire,  while Commander 
Miller (see chapter 9), one of the junior class students, was the Historian. Blue and 
Purple each had Move Umpires and Force Damage Recorders—Commander Dal-
ton (see chapter 8), Colonel Edson (see chapter 8), Lieutenant Commander Howell 
(see chapter 9), and Lieutenant Colonel Thompson (see chapter 9), all junior class 
students. During Phase One, there were two Air-Submarine Contact Evaluators, 
Lieutenant Commander Holzapfel again and Lieutenant Commander Taeusch (see 
chapter 8), from the junior class. There were also two Submarine-Surface Contact 
Evaluators, again Lieutenant Commander Taeusch and his classmate Lieutenant 
Commander Aymond (see chapter 8).2 
Phase One required several Assistants to the Air Umpire, roles played by ad-
ditional junior-class members: an Aerial Combat Loss Computer, who was Lieu-
tenant Colonel Leary (see chapter 8); a Hit Computer, Commander Richardson 
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(see chapter 9); an Anti-Aircraft Loss Computer, Lieutenant Commander Bon-
ner (see chapter 9); Blue and Purple Status Board Recorders, Commander White 
(see chapter 8) and Colonel Mason (see chapter 9); an Operational Loss Com-
puter, Commander Rynd (see chapter 9); Blue and Purple Radar Contact Record-
ers, Commanders Coleman (see chapter 8) and Foley (see chapter 9); and two 
civilian Plotters, draftsmen John Lawton (see chapter 9) and Frederick Wagner 
(see chapter 9) from the Department of Tactics’ War Gaming Section. For Phase 
Two, Blue and Purple each had Damage Computers for their battle lines, this 
time Lieutenant Commanders Aymond and Bonner again. The Damage Com-
puters for Center and Van Cruisers for Blue and Purple were again Command-
ers Coleman and Richardson, respectively, while Commanders Kirkpatrick and 
Rynd this time were the Blue and Purple Damage Computers for the Center and 
Van Destroyers. The Blue and Purple Damage Computers for the Rear Cruisers 
were Lieutenant Commander Taeusch again and Commander Foley again, while 
those for the Rear Destroyers were Lieutenant Colonel Downey (see chapter 8) 
and again Colonel Mason. Mr. Lawton was again the Plotter, while the two As-
sistant Plotters were again Mr. Wagner and Miss DeMarco (see chapter 9), all 
draftsmen.3 
The Blue Statement of the Problem
The objectives of the maneuver were to provide student officers opportunities to 
exercise in preparing an Estimate of the Situation, formulating appropriate direc-
tives and dispositions, and executing planned actions in a Chart or Board Maneu-
ver. In addition, Operations Problem 2J was to demonstrate to them the capabili-
ties, limitations, and tactical employment of ships and aircraft; demonstrate the 
capabilities, limitations, and tactical employment of new submarine types and an-
tisubmarine measures; and highlight the restrictions on a task force’s freedom of 
movement when assigned to protect a convoy.4
In the General Situation, the Purple–Blue War had commenced on 15 August 
1950 when the Purple Far Eastern Air Force flew large-scale, surprise raids on Blue 
forces and installations in Japan and the Aleutians, accompanied by the advance of 
Purple ground forces into Manchuria. Purple was now occupying southern Korea, 
Manchuria, and northern China. All Purple attempts to invade Japan had been 
“temporarily” forestalled by the Blue atomic bombing of Purple amphibious forces 
and transport aircraft units assembled at Vladivostok. At the commencement of 
hostilities, Blue had a small occupation force in Japan, augmented by a “moderately 
strong” air force of long-range and medium-range bombers as well as long-range 
fighters. Owing to “excellent” dispersion, most of the Blue air forces had escaped 
destruction in the initial Purple air attacks. Blue air strength had been dissipated in 
subsequent action but it still had an “operationally effective” force in the Japanese 
home islands. (Page 1.)
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At the outbreak of war, the Purple Pacific Fleet, with headquarters at Vladivos- 
tok, was based in Siberia, on Sakhalin, and in the Kuriles. The Blue Pacific Fleet, 
headquartered at Pearl Harbor, was based in Hawaii. Other than submarines, the 
only Blue fleet combatant forces immediately available were a small Fast Carrier 
Task Force, a small amphibious force, a two-division force of Marines, and the fleet 
air wings. The small Blue fleet forces operating in Far Eastern waters had been 
withdrawn to Guam during the period of strained relations that had preceded the 
war. The mobilization of the Blue Army, however, was expected to permit the stag-
ing of four divisions monthly from the San Francisco Port of Embarkation. The 
Special Situation laid down that Blue plans to reinforce its occupation forces in 
Japan had been approaching fruition at the outbreak of hostilities. All the plan-
ning for an invasion of Avacha Bay was now set aside; the mission of Blue forces 
now was to get these reinforcements through to Japan, where they would resist the 
threatened Purple invasion. 
The 2nd and 3rd Infantry Divisions and major elements of the 15th Army Air 
Force—personnel, fighter aircraft, and ground equipment—had arrived in Pearl 
Harbor on 13 August and had been scheduled to depart on 20 August in an escort-
ed convoy designated HTF-1. Given the critical situation that had arisen because of 
the Purple surprise attack, it was decided to add the 1st and 3rd Marine Divisions 
to the reinforcement program even though they were assault trained. These units 
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would be embarked in the available transports of the Blue Amphibious Force and 
would sail with Convoy HTF-1. The sailing date for HTF-1 was advanced to 19 Au-
gust, and Fleet Admiral BA, Commander-in-Chief of the Blue Pacific Fleet (no des-
ignated student officer), accordingly issued his Operation Order No. 8-50. (Page 2.)
Fleet Admiral BA’s orders were specifically issued to Vice Admiral BC, Com-
mander, Blue Covering Force (Commander Baldridge—see chapter 9), designated 
Task Force 11. The Blue Covering Force consisted of three battle carriers organized 
into Carrier Division 2, three fast battleships organized into Battleship Division 1, 
five heavy cruisers organized into Cruiser Division 1, and one antiaircraft cruiser, 
along with twenty-three destroyers organized into Destroyer Flotilla (DESFLOT) 
1. Vice Admiral BC was apprised of the weakness of Blue occupation forces for 
repelling a Purple invasion of the Japanese home islands, of the fact that Purple 
amphibious forces and transport aircraft had been damaged by Blue atomic at-
tacks, and that Blue Army Air Forces in Japan had been weakened but were still 
operationally effective. Also, not only had all of Blue’s atomic bombs that had been 
available in Japan at the commencement of hostilities now been expended but it 
was believed that Purple had produced a small number of its own. Blue thinking on 
the matter, however, was that Purple was reserving those weapons for use in more-
critical areas; none had yet been employed in the Far East. (Page 3.)
Purple naval forces known to be in Far Eastern waters as of 10 August included 
three fleet carriers similar to the Essex class, three fast battleships like those of the 
South Dakota class, and six heavy cruisers equivalent to the Baltimore class. Also 
known were four squadrons of “modern” destroyers, an amphibious force assem-
bling at Vladivostok that consisted of transport squadrons and other vessels ca-
pable of a major landing, a submarine force of about sixty high-speed submarines 
based at Vladivostok and Kashiwabara, and a fleet air force based at Shimushu, 
Paramushiru, Matsuwa, and Etorofu. Purple’s submarines were believed to be on 
patrol in the Hawaiian, Central Pacific, and Aleutian areas. The Purple Fleet Air 
Force operated naval patrol planes whose characteristics were similar to those of 
Blue PBM Mariner naval patrol bombers. At least two fleet carriers and three fast 
battleships had been sighted on 14 August in Kashiwabara Harbor, among “many” 
other combatant ships. (Page 3.) 
Blue submarines were engaged in war patrol and reconnaissance in the Yellow 
Sea, the Japan Sea, and the waters adjacent to the Kurile Islands. Blue submarines 
proceeding to and from stations would be routed clear of the Blue forces involved 
in this operation. Convoy HTF-1 was to depart Pearl Harbor on 19 August, and 
BC’s Covering Force—along with an Escort Force, Task Group 51.7, commanded 
by Commodore BJ (Commander Morton—see chapter 9)—had been assigned as 
escort. Commander, Blue 5th Air Wing (not played by a designated student officer) 
was directed to provide air cover to the Blue Covering Force and Convoy HTF-1 
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within seven hundred miles of Oahu and Midway. Commander, 20th Blue Army 
Air Force (no designated student officer) was requested to provide air cover within 
seven hundred miles of Honshu. Blue Covering Force was to ensure the safe arrival 
of HTF-1 at Tokyo at the earliest possible date; Commander, Blue Covering Force 
was authorized to issue orders to Convoy HTF-1 when the occasion required. Prior 
to departure from Pearl Harbor, he was authorized to load two atomic bombs on 
each Covering Force battleship for delivery to the 20th Army Air Force in Japan. 
Rear Admiral BE (Commander Simonsen—see chapter 9), embarked in battle car-
rier CVB-41, was designated as the second in command of this operation. Finally, 
Vice Admiral BC was additionally provided information on the assignment of 
forces to TG 51.7, the composition and prescribed route of HTF-1, the assignment 
of forces to the overall Blue Covering Force, and the estimated characteristics of the 
Purple high-speed submarines (see below). (Pages 3–5.) 
Task Force 11 and Convoy HTF-1, escorted by TG 51.7, departed Pearl Harbor 
at 0630 on 19 August. TF 11 maintained a position within air support distance of 
the convoy, which proceeded along its prescribed route at a speed of fifteen knots. 
At 2100 on 22 August, ships of TF 11 reported intermittent radar contact on a pos-
sible surface target but attempts to establish visual or sonar contact were unsuccess-
ful. At the time of this incident, Vice Admiral BC’s flagship was at 30° N, 179° W, 
on a course of 275 true at a speed of fifteen knots. At 2330, he received a message 
from Fleet Admiral BA that Blue submarine SS-127, patrolling off Kashiwabara, 
had reported a Purple force of about ten large and twenty small ships departing that 
base at 1000 on 23 August on a course of 160 at twenty knots. This force was evalu-
ated as the Purple Striking Force; there was no evidence of another Purple surface 
force at sea in the Pacific. (Page 5.)
At 0800 on 24 August, following a submarine contact, attack cargo ship AKA-99 
of HTF-1 was sunk by a torpedo. Destroyers participating in depth-charge attacks 
on the Purple submarine reported “extreme difficulty” in tracking the target and 
could not determine the results of their attack. During the afternoon of 24 August, 
destroyers of TG 51.7 were refueled from convoy tankers. The operation was com-
pleted by 1630 and all ships of TF 11 were topped off from the convoy oilers during 
the morning of 25 August. At 1700 on 25 August, with his flagship at 31° N, 166° E, 
Vice Admiral BC launched an X-RAY search between bearings 272 and 056 degrees 
true out to four hundred miles. One night fighter and one attack plane were as-
signed to each sector, except that airborne-early-warning aircraft were substituted 
for attack planes in Sectors 38, 42, 1, and 5. At 1927, a “bogey” (an unidentified air 
contact) was reported bearing 335 true at an altitude of ten thousand feet and a 
range of 105 miles. At 1930, the AEW plane in Sector 42 reported radar contact on 
a surface force at 38° N, 162° E. This force was estimated to be composed of nine 
large and sixteen small ships proceeding on 170 degrees at about twenty knots. BC’s 
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flagship was then at 31°10ʹ N, 165°55ʹ E. The center of HTF-1 was thirty-five miles 
to the southward; Blue was steering 280 at fifteen knots. Weather in the vicinity of 
TF 11 at 1930 on 25 August was wind from the southeast at Force 3, smooth seas, 
unlimited visibility, and two-tenths cloud cover. There was to be no appreciable 
change in weather for the next twenty-four hours. (Pages 5–6.)
Each student officer was to submit Vice Admiral BC’s Estimate of the Tactical 
Situation as of 1930 on 25 August as well as his own Solution to the Problem. (It 
was the Staff Solution, summarized below, that would actually be played.) Students 
were to use data previously compiled and carried in the Running Estimate. Each 
student officer was also to submit a Commander, Task Force 11 Action Plan as 
of 1930 on 25 August and a Cruising Disposition for TF 11. The student officer 
ultimately selected to play CTF 11, assisted by members of his section, was also 
to submit any additional dispositions considered necessary for TF 11 as well as a 
Cruising Disposition for the convoy and the Escort. Modified or new Battle and 
Approach Dispositions for Phase Two were to be submitted at the conclusion of 
Phase One, the Chart Maneuver. There were also to be submitted a Communica-
tion Plan—to be devised in accordance with the Maneuver Rules—any additional 
annexes desired, flimsies and Aircraft Flight Forms covering all airborne aircraft 
at 1930 hours, and flimsies and Aircraft Flight Forms covering the movement of 
surface forces and aircraft during Move 1. Move 1 was to occur at 1930 on 25 Au-
gust, game time. Students were to employ specific Plotting Sheets for strategic and 
tactical plotting. (Page 7.)
Forces assigned to TF 11 included the three battle carriers of Rear Admiral 
BE’s Carrier Division 2, the three fast battleships of Rear Admiral BF’s (Com-
mander Baldridge) BATDIV 1, and five heavy cruisers from Rear Admiral BG’s 
(Commander Baldridge) CRUDIV 1. Commodore BD’s (Commander Baldridge) 
DESFLOT 1 would consist of antiaircraft cruiser CLAA-95 as the flagship; four 
radar-picket destroyers from Captain B-5’s (Commander Morton) Destroyer 
Squadron 5; nine destroyers from Captain B-9’s (Commander Bridewell—see 
chapter 9) Destroyer Squadron 9; and ten destroyers from Captain B-13’s (Com-
mander White) DESRON 13. All of Blue’s destroyers were equipped with Type G-3 
torpedoes. The three battle carriers each had air wings of two fighter squadrons. 
Two of the three carriers also had two attack squadrons, the third only one. Never-
theless, each carrier had the same number of planes. These consisted of fifty-three 
Corsair fighters, four Corsair photographic reconnaissance fighters, eight Cor-
sair night fighters, thirty-two Helldiver attack planes, twenty-four Avenger attack 
planes, four Avenger tactical electronic-warfare aircraft, and four Avenger AEW 
aircraft. In addition, BATDIV 1 had six observation scout planes, while CRUDIV 
1 carried ten additional planes of this type. Blue aircraft were armed with Type E-1 
aircraft torpedoes. (Pages 8–9.)
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Convoy HTF-1’s route was from Pearl Har-
bor to Points TIN (22°35ʹ N, 159°28ʹ W), STEEL 
(30°00ʹ N, 178°00ʹ W), COPPER (31°00ʹ N, 168°30ʹ 
W), LEAD (33°10ʹ N, 144°00ʹ E), and thence to 
Tokyo. Its composition consisted of the Convoy 
Commodore—Rear Admiral BH (Commander 
Morton)—in amphibious force flagship AGC-7, 
the Convoy Vice Commodore—Commodore BV 
(Commander Webber—see chapter 8)—in attack 
transport APA-27, twenty attack transports in total, 
twelve attack cargo ships, seven Navy transports, 
four oilers, one ammunition ship, one provision 
ship, and eleven merchant ships. Also part of this 
force were two escort carriers loaded with Army 
Air Forces fighters; these planes, loaded by crane, 
could neither launch nor recover from the escort 
carriers. Forces assigned specifically to Commo-
dore BJ’s Task Group 51.7 included the antiaircraft 
cruiser CLAA-121, from which he flew his flag, 
five destroyers and four radar-picket destroyers of 
DESRON 1, nine destroyers from DESRON 7, and 
six destroyer escorts from Escort Division 1. (Page 9.)
Blue knew that all the Purple high-speed submarines were equipped with mast- 
and periscope-mounted surface-search radars as well as mast-mounted air-search 
radar. All air-search and periscope surface-search radars could be used both on the 
surface and at periscope depth. Radar interception was considered “practicable” 
on the surface or at periscope depths, as was radio reception and transmission. 
The percentage of battery depletion while running at any given speed was to be 
computed as a direct relation between the number of minutes at that speed and 
endurance at that speed. While charging batteries, Purple submarines could not 
make more than seven knots; battery-charging rates were shown in the Maneuver 
Rules. Noise at silent-running speeds was comparable to that emitted at two or 
three knots, silent running, by conventional fleet-type submarines. (Page 10.)
The Blue Chart Maneuver
For the Blue Chart Maneuver, Task Force 11’s Covering Force had student officers 
playing CTF 11 (Vice Admiral BC) and CTF 11’s Chief of Staff (Lieutenant Colonel 
Wallace—see chapter 9); Commander, Battleship Division 1 (Rear Admiral BF); 
Commander, Cruiser Division 1 (Rear Admiral BG); and Commander, Destroyer 
Flotilla 1 (Commodore BD). In addition, student officers played Commander, Car-
rier Division 2 (Rear Admiral BE), his Chief of Staff (Colonel Manzo—see chapter 
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9), and his Operations Officer (Commander Rogers—see chapter 9). Players were 
assigned as commanders of each of the three carrier battle groups, built around 
CVB-41, -42, and -43 (again Lieutenant Colonel Downey, Commander Bridewell, 
and Commander Kirkpatrick). Finally, student officers played HTF-1’s Convoy 
Commodore (Rear Admiral BH) and Convoy Vice Commodore (Commodore 
BV), as well as Commander, Task Group 51.7, the Escort Force.5
Vice Admiral BC’s Task Organization laid down that Rear Admiral BE would 
command the Carrier Group, the three battle carriers of CARDIV 2. Rear Admiral 
BF would lead the Heavy Striking Group, three fast battleships from BATDIV 1 
and nine destroyers from DESRON 9. Rear Admiral BG would command the Light 
Striking Group—the three heavy cruisers of CRUDIV 1 and nine additional de-
stroyers from DESRON 9. Finally, Commodore BD would lead the Screen, which 
consisted of the antiaircraft cruiser and the twenty-three destroyers from DESFLOT 
1. In this scenario, on the evening of 25 August, there would be bright moonlight 
after 2200. Since Blue forces had already been attacked by Purple submarines and 
were probably being shadowed by them, Admiral BC thought there was good prob-
ability that a detached Purple surface striking group was in the area but had not yet 
been detected. An unidentified plane had recently been detected near his force.6
BC knew that the Purple Main Body of ten large and twenty small ships had 
sortied from Kashiwabara Bay during the night of 23–24 August. He also knew that 
at 1930 on this date, a Blue search plane had reported the Purple Main Body at 38° 
N, 162° E, on course 170 at a speed of twenty knots, by this time consisting of nine 
large and sixteen small ships. Purple was known to have in Far Eastern waters on 10 
August an even greater force, consisting of three fleet carriers, three fast battleships, 
six heavy cruisers, and four squadrons of destroyers. A sighting at Kashiwabara Bay 
on 14 August revealed two fleet carriers and three fast battleships. As for his own 
forces, there were no Blue submarines in the area, no reinforcements immediately 
available, and no land-based air forces to assist. Admiral BC assumed that Purple 
would press home an attack that night or the next morning on the Blue Covering 
Force and that these surface attacks would be supported by wolf-pack submarine 
attacks in the evening. He also assumed that Purple had a detached, high-speed 
surface striking group in the area that was still undetected and that Purple’s ulti-
mate objective was, of course, to prevent HTF-1 from getting to Japan.7
Therefore, the Blue Covering Force would first divert the convoy to the south-
west and then deliver early, repeated, and overwhelming air attacks on the Purple 
forces. These strikes would be followed by a rapid closure of the range; Admiral BC 
would accept a day battle if it was necessary to annihilate the Purple surface forces. 
He would also conduct continuous air searches to detect other Purple surface units 
in the immediate area. These air searches would commence at 2000 on 25 August; 
meanwhile, the Blue Covering Force would remain in a position to protect HTF-1. 
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The convoy’s withdrawal to the southwest would take place at night, and the Cover-
ing Force would gain a position downwind within thirty-five miles of the convoy 
and between it and the reported Purple striking force. The Covering Force would 
be prepared to launch major air strikes and conduct searches to the south and west 
during the night. Additionally, a fast battleship striking force could be formed at 
any time during day or night to repel any surprise Purple surface encounter. This 
plan was to be effective at 1930 on this day. Commander, Task Force 11 was em-
barked in fast battleship BB-57 and Rear Admiral BE, embarked in CVB-41, was 
designated as the second in command.8 
BC’s Task Organization had Rear Admiral BF commanding the Battleline, 
the three fast battleships from BATDIV 1, as well as the Center Force, one heavy 
cruiser. Rear Admiral BG commanded two heavy cruisers from CRUDIV 1 and 
ten destroyers from DESRON 13, together constituting the Right Flank Force. The 
Left Flank Force, commanded by Commodore BD, consisted of the two remain-
ing heavy cruisers from CRUDIV 1, the antiaircraft cruiser, and nine destroyers 
from DESFLOT 1. Rear Admiral BE commanded the Carrier Group, the three 
battle carriers from CARDIV 2 and four radar-picket destroyers from Destroyer 
Squadron 5.9 
Blue carrier aircraft were to attack the reported Purple surface forces and scout 
for any additional Purple surface forces to the west and south at dawn on 26 Au-
gust. HTF-1 was to remain outside the reach of Purple carrier-based air. BC as-
sumed that Purple surface forces would be reduced in strength by his carrier air 
strikes and that a detached surface force would have been detected and dealt with. 
He also assumed that no undetected Purple surface forces were within threaten-
ing distance of HTF-1 since searches had come up negative. Additionally, he envi-
sioned a daylight battle, good weather (aircraft could fly and smoke would lie), and 
encounters with high-speed Purple submarines. He planned to have his battle line 
initially engage the Purple battle line at extreme range and close as rapidly as pos-
sible to between eighteen and twenty-two thousand yards, and then again to mod-
erate ranges in conjunction with destroyer torpedo attacks. The battle line would 
provide its own Air Spot and Inner Anti-Submarine Patrol. The Center Force was 
to scout the enemy and report its dispositions, then retire and join the Van as re-
inforcement. The Right Flank Force, if in the Van, would defend the battle line 
against Purple light-force attacks. The Right Flank cruisers were also to support the 
destroyer torpedo attacks against the Purple battle line when the range closed to 
twenty thousand yards. Cruiser planes were to furnish the Air Spot and Intermedi-
ate Anti-Submarine Patrol. The Right Flank Force, if in the Rear, would defend the 
formation from Purple light forces.10
If the Left Flank Force found itself in the Van, it would also defend the 
Blue battle line against Purple light-force attacks. Otherwise, it was to defend 
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against those light-force attacks from the Rear. The Carrier Group would 
furnish its own antisubmarine and combat air patrols as well as the com-
bat air patrol for the battle line. It was additionally to coordinate air strikes 
against the Purple battle line. After deployment, 
it would operate on the disengaged side of the 
Blue battle line—outside the main-battery gun 
range but within supporting distance of HTF-
1—so as to give it air cover. If that was not feasi-
ble, the Carrier Group was to detach one battle 
carrier with an escort to join and operate with 
the Blue Escort Force. The direction of the de-
ployment would be signaled and all planes were 
to report and attack all submarines that had 
been sighted and could be struck. Rear Admiral 
BF, Commander, Battleline, was designated as 
second in command in BB-58. CTF 11 was em-
barked in BB-57.11
All units were to maintain radio silence but 
not after contact. Radio frequencies consisted 
of numerous functional circuits, including a 
Talk Between Ships Emergency Tactical Voice 
Circuit, a Task Group Commanders Voice Command Channel, and a Task 
Force Common Circuit. There were also the Inter-Fighter Director and Tac-
tical Voice Circuits for the battle line, the Center Force, the Right and Left 
Flank Forces, and the Carrier Group. Addition-
ally, there were General Warning Voice, Air 
Spot, Air Search and Airborne Early Warning, 
Fighter Director, Strike Control, and Task Force 
Combat Air Patrol Common Circuits. There 
was no radar silence, and all ships and aircraft 
were to have their Identification Friend or Foe 
transponders on. Guard ships were also to have 
their interrogator-responder units on and ready 
for actuation at all times. BB-58 and BB-59, as 
well as heavy cruisers CA-130 and CA-131, were 
designated as radar intercept guard ships. The 
two fast battleships, along with CA-73, -74, -75, 
and -95, were designated as radio intercept guard ships. As was standard pro-
cedure, the Plan put the control of radar jamming and radio deception under 
the Officer in Tactical Command.12
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The Blue Staff Solution to the Problem
The Blue Staff Solution to the Problem reiterated that by 1930 on 25 August, radar 
contact had been made on a large Purple force. As the contact had been made 
by a carrier-based AEW aircraft from a distance of about eighty-five miles, it was 
inferred that the information might be considerably in error. An attack cargo ship 
from HTF-1 had been sunk the day before by submarine attack. Purple had about 
sixty modern, high-speed submarines in Far Eastern waters when hostilities com-
menced, some on patrol in the Central Pacific. As of 1930, the Purple force was 455 
miles distant and bearing 335 degrees true from his flagship, which was by this time 
at 31°10ʹ N, 165°55ʹ E. Admiral BC assumed that his force was known to Purple, 
a bogey having been reported at 335, 105 miles. Since Convoy HTF-1 and the Es-
cort Force were only thirty-five miles to the south, their positions were presumably 
known as well. His current position was outside the effective range of both Blue and 
Purple land-based airpower.13 
He interpreted his orders to ensure the safe arrival of Convoy HTF-1 in Tokyo at 
the earliest possible date as meaning without either serious damage or undue delay. 
The Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet had assigned nearly all combatant 
forces available to this mission. In light of his orders and the strength of his forces, 
Admiral BC discarded the option of withdrawing his force to the protection of air 
cover that was available to the southwest. Instead, he had to take positive action 
against the Purple forces that were coming into range. If he had to divert HTF-1, 
that diversion could only be temporary. He could, however, consider his mission 
successful if he merely drove off the Purple forces rather than destroying them, 
as long as they did not continue to threaten the convoy. If Purple forces remained 
within threatening range, however, Admiral BC would be forced to destroy them. 
The Purple force just reported did not yet pose a potential threat to the convoy but 
it could within a few hours, so its destruction would be his immediate objective. 
(Pages 2–4.)
Formal factors of the Situation that could possibly affect his own Course of Ac-
tion were Relative Combat Power, Reinforcements, Time and Space, Hydrography, 
Weather, Moonlight and Daylight Periods, and Logistics. As concerned Relative 
Combat Power, he had several sources of information. First, intelligence reports 
listed Purple combatants in Far Eastern waters on 10 August as the three fleet car-
riers, three fast battleships, six heavy cruisers, and four squadrons of destroyers 
reported above. Second, air reconnaissance of Kashiwabara on 14 August revealed 
“many combatant” types, definitely including two fleet carriers and three fast bat-
tleships. Third, a Blue submarine patrolling off Kashiwabara had reported the de-
parture at 1000 on 25 August of a Purple force of ten large and twenty small ships. 
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet surmised that this was the only Purple force at 
sea in the Pacific and his AEW plane report of nine large and twenty small ships 
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was close to the mark. Considering all these reports, Vice Admiral BC deduced that 
Purple had at sea at least two or three fast battleships, two or three fleet carriers, 
four to six heavy cruisers, and sixteen to twenty destroyers. He limited the estimat-
ed number of Purple destroyers to twenty because of these reports, because Purple’s 
preparations for additional amphibious operations would require destroyers, and 
because he knew that Purple had only about thirty-six destroyers in the Far East. 
Admiral BC surmised that Purple might have an additional force of one to three 
large ships and four destroyers. He took all these numbers into account in case his 
aircraft report was inaccurate. If a second force was present, it had probably sailed 
with the first force that had been sighted and could not now be more than a few 
hundred miles south of the initial contact. Still, because Purple was limited in its 
number of destroyers, Admiral BC thought it doubtful that a second force existed. 
Nevertheless, he could not entirely discount the possibility until more concrete in-
formation was received. (Pages 5–6.)
Purple’s carriers were known to carry about a hundred aircraft, of which about 
fifty-five were fighters. The fighters included night fighters, and the carrier comple-
ments included attack, AEW, and tactical electronic-warfare planes. If Purple had 
three fleet carriers, Blue had about twenty more fighters and forty-five more at-
tack planes. If Purple only had two fleet carriers, Admiral BC’s superiority would 
be about seventy-five fighters and ninety-five attack planes, respectively. He also 
estimated that the Purple fleet carriers carried about the same 
number of night fighter, AEW, and tactical electronic-warfare 
planes as did his battle carriers. In total, if he had three carriers 
to Purple’s two, he would have 381 planes compared with two 
hundred. If numbers of carriers were even, he would still have 
381 aircraft to Purple’s three hundred. (Pages 6–7.) 
Since Blue submarines were on combat and reconnais-
sance patrols in the Yellow Sea, the Sea of Japan, and the Kuriles but were go-
ing to be rerouted away from his forces, Vice Admiral BC assumed that any 
submarines encountered would be enemy ones. He understood that on about 
10 August, Purple’s sixty high-speed submarines were on patrol in the Hawai-
ian, Central Pacific, and Aleutian areas but his information about the location 
and employment of Purple submarines was limited to that and the fact that his 
forces had been attacked the previous day. He had no means of estimating the 
number of Purple submarines deployed against him but had to assume that it 
was substantial. He also surmised that these submarines were deployed at or 
near focal points on his route and that Purple would have had “ample” time to 
concentrate them. If Purple’s surface and submarine forces were operating in 
tactical concentration, he thought it probable that the submarines would be de-
ployed in the Van of Purple surface ships, so as to avoid mutual interference. If 
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Purple submarines were operating independently, he assumed that Purple would 
follow the World War II German pattern of concentrating wolf packs along the 
convoy route, especially in midocean, where Blue land-based airpower would be 
minimal. (Pages 7–8.)
Certain characteristics of the Purple submarines were worthy of special consid-
eration. In particular, the maximum speed on the surface of Purple’s Type A sub-
marine was only sixteen knots and the submerged speed eighteen knots. The Type 
B submarine was capable of only eleven knots on the surface but twenty-four knots 
submerged. The submerged endurance of a Type A was 365 miles at five knots, 170 
miles at eight knots, 110 miles at ten knots, and twenty-two miles at eighteen knots. 
The submerged endurance of a Type B was 224 miles at fifteen knots and 158 miles 
at twenty-four knots. Both types had very extensive ranges when submerged on 
a schnorchel, but their maximum speed when operating in this manner was only 
seven knots. He concluded that the Type A submarines could not make an end run 
around his convoy and that Type B could do so only when submerged. In view of 
the limited endurance of the Type B at high submerged speed, he regarded this pos-
sibility as remote; he deduced that his losses in submarine waters would be propor-
tional to the time he spent in those waters: “My losses may be held to a minimum 
by ‘bulling through’ submarine infested waters.” (Pages 8–9.)
Rear Admiral BC’s midocean position, outside the effective range of friendly 
land-based air, was also outside the range of Purple land-based aircraft operating 
out of the Kurile Islands. An advance of about six hundred miles to the westward 
would bring his forces within range of Blue land-based air on Honshu, but after 
advancing only about five hundred miles his force would be within range of Purple 
land-based air on Etorofu, in the Kuriles. These latter aircraft were believed to be 
similar to Blue PBM Mariners so they would not constitute a serious threat at a 
distance of more than 750 miles. Still, they were capable of patrol operations out 
to a thousand miles. The naval patrol land-based air support available to him was 
questionable. The 20th Army Air Force had suffered serious losses and its combat 
tasks might preclude any assistance to Admiral BC’s forces. 
Also, unless additional atomic bombs were flown separately 
into Japan, the 20th Army Air Force would not have any until 
TF 11 arrived. Accordingly, he did not consider land-based 
airpower to be a decisive factor in the upcoming operations. 
(Pages 9–10.)
BC considered his battle carriers to be capable of higher 
sustained speed than Purple’s fleet carriers and superior in 
their ability to withstand damage and put up antiaircraft fire. He also considered 
the two forces equal in operating efficiency. He additionally considered his force 
generally equal to Purple in numbers of battleships; that was true also of heavy 
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cruisers, with a possible difference of one ship either way. His 
antiaircraft cruiser merely augmented his destroyers in air and 
torpedo defense and in antisubmarine work; having no tor-
pedoes, it was of small value for offensive purposes in a fleet 
engagement. Finally, in the absence of more information, he 
assumed that all of Purple’s destroyers were equipped similarly 
to his of the 692 class, with ten torpedoes each. (Pages 10–12.) 
Admiral BC also took his destroyers to be quite similar to 
Purple’s in general performance but calculated that the Purple 
destroyers had about two hundred torpedoes to his 160, while 
he had at least three and possibly seven more destroyers than Purple. Further, he 
had more five-inch guns in his light forces for defense against destroyer torpedo at-
tacks than did his adversary. In addition, Blue Destroyer Division 51, four Gearing-
class destroyers, was equipped with the latest radar, radar countermeasures, and 
Combat Information Centers, factors that he thought made 
these ships particularly well suited as radar pickets. (Page 13.) 
In terms of antiaircraft weapons, Admiral BC had 320 five-
inch guns in TF 11; Purple might have as many as 298 simi-
lar guns or as few as 208. His 40 mm guns numbered 996 to 
Purple’s estimated 664–948. 
No reinforcements would be available to either side. Still, 
there was a possibility that “unaccounted for” Purple forces 
could be within supporting distance of the reported Purple 
force, but the Purple commander would gain nothing by di-
viding his limited surface forces. Admiral BC planned on guarding against that 
possibility, but he was confident that the reported Purple force was the only one 
out there. (Page 13.)
The factors of time and space were important. The need for the reinforcement 
in Japan was urgent and delay would allow Purple to de-
ploy submarines more effectively. In addition, he wanted to 
come within Blue land-based air range as soon as possible. 
The Purple Striking Force was now about five hundred miles 
north-northwest of HTF-1. At twenty-five knots, it could be 
about 210 miles from the convoy at 0430, if the convoy and 
its escorts continued on 280 degrees at fifteen knots. Purple 
torpedo planes were thought to have a radius of 425 miles at 
130 knots true airspeed, assuming equal distances flown both 
before and after dropping the torpedo. To simplify calculations, he assumed the 
Purple torpedo planes could fly a total of 850 miles at 130 knots—that is, for 6.54 
hours. Assuming a wind component of twelve knots along the planes’ track and a 
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(Purple) carrier speed of twenty-five knots, he thought that 
these planes had to fly 4.17 hours out at ninety-three knots 
relative speed and 2.37 hours back at 167 knots relative speed. 
In the same way, with their carrier closing at thirty knots, the 
times would be 4.3 hours out and 2.24 hours back. With Blue 
forces on course 225 degrees, Purple planes under present 
wind conditions could close at 109 knots in a 4.17-hour run 
if they were launched at 456 miles from Blue and a 4.3-hour 
run if launched 470 miles from Blue. With the Purple carriers 
closing at twenty-five knots and Blue forces still on course 225 
degrees, Purple could close to 456 miles from the Blue forces by about 2155; an at-
tack launched at that time could not reach Admiral BC’s forces before 0205. Under 
the same conditions, an attack launched against TF 11 at 1945 would arrive at about 
2355. (Page 14.)
With the enemy carriers closing at thirty knots and with Blue forces still on 
course 225 degrees, Purple could launch an attack as early as 2040, with the strike 
arriving over TF 11 at about 0058. An attack against TF 11, in other words, could 
be launched almost immediately and arrive shortly before midnight. He stressed, 
however, that Purple would have to continue its course and speed after launching 
and until its planes were back on board. If Blue forces turned south, Purple would 
have to close to 430 miles if it steamed at twenty-five knots or 443 miles if at thir-
ty knots to launch a torpedo attack. At twenty-five knots, the Purple commander 
could close TF 11 to 430 miles by 0200 but an attack launched at that time could 
not reach the Blue forces during darkness. At thirty knots, the Purple commander 
could close to 443 miles by 2300 and attack at that time so as to see the strike arrive 
over TF 11 at about 0320. (Page 15.)
Admiral BC acknowledged that his analysis deliberately stretched the Purple 
torpedo planes’ capabilities slightly to allow for maximum possible launching 
ranges. Therefore, it appeared that by turning Task Force 11 south during the night, 
he could preclude the possibility of a night torpedo attack unless Purple detached 
one or more carriers to close him at thirty knots. Even in that case, he surmised that 
an attack could not be made prior to 0320 and that the Purple force would have to 
continue to approach TF 11 at thirty knots until about 0530 to recover its planes. 
By turning TF 11 slightly toward the Purple Striking Force shortly before dawn, he 
thought that he could be well within a 335-mile striking range by 0500 and launch 
a full strike against the Purple carriers. He admitted, however, that his analysis did 
not include one-way or suicide missions by Purple, which were possible at Purple’s 
present distance from TF 11. (Pages 15–16.)
To facilitate antisubmarine and combat air patrols for TF 11, Admiral BC want-
ed his carriers to remain as close as they could to Convoy HTF-1. At distances 
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between the convoy and the Blue Covering Force up to thirty miles, it was prac-
ticable for a combat air patrol to protect effectively both forces. At distances up 
to 150 miles, it was considered practicable to maintain a combat air patrol and 
antisubmarine patrol over the convoy, with reliefs on station every two to two and 
a half hours. (Page 16.)
His air search to the northeast would cover the area from which a second but 
smaller Purple force would have to approach in order to close to within air strike 
range before midday on the next day. He was again assuming here that Blue forces 
could advance west and south at fifteen knots. He did not think that the air search 
entirely eliminated the possibility of a second Purple force to the west; a second 
force might in fact remain undetected and be within striking range of HTF-1 at 
dawn in the sector between southwest and northwest. Given these considerations 
of time and space, he concluded that he had to eliminate the possibility of a second 
force to the west by a search launched prior to 0100. He also determined that a 
change of course to the south was necessary to avoid aerial torpedo attacks at night. 
Admiral BC additionally thought that he could safely resume his westerly course at 
dawn and that, given his air superiority, he could interpose the Blue Covering Force 
at such a distance from Convoy HTF-1 that effectively precluded Purple strikes on 
it. If tracking the enemy force at night disclosed that it was not attempting to close 
his force, he could resume his westerly course without danger of a night torpedo 
attack. (Pages 16–17.) 
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XVIII Operations Problem 2J
The Blue Solution Continued and Concluded,  
October–November 1946
Admiral BC expected effective sonar ranges of 1,500 to two thousand yards in the area of operations. With a “fairly calm” sea—which existed at pres-ent—1,500 yards was a “fairly safe” prediction. Surface sea temperatures 
would be about 79 degrees Fahrenheit, and no change was expected in these condi-
tions for the next twenty-four hours. He therefore concluded that the conditions 
were favorable for Purple submarine operations, in that the time available for his 
surface escorts to conduct an attack after making sonar contact on a high-speed 
submerged submarine would be “extremely short.”1
The direction of the wind was favorable to Purple, in that its commander could 
close Task Force 11 while both launching and recovering aircraft, though the radius 
of action of his planes was reduced by the necessity of carrying heavy bomb loads 
against a headwind. By the same token, Blue would have difficulty closing Purple 
but would have the advantage of a tailwind when planes were loaded. Clear vis-
ibility and unlimited ceiling would be an advantage for Purple if the Purple com-
mander contemplated night torpedo attacks. Clear visibility, however, would assist 
fighter interception for both sides. He also thought that the advantages of a smooth 
sea for submarines and for the antisubmarine units were about equal. Smooth 
seas, for instance, introduced temperature gradients that enhanced a submarine’s 
chances for an undetected approach at periscope depth or deep. The same sea con-
ditions, however, enhanced visual or radar detection of a submarine near the sur-
face. (Pages 17–18.)
As concerned daylight and dark periods, sunset on the 25th was 1700, while 
sunrise on the 26th was 0445. Moonrise on the 25th was 2200 and moonset on 
the 26th was 1200. The moon was in its last quarter with a nineteen-degree north 
declination. Admiral BC had been concerned over Purple night air attacks and now 
grew even more so given the clear visibility during daylight and the illumination 
provided by the moon at night. The overall advantage was still with the attacker. 
Night aerial torpedo attacks against targets silhouetted against a low moon were 
far more likely to be successful then were interceptions of the attacking aircraft by 
night fighters. Considering the advantages that accrued to the defense from forcing 
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a submarine to remain submerged, however, illumination from the moon was a de-
cided disadvantage for the Purple submarines. He assumed that Purple submarine 
radar was sufficiently developed to provide all the target information required but 
that conditions permitting visual observation would aid the defense more. 
If the action was not prolonged, he did not think that logistics would become 
an important factor. All of TF 11’s ships had been topped off that morning, and 
Convoy HTF-1’s escorts had been fueled the day before. However, since the Purple 
Striking Force had departed Kashiwabara only two days ago, Admiral BC assumed 
that the enemy’s logistics situation was favorable too. (Pages 18–19.) 
Vice Admiral BC saw his own forces as superior in total numbers of aircraft. In 
addition, he had aircraft carriers that were capable of higher sustained speed and 
better able to resist damage. Because of his greater number of planes, he also saw 
his force as superior in terms of antiaircraft defense and ability to retain fighters 
for defense in an exchange of air strikes. He additionally had the superiority of 
having an antiaircraft cruiser, having at least three more destroyers than Purple, 
and perhaps having as many as seven more destroyers. Blue’s bombers could carry 
bomb loads farther owing to tailwinds en route to the target. Weaknesses included 
a lack of freedom of action due to the necessity of protecting the convoy and the 
need to get it to Japan as soon as possible. He also had to use some of his strike 
aircraft in a search role, had to maintain antisubmarine and combat air patrols over 
both his own force and HTF-1, and faced poor sonar conditions in which to try 
to detect Purple submarines. Purple’s strengths included an unknown number of 
high-speed submarines and unlimited freedom of action and initiative. Purple also 
might have forces yet unlocated by Blue, whereas Purple knew the locations of all 
of Blue’s forces. A predominant southeast wind permitted Purple to close with Blue 
while conducting flight operations, and weather and visibility conditions favored 
submarine and night air attacks. Purple surface forces also had sustained speeds 
ten knots faster than the Blue convoy, and Purple had a possible superiority of forty 
torpedoes in its destroyers. However, Purple was inferior in terms of its number of 
aircraft and in light forces, and it had to accomplish its mission in the next two days 
or be subjected to land-based air attack. (Page 20.)
Admiral BC concluded that the Purple strengths most likely to be decisive were 
the offensive power of its submarines and the fact that the Purple commander had 
such freedom of action and initiative. He expected these factors to be most “skill-
fully” exploited by Purple. Blue factors most likely to be decisive were its air supe-
riority and the opportunity to exploit that superiority under favorable conditions. 
The distance separating the Blue and Purple forces should, he thought, enable 
him to avoid combat during the night, and once his force came under the protec-
tion of Blue land-based air forces, six hundred miles to the west, Purple would 
be forced to act under unfavorable conditions. Although he considered himself 
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greatly handicapped by the need to protect HTF-1, he thought that his forces were 
adequate and that conditions were favorable to the accomplishment of his mission. 
(Page 21.)
Looking at things from Purple’s viewpoint, and given its past success in the em-
ployment of secret agents in Blue territory, Admiral BC assumed that Purple’s in-
telligence on the movement of Blue forces was excellent. He also assumed that the 
importance of the prompt and safe arrival of his convoy in Japan was known to 
Purple. The commander of the Purple forces to the north was in a position to force 
an engagement that might conceivably result in the destruction of HTF-1, which 
would “greatly enhance” Purple’s prosecution of the war. The Purple commander 
had also to be aware of the superiority of Admiral BC’s forces, with the exception 
of submarines. The Purple commander, he thought, would therefore be counting 
heavily on Blue’s lack of knowledge concerning the location and employment of 
the Purple submarines. The Purple commander’s actions would be influenced by 
time and space considerations. In the Purple Estimate, it would be vital to prevent 
BC’s forces from getting into range of Blue land-based air. Moreover, Purple could 
not be certain that Blue land-based air in Japan had expended all its atomic bombs. 
BC accordingly thought it logical that Purple’s inferior force would attempt to gain 
equality or superiority by attrition attacks, especially by the tactical concentration 
of its high-speed submarines. In any case, he surmised that Purple had to realize 
that its force would be more and more at risk the closer that Admiral BC’s forces got 
to Japan and that this reality would force Purple into early offensive efforts. (Pages 
22–23.)
Admiral BC saw Purple’s first task to be to attack the Blue Covering Force so 
as to get at Convoy HTF-1. BC listed Purple’s inferable capabilities in terms of 
destroying Blue forces by either submarine, air, or surface attack, or in combina-
tion. Admiral BC’s primary and only mission being protection of HTF-1, he had 
no speed advantage over Purple and could only close with Purple surface forces 
if the latter desired an engagement. Also, given his inferior speed, he could not 
evade Purple forces; he had to destroy them or drive them off. Under these circum-
stances, Admiral BC had to let Purple take the initiative. Purple submarine attacks 
seemed the primary threat to the Blue forces. He did not see Purple surface and air 
forces, in theory at least, as sufficiently strong to overwhelm the Covering Force 
and destroy HTF-1. In contrast, a large number of Purple’s high-speed submarines 
could inflict serious damage on TF 11, and lacking positive intelligence, he had to 
assume that these submarines would be employed to the maximum of their capa-
bilities and that there had been ample time to concentrate them along the convoy 
route. (Pages 23–26.)
The best defense against submarine attack would be, in view of the superior 
effectiveness of the Purple submarines, to prevent them from gaining favorable 
 334 BLUE VERSUS PURPLE
attack positions. It followed that Purple’s ability to exploit the offensive strength 
of its submarines was largely dependent on its present position relative to the Blue 
forces. Admiral BC thought it advisable to change course south to 180 degrees true; 
he could hold a southerly course until dawn before resuming his westerly head-
ing. He did not see this course change delaying his arrival in Japan for more than 
thirteen hours. He now revisited his antisubmarine air searches. Search Plan Love 
was now being flown, entailing 360-degree coverage by twenty-four Helldiver at-
tack planes to a distance of 150 miles in the Van and on the flanks, forty miles 
astern. These planes were each loaded with two 350-pound depth charges and had 
orders to conduct hold-down tactics in the event of submarine contacts. The over-
all purpose was to prevent Purple submarines from approaching Blue forces on 
the surface. The difficulty of detecting submarines employing the schnorchel, espe-
cially at night, was admitted, but submarines so deployed could not exceed seven 
knots and would not be able to overtake the Blue convoy at that speed. Moreover, 
the Purple submarines, with their short submerged, high-speed endurance, could 
attack his convoy only from favorable initial positions. By changing his course to 
the south, Vice Admiral BC also prevented Purple from launching an effective air 
strike against Blue forces at night. He was similarly limited against Purple surface 
forces but this turn gave him the advantage of continuing to employ his attack 
planes on antisubmarine patrols. He thought his diversion to the south, therefore, 
would keep his losses to Purple submarines to a minimum. (Pages 26–28.)
After the Purple submarine strikes, the threat of Purple air attacks was consid-
ered the most dangerous. Because the two forces were still 460 miles apart, nothing 
but one-way attacks were currently possible. Since Blue forces had a superiority 
of at least eighty planes and possibly 180 over Purple carrier air forces, Admiral 
BC thought he should be able to inflict more damage on Purple than Purple did 
on him. He had to maintain combat air patrols over both the Covering Force and 
Convoy HTF-1 as well as extensive air antisubmarine patrols but he was going to 
abandon the latter if he had the opportunity to launch an “effective” strike against 
Purple. If he was to launch such a strike and prevent Purple from doing the same 
against him, continuous accurate information on the enemy had to be obtained 
and a condition of readiness for rapid launching of strike aircraft had to be main-
tained. He thought that he could obtain the necessary intelligence on Purple forces 
by keeping three airborne-early-warning aircraft in position as snoopers to track 
the Purple force. These aircraft were to be provided with a fighter escort during the 
day. (Pages 28–29.) 
Admiral BC assumed that Purple’s substantial air attacks would wait until it had 
eroded Blue air superiority by attrition attacks in the form of submarine and one-
way air strikes. Purple might have submarines pick up aircrews that ditched after 
the attacks. To maximize their possibilities of these strikes, Purple would, Admiral 
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BC thought, coordinate them from a direction somewhat north of west within two 
or three hours of moonrise. Therefore, Blue forces would have to maintain a strong 
nighttime combat air patrol and adequate AEW picket coverage. Another possibility 
for employing Purple air strength was to use that strength for purposes of deception 
in an effort to draw Blue forces through submarine waters. Since Purple submarines 
could not conduct an end run around the Blue forces if the latter maintained course 
and speed, Purple might try in this way to get Blue to change course and speed so 
as to enable the Purple submarines to take up attack positions. Therefore, Admiral 
BC planned instead on maintaining course and speed and traversing submarine wa-
ters as quickly as possible. His air superiority would more than offset the Purple air 
threat and inflict “disproportionate” damage on Purple. (Page 29.) 
The possibility of a surface engagement between Blue and Purple forces ap-
peared remote to Admiral BC but he had to consider it. If Purple submarine and 
air attacks reduced Blue air superiority through the destruction or damage of BC’s 
carriers, further submarine, air, and surface action could bring further destruction 
on the Blue Covering Force and Convoy HTF-1. If, however, he could prevent the 
initial damage, Admiral BC was certain that initial Purple failure would preclude 
a second, surface phase. Given the possible scenarios for a surface engagement, 
Admiral BC did not foresee any surface action until such time as carrier-based air 
on both sides had been eliminated or reduced to “impotency.” He also assumed that 
ample time was available for modification or preparation of new surface-action 
plans in that case. Blue forces would not be diverted, and the necessity of interpos-
ing his surface forces between HTF-1 and the enemy would result in a normal ac-
tion. He therefore devised three possible Plans of Action. Plan No. 1 assumed that 
combatant surface strength had not been reduced, except in carriers. Given his lack 
of definitive information on Purple forces, he could not make detailed evaluation 
of Purple strengths and weaknesses under this plan but he felt he had to consider 
Purple using part of its surface forces as a decoy to draw off the major Blue strength 
and then engage the convoy with the remaining majority of its surface forces. Here, 
battleship and cruiser scout planes would be most useful in limited search mis-
sions. (Pages 29–31.)
Under Plan No. 2, Blue surface strength was still superior. Under this scenario, 
Admiral BC could expect Purple to take advantage of all conditions or circum-
stances to neutralize Blue superiority, even seeking engagement at night or in 
reduced visibility. Efforts to evade the Covering Force and attack HTF-1 direct-
ly would be intensified, and the offensive capabilities of Purple submarines that 
could be brought into position would be exploited to the fullest. Under Plan No. 
3—in which the remaining Blue surface forces were inferior—Admiral BC would 
be forced to fight a retirement action to protect HTF-1 to the limit of the Blue 
Covering Force’s remaining capabilities. Admiral BC would try to hold a westerly 
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course and would request a strike mission from Commander, 20th Army Air Force. 
He did not think that even in this scenario he would be inferior in light forces and 
he would entertain the thought of employing his destroyers in night attacks. He 
also had to consider that Purple might be able to coordinate its submarine and air 
attacks; he thought, however, that Purple could not coordinate all weapons simul-
taneously without first negating some portion of the Blue force and, ultimately, 
that Purple coordination of its forces could not prevent him from carrying out 
his mission. Still, he had to make provision for damaged ships. Any damaged ship 
capable of fifteen knots could join the convoy; others were to be sent to Guam or 
Eniwetok with a suitable escort, under tow if necessary. Air cover and tugs were to 
be requested from Guam or Eniwetok. (Page 32.) 
In approaching his Complementary Problems, Admiral BC noted the tasks that 
had to be performed by his aircraft: antisubmarine operations, the search for and 
tracking of enemy surface forces, AEW patrols, defense against air attack, and the 
destruction of enemy surface forces by air attack. He understood that his air an-
tisubmarine and air strike tasks were in conflict in that extensive employment of 
aircraft for antisubmarine use would reduce the number available for strikes. How-
ever, in view of the serious threat posed by Purple submarines and because of the 
unlikelihood of Purple surface forces coming within air striking range until Blue 
air superiority was reduced by Purple submarine and one-way air attacks, Vice Ad-
miral BC was going to subordinate his air strike requirements, at least for the time 
being. He did, however, have to maintain an accurate track of Purple surface forces 
and be ready to launch strong air strikes when the opportunity presented itself. 
(Page 33.)
In terms of air antisubmarine operations, Admiral BC considered the chief val-
ue of his aircraft to be one of interference with attempts by Purple submarines to 
approach his forces. If he could force the Purple submarines to remain submerged, 
he might destroy them by air attack. More importantly, he thought, hold-down 
tactics would interfere to some extent with submarine communications. 
Accordingly, he planned to use two types of antisubmarine patrols. Plan A en-
tailed Search Plan Love, already described. These planes were to be launched at 
two-and-a-half-hour intervals. Plan B was a close-in antisubmarine patrol during 
daylight hours to a distance of thirty to forty miles outside the screens of both Task 
Force 11 and HTF-1. Twelve to eighteen Avenger attack planes would be airborne 
for this purpose during daylight hours. He planned to cancel this patrol if a Purple 
air attack was probable. In case of enemy air attacks while antisubmarine planes 
were airborne, these planes would be informed of the attack and directed to pro-
ceed immediately at minimum altitude to a distance of at least seventy-five miles 
from either Blue surface force. (Pages 33–34.) 
Admiral BC planned to keep three AEW planes aloft during the night, launch-
ing them at three-hour intervals. These planes would employ snooper tactics, 
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especially low-altitude flying to avoid interception. He realized that these tactics 
were inconsistent with the task of early warning but he thought that his planes 
could still detect Purple carrier flight operations. At dawn, these planes would re-
tire to a safe distance, and four additional AEW planes—each with four fighters as 
escorts—would be employed during daylight hours. One of these planes would re-
main generally southeast of the present contact and at maximum effective tracking 
range while a second would remain southwest of the contact at the same range. The 
remaining two would be stationed 150 miles from TF 11, twenty degrees to either 
side of the general bearing. One of these two planes would be at twenty thousand 
feet and the other at ten thousand, alternating altitude assignments at two-hour 
intervals to relieve the crews on oxygen. To eliminate the possibility of a second 
Purple surface force going undetected, Admiral BC would also launch a reinforced 
X-RAY search out to a distance of four hundred miles between bearings 240 degrees 
and 312 degrees at 0115. For this search, he would employ eighteen fighters and 
nine attack planes, each attack plane protected by two fighters in each sector. This 
search would ensure the discovery of a second Purple force—if one existed—in 
time to launch air strikes against it at dawn. He also thought that his antisubmarine 
search would provide “ample” protection during the night against any attempted 
surprise surface attack. (Pages 34–35.)
BC did not think a Purple night air attack was very probable before about 0200. 
Still, he would launch four night fighters at 1945 for use against enemy search 
planes and snoopers, and at 0030 he would launch eight night fighters as a night 
combat air patrol, landing them at 0445. At dawn, he could then launch twenty-
four fighters for a day combat air patrol, which could be increased to forty-eight 
fighters if Purple air forces were within striking range. About seventy fighters— 
including those airborne—plus all the night fighters would be retained for defense 
when and if Blue day air strikes were launched. 
Related to the other uses of his airpower was the destruction of enemy surface 
forces themselves. He knew that if Purple approached within night striking range, 
Purple surface forces would be exposed at dawn to a strike by his carriers. There-
fore, he did not plan on launching any night air attacks but would retain all possible 
aircraft for day strikes. If Purple surface forces did approach to within air striking 
range, at dawn he would immediately launch the strongest possible air strike for 
the destruction of the Purple carriers. Antisubmarine patrols would be reduced 
or discontinued as necessary to utilize all “suitable” aircraft for strike operations. 
If the strike range was greater than 335 miles, Helldivers would be continued on 
their antisubmarine patrols. All carrier electronic-warfare aircraft would also be 
used; the primary targets would be the Purple carriers. These ships would be struck 
until sunk or so damaged that further Purple air operations were impossible. Be-
cause Purple cruisers and destroyers might raid the convoy, these ships would be 
the next targets. Admiral BC’s ability to launch repeated strikes, he knew, would 
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largely depend on the success of the initial strike and the effectiveness of his de-
fense against Purple air strikes. If he was able to eliminate Purple air strength, he 
could give antisubmarine operations first priority. (Page 35.) 
The employment of his surface forces would first involve the detection and de-
struction of the Purple submarines, followed by the destruction of Purple aircraft. 
The latter would involve early warning of air attacks by picket destroyers and as-
signed radar guard ships, fighter direction, and antiaircraft gunfire. Finally, his sur-
face forces would need to be ready to destroy Purple surface ships by gunfire. TF 11 
was disposed in Cruising Disposition 11-R, which employed all available destroyers 
in screening stations. While the twenty-three destroyers assigned to his command 
were not adequate, 11-R employed them to the maximum of their capabilities. The 
eccentric screen, centered two thousand yards ahead of the Disposition Center, was 
in the direction of the course and was designed to provide maximum protection 
against a forty-six-knot torpedo fired from a range of five thousand yards. Consid-
ering the high speed of Purple’s submarines and the low speed of his convoy, he did 
not think it was possible to achieve immunity from submarine attack from astern 
nor did he think that the frequent course reversals necessary to conduct air opera-
tions would improve matters. Antisubmarine tactics for his screening ships were 
based on the necessity of having one destroyer track a contact while it coached a 
second destroyer on to the target for the attack. Sonar contacts were to be plotted 
on a moving grid centered on the ship in contact, which would keep the attacking 
ship constantly informed of the target’s location by grid-square coordinates. Com-
munications were to be by VHF voice radio; aircraft of the Inner Anti-Submarine 
Patrol would guard this circuit and join in the attack. (Pages 36–37.)
The two-destroyer unit would remain with the contact only until TF 11 had 
reached a position such that the submarine was no longer in a position to attack. 
Harassing attacks and random depth charges were to be delivered to hamper the 
submarine’s fire control. In case of multiple sonar contacts, all of the destroyers in 
the vicinity would drop depth charges and take all measures to complicate the sub-
marines’ attack problem. This would result, he argued, in TF 11’s passing through 
submarine-infested waters as quickly as possible. These tactics had been rehearsed 
by TF 11’s screening ships and aircraft and a “high degree” of proficiency had been 
achieved. While these tactics were admittedly not adequate to preclude an effective 
submarine strike, BC thought they and his aircraft that were engaged in antisubma-
rine search and patrol would enable him to keep his losses from Purple submarines 
within “acceptable” limits. He therefore considered his antisubmarine arrange-
ments to be as complete as possible with the forces under his command. (Page 37.)
BC had deployed Destroyer Division 51—his radar-picket ships—in the anti-
submarine screen around his heavy ships rather than on the picket station. How-
ever, loss of his AEW planes would necessitate the employment of DESDIV 51 on 
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picket stations, and provisions were made for that in Cruising Disposition 11-R. 
Additional radar guards had been assigned to Task Force 11 so as to afford com-
plete radar coverage. Radar intercept and jamming assignments had also been 
made. All of TF 11’s heavy ships were capable of acting as standby fighter-direction 
ships, as were DESDIV 51’s. Additionally, air-sea rescue services by battleship and 
cruiser aircraft would be available upon request. (Pages 37–38.)
BC did not think it possible to formulate Surface Action Plans with any degree 
of assurance, since not all possible circumstances could be foreseen. Nevertheless, 
he promulgated three Surface Action Plans in “more or less” skeletal form based 
on the assumptions that Blue and Purple forces would be of about equal strength, 
that Blue forces would be superior to those of Purple, and that Blue forces would be 
inferior, respectively. It would be “simple” to make any necessary changes by signal 
or message. In view of the submarine threat, the Surface Action Plans would con-
template deployment directly from Cruising Disposition 11-R. He was prepared for 
a night action with Purple but preferred a day action. (Page 38.)
The Blue Board Maneuver now began. Rear Admiral BE (Commander Simonsen) 
continued in command of the Carrier Group, the three battle carriers from Carrier 
Division 2. Rear Admiral BF (Colonel Manzo) was now commanding the Heavy 
Support Group, which consisted of the three fast battleships from Battleship Divi-
sion 1 and the five heavy cruisers from Rear Admiral BG’s (Commander Rogers) 
Cruiser Division 1.2
Vice Admiral BC now surmised that since Purple carrier-based aircraft could 
not carry atomic bombs, Purple would employ one-way missions to deliver tor-
pedo attacks on the Blue carriers this night, strikes that would be aided by present 
weather conditions. He also surmised that Purple would offensively employ its sur-
face force sometime in the next thirty-six hours after Blue forces had been whittled 
down by air and submarine attrition attacks. (Page 40.)
The Heavy Support Group and Commodore BD’s (Commander Morton) 
Screen Group were to destroy enemy air and submarine forces as well as provide 
radar pickets, radar guard intercept, jamming, fighter direction, and air-sea rescue 
per current instructions and orders. When directed, the Heavy Support and Screen 
Groups were also to destroy Purple surface forces; all units were to employ Cruis-
ing Disposition 11-R, from which the Blue Covering Force would deploy. CTF 11 
was embarked in fast battleship BB-57 with the Heavy Support Group, and Rear 
Admiral BF, in fast battleship BB-58, was the second in command. (Page 41.)
In the Air Plan, Rear Admiral BE’s Carrier Group was again ordered to assist in 
destroying Purple submarine, air, and surface forces so as to ensure Convoy HTF-
1’s safe arrival in Japan. His three battle carriers specifically were to contribute by 
providing the early warning and air defense. The Carrier Group was to prioritize 
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Purple carriers, and Target Coordinators, who were assigned approach altitudes 
and were to devise the strike tactics, were to direct all air attacks to the enemy car-
riers until those ships were sunk or further Purple air operations were “unmistak-
ably” impossible. Targets for “Charlie Strikes” (see below) would be assigned by 
message. (Pages 42–45.)
Plan Able was laid down for strikes 335 to 370 miles distant. Strike A-1 was to 
consist of ninety-six fighter planes, each with two drop tanks and “window” (i.e., 
metal strips, “chaff,” to obscure the enemy radar image); forty-nine to seventy-two 
Avenger attack planes, each with two drop tanks and window, as well as one tor-
pedo; and twelve tactical electronic-warfare aircraft with radar-countermeasures 
equipment. All available Avenger attack planes were to be employed, even to the 
point of canceling antisubmarine patrols that involved these planes if they could 
be landed and rearmed in time to be used. Plan Baker was for strikes closer than 
335 miles. This strike, Strike B-1, was to employ fifty-two fighter planes, each with 
window and one or two drop tanks. 
In addition, there would be forty-eight to ninety-six Helldiver attack planes, 
each equipped with window and carrying one thousand-pound general-purpose 
bomb and a drop tank or, if the range permitted, one two-thousand-pound general- 
purpose bomb. There would again be twelve tactical electronic-warfare aircraft 
equipped with radar countermeasures. In Strike B-2, forty-eight fighters would 
have window, a drop tank, and a thousand-pound general-purpose bomb if the 
range permitted. Forty-nine to seventy-two Avenger attack planes would again be 
employed, this time with window, one or two drop tanks, and a torpedo each. All 
attack planes were again to be taken from antisubmarine search and patrol if they 
could be readied for the strike. Strike B-2 was to coordinate with Strike B-1 so as to 
begin just as the latter was finishing. Finally, Plan Charlie—for use after Purple air 
strength had been eliminated—was also divided into two types. Strike C-1 would 
see seventy-two fighters with maximum bomb and rocket loads used inside their 
target range, along with window. In addition, there would be thirty to sixty attack 
planes with window and either torpedoes or bombs, as ordered. Additionally, there 
would be six tactical electronic-warfare aircraft, again equipped with radar coun-
termeasures equipment. Strike C-2 had a similar composition. Charlie Strikes were 
seen as mopping-up attacks that employed all available aircraft to destroy the re-
maining Purple surface forces. Antisubmarine operations were to take precedence 
over Charlie Strikes unless otherwise ordered by the Officer in Tactical Command. 
(Pages 45–46.)
In Surface Action Plan No. 1, Rear Admiral BF’s Battleline consisted of the three 
fast battleships of Battleship Division 1 along with the four radar-picket destroyers 
from DESDIV 51. Commodore BD’s Right Flank Group consisted of heavy cruis-
ers CA-130 and CA-131, antiaircraft cruiser CLAA-95, and five destroyers from 
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DESDIV 131. Rear Admiral BG’s Left Flank Group was composed of CA-73, -74, 
and -75 as well as nine destroyers from DESRON 9. Finishing off this Task Orga-
nization were the three battle carriers of Rear Admiral BE’s CARDIV 2 and five 
destroyers from DESDIV 132, these units together now comprising the Air Support 
Group. In this scenario, Blue and Purple carrier-based air strength had both been 
substantially neutralized and Purple surface strength was about equal to Blue’s. In 
addition, Purple was attempting to evade the Blue Covering Force in order to de-
stroy HTF-1. When the Blue Covering Force interposed itself under these condi-
tions, it was assumed that a normal action would result. Therefore, the Blue Cover-
ing Force was to destroy the Purple force by a daylight surface engagement, initially 
at maximum gun range and then closing to decisive range when the Purple battle 
line had been reduced by gunfire and torpedo attacks. (Page 47.) 
Admiral BC’s battle line was to destroy the Purple battle line but keep itself 
between the Purple ships and HTF-1. It was to provide its own Air Spot and Anti-
Submarine Patrol as well as be prepared to destroy any detached Purple surface 
forces. The Right Flank Group was to hold position while the Left Flank Group 
defended the Blue battle line against Purple light forces opposite its own flank. The 
Fig. 138
Blue Covering Force Flight 
Plan, Operations Problem 
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Left Flank Group was also to attack the Purple battle line with torpedoes when 
favorable opportunities presented or when ordered to do so by the OTC. The Left 
Flank cruisers were to provide their own Air Spot and Anti-Submarine Patrol as 
well as be prepared to conduct limited air search missions when ordered by the 
OTC. The Carrier Group was to provide such air support as its material condi-
tion allowed, coordinating its air efforts with the attacks by the Left Flank Group. 
If incapable of further offensive action, the Carrier Group was to join HTF-1 and 
release DESDIV 132 for reassignment by the convoy OTC. (Pages 47–48.)
Surface Action Plan No. 2, an identical Task Organization, reflected the same 
assumption about Blue and Purple carrier airpower being mutually neutralized. 
Here, however, Purple was seeking a night action; its efforts to evade the Blue Cov-
ering Force would therefore involve the division of its forces. Thus, to ensure the 
safe arrival of Convoy HTF-1, Vice Admiral BC had to plan for a night surface en-
gagement. Specifically, his battle line would interpose itself between the Purple sur-
face striking group and HTF-1 and endeavor to destroy the Purple battle line. The 
Right Flank Group would again hold position while the Left Flank Group defended 
the Blue battle line from the Purple light forces opposite its own flank. As soon as 
the Blue and Purple battle lines were engaged, the Left Flank Group would also at-
tack the Purple battle line with torpedoes. The Carrier Group would again provide 
air support as its condition permitted and again coordinate that air support with 
the flank-group attacks. If incapable of air operations, the Carrier Group was again 
to join HTF-1, releasing DESDIV 132 for assignment by the OTC. (Pages 49–50.)
In Surface Action Plan No. 3, Commander, 20th Army Air Force was requested 
to strike the Purple forces with all available bombing aircraft. Again assuming the 
mutual neutralization of both Blue and Purple carrier air forces, in this case Purple 
surface forces would be superior to his and would close Blue as rapidly as possible 
in an attempt to destroy the Blue convoy by gun and torpedo fire. Admiral BC’s 
plan now would be to protect HTF-1 by a retirement action, presumably as TF 11 
came under the air umbrella of the 20th Army Air Force. The Blue Covering Force 
again was to keep itself interposed between the Purple forces and HTF-1. All weap-
ons capable of inflicting damage on Purple were to be exploited and preparations 
to launch nighttime light-force attacks were to be made. (Page 51.)
Student officers played CTF 11 as well as his Chief of Staff. Other roles to be 
filled were Commander, Battleline, who was also Commander, Battleship Division 
1 (Rear Admiral BF). Commander, Center Force wore a second hat as Command-
er, Destroyer Squadron 5 (Captain B-5—Commander Morton), and there was a 
separate officer in the Center Force to command CA-75 (Captain B-6—now Lieu-
tenant Colonel Leary). The student officer who played Commander, Right Flank 
Force was also Commander, Cruiser Division 1 (Rear Admiral BG—Commander 
Rogers); a second officer in this unit played Commander, Destroyer Squadron 13 
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(Captain B-13—now Commander White). Commander, Left Flank Force was also 
Commander, Destroyer Flotilla 1 (Commodore BD—Commander Morton); an-
other student officer commanded CA-130 and CA-131 (Captain B-4—also Lieu-
tenant Colonel Leary). Additionally, there was a Commander, Observation Aircraft 
(also Commander Simonsen); the Convoy Commodore (Rear Admiral BH—now 
Commander Webber); and Commander, Task Group 51.7, the Escort Force (Com-
modore BJ—also Commander Webber).3 
N O T E S  1 Junior Class of June 1947, “Operations Problem 2J: 
The Blue Staff Solution,” 21 November 1946, p. 17, 
folder 2604-O, box 139, RG 4, NHC. Subsequent 
in-text page references until the next endnote are  
to this source.
 2 Junior Class of June 1947, “Operations Problem 2J: 
Requirement B,” 20 November 1946, p. 39, folder 
2604-O, box 139, RG 4, NHC. Subsequent in-text 
page references until the next endnote are to this 
source.
 3 Junior Class of June 1947, “Operations Problem 2J: 
Board Maneuver,” 22 November 1946, p. 1, folder 
2604-L, box 139, RG 4, NHC.

XIX Operations Problem 2J
Purple, October–November 1946
Purple’s Statement of the Problem contained the same Schedule of Events, Objectives, and General Situation information, with the exception that Pur-ple did not know how many Blue Army divisions were assembling near San 
Francisco for embarkation to East Asia. Admiral PA, Commander-in-Chief of the 
Purple Pacific Fleet (no designated student officer), listed his forces as fast combat-
ant surface ships based at Kashiwabara; a submarine force based at Vladivostok, 
with a partially deployed advanced base at Kashiwabara; an amphibious force; a 
service force; a mine force; and his fleet air wings, based in the Kuriles. As a conse-
quence of the enforced delay in launching Purple’s invasion of Japan, Admiral PA 
issued Operation Plan No. 7-50 to Vice Admiral PB, Commander, Purple Striking 
Force (Commander Loveland—see chapter 9). Operation Plan No. 7-50 laid out 
the forces available to PB, namely, two fleet carriers from Carrier Division 1, three 
fast battleships from Battleship Division 1, four heavy cruisers from Cruiser Divi-
sion 3, and eighteen destroyers from Destroyer Squadrons 2 and 4. There were also 
six submarine tenders and sixty submarines from Submarine Squadrons 1, 2, 3, 4, 
5, and 7, all under the command of Rear Admiral PF (Commander O’Connell—
see chapter 9) and constituting the Submarine Force. Fleet units for the Attack 
Force, the Mine Force, the Service Force, and the fleet air wings had not yet been 
designated.1
The Purple Statement of the Problem
Blue atomic bomb strikes on Purple amphibious forces had severely damaged those 
forces, which were being reorganized for another invasion attempt. Blue reinforce-
ment of Japan might prevent an early Purple occupation of the Japanese home is-
lands. The Blue 20th Army Air Force in Japan still had one wing of Superfortress 
heavy bombers and six squadrons of fighters in an operational status. Admiral PA 
thought that all available atomic bombs had been expended on Purple forces. Nev-
ertheless, he knew that the Blue Joint Chiefs of Staff (no designated student offi-
cers) had ordered a reinforcement of the Blue occupation forces and that Blue air 
bases at Pearl Harbor, Johnston Island, Eniwetok, Guam, and Saipan were now fully 
operational, though the air bases at Wake and Marcus would not be activated for a 
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period of at least thirty days. He did not know about the status of the Blue air base 
at Iwo Jima but he did know that Guam was fully operational as an advanced fleet 
base and capable of supporting Blue surface and submarine forces to the extent of 
the tender facilities that were available there.2 
Additionally, Admiral PA knew that Blue surface forces had been concentrated 
in the Hawaiian area and that on 15 August they were estimated to be three bat-
tle carriers, three South Dakota–class fast battleships, eight Baltimore-class heavy 
cruisers, “about” five squadrons of destroyers, and “many” escort and transport 
ships. Minor surface forces of “negligible” combat strength were now at Guam, 
where two auxiliaries with submarines moored alongside had been spotted on 14 
August. Unidentified submarines that were probably Blue had been sighted in the 
vicinity of Vladivostok, Port Arthur, Tsingtao, the La Perouse Strait, and the Kuriles 
during July and early August. Admiral PA additionally informed Vice Admiral PB 
that Blue possessed a limited number of high-speed submarines whose character-
istics were similar to Purple’s. The Purple Far Eastern Air Force was to continue 
its neutralization of Blue air strength in Japan and the Aleutians in anticipation of 
Blue attempts to reinforce its occupation forces in Japan. This reinforcement effort 
was assumed to entail the transportation by sea of ground, service, and air forces; 
supplies; and munitions, the latter including an additional supply of atomic bombs. 
It was further assumed that Blue reinforcements would be staged through Pearl 
Harbor and would travel in “strongly protected” convoys. It was also assumed that 
considerations of time prevented Blue from sending its convoys on routes that were 
entirely under shore-based air cover. Additionally, Blue commitments in other the-
aters precluded substantial reinforcement of the Blue Pacific Fleet during the early 
phases of operations in the western Pacific.3
Accordingly, the Purple Pacific Fleet was to support the Purple occupation of 
Japan by preventing reinforcement by sea of Blue forces in Japan and by establish-
ing Purple Army forces ashore on the island of Honshu in order to extend Purple 
control over the northwestern Pacific area. When directed by Admiral PA, the At-
tack Force would establish Purple Army forces “firmly” ashore on Honshu, and the 
Striking Force would prevent Blue reinforcement by sea. The Purple Striking Force 
was to coordinate its operations with units of the Submarine Force, which was de-
ployed across the Hawaii–Japan sea routes. The fleet air wings were to locate, re-
port, and track enemy sea forces within the search radius of the Kurile Islands bases 
and destroy any Blue submarines encountered. The Submarine Force was also to 
locate, observe, and report on the operations of Blue sea forces in the Hawaiian, 
Central Pacific, and northwestern Pacific areas. It was to destroy enemy sea forces 
when the opportunity permitted in accordance with specific orders that were to be 
issued to the submarine units. The Submarine Force was additionally to assist the 
Striking Force in preventing Blue reinforcement of its occupation forces in Japan 
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by sea. Further, its submarines deployed across the Hawaii–Japan sea routes were 
to coordinate their operations with Commander, Striking Force when ordered by 
that officer.4
The Mine Force was to plant defensive minefields in accordance with the Mine 
Plan and provide minesweeping service in accordance with the Minesweeping Plan. 
It was also to provide antisubmarine patrols at the Purple fleet bases, while the Ser-
vice Force was to provide logistical services to Purple Pacific Fleet forces in accor-
dance with Purple Pacific Fleet Logistic Plan No. 2-50. Operation Plan No. 7-50 
was to become effective upon receipt and included charts that indicated submarine 
operating zones as well as zones with bombing and attack restrictions. Commander, 
Submarine Force was also to promulgate Submarine Notices to all commands con-
cerned with submarines departing from their assigned patrol areas. At the same 
time, task force commanders were to ensure that all surface ships so equipped made 
the required challenge on their sound gear in accordance with the Purple Recogni-
tion Manual when operating in Purple submarine patrol zones. Finally, Admiral PA 
would be at Fleet Headquarters, Vladivostok, during these operations.5
The Purple Chart Maneuver
The Chart Maneuver for Purple Section B began on 18 November 1946, starting 
with the student officer assignments for the maneuver. The Chart Maneuver had 
student officers playing the roles of Commander, Task Force 32, the Purple Strik-
ing Force (Vice Admiral PB—Commander Loveland), and of his Chief of Staff 
(Lieutenant Colonel Street—see chapter 9). In addition, there were student officers 
playing the roles of Commander, Carrier Group (Rear Admiral PD—Commander 
Owers [see chapter 9]); his Chief of Staff (Colonel Hawthorne—see chapter 9); 
and his Operations Officer (Commander Lundgren—see chapter 9). Student of-
ficers would also play COM CVG 1 (Commander Marvin-Smith—see chapter 9) 
and COM CVG 2 (Commander Church—see chapter 9). Additionally, there was 
a Commander, Support Group (Rear Admiral PE—also Commander Loveland); 
a Commander, Screen (Captain P-2—also Commander Loveland); and four stu-
dent officers for Task Force 34, the Submarine Force. These student officers played 
the Commander, Submarine Force (Rear Admiral PF—Commander O’Connell); 
Commander, Submarine Squadron 3 (also Commander O’Connell); Command-
er, Submarine Division 21 (Captain P-6—Commander Gillette [see chapter 9]); 
and Commander, Submarine Division 22 (Captain P-7—Lieutenant Commander 
Ramage [see chapter 9]).6 The Chart Maneuver itself entailed Air Action Plan No. 
1-50, which in turn revolved around a Task Organization of Rear Admiral PD’s 
Carrier Group, the two fleet carriers from Carrier Division 1; Rear Admiral PE’s 
Support Group, the three fast battleships from Battleship Division 1 and the four 
heavy cruisers from Cruiser Division 3; and Captain P-2’s Screen, the eighteen de-
stroyers from Destroyer Squadrons 2 and 4.7
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The General Situation revealed that the Purple invasion of the Japanese home 
islands was planned for 29 August, making Blue’s reinforcement of its occupation 
forces imperative before that date. The Blue forces were at 31ʹ10° N, 165ʹ55° E 
at 1930 on 25 August, on an estimated course of 273 degrees and at a speed of 
eighteen knots. This force was now identified as three Midway-class battle carriers, 
three South Dakota–class fast battleships, four or five Baltimore-class heavy cruis-
ers, and twenty-three Sumner-class destroyers. Another Blue convoy of thirty to 
forty fast auxiliaries, three to four heavy cruisers, eighteen to twenty-three destroy-
ers, and possibly some destroyer escorts was thirty-five miles to the south. By 1928, 
Vice Admiral PB knew from a reported bogey that Blue had sighted the Purple 
Striking Force.8
At the same time, Vice Admiral PB had SUBRONs 2 and 4 maintaining a patrol 
to the south of his present position with orders to coordinate their operations with 
his. He assumed that the Blue forces would maintain a speed of eighteen knots as 
well as a nighttime course between 225 and 270. By dawn, he expected Blue to be 
on a course between 270 and 280, by which time he also expected Blue to attempt 
an “all-out” daylight air strike on the Purple Striking Force if it was in range. He 
planned to have his force reduce Blue carrier strength during the night by air and 
submarine attacks to gain air parity or superiority as a preliminary to thwarting 
Blue’s reinforcement attempt. As such, the Carrier Group was to launch night air 
attacks, track the Blue force, and destroy enemy snoopers. The Support Group was 
to provide antiaircraft protection to the Carrier Group during this operation while 
the Screen provided antiaircraft and antisubmarine protection to both the Carrier 
and Support Groups as well as plane guard services to the Carrier Group. The Sub-
marine Group was to concentrate and deliver its attacks against the Blue Covering 
Force. Admiral PB would be embarked in fast battleship BB-2, while his second in 
command, Rear Admiral PD, Commander, Carrier Group, would be embarked in 
fleet carrier CV-1.9
Under Annex A to the Air Plan, airborne early warning planes were to be main-
tained in Sectors 19 and 21 to track the Blue forces. Reliefs for these planes were to 
be provided in order to maintain continuous contact and tracking. Between 0030 
and 0130 on 26 August, Vice Admiral PB would launch his nighttime air strike so 
that the Blue forces were hit at 0330. This strike was to be a torpedo attack car-
ried out with twenty-four Avenger attack planes and twelve night fighters. This 
was to be a decisive attack on the Blue battle carriers, with each Avenger armed 
with a torpedo and the night fighters each carrying five-inch rockets. The fighters 
were to create a diversion by destroying Blue aircraft on their flight decks by rocket 
and strafing attack. The fighters were also to carry out strafing attacks on the Blue 
screening ships; Admiral PB stressed early and accurate reporting about damage 
to the Blue carriers. He additionally established 30°00ʹ N, 164°00ʹ E as a ditching 
 PROBLEM 2J: PURPLE 349
point for planes that could not return to their carriers. Aircrews at this ditching 
rendezvous would be picked up by Purple submarines. Further, during the night, 
he would maintain night fighters in readiness on deck to be catapulted to intercept 
and destroy any Blue bogeys. A total of four night fighters would be retained for 
this purpose after the night strike had been launched.10 
At dawn, if sufficient success had been attained by night air and submarine 
attacks, an all-out air strike would be made. This dawn air strike would consist 
of forty-eight attack planes, each armed with a thousand-pound armor-piercing 
bomb, and forty-five fighters, twenty of which would be armed with thousand-
pound armor-piercing bombs. The primary targets would again be the Blue battle 
carriers, which were to be attacked until they were rendered “definitely harmless.” 
Secondary targets were the fast battleships and heavy cruisers. The fighters armed 
with bombs, however, were to jettison their ordnance if it was necessary to protect 
the attack planes or themselves. Vice Admiral PB expected to launch the planes at 
0500 on 26 August but the strike would be initiated only on his order.11
In Annex B, the Submarine Plan, the location of the Blue forces was given again, 
as were their probable nighttime moves. SUBRON 2 was given the specific mis-
sion of inflicting maximum damage on the Blue carriers by concentrated attack 
prior to dawn. Submarines SS-11, SS-12, and SS-13 were to proceed at maximum 
submerged speed on course 185 while SS-14 and SS-15 proceeded at their maxi-
mum submerged speeds on 165. SS-16, -17, -18, -19, and -20 would proceed toward 
31°10ʹ N, 165°55ʹ E at a speed of eleven knots. All boats were to guard schedules for 
five minutes every hour on the half hour. SUBRON 3 was to inflict maximum dam-
age on either the Blue Covering Force or the convoy, as directed, by concentrating 
in two groups for the nighttime attacks. SS-21, -22, -23, -24, and -25 were to pro-
ceed to Point LOVE—30°35ʹ N, 155°48ʹ E—and arrive by 0400 on 27 August. Fleet 
submarines SS-26, -27, -28, -29, and -30 were to proceed to Point MIKE—30°30ʹ 
N, 158°00ʹ E—to arrive by 1600 on 26 August. They were to establish patrol lines 
north of these points at five-mile intervals and guard schedules for five minutes 
every hour on the hour.12
Visual communications were to be employed in lieu of the radio whenever pos-
sible. The use of radar was unrestricted and the radar guard ships had been as-
signed in Cruising Disposition 32-N. All ships and aircraft were to keep Identifica-
tion Friend or Foe transponders energized; interrogators were to be restricted to 
emergency use except for recognition guard ships.13
All ships having two Talk Between Ships sets were to have both the Task Force 
Common freqency and their respective Task Group frequencies set up and task 
group commanders were to relay information received on the Task Force Common 
Circuit to ships of their groups that were only guarding the Task Group Circuit. 
There was also a visual chain of command, a Task Force Commanders Circuit, and 
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directions for the Aircraft-Submarine Common 
Circuit. Concerning Communications Intercept 
and Countermeasures Plan, radio intercept guard 
ships and assigned frequencies were assigned to 
BB-1 and BB-2 as well as heavy cruisers CA-2, 
-3, and -4. When ordered by the Officer in Tacti-
cal Command, Blue radio frequencies were to be 
jammed.14
Vice Admiral PB put forth a Surface Action 
Plan, No. 2-50, with a Task Organization consisting of three fast battleships from 
Battleship Division 1, under Rear Admiral PE, as the Battleline, as well as Rear 
Admiral PF’s Center Forces, four heavy cruisers from Cruiser Division 3 and eigh-
teen destroyers from Destroyer Squadrons 2 and 
4. With the same General Situation and the same 
composition of Blue forces, Surface Action Plan 
No. 2-50 noted that Purple SUBRON 3 was trail-
ing the Blue Covering Force to sink ships dam-
aged in the Air Phase. The plan assumed by this 
time that the carrier air forces on each side would 
have been neutralized, though spotting planes were 
available to both sides. It further assumed that Blue 
had passed through Purple submarine waters. Last, 
it assumed that the Blue Covering Force was still 
pressed for time and limited tactically in having to 
keep itself interposed between the Blue convoy and 
the Purple Striking Force. Within a General Plan 
of destroying the Blue Covering Force by daylight 
surface engagement as a prelude to destroying the 
convoy, Admiral PB set out the details for his com-
ponent commands. The Purple battle line was to 
engage the Blue battle line by commencing action 
at “extreme range,” closing to long range, and keep-
ing Blue “well occupied” while a surface torpedo 
attack was pressed home. If the enemy “counter-
marched” to avoid Purple torpedoes, the Purple 
battle line was not to follow but should bear toward 
the convoy. The Purple battle line was to remain 
concentrated and be alert to any tactical confusion 
in the Blue Covering Force that might present an 
opportunity to concentrate fire on unsupported 
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units. If Blue deployed a battleship Detached Wing, the Purple battle line was to 
make every effort to isolate it from mutual support of the Blue battle line and de-
stroy it in detail. 
The Center Forces were to gain station “expeditiously” and push home a tor-
pedo attack against the Blue battle line as soon as the opposing battleships became 
engaged. The heavy cruisers were to support the destroyer torpedo attack, repel any 
Blue torpedo attack, and—depending on the tactical situation—shift one or two 
cruisers to the inner cruiser area if that became necessary. The Center Forces were 
not to come within gun range of any Blue battleship until that ship was engaged 
by the Purple battle line. The Center Forces were to assign three planes to locate, 
track, and report on the convoy. Commander, Purple Striking Force was embarked 
in BB-2 with the battle line, and Rear Admiral PE, the second in command, was in 
BB-1.15
In Annex C to the Surface Action Plan, PB’s Deployment Plan Able envisioned 
that the Blue Center Force—if there was one—would be weaker than his. Admiral 
PB’s Center Forces would deploy to the right at maximum formation speed when 
forty-five thousand yards from the Blue battle line on a course so as to reach an 
advanced position just outside of Blue gun range when the two battle lines became 
engaged. Reiterating that the Center Forces were not to come within Blue battle line 
gun range during this deployment, he also ordered his battle line to deploy to the 
right so as to complete the movement by the time it reached maximum gun range 
on the Blue battle line. Under Deployment Plan Baker, all units would deploy in the 
same manner as in Deployment Plan Able except to the left instead of the right. Un-
der Deployment Plan Charlie, the assumption was that the Blue Center Force—with 
or without a fast battleship—was stronger than his Center Forces. Accordingly, his 
Center Forces would commence deployment to the right at the best formation speed 
when seven thousand yards outside of Blue gun range, if there was no Blue battle-
ship, and twelve thousand yards if there was one. This deployment was to be a retir-
ing deployment about 115 degrees to the right of the enemy bearing and was to be 
an effort to draw the Blue Center Force within range of the Purple battle line. Center 
Force units were to remain outside of the gun range of any superior Blue force and 
take advantage of any opportunity to turn and concentrate on an inferior Blue force. 
When the situation permitted, the Purple Center Forces were to gain station for a 
torpedo attack. Also under Deployment Plan Charlie, the Purple battle line would 
close at its best speed in an attempt to engage the Blue Center Force before it could 
be supported by the Blue battle line. Upon reaching the extreme gun range of the 
Blue battle line, the Purple battle line was to deploy to the right or left, whichever 
best suited the tactical situation at the time. Finally, Deployment Plan Dog was the 
same as Charlie, except the Purple Center Forces would deploy to the left.16
 352 BLUE VERSUS PURPLE
Annex D of the Surface Action Plan, the Torpedo Attack Plan, had as its objec-
tive maximum damage on the Blue battle line by launching a destroyer torpedo 
attack as soon as the opposing battle lines were engaged. Admiral PB assumed in 
this plan that his own light forces were strong enough to break through the Blue 
defenses and reach an attack point. He also assumed that the Blue battle line would 
turn away from a strong torpedo attack and that the torpedoes, to be effective, 
needed to be limited to a twenty-minute run to the target if possible. Under Attack 
Plan X-ray, Purple destroyers would conduct their approach in line of divisions 
with an axis approximately normal to expected torpedo tracks and with standard 
distances and intervals. The destroyers were to use maximum formation speed and, 
upon deployment, effect a quick deployment ahead by divisions, commencing at 
about twenty-two thousand yards from the Blue battle line. At a range of eighteen 
thousand yards, the Purple destroyers would make a simultaneous turn into col-
umn on a firing course, fire their torpedoes when steady, and retire under a smoke 
screen. Smoke screens, in fact, were to begin as soon as the torpedoes were fired.17 
All ships were to fire simultaneously by division, and each division was to fire 
by the Base Torpedo Course Method. The Division Leader would—on the basis 
of a normal gunfire distribution—fire at the Blue Van, with the Division Leader 
selecting the leading Blue ship as his point of aim. He would signal his base tor-
pedo course to his formation while the next adjacent division would apply a three- 
degree correction to the base torpedo course in the direction of the Blue Rear. Each 
succeeding division would apply an additional three-degree correction to the Blue 
Rear, the wing divisions thus having base torpedo courses that were nine degrees 
apart. If the approach was made within thirty degrees of the enemy’s bow or stern, 
the Control Division Leader would displace his own base torpedo course three 
degrees toward the Blue Van. All ships were to use high-speed settings and half-
degree spread angles on their torpedoes and were to fire full salvos.18
Under Attack Plan Yoke, the assumption was that there would be considerable 
difficulty in reaching the torpedo firing point because of Blue gunfire and that the 
Purple destroyers might therefore have to fire at long range. Thus, Attack Plan X-
ray would be followed insofar as practicable except that the standard Base Torpedo 
Course Method would be used. Finally, under Attack Plan Zebra, the assumption 
was that Blue opposition was exceptionally strong, preventing the employment of 
either Attack Plan X-ray or Yoke. In addition, Admiral PB was assuming in this 
case that his destroyers had suffered heavy damage, had uncertain communica-
tions, and had ragged or broken formations. Therefore, the attack procedure was to 
conduct attacks in large groups when practical from the best position that could be 
attained using an individual-target plan. Every effort here was to be made to launch 
torpedoes at a Blue target before the Purple destroyers in question were sunk.19
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The Purple Staff Solution to the Problem 
Vice Admiral PB, having prevented reinforcement by sea of Blue forces in Japan, 
was to assist in establishing Purple Army forces ashore on Honshu to extend Purple 
control over the northwestern Pacific area. He did not see anything that was not 
feasible in this.20
PB knew the Blue 20th Army Air Force was based in Japan and had one wing 
of long-range bombers and six squadrons of fighters that were operational. Pearl 
Harbor, Eniwetok, Johnston Island, Guam, and Saipan were all fully operational 
Blue bases. He did not know the status of Iwo Jima and he also assumed that Wake 
and Marcus would not be operational for at least thirty days. Guam was capable of 
supporting Blue surface and submarine forces to the extent of its available tend-
er facilities. PB estimated that Blue would have three battle carriers, three South 
Dakota–class fast battleships, eight Baltimore-class heavy cruisers, five squadrons 
of destroyers, and many escort and transport ships in the Hawaiian area. Blue sub-
marines were operating in the vicinity of Vladivostok, Port Arthur, Tsingtao, La 
Perouse Strait, and the Kuriles. He understood Blue ground forces in Japan to be 
small occupation forces but that a two-division Marine force was in Hawaii, as well 
as “several divisions” of Blue Army troops in San Francisco. (Pages 2–3.)
Vice Admiral PB’s own air bases and air forces consisted of the fleet air wings of 
naval patrol planes and bombers, which had the task of locating and tracking the 
Blue surface forces and destroying the deployed Blue submarines. His sea forces 
consisted of the Purple Attack Force, which included the Amphibious Force, whose 
mission was to land on Honshu about 29 August. He also had the Mine Force for 
defensive mining and minesweeping, the Service Force for the logistical needs of 
the Purple Pacific Fleet, and the Submarine Force, sixty boats that were to locate, 
observe, report on, and then destroy the Blue surface forces in the Hawaiian, Cen-
tral Pacific, and northwestern Pacific areas in coordination with his Striking Force. 
Purple ground forces were those of the Purple Army, which was in the process 
of occupying Manchuria, southern Korea, and North China. He endorsed the as-
sumptions of Commander, Pacific Purple Fleet regarding the coming action. (Pag-
es 3–4.)
At this point, the scenario began to develop, and planning adjusted to accom-
modate it, effectively in real time. On the afternoon and evening of 23 August, 
Purple submarine SS-35 sent three contact reports of Blue naval forces at sea, in two 
groups of ships. The first group was an estimated ten large and twenty small ships, 
in a circular disposition, on course 270 at speed eighteen knots. The second group 
had a larger number of ships; it was east of the first group, also on 270, at fifteen 
knots. At 1700 on 25 August, a Purple X-ray search was launched, and an AEW air-
craft reported contact with the two Blue forces. The first group was now estimated 
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to be eleven large and twenty small ships. The second group, now reported thirty-
five miles south, was again reported to be simply a large force. Admiral PB assumed 
that these various contact reports referred to the same two groups of Blue ships; 
he surmised that the smaller group was the Blue Covering Force, the larger one 
the troop convoy protected by escort, and possibly large combatant, ships. These 
contact reports reinforced his understanding of the Blue objective as being the re-
inforcement of occupation troops in Japan. (Pages 4–5.)
Given that the Blue Pacific Fleet could not be reinforced, his submarine and 
aircraft contact reports meant, he concluded, that three to four heavy ships and 
some twenty smaller ships were absent from the Covering Force. Either not all 
the ships initially available had sailed, or the unaccounted-for ships were with the 
convoy to strengthen its defenses, or there was another Blue force at sea. “Reliable” 
Purple intelligence had indicated that at the outbreak of war Blue had had available 
a small carrier task force. He did not think that Blue would split into two separate 
groups a unit that had trained and operated together as an effective Fast Carrier 
Task Force. In addition, such a division would violate the principle of concentra-
tion. So he discarded the possibility of another Blue force in the area and assumed 
that Blue combatant strength was concentrated in one carrier task force that con-
stituted the Blue Covering Force. Knowing that Blue would make every effort to 
sail with maximum aircraft and battleship strength—even delaying departure to do 
this—Admiral PB concluded that the Blue Covering Force was composed of eleven 
large ships and about twenty small warships. He now estimated that his two fleet 
carriers, three fast battleships, four heavy cruisers, and eighteen destroyers were 
facing three battle carriers, three fast battleships, five heavy cruisers, and eighteen 
to twenty-three destroyers. He therefore assumed that the Blue convoy, with its 
large number of transport ships and an unknown number of escort ships, had also 
three heavy cruisers and twenty to twenty-five destroyers. (Pages 5–7.)
Admiral PB had ninety Corsair fighters, sixteen Corsair night fighters, and eight 
Corsair photographic reconnaissance fighters. He also had forty-eight Helldiver 
and twenty-four Avenger attack planes, eight Avenger tactical electronic-warfare 
planes, and eight Avenger AEW aircraft. There were also fourteen observation 
planes and the naval patrol bombers from the fleet air wings, as well as an unde-
termined number of army fighter and rescue planes. Blue had an estimated 153 
fighters, twenty-four night fighters, twelve day fighters, 168 attack planes, twelve 
tactical electronic-warfare planes, twelve AEW planes, sixteen observation planes, 
an unknown number of naval patrol bombers, 150 army fighters, and 120 Super-
fortress heavy bombers. In the absence of more information, Vice Admiral PB as-
sumed that Blue planes were comparable to Purple’s. (Page 8.)
Admiral PB took the sides to be equal in the combat efficiency of their person-
nel. As to the relative combat efficiency of materiel, only the comparison of the 
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Purple Striking Force to the Blue Covering Force mattered, be-
cause Blue would attempt to keep the maximum distance be-
tween the Purple Striking Force and its convoy, whereas Blue 
could not weaken the convoy’s antisubmarine and antiaircraft 
protection by detaching units from the Covering Force. In any 
case, the Blue convoy’s escort strength would be negligible in 
comparison to the Purple Striking Force. The maximum com-
batant strength opposing him at any one time would be repre-
sented by the Blue Covering Force. (Pages 8–9.)
Admiral PB took Blue battle carriers to be “much superior” to Purple’s fleet car-
riers in terms of age, armored flight decks, antiaircraft protection, and sustained 
speed. They were, therefore, much more difficult to put out of action. In addition, 
Blue had one more carrier than Purple and larger air wings for 
each carrier, resulting in an almost two-to-one superiority in 
fighter planes and better than two to one in attack planes. Blue 
and Purple were equal in battleships on paper, and Admiral 
PB considered the two forces equal ship for ship in cruisers, 
but Blue had five of these to Purple’s four. All of Purple’s de-
stroyers were equivalent to the Sumner class, with ten torpedo 
tubes each, except for five that only had five tubes each. He 
thought it probable that in all Blue possessed a superiority of 
two to five destroyers and a probable superiority in numbers 
of torpedoes. In the absence of more information, he also took 
Blue and Purple torpedo performance to be “at least” equal. Finally, he assumed 
Purple to have a “great superiority” in the numbers of submarines available for 
tactical employment, a factor he took to be of critical importance. (Pages 9–12.)
The destructive effect of the atomic bomb was of such magnitude that he con-
sidered it necessary to evaluate separately the probability of its 
use by the Blue 20th Army Air Force against the Purple Strik-
ing Force. He was convinced that Blue still had atomic bombs 
in Japan, since they had been used on Purple amphibious 
forces in the Far East, although Commander, Purple Pacific 
Fleet believed that Blue had expended all of these weapons. 
If Blue did still have atomic weapons, they must be in short 
supply, since it had been briefed that the Blue convoy was car-
rying additional atomic bombs. Considering that the Purple 
Striking Force was not the only or even the main Purple force 
attempting to occupy the Japanese home islands, Vice Admiral 
PB did not think that Blue would use any remaining atom-
ic bombs on his force; there were much more “profitable” targets closer to Blue 
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land-based air forces. He had no factual data on which to pre-
dict results if, nevertheless, an atomic bomb were used, but he 
estimated that the maximum damage Blue could expect from 
one bomb would be the loss of one ship and damage to one or 
more others. Even this presupposed Blue’s being able to locate 
the Purple Striking Force, make a successful attack against his 
defense, and obtain a hit. (Pages 12–13.) 
Admiral PB reviewed hydrographic factors in detail, con-
cluding that sonar conditions would be poor, that the lowest 
probability of sonar detection would occur at periscope depth 
and at deep depth, and that these conditions should assist Purple submarine opera-
tions but also complicate the detection of Blue submarines. (Pages 14–15.)
From an operational standpoint, therefore, the weather was favorable for Purple 
air, except that the Purple Striking Force would have to close 
the enemy during flight operations if the present wind con-
ditions prevailed. High visibility, he surmised, would favor 
scouting operations and daylight defense against enemy air at-
tack. With respect to submarine operations, if present sea con-
ditions continued, the visual detection of submarines during 
daylight was possible because of periscopes “feathering,” wake 
indications at the surface, and impulse bubbles. (Pages 15–16.)
Visibility conditions at night should aid in the detection of 
surface submarines but also assist aircraft in night attacks. He 
expected, moreover, Blue submarine attacks from “down moon” (that is, from the 
direction of the moon, which would illuminate the target for the submarine). At 
this time the two groups of Blue ships were 450 miles southeast of the Purple Strik-
ing Force. At 1928, a bogey was detected by the Purple Striking Force, indicating 
that Blue air search planes had probably located the Purple Striking Force. Given 
the comparative speeds of the two forces, however, PB did not think that Blue could 
close his force unless he so desired; in fact, he could force Blue to approach by 
threatening the convoy, which was limited to only fifteen knots. The closest Purple 
submarine was about 120 miles to the south; if PB continued southward, he had 
either to shift the submarines or to keep them fully informed of his movements 
and trust their recognition procedures; he would try to stay clear of any Purple 
submarines. (Pages 16–17.)
In light of the distances to the various Blue air bases, it appeared that a day’s 
run by the Purple Striking Force at twenty knots on any course would not ma-
terially increase the danger from conventional, land-based air attack except from 
Japan and Iwo Jima. (This assumed that Blue bombers were not sent on one-way 
missions.) In any case, he recalled from World War II that Iwo Jima could be used 
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for emergency landings but that its usefulness for large-scale bombing attacks was 
limited. Any significant land-based bombing, therefore, had to originate in Japan 
itself. (Page 17.)
Purple submarines were located along two patrol lines. The center of the closest 
line to Blue was about 200 miles from the Blue position. If Blue forces continued 
on their present course and speed, it would be possible for some of Purple’s subma-
rines to reach attack positions shortly before dawn. (Page 17.)
The Purple Striking Force had fueled to capacity and loaded necessary supplies 
prior to its sortie from Kashiwabara at 2000 on 23 August. On the morning of 25 
August, the destroyers had topped off. Submarine Squadrons 2 and 3 had ample 
diesel fuel and all of their torpedoes. As for Blue’s logistics, PB knew that Blue 
had recently departed Hawaii, so he assumed that Blue fuel and supplies were also 
ample. He further assumed that the Blue commander could top off his destroyers 
as necessary. He did not see logistics as a critical factor for either side. However, 
both Purple and Blue were approximately a thousand miles from the nearest base 
to which damaged ships could retire. Admiral PB therefore planned to station sub-
marines that were not able to reach primary attack positions along the probable 
retirement courses of damaged Blue ships. (Page 18.) 
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XX Operations Problem 2J
More Purple, October–November 1946
Formally summarizing his Strength Factors, Vice Admiral PB saw one strength as Purple’s two squadrons of submarines that were within intercep-tion distance of the Blue forces. In addition, his forces had freedom of action 
and the submarines could expect poor sonar conditions. In contrast, he considered 
himself “vastly inferior” to Blue in carrier aircraft, though Admiral PB thought 
that if aircraft strength could be eliminated the relative strength of the Blue Cover-
ing Force and the Purple Striking Force in a surface engagement would be “nearly 
equal.” Meanwhile, any advantage he had was with his submarines. They would be 
a potent weapon if used “properly,” though he had to remain out of attack aircraft 
range as long as Blue held its present carrier superiority while he exploited his own 
submarine advantage.1
Admiral PB understood that the Blue convoy headed to Japan might be only 
one of several, but since it was the only one on which he had information, he would 
make it his target. He had to destroy this convoy or at least reduce its shipping and 
defensive strength to the point where it was no longer feasible for it to continue to 
Japan. It was possible for Purple submarines to get directly at the convoy, but for 
his surface and air forces to do so he had first to destroy the Blue carrier forces or 
destroy, drive off, or evade the Blue Covering Force. Otherwise, PB would have to 
attack the convoy and the Covering Force at the same time. On this basis, he con-
sidered the following actions. First, he could attempt to destroy the Blue carrier air 
forces and then the Blue convoy by air attack. He might also attempt to destroy or 
drive off the Blue Covering Force and then, by air and surface attacks, destroy the 
Blue convoy. His third alternative was to drive off the Blue convoy by submarine 
attrition attacks. Lastly, if he could evade the Blue Covering Force, he would be able 
to employ air, surface, and submarine attacks to destroy the convoy. (Pages 20–21.)
Admiral PB knew that Blue’s movements would be highly restricted. Blue could 
still evade Purple forces to the south, however. In addition, the Blue Covering 
Force could interpose itself between the convoy and the Purple Striking Force. It 
could also drive off Purple forces that approached to within striking range. Finally, 
the Blue Covering Force could destroy the Purple forces by “relentless” attacks, 
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disregarding close support of the convoy. Evasion to the south and toward the cover 
of land-based aircraft could occur only if the Blue commander was able to delay 
the arrival of the reinforcements in Japan. In any case, given Purple superiority in 
speed, the Blue commander could only delay, not prevent, action with the Purple 
Striking Force. If the Blue Covering Force interposed itself between the Purple 
Striking Force and the convoy, its mere presence would discourage offensive ac-
tion by Purple. Admiral PB surmised that if he persisted in attempting to reach the 
convoy, Blue would have to be prepared to destroy him since PB had no intention 
of being driven off. (Pages 21–23.)
Admiral PB considered specifically a Course of Action in which he destroyed 
the Blue carrier air forces with his own airpower, then used that airpower to destroy 
the Blue convoy. If he could destroy the Blue battle carriers by air attack, submarine 
attack, or a combination, he would be able to send his remaining air strength over 
the Blue Covering Force to strike directly at the convoy without having to engage 
the Covering Force with his surface forces. This was the desirable option since it 
would expose the least number of his units to Blue. However, Blue carrier air supe-
riority was such that Admiral PB did not think he had much chance of success in 
it. Submarines could attack the Blue carriers but he did not think that they could 
completely destroy them given the carriers’ “excellent” underwater protection. He 
estimated, in fact, that it would take six to eight torpedo hits per carrier. Still, sub-
marine attacks might reduce Blue carrier air superiority to nearly that of Purple. 
If the Blue carriers were completely destroyed, Purple carrier planes could strike 
at the convoy without further reducing the Blue surface forces by air attack, but 
Admiral PB thought it more likely that he would have to make further air strikes 
on them. The probable result would be the effective elimination of air strength on 
both sides, in which case the Purple Striking Force would still have to deal with the 
remainder of the Blue Covering Force. Since he did not think that this Course of 
Action had great prospect for success, he would retain it for future consideration as 
possible but not probable. (Pages 23–24.)
He was still faced, however, with the need to eliminate Blue’s superior carrier 
strength. He did not think that could be done by day air attack alone. He therefore 
contemplated a night aircraft strike. If he steamed directly toward Blue at maxi-
mum speed, he might be able to close for a night air strike. This strike, however, 
would depend on Blue movements. He expected Blue to divert the convoy to the 
south and interpose the Blue Covering Force upon detection of the Purple Strik-
ing Force. Admiral PB thought it might be possible to launch a night attack a few 
hours after 1930. To hold off for moonlight might be desirable but in either case 
he did not think that surprise was likely. Given this reality, he assumed he would 
be open to counterattack and he did not think the damage he would take justified 
the damage he might inflict on Blue. In addition, with the wind from the southeast, 
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launches and recoveries would require Purple to steam toward Blue. If any delays 
occurred, he might find himself in daylight within Blue aircraft range and not able 
to withdraw. (Page 25.)
Therefore, Admiral PB returned again to the idea of eliminating Blue air supe-
riority by submarine attacks on Blue’s carriers. To do that, Blue’s submarines had 
to take up new attack positions. Once there, he thought, the submarines should be 
able to pick out targets and inflict serious damage. As of 1930, Purple Submarine 
Squadron 2 was so disposed that at least some of its boats could attain a predawn 
attack position provided that the Blue Covering Force made good any course be-
tween 235 and 345. He saw it as “most probable” that this would be the case, so 
SUBRON 3 was also to be in an attack position by the following morning. He pro-
posed to regulate the movements of the Purple Striking Force so as not to inter-
fere with these boats and maybe even draw the Blue Covering Force into Purple 
submarine waters. He thought it essential that he maintain constant scouting of 
Blue forces and relay updates to SUBRONs 2 and 3. The submarines’ movement 
to station would require considerable night surface steaming. Blue antisubmarine 
patrols might force the submarines to submerge temporarily but even limited use 
of high submerged speeds should allow four to six submarines to achieve an attack 
position. These boats, in turn, should enable Admiral PB to engage the Blue Cover-
ing Force on more favorable terms. (Pages 25–26.)
As long as Blue possessed its carrier superiority, PB did not think it advisable to 
remain very long within aircraft striking range. As of 1930, Purple and Blue were 
approximately 450 miles apart, out of range. Although Blue might decide to close 
with him, Vice Admiral PB thought that he could maintain this distance unless 
Blue detached one or more carriers minus their heavy-ship antiaircraft support. In 
the latter case, Admiral PB thought he could strike the Blue carriers. He expected 
action to start on the evening of 25 August and the early morning of 26 August. 
While he remained out of range, the Purple submarines would attack the Blue Cov-
ering Force. After the reduction of Blue carrier strength, Admiral PB could strike 
with his carrier air forces, then engage and drive off the Blue Covering Force. Fol-
lowing this engagement, he could expect to overtake the convoy late the same af-
ternoon or early that evening. By late on the afternoon of 26 August, he would be 
approximately eight hundred miles from Blue’s land-based air cover in Japan. Since 
this land-based air cover was a threat of limited proportion, he thought that closing 
the distance to Japan was a justified, calculated risk. (Pages 26–27.)
For the submarine attrition attacks, he had twenty submarines with a total of 
three hundred torpedoes. He thought it doubtful that anywhere near all the sub-
marines could get into the attack. Sooner or later, Blue would detect his subma-
rines and by a combination of evasive courses and antisubmarine tactics be able to 
“bully” through submarine waters to Japan, even with losses. Once the Blue convoy 
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managed to pass one of Purple’s submarines, that submarine was eliminated as a 
threat—as long as the convoy continued on the same course and speed—given the 
submarines’ slow surface speed and restricted range at high underwater speeds. At 
most, any one submarine could expect to make only one attack and many would be 
unable even to reach attack positions. Therefore, PB did not think he could destroy 
or drive off the convoy by submarines alone. (Page 27.)
The Blue Covering Force had the advantage of interior lines, meaning that the 
Purple Striking Force could not evade it. He might be able to detach a small com-
batant group to get at the convoy but the success of this action would depend on 
Blue failing to detect the division of Purple forces. In view of Blue air superiority 
and the probability that Blue had already detected the Purple Striking Force, PB 
did not think it suitable to risk piecemeal destruction. He might get within aircraft 
striking range of the convoy and send some planes to attack the Blue Covering 
Force while the majority of the Purple Striking Force engaged the Blue convoy. This 
action too did not appear to be acceptable, however, in view of Blue’s “overwhelm-
ing” air superiority. So not even submarine, air, and surface strength combined 
could defeat both Blue forces, at least by day. Therefore, he decided, he would de-
stroy or drive off the Blue Covering Force and then destroy the convoy, first reduc-
ing Blue air and surface strength by night and early-morning submarine attacks. 
These would be followed by daylight submarine and carrier air strikes to destroy 
the carriers and reduce the surface forces. The remaining Blue surface forces would 
then be destroyed or driven off by daylight surface engagement, after which all 
available Purple forces would attack the convoy. These attacks were to take place 
out of range of Blue land-based air forces in Japan. (Pages 27–28.)
Having decided on his Course of Action, Vice Admiral PB divided his tasks into 
four phases of execution. Phase One entailed cruising and tactical scouting by the 
Purple Striking Force and then the reduction of Blue air and surface strength by 
night and early-morning submarine attack. Phase Two would be the destruction of 
Blue carrier air forces and the reduction of the Blue Covering Force’s surface units 
by daylight submarine and air attack. Phase Three was the destruction or driving 
off of the remaining surface units of the Blue Covering Force by daylight surface 
engagement. Phase Four was the destruction of the convoy. (Page 29.)
In Phase One, the mission was to track the Blue force, remaining outside aircraft 
attack range while submarines reduced Blue carrier air strength by attacking the 
carriers themselves. In this phase, it seemed unlikely that Blue had a considerable 
number of submarines in the present area of operations since there was no reason 
to expect Blue to have had advance information on the proposed movements of 
the Purple Striking Force. It seemed more likely that Blue submarines were off port 
entrances and at focal traffic points, which is exactly where they had been sighted. 
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Only the normal antisubmarine precautions and patrols were required, therefore. 
(Pages 29–30.)
Admiral PB saw air attack from Blue land-based air forces in Japan—including 
atomic-bomb strikes—as a more likely and constant threat. He also had to take into 
account the possibility of a surprise attack by carrier-based air forces if he lost con-
tact with the Blue Covering Force. Therefore, he chose Cruising Disposition 32-R, 
which he thought would provide good protection against “normal” air attacks and 
“fair” protection against submarines. In the event of early warning of an air attack, 
Vice Admiral PB planned to shift to a tighter disposition, Air Defense Disposition 
32-V. Should an atomic-bomb attack become likely, he would open up Cruising 
Disposition 32-R to a new disposition. (Page 30.)
Movements by the Purple Striking Force during Phase One would be as required 
to stay out of the Blue air striking range, to remain clear of Purple submarines, to 
draw Blue through Purple submarine waters, and to approach the Blue convoy’s 
eventual track to Japan. But what was the Blue air striking range? By comparison to 
his own planes’ characteristics, fighter planes had a maximum combat radius of 370 
miles with two auxiliary fuel tanks. Attack planes carrying a torpedo would have a 
maximum combat radius of 425 miles, while attack bombers carrying a thousand-
pound bomb would have a maximum combat radius of 335 miles. Any strike be-
yond the combat radius of fighter aircraft would have little prospect of success, 
so if he remained farther than about four hundred miles from the Blue Covering 
Force until his submarines had completed their attacks, he could expect to be safe 
from an effective Blue air strike. On this basis, he planned to steam initially to 
the southwest; later changes in his movements would depend on information he 
received from his search planes. In tracking the Blue forces, he noted that one of 
his airborne-early-warning planes had made contact at 1930. He had directed this 
plane to maintain and develop (i.e., collect more information about) the contact. 
The plane had a remaining endurance of approximately 5.7 hours, so he would 
launch two additional AEW planes at once to take over. From this point on, he 
would launch an additional two AEW planes every three hours to permit continu-
ous tracking of Blue movements. (Pages 31–32.)
He again saw the effective employment of his submarines as the key to his “dif-
ficult” situation. He concluded that if only a few submarines were able to make 
their attacks, the results would be more decisive if these strikes were delivered 
against the Blue Covering Force rather than the convoy’s transports. If he placed 
all of his submarines in one line that ran roughly north–south, he could not expect 
more than one or two of his submarines to get in attacks and once Blue had passed 
this line, his submarines would no longer be effective. The optimum, from the 
submarine viewpoint, was to station his boats in depth along an east–west line and 
 364 BLUE VERSUS PURPLE
along the projected track of the Blue Covering Force, thus permitting each boat to 
make an attack. He could not count on the route Blue would take, however, so he 
had to compromise and attempt to obtain submarine coverage in both depth from 
east to west and from north to south across Blue’s most probable track. (Pages 
32–33.)
If PB ordered his submarines to close immediately on Blue’s last reported posi-
tion, they would probably all be flanked later by Blue movements. He expected Blue 
to divert its convoy southward during the night but eventually to come back to a 
course that would take it to southern Japanese ports. He would have submarines 
attempt to get ahead of the Blue Covering Force and continually interpose them-
selves between the Blue forces and Japan. The Blue forces could not divert greatly 
from their route because of the urgent need for reinforcements in Japan. To cover 
any probable diversions, he ordered Commander, Submarine Force to divide his 
submarines into four wolf packs, each of five boats organized as a submarine divi-
sion. Submarines were to be directed to adjust the present positions so as to estab-
lish patrol lines by about sunrise on 26 August. The submarine with the lowest hull 
number of each division would occupy reference points; the remaining boats of a 
division would take station at ten-mile intervals bearing 205 degrees from the ref-
erence point. Submarine Division 21’s reference point would be 31°00ʹ N, 163°12ʹ 
E; SUBDIV 22’s reference point would be 30°10ʹ N, 163°24ʹ E; SUBDIV 31’s was 
32°25ʹ N, 161°06ʹ E; and SUBDIV 32’s boats would take up stations on 31°38ʹ N, 
162°54ʹ E. Commander, Submarine Force was to reroute his submarines if such 
action was indicated by information from the search planes. To permit individual 
submarines to receive early intelligence on Blue movements, an Air Search fre-
quency was established; AEW planes were directed to report on it and submarines 
were to maintain a listening watch. (Pages 33–34.)
Admiral PB expected the new patrol lines to allow his submarines to attain at-
tack positions even if Blue steamed directly west or north of west from its 1930 
position. The submarine patrol lines would also cover any Blue diversion to the 
south for up to ten hours. Additionally, he planned to deploy his submarines in 
depth along any other probable Blue route. After these initial deployments, how-
ever, he would be forced to rely on Commander, Submarine Force to assist the 
submarines in gaining their final attack positions. He would keep Commander, 
Submarine Force fully informed of enemy movements and keep the Purple Strik-
ing Force west of 160 degrees east. If he was forced to go east of this line, he would 
so inform the submarine commander so that the latter’s boats could be notified. 
Purple air and surface forces would be directed not to attack submarines encoun-
tered east of 160 east and to make appropriate sonar challenges when forced to 
operate there. Submarines that could not close the Blue Covering Force were to 
attack the convoy. Since he could not forecast when and where the air and surface 
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engagements would take place, Commander, Submarine Force would be informed 
of his intentions when events developed “sufficiently,” at which point he would be 
directed to deploy his submarines in the action or take up positions along the most 
probable course along which Blue cripples would retire. (Page 34.)
Phase Two operations—the destruction of Blue carrier air forces and the re-
duction of the Blue Covering Force’s surface units by daylight submarine and air 
attack—were to commence upon the completion of Phase One. Admiral PB knew 
a follow-on air strike by the Purple Striking Force was necessary. If his Corsair 
fighters were equipped with two auxiliary fuel tanks, they had a radius of 375 miles. 
His Helldiver attack planes had a radius of 335 miles if carrying an auxiliary fuel 
tank and a thousand-pound bomb; a radius of 230 miles if armed with a torpedo; 
and a 370-mile radius if carrying a 1,600-pound bomb and two wing tanks of fuel. 
His Avenger attack planes had a radius of 425 miles if carrying a torpedo and two 
auxiliary fuel tanks, or a radius of 435 miles with the same auxiliary fuel tanks but 
a thousand-pound bomb replacing the torpedo. From these figures, his maximum 
striking distance for a coordinated attack employing Helldiver attack planes was 
370 miles; for an attack employing the Avenger attack planes with bombs, torpe-
does, or some of each, plus fighter escorts, it was 375 miles. Primary targets for the 
initial air strikes were the Blue battle carrier flight decks and their onboard aircraft. 
By using “toss bombing” techniques and thousand-pound armor-piercing bombs, 
he hoped to achieve penetrations of the battle carriers’ armored flight decks. With 
the 1,600-pound armor-piercing bombs, he hoped for penetration of both flight 
and hangar decks. A coordinated attack approaching from different directions and 
preceded by deceptive measures and fire-control radar jamming would give the 
best chance for success. If he was able to destroy the Blue carriers without the loss of 
all of his aircraft, the rest could attack the surface ships in the Blue Covering Force. 
(Pages 35–36.)
With forty fighters, sixteen night fighters, and eight photographic reconnais-
sance fighters, the Carrier Group would augment the combat air patrol and defend 
the Purple Striking Force from Blue air attack. With seventy-two attack planes and 
fifty fighters, it would complete the destruction of the Blue carriers and their air 
forces and then inflict maximum damage on the enemy surface forces. Priority of 
targets after the carriers was the fast battleships and then the heavy cruisers. Three 
AEW planes would provide a basic early warning watch while five others scouted 
for contacts. Eight tactical electronic-warfare planes would jam enemy radars and 
employ radar deception when ordered by the Officer in Tactical Command. PB did 
not contemplate further coordination of submarine operations after Phase One. 
However, submarines of Submarine Squadron 3 that had been unable to close the 
Blue Covering Force during Phase One should be able to attack that unit during 
Phase Two. (Page 36.)
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Phase Three operations were to consist of the destruction or driving off of the 
Blue Covering Force’s surface ships by a daylight surface engagement. It was im-
possible to predict the situation this far in advance but as the basis for Phase Three 
planning he assumed that by this time Blue carrier air strength had been either 
destroyed or greatly reduced and that Purple carrier air strength was in the same 
state. According to his estimate, the opposing forces would still be two fleet carri-
ers, three fast battleships, four heavy cruisers, and eighteen destroyers for Purple 
facing three battle carriers, three fast battleships, five heavy cruisers, and eighteen 
to twenty-three destroyers for Blue. He saw the two forces as essentially equal in 
fast battleships but with a Purple inferiority in both heavy cruisers and destroyers. 
This imbalance gave Blue a “probable” superiority in light forces and the number 
of surface torpedoes. If, however, he had any remaining air strength, Admiral PB 
was prepared to exploit it, combining aircraft attacks with submarine torpedo and 
surface gun and torpedo attacks. (Page 37.)
Present indications were that the Blue convoy would be to the southwest and a 
southwesterly deployment course would not cause much difficulty in aircraft op-
erations with a southeasterly wind. Admiral PB expected the Blue Covering Force 
to attempt to remain between the Purple Striking Force and the convoy. He also 
expected that moving the Purple Striking Force toward the convoy would cause 
the Blue Covering Force to seek a surface engagement. He did not think he could 
gain the windward position with its attendant advantages for his light forces and 
the employment of smoke. He further assumed that whichever way he deployed, 
Blue would deploy in the same direction so as not to be outflanked. The best dis-
tribution of his light forces would be two-thirds of them in the Van and one-third 
in the Rear. Blue would attempt to flank his position and probably have a similar 
distribution of light forces. 
To ensure the flexibility, he was going to organize a Center Force that he could 
use to strengthen either flank. Since the two battle lines were equal in numbers and 
characteristics, there were no favorable ranges. Fire, therefore, would be opened at 
extreme range to obtain early hits. As soon as the Blue battle line was under Effec-
tive Fire from Purple’s main batteries, the light forces in the Van would be ordered 
to attack. Any remaining air strength would be coordinated by the OTC to support 
this attack. After air and light-force attacks had reduced the Blue battle line’s speed, 
the enemy would be closed to decisive range. His submarines would be directed 
by message as the situation developed. Once the Purple battle line engaged at long 
range and the air and light-force attacks had reduced the Blue battle line so it could 
be engaged at short range by Admiral PB’s battleships, the Purple Striking Force 
would have access to the convoy. (Pages 38–39.)
The Purple Striking Force’s fourteen observation planes would scout tactically, 
provide Air Spot for their parent ships, and detect and destroy Blue submarines. 
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The Purple battle line of three fast battleships would engage at long and then short 
ranges in coordination with the air and light forces, while the Center Group (two 
heavy cruisers and five destroyers) would defend the area ahead, defend the area 
between the Left and Right Flank Groups, and join the forces in the Van upon de-
ployment. The Right Flank Group of one heavy cruiser and five destroyers along 
with the Left Flank Group of one heavy cruiser and four destroyers would defend 
the battle line from Blue light-force torpedo attacks and attack the Blue battle line 
with torpedoes when ordered by the OTC. Finally, the Carrier Screen’s four radar-
picket destroyers would escort the two fleet carriers, furnishing them with antisub-
marine protection and plane-guard services. (Pages 39–40.)
Phase Four would entail the destruction of the convoy. The convoy was estimat-
ed to consist of a large group of transport ships protected by an unknown number 
of escort vessels and possibly a few larger combatant ships. Admiral PB had con-
cluded earlier that the combatant strength protecting the convoy would be negli-
gible as compared to the strength of the Purple Striking Force. However, he could 
not yet make “intelligent” plans for Phase Four; it depended on the outcomes of 
Phases One, Two, and Three, the remaining strength of the Purple Striking Force, 
the location of the Blue convoy, and the position of Purple’s submarines. All of 
his efforts, however, were directed toward the successful accomplishment of Phase 
Four. He thought that his running estimate would provide him with the necessary 
information for issuing required instructions, the latter to be delivered to his ships 
by Talk Between Ships. (Page 40.)
The Purple Board Maneuver 
On 21 November (real time), Vice Admiral PB (again Commander Loveland 
for the Board Maneuver) outlined for the Purple Board Maneuver his operation 
plan—Commander, Battleship Squadron 1 Plan No. 1-50. The Task Organization 
consisted of Rear Admiral PD’s (again Commander Owers) Carrier Group, the two 
fleet carriers of Carrier Division 1; Rear Admiral PE’s (now Colonel Hawthorne) 
Heavy Support Group, the three fast battleships from Battleship Division 1 and 
four heavy cruisers from Cruiser Division 3; and Captain P-2’s (now Commander 
Lundgren) Screen of eighteen destroyers from Destroyer Squadrons 2 and 4. The 
General Situation, recent events, broad assessments and assumptions, objectives, 
and tasks for the projected four phases were the same as for the Chart Maneuver. 
(Pages 41–43.)
Vice Admiral PB’s Surface Action Plan added new details. Its Task Organiza-
tion had Rear Admiral PD’s two fleet carriers from Carrier Division 1 and four 
radar-picket destroyers from Destroyer Division 41 collectively constituting the Air 
Group. The three fast battleships from Battleship Division 1 were now organized as 
Rear Admiral PE’s Battleline, while Rear Admiral PF’s (now Commander Gillette) 
Center Group was organized from heavy cruisers CA-1 and CA-2, four destroyers 
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from DESDIV 42, and one radar-picket destroyer from DESDIV 41. Captain C-3’s 
(not played by a student officer) Right Flank Group consisted of heavy cruiser CA-3 
and five destroyers from DESDIV 21, while the Left Flank Group, under Captain 
C-4 (no designated student officer), comprised heavy cruiser CA-4 and four de-
stroyers from DESDIV 22. SUBRONs 2 and 3 were to operate in support. Since the 
plan assumed that the carrier air strength on each side would have by now been 
neutralized and the Blue surface force would be seeking a surface engagement, the 
Purple Striking Force would engage in a daylight Normal Action. The Purple battle 
line would engage at extreme gun range and then at shorter ranges after the Purple 
light and air forces had reduced the Blue battle line’s speed by coordinated attacks. 
(Page 44.)
The remaining planes from the Air Group would defend the Purple Striking 
Force from Blue air attack and support the light-force attacks on the Blue battle 
line. Additionally, they would continue to scout tactically. While the Purple battle 
line engaged the Blue battleships, the Center Group would defend the area ahead 
and between its own flanks from Blue attack and join the Purple Van upon de-
ployment while the Right Flank Group held position. The Left Flank Group would 
defend the Purple battle line from Blue light-force torpedo attacks while it attacked 
Fig. 146
Cruising Disposition 32-R, 
Purple Staff Solution, 
Operations Problem 2J
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the Blue battleships with torpedoes, when ordered to do 
so by the OTC. It would also provide its own Air Spot 
and Anti-Submarine Patrols. The plan was to become 
effective upon signal; the Officer in Tactical Command 
would coordinate air support for the light-force attacks; 
and all units were to employ Approach Disposition 32B 
and Surface Battle Disposition 32C. (Pages 44–45.) 
Student officers were assigned to play Command-
er, Task Force 32 (Vice Admiral PB); his Chief of Staff 
(again Lieutenant Colonel Street); and Commander, 
Battleline, who was also Commander, Battleship Divi-
sion 1 (Rear Admiral PE). Other student officers played 
Commander, Center Forces, who was also Commander, 
Cruiser Division 3 (Rear Admiral PF); Commander, De-
tached Cruisers (Captain P-5—Commander Church); 
and Commanders, Destroyer Squadrons 2 and 4 (Cap-
tain P-2 [now Commander Lundgren] and Captain P-4 
[now Lieutenant Commander Ramage]). Finally, stu-
dent officers took the roles of Commander, Observa-
tion Aircraft (again Commander Owers); Commander, 
Fig. 147
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1, Purple, Operations 
Problem 2J
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2, Purple, Operations 
Problem 2J
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Task Force 34 (also Commander, Submarine Force) (now Rear Admiral PS—Com-
mander O’Connell); and Commanders, SUBDIVs 31 and 32 (Captain P-8 [again 
Commander O’Connell] and Captain P-9 [Commander Marvin-Smith]).2
The Critique 
Operations Problem 2J ended here. As is fairly typical in war-game-based pedago-
gy, as soon as the Director of the Maneuver determined that no further educational 
value was to be derived from continuation, the exercise or maneuver was brought 
to an end. Since there were no written records kept for critiques at this point of the 
College’s history, it is difficult to determine how even this scenario (much less a 
real-world one) would have played out, but these types of conclusions were not the 
purpose of the exercises and maneuvers in any case.
The Critique for Operations Problem 2J took place on 26–27 November 1946, 
in the Maneuver Room of Luce Hall. Again, while there is no written record of the 
Critique itself, a delineation of roles played by the College’s staff and students gives 
some indication of what the critiques themselves attempted to accomplish. After an 
introduction by Captain Evans, the Director of the Maneuver, the student officers 
designated for Operations Problem 2J gave five-minute summaries of their own 
solutions as well as the Staff Solutions, paying particular attention to differences 
in methods of development and in what actually happened. Student officers also 
gave critiques of the Estimates of the Situation for both Blue and Purple. There was 
an examination of the mission itself, then a critique of the Situation and Opposing 
Courses of Action by Lieutenant Colonel Leary for Blue and Commander Foley 
for Purple. Colonel Edson for Blue and Lieutenant Colonel Thompson for Purple 
then critiqued Enemy Capabilities, while Lieutenant Commanders Taeusch and 
Aymond, for Blue and Purple, respectively, critiqued Own Courses of Action. Lieu-
tenant Colonel Downey for Blue and Lieutenant Commander Bonner for Purple 
followed with an analysis of Opposing Courses of Action. Commander Coleman 
for Blue and Commander Rynd then presented a comparison of Own Courses of 
Action and the Decisions; Commander White for Blue and Colonel Mason for Pur-
ple critiqued the Complementary Problems. Commanders Kirkpatrick and Rich-
ardson for Blue and Purple, respectively, critiqued the Action Plans. Commander 
Dalton for Blue and Lieutenant Commander Howell for Purple critiqued the Cruis-
ing Dispositions.3 
Moving to the Chart Maneuver itself, there were Blue and Purple analyses of 
the Officer in Tactical Command’s Plans and Dispositions, at 1930 (it is unclear 
whether such evening sessions were the norm for the Naval War College at the 
time) by Commander Baldridge and Lieutenant Commander Wallace for Blue and 
Commander Loveland and Lieutenant Colonel Street for Purple. There were also 
Blue and Purple analyses of the Initial Searches and Contact Scouting, including a 
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brief by Commander Miller; analyses of Air Operations by Commander Simonsen 
for Blue and Commander Owers for Purple; analyses of Submarine Operations 
by Commanders O’Connell and Gillette and Lieutenant Commander Ramage for 
Purple; and analyses of Surface Ship Operations by Commanders Baldridge and 
Morton for Blue and Commander Loveland for Purple. The officers who carried 
out the critiques of the Brief, the Air Operations, the Submarine Operations, and 
the Surface Ship Operations then critiqued the Blue Searches, the Purple Air Strike, 
Blue’s attempted counterattack, and the Special Blue searches conducted in the ear-
ly morning hours of the next day of the maneuver. These latter critiques included 
analyses of the actions of the Blue and Purple Air Group Commanders.4 
Further, there would be analyses of intentions of the Blue and Purple Officers in 
Tactical Command by Commanders Baldridge and Loveland for Blue and Purple, 
respectively. Additional Comments on Air Operations, including Night Snooper 
Tactics, Intercepts, and Air Attacks, would be given by the Air Umpire, junior-class 
instructor Commander Kirkpatrick and his colleague and Assistant Air Umpire 
Lieutenant Commander Holzapfel, as well as their assistants Lieutenant Colonel 
Leary, Commander Richardson, Lieutenant Commander Bonner, Commander 
White, Colonel Mason, and Commanders Rynd, Coleman, and Foley. Comments 
on Submarine Operations, including Capabilities and Tactical Techniques of New 
Submarines, were given by the Submarine Umpire, Commander Reed, and his 
assistants, Lieutenant Commanders Taeusch and Aymond. Comments on Com-
munications and Radio Countermeasures were provided by the Communication 
Umpire, Lieutenant Commander Curran. The conclusion was then conducted by 
Captain Evans.5 
For the Board Maneuver, there would again be Blue and Purple analyses of each 
OTC’s plans, this time by Commander Baldridge for Blue and Commander Love-
land for Purple. Center Force operations during the approach would be analyzed 
by Commander Morton for Blue and Commander Gillette for Purple, while Light 
Force Consolidations for Blue were presented by Commanders Morton, Rogers, 
White, and Bridewell as well as Lieutenant Colonel Leary. Light Force Consolida-
tions for Purple were analyzed by Commanders Gillette, Church, and Lundgren, as 
well as by Lieutenant Commander Ramage. Blue and Purple would then both com-
ment on battle-line action, with Colonels Manzo and Hawthorne providing these 
comments. Concluding Light Force Action was analyzed by these same two of-
ficers, Submarine Operations for Purple by Commanders O’Connell and Marvin- 
Smith, and Convoy Operations for Blue by Commander Webber. Commander 
Baldridge for Blue and Commander Loveland for Purple then offered analyses of 
the Future Intentions of the Officers in Tactical Command. Following these pre-
sentations would be summaries on Fire Distribution Damage by the Chief Damage 
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Computer, Commander Mayberry; on Ship Handling, with Commander Dalton 
analyzing for Blue and Lieutenant Commander Howell doing the same for Purple; 
and Communications by Lieutenant Commander Curran, the Communications 
Umpire. Captain Evans then conducted the conclusion of the Critique.6
N O T E S 1 Junior Class of June 1947, “Operations Problem 2J: 
The Purple Staff Solution,” 21 November 1946, pp. 
18–20, folder 2604-P, box 139, RG 4, NHC. Subse-
quent in-text page references until the next endnote 
are to this source.
 2 Junior Class of June 1947, “Operations Problem 2J: 
Purple—Section B, Board Maneuver,” 22 November 
1946, p. 1, folder 2604-M, box 139, RG 4, NHC. 
 3 Junior Class of June 1947, “Operations Problem 2J: 
The Critique,” 25 November 1946, p. 1, folder 2604-
N, box 139, RG 4, NHC.
 4 Ibid., p. 2. 
 5 Ibid.
 6 Ibid., p. 3.


XXI Operations Problem 3
Statements, Estimates, Staff Solutions, and the History of the  
Maneuver, October–November 1946
In late October 1946, the senior class of June 1947 was issued materials for Op-erations Problem 3. Operations Problem 3 was the senior-class version of Op-erations Problem 1J. A Chart Maneuver, it took place between 25 October and 
9 November. Introduced as usual by Rear Admiral Smith, Operations Problem 3 
entailed the same mix of Staff Presentations, preparations for the maneuver and its 
conduct, and the Critique. 
The Blue Statement of the Problem, Estimate of the Situation, and Staff Solution
The General and Special Situations were the same as Operations Problem 1J— 
Purple was going to attempt to invade the western Aleutians with an Amphibious 
Force escorted by a Covering Force. The Blue Alaskan Defense Force was again de-
tailed to intercept and destroy these forces. The Blue Alaskan Defense Force com-
prised almost the exact same number of surface ships as in Operations Problem 1J: 
four fast battleships, two battle cruisers, four light cruisers, and thirty-six destroy-
ers (instead of the twenty-seven assigned to the junior-class problem). The major 
difference in force composition, however, was in aircraft carriers. Instead of two 
fleet carriers, as in Operations Problem 1J, Commander, Heavy Surface Striking 
Force and Alaskan Defense Force now had three fleet carriers and two light carriers 
at his disposal. Intelligence information, tactical dispositions, purposes of the ma-
neuver, and even Student Requirements mirrored those of Operations Problem 1J.1
In addition, the Blue Staff Solution was largely identical. The Blue commander, 
Admiral BA (Captain Madeira—see chapter 10), again reasoned that his best bet 
for preventing the Purple invasion of the Aleutians was to find, intercept, and de-
stroy the Purple Covering Force so as to make the Purple Amphibious Force’s posi-
tion untenable. Blue submarines were not deployed very effectively, both Blue and 
Purple land-based air were neutralized by recent action, Admiral BA’s force was on 
its own, and, he reasoned, Purple was in the same situation. Weather conditions 
told him that air activity might be severely curtailed while Blue and Purple surface-
ship strengths and weaknesses were at a premium. The estimate of Purple surface 
ship strength in terms of numbers and characteristics was the same as in Opera-
tions Problem 1J aside from an assumption that Purple aircraft carrier strength 
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was four fleet carriers and two light carriers instead of the two fleet carriers of the 
earlier problem. There was more consideration of a night surface engagement this 
time but the primary emphasis was again on a day surface action with the Purple 
Covering Force.2 
This time, however, there was a slightly longer analysis of the capabilities of Ad-
miral BA’s carrier aircraft and their role in potentially knocking out Purple battle-
ship strength after destroying the Purple carriers. In general, there were more tasks 
assigned to his Carrier Group in the planned-for engagement. For example, the 
carriers this time were to launch an initial fighter strike to destroy Purple combat 
air patrols and reduce Purple antiaircraft defenses. The Blue fighters were then 
to take station as high cover for an initial glide-bombing strike by Blue attack 
planes. Returning with that strike, the fighters were to continue scouting tactically 
for Purple fleet units. Admiral BA was hoping to destroy the Purple flight decks 
with his initial glide-bombing strike—as opposed to the dive-bombing that oc-
curred in the other Operations Problems—though he did not expect to destroy 
the carriers themselves. His attack planes, however, were to continue glide bomb-
ing until all the Purple carriers had been made nonoperational. His fighters were 
to maintain combat air patrols and his attack planes were to continue scouting, 
airborne-early-warning, and electronic-warfare missions. The attack planes were 
then to be prepared for general-purpose bomb strikes as well as aerial torpedo 
strikes on the Purple battle line. The remaining Battle Plan was again highly similar 
Map 14
North Pacific Ocean Sub-
Orientation Chart 
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to Operations Problem 1J: Admiral BA would engage with his Battleline, Center 
Group, Right and Left Flank Groups, and Detached Wing. The Battle Plan again 
included a potential Reverse Action and had the Carrier Group on the disengaged 
side of the formation with a light destroyer screen as it assisted in the battle.3
The Purple Statement of the Problem, Estimate of the Situation,  
and Staff Solution
The Purple Schedule of Events was a mirror of Blue’s, as was the Purple Statement. 
Blue surface-ship strength estimates by Purple Vice Admiral PS (Captain Taylor—
see chapter 10) were also identical to those of Operations Problem 1J, the exception 
again being carrier strength. Whereas in Operations Problem 1J Admiral PS had 
thought the Blue Alaskan Defense Force would have two to three fleet carriers, he 
now assumed three to four fleet carriers, backed up by one to two light carriers. 
Mutual neutralization of Blue and Purple land-based airpower in recent Purple air 
offensives was again assumed, and it was again supposed that neither Blue nor Pur-
ple submarines would be in a position to give significant assistance. PS’s estimates 
of Blue garrison forces in the Aleutians were also the same. The Purple Staff Solu-
tion was also nearly identical, Vice Admiral PS analyzing his mission of protecting 
the Purple Amphibious Force by the interception and destruction—or at least the 
driving off—of the Blue Alaskan Defense Force. Interestingly enough, although the 
comparisons of Blue and Purple ship characteristics were highly similar to those 
of Operations Problem 1J, Vice Admiral PS now speculated from intelligence es-
timates that a Blue BB-61-class fast battleship and CB-1-class battle cruiser were 
being armed with main batteries of rocket projectors in place of their guns, though 
he did not think that these ships were present in the Blue Alaskan Defense Force. 
There was again an analysis of competing carrier air strength, weather, and logis-
tics and, especially, the characteristics of the two sides’ surface combatants; Admiral 
PS too saw the likelihood of a day surface engagement. Also not surprisingly, he saw 
this day action as very similar to that proposed in Operations Problem 1J; namely, 
that Purple—with a superiority in numbers of carrier planes—would be able to take 
out the Blue carriers’ flight decks and then battleships, battle cruisers, light cruis-
ers, and radar capability. There were also provisions for surface gun and torpedo 
action by the Purple battle line, Center Group, Right and Left Flank Groups, and 
Detached Wing as well as continued supporting action by the Carrier Group in re-
newed strikes, air spotting, and antisubmarine and combat air protection.4
A bit more involved, however, was the Detail of Maneuver Staff for the differ-
ent phases of the Chart Maneuver itself since this exercise did not stop with the 
Solutions to the Problem but went on to a Chart Maneuver. The Maneuver Staff 
comprised the Director of the Maneuver, Capt. John Sweeney, head of the Naval 
War College’s Department of Tactics (see chapter 1), along with Liaison Officers for 
both Blue and Purple: Capt. Cornell Sullivan, head of the Department of Tactics’ 
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Liaison Officer for 
Purple, Operations 
Problem 3 (Cdr. 
Joseph Staley, Instruc-
tor, Department of 
Tactics)
War Gaming Section (see chapter 1); and Cdr. Joseph Staley, an 
instructor from the Department of Tactics. 
The Air Umpire, Commander Johnson, also a Department 
of Tactics instructor (see chapter 1), had four Assistant Air 
Umpires—Captains Bruner (see chapter 12) and Tucker (see 
chapter 13) and Commanders Roudebush (see chapter 10) and 
Castree (see chapter 13), all senior-class students. The Com-
munication Umpire, Commander Haskell of the Naval Re-
serve, a Department of Intelligence instructor (see chapter 10), 
only had one Assistant, his colleague from the Department of 
Intelligence, Lieutenant Commander Curran (see chapter 1). 
There was a Chief Damage Computer—Commander Pelling, 
from the Department of Tactics (see chapter 1)—along with Blue and Purple Move 
Umpires, Captains Smith (see chapter 10) and Stryker (see chapter 13) from the 
senior class, as well as Blue and Purple Force Damage Recorders, Captains May 
(see chapter 10) and Price (see chapter 13), respectively, of the senior class.5 
The Chief Damage Recorder was assisted by a number of Blue and Purple Dam-
age Computers from the senior class of June 1947. The Blue and Purple Damage 
Computers for the battle-line battleships and destroyers, for instance, were Cap-
tains Bruner and Greenacre (see chapter 13). The Blue and Purple Damage Com-
puters for the Right Flank heavy cruisers were Colonel Vaughan (see chapter 1) 
and Lieutenant Colonel Negri (see chapter 13); Lieutenant Colonel Sawicki (see 
chapter 12) and Commander Castree were the Blue and Purple Damage Comput-
ers for the Right Flank destroyers. Commander Woodaman (see chapter 12) and 
Captain John Sweeney, a senior-class student (not the Director, also a John Swee-
ney—see chapter 13), were the Blue and Purple Damage Computers for the Center 
Force heavy cruisers. Commander Antrim (see chapter 1) and Captain Sweeney 
were the Blue and Purple Damage Computers for the Detached Wing battleships 
and destroyers; Commander Roudebush and Captain Tucker were the Blue and 
Purple Damage Computers for the Left Flank Force heavy cruisers and light cruis-
ers. Completing this team were Commander Roudebush and Captain Purmort (see 
chapter 13) as the Blue and Purple Damage Computers for the Left Flank Force 
destroyers. Since this Chart Maneuver was to be conducted in two phases—Air 
and Board—the Damage Computers were to assist the Air Umpires during the Air 
Phase and these officers would be assigned specific positions by the Air Umpire. 
Additionally, there were four civilian draftsmen, three of them—Mr. Lawton (see 
chapter 9), Mr. Wilson (see chapter 10), and Mr. Wagner (see chapter 9)—serving 
as Plotters and one, Mr. Scannevin (see chapter 10), serving as the civilian Histo-
rian. All of these men were from the Department of Tactics’ War Gaming Section 
and constituted the personnel of the Drafting Room.6
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The Blue Staff for the Air Phase involved student officers playing Commander, 
Task Force 22 (Admiral BA—Captain Madeira), as well as his Chief of Staff (Colo-
nel Shores—see chapter 10), Operations Officer (Captain Agnew—see chapter 12), 
and Communications Officer (Lieutenant Colonel Shell—see chapter 12). The role 
of Task Group 22.5 Air Group Commander was also filled (Captain Hoffheins—see 
chapter 10), along with those of his Chief of Staff (Lieutenant Colonel Lane—see 
chapter 10), Communications Officer (Captain Lane—see chapter 12), and Move 
Plotter (Colonel Grossetta—see chapter 10). Commander, Carrier Division 7 (Cap- 
tain Snyder—see chapter 12) and Commander, Carrier Division 13 (Colonel 
Koonce—see chapter 10) had similar staffs. Commander Richards (see chapter 
12) and Captain Hummer (see chapter 10) served as the respective Chiefs of Staff, 
while Colonel Erlenkotter (see chapter 10) and Captain Hardin (see chapter 10) 
served as the respective Operations Officers. Commander Kaplan (see chapter 12) 
and Colonel Privett (see chapter 10) filled the roles of the respective Communi-
cations Officers, while Commander Nisewaner (see chapter 10) and Commander 
Van Every (see chapter 12) performed the same roles as the respective Move Plot-
ters. Commanders, Pickets Right (Captain Heberton—see chapter 10) and Pickets 
Left (Captain Outerbridge—see chapter 10) each had a Communications Officer 
(Commander Munholland [see chapter 10] and Colonel Wood [see chapter 1]). 
There was additionally assigned a Move Umpire (again Captain Smith), a Force 
Damage Recorder (again Captain May), and six Damage Computers (again Cap-
tain Bruner, Colonel Vaughan, Commanders Woodaman, Antrim, and Roude-
bush, and Lieutenant Colonel Sawicki). For the Blue Board Phase, students played 
the Officer in Tactical Command, Alaskan Defense Force (again Captain Madeira), 
along with his Chief of Staff and Operations and Communications Officers (again 
Colonel Shores, Captain Agnew, and Lieutenant Colonel Shell, respectively). The 
role of Commander, Battleline was also filled by a student officer (Captain Sulli-
van—see chapter 10), as were those of his Communications Officer, Move Plotter, 
and Damage Computer (again Captain Hardin, Colonel Erlenkotter, and Captain 
Bruner, respectively). Commander, Center Group was played by a student with-
out a staff (Captain Van Deurs—see chapter 10) but Commander, Heavy Cruisers, 
Center (also Captain Van Deurs) had Operations (again Colonel Privett) and Com-
munications Officers (again Commander Richards), a Move Plotter (again Captain 
Hummer), and a Damage Computer (again Colonel Vaughan). Commander, Light 
Cruisers, Center (Commander Andrews—see chapter 10) also had a Communica-
tions Officer (again Commander Van Every), a Move Plotter (again Captain Sny-
der), and a Damage Computer (again Commander Antrim) as did Commander, 
Destroyers, Center (Commander Briggs [see chapter 12] with Lieutenant Colonel 
Lane, Commander Nisewaner, and Commander Woodaman as his staff officers); 
Commander, Right Flank (again Captain Heberton with Commander Munholland, 
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Colonel Koonce, and Commander Roudebush as the staff officers); Commander, 
Left Flank (again Captain Outerbridge with Colonel Wood, Commander Kaplan, 
and Lieutenant Colonel Sawicki as the staff officers); and Commander, Carrier Air 
Group (again Captain Hoffheins with Captain Lane and Colonel Grossetta as the staff 
officers).7
The Purple Staff for the Air Phase included Commander, Task Force (Vice Ad-
miral PS, Captain Taylor), the Chief of Staff (Colonel Cooley—see chapter 13), 
and the Operations (Commander Woods—see chapter 13) and Communications 
Officers. 
There were also two Task Group Air Coordinators (Captain Ricketts [see chap-
ter 13] and Commander Hydeman [see chapter 1]); commanding officers of the 
three fleet and two light carriers (Captain Higgins [see chapter 15], Colonel Luckey 
[see chapter 13], and Colonel Lyle [see chapter 1] commanding the fleet carriers 
and Commander Lyons [see chapter 13] and Captain Ricketts commanding the 
light carriers); and Commander, Purple Air Forces (Colonel Bidwell—see chapter 
13), his Air Officer (Commander Matter—see chapter 13), his Communications 
Officer (Commander Hay), and his Fire Director (Colonel Simonsen). 
The Purple Board Phase roles consisted of the OTC, his Chief of Staff, and his 
Operations and Communications Officers (again Captain Taylor, Colonel Cooley, 
Commander Woods, and Colonel Johnson). Commander, Battleline (Rear Admi-
ral PL—Captain Ashford [see chapter 13]) also had Operations and Communica-
tions Officers as well as a Move Plotter (all played by Commander Stevens). 
These three staff billets were additionally filled for Commander, Center and 
Detached Wing (Rear Admiral PR—Captain Goulett [see chapter 13]) by Com-
mander Hay; for Commander, Cruisers, Center (Captain P-1—Captain Greer [see 
chapter 13]) and for Commander, Destroyers, Detached Wing (Captain Heming) 
by Robert Strong; Commander, Right Flank (Rear Admiral PZ—Colonel Luckey) 
only had Operations and Communications Officers (both played by Captain Hig-
gins), but Commander, Cruisers, Right Flank (also Colonel Luckey) had not only 
these slots filled but also a Move Plotter (all played by Captain Higgins). So did 
Commander, Destroyers, Right Flank (again Captain Ricketts, with Lieutenant 
Colonel Bowen [see chapter 13] as his various staff officers); Commander, Cruis-
ers, Left Flank (Captain Fitzsimmons [see chapter 15] with Commander Lyons as 
his staff officers); and Commander, Destroyers, Left Flank (Commander Hydeman, 
with Colonel Lyle as his staff officers). Commander, Left Flank (Rear Admiral 
PT—again Captain Fitzsimmons) only had Operations and Communications Of-
ficers (again Commander Lyons in both billets) assisting him, but Commander, 
Carrier Air Group (Colonel Bidwell) had a Staff Operations Officer (Commander 
Matter), a Communications Officer (also Commander Matter), and a Move Plot-
ter (Commander Matter again). Commander, Destroyer Squadron 17 (Captain 
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Tackney—see chapter 13) had a Move Plotter (again Captain Tackney) and a Fire 
Director (again Colonel Simonsen).8
The History of the Maneuver
Unlike for Operations Problem 1J, a History of the Maneuver was recorded for 
Operations Problem 3. It began with a Preliminary History, which in turn began 
with weather conditions at the start of the Chart Maneuver. After giving wind force, 
sea conditions, visibility, ceiling, cloud cover, sunrise, and sunset, the Preliminary 
History noted the Blue force’s task of bringing the Purple surface combatant forces 
in the northwest Pacific to decisive action in order to deny Purple the ability to 
establish forces ashore in the Aleutians. At 0600 on 28 July (Maneuver Time and 
Date), the Blue Alaskan Defense Force effected a rendezvous with Task Unit 11.2.2 
and refueled on a southwesterly course. Just prior to the completion of refuel-
ing, Commander, Blue Alaskan Defense Force received a message from the Blue 
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet that Purple assault troops were landing on Attu. 
Upon completion of fueling, Commander, Blue Alaskan Defense Force ordered 
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Commander, TU 11.2.2 to operate to the eastward of 180 degrees east and south of 
42 degrees north to await orders. Commander, Blue Alaskan Defense Force then 
proceeded at twenty knots to Point X-RAY, 47°31ʹ N, 173°40ʹ E. At 0300 on 29 July 
at Point X-RAY, Commander, Blue Alaskan Defense Force launched a search with 
bearing limits of 340 degrees and 010 degrees true out to 355 miles for the pur-
pose of locating the Purple Covering Force. At 0430, he launched a day combat air 
patrol of twelve planes and landed eight night fighters. At 0500, a destroyer in TG 
21.1’s screen made a sound contact and conducted an unsuccessful depth-charge 
attack. Fifteen minutes later, Commander, Blue Alaskan Defense Force received a 
contact report from one of his search planes that a Purple task group of three to 
four fleet carriers, two to three fast battleships, three to four heavy or light cruisers, 
and sixteen to twenty destroyers had been spotted at 52°36ʹ N, 171°30ʹ E. At 0520, 
he received another contact report from the same search plane that a second group 
of Purple ships of similar composition had been sighted bearing 240 degrees, eight 
miles from the previously reported Purple group.9
Purple’s Preliminary History recorded its task to seize, occupy, and defend Attu 
in order to develop it into a base for future long-range air operations against Blue 
bases in the eastern Aleutians and Alaska. The Purple Covering Force was more ex-
actly ordered to cover the landings by the Purple Amphibious Force and exploit all 
opportunities to destroy Blue surface and air forces encountered north of 40 degrees 
north latitude and west of 170 degrees west longitude. At 2000 Zone M time, the 
Purple 8th Fleet—which included Task Force 81, the Covering Force—sortied from 
the Gulf of Kamchatka and Avacha Bay and proceeded to Attu. D-Day remained 28 
July and H-Hour was set at 0500. The operation proceeded as planned and the first 
wave of Purple assault troops landed on Attu at 0510 on 28 July. At 0130 on 28 July, 
Commander, Purple Covering Force received a contact report from a submarine 
informing him that a large group of Blue ships—including several large vessels and 
destroyers—was sighted at 0100 on 28 July at 46°53ʹ N, 173°57ʹ E proceeding on a 
northerly course at about twenty knots. At about 0300, Commander, Purple Cover-
ing Force launched a search between 145 degrees and 180 degrees out to a distance 
of 340 miles to locate the Blue Task Force. At 0400, he also launched a day combat 
air patrol of twelve planes and landed his eight night fighters. At 0515, he received 
a report from one of his search planes that an enemy force composed of three fleet 
or light carriers, two to four battleships or battle cruisers, two light cruisers, and 
sixteen to twenty destroyers had been sighted at 48°10ʹ N, 173°25ʹ E. Five minutes 
later, the same pilot reported on a second Blue task group of the same composition 
about ten miles from the first group of Blue ships and bearing 270 degrees.10
As the maneuver began at 0515, game time, with Move 1, the Blue Heavy Surface 
Striking Force was in its Cruising Disposition on a course of 315 at a speed of six-
teen knots. At 0600, it changed course to 347 and increased speed to twenty-seven 
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knots. At the beginning of Move 1, there was one Blue destroyer division on picket 
lines out to thirty-five miles, thirty degrees each side of the Fleet Axis. Purple was 
on course 140 at twenty knots in its Cruising Disposition. At 0515, both forces 
turned into the wind and they both began launching planes at 0530. The Purple 
Covering Force was in several groups that were separated by ten miles: a section of 
destroyer pickets fourteen miles ahead of the Center, one section sixty degrees to 
the right of the right-hand group fifteen miles out, and one section sixty degrees to 
the left of the left-hand group, also fifteen miles out. At 0515, both Blue and Purple 
had two to three single bogies on their radar screens and by 0530 Purple had a com-
bat air patrol of twenty-one planes aloft, while Blue had a CAP of thirty-nine planes 
in the air. Also at 0530, Blue Search Groups 4-VF and 3-VA reported the composi-
tion, course, and speed of the Purple Covering Force as they circled it. At the same 
time, the Purple night search plane noted above reported the composition, course, 
and speed of the Blue Alaskan Defense Force to his Air Group Commander. In ad-
dition, Blue night search plane 381-A-19, an airborne-early-warning aircraft, was 
shot down by Purple. Purple night search plane 471-A-16 was shot down by Blue at 
the same time. Blue AEW aircraft 301-A-10, on a bearing of 347 at thirty thousand 
feet and seventy-five miles ahead of the Blue Alaskan Defense Force, reported a 
“lot” of radar pips at approximately two hundred miles and appearing to orbit.11
Between 0530 and 0540, Blue began launching several strikes. Attack A con-
sisted of thirty-six fighters, sixteen attack planes loaded with torpedoes, another 
sixteen attack planes each with a thousand-pound general-purpose bomb, two 
photographic reconnaissance fighters, and two AEW planes. Attack B consisted of 
twenty-four fighters each with a thousand-pound general-purpose bomb, twelve 
fighters each carrying eleven-inch rockets, eight attack planes with torpedoes, six-
teen attack planes each with a thousand-pound general-purpose bomb, two pho-
tographic reconnaissance fighters, four tactical electronic-warfare aircraft, and two 
AEW aircraft. Attack C consisted of twenty-four fighters as escorts, twelve attack 
planes each with a thousand-pound general-purpose bomb, eight attack planes 
with torpedoes, two photographic reconnaissance fighters, four tactical electronic-
warfare aircraft, and two AEW aircraft. Attack D consisted of twenty-four fighter 
escorts as well as eight attack planes carrying torpedoes, twelve more attack planes 
with a thousand-pound general-purpose bomb each, two photographic reconnais-
sance fighters, and two AEW aircraft. Finally, Attack E had twelve fighters with 
thousand-pound general-purpose bombs each, eight attack planes with the same 
ordnance load, and nine additional attack planes with torpedoes. 
At 0540, Purple AEW aircraft 332-A-17—about thirty-five miles ahead of the 
Purple Covering Force—picked up many low-flying aircraft about two hundred 
miles away on a bearing of 167. At 0531, the Purple OTC had ordered his strike 
planes to attack in succession, those from TG 81.1 attacking first. At 0551, Purple 
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launched thirty-seven fighters with orders to intercept Blue Raid 1. At 0600, Pur-
ple also launched 118 fighters and 111 attack planes, along with three radar coun-
termeasures aircraft. All the attack planes had maximum loads of five-hundred-
pound general-purpose bombs. At this time, Blue had sixty-two planes available for 
combat air patrols, and Purple had eighty-six. (Page 2.)
At 0635, the Purple OTC picked up Blue aircraft coming in at a distance of a 
hundred miles. At the same time, Blue vectored six fighters of its combat air patrol 
to a course of 270; at 0653, they began orbiting the Blue Alaskan Defense Force. 
Blue also diverted two of its AEW planes from Strike D to a position previously oc-
cupied by two AEW planes with which Blue had lost contact. Two of the same types 
of planes from Strike E were sent to a position previously occupied by another of 
the Blue AEW aircraft; the two relief planes were stationed at ten and thirty thou-
sand feet, respectively. By 0635, the thirty-seven Purple planes vectored out at 0600 
had made contact with Blue Attack Group A. 
Blue lost fourteen fighters and seventeen attack planes in the engagement; 
Purple lost twenty-five fighters. Simultaneously, the Blue radar-picket line de-
tected many planes flying high and the Purple AEW planes flying with their 
strike made contact with many planes on a northerly course. Weather condi-
tions were also announced at 0635. Fifteen minutes later, Blue picked up Purple 
aircraft closing at a distance of a hundred miles. Two minutes later, Purple vec-
tored out sixteen fighters to intercept Blue Strike B, which reportedly consisted 
of thirty-five fighters, twenty-four attack planes, two photographic reconnais-
sance planes, four radar countermeasures aircraft, and two weather planes. 
In the melee, Purple lost ten fighters while Blue lost four fighters and six at-
tack planes. Also at 0652, the Blue fighter squadron commander gave “tally- 
ho” and reported fifty to two hundred “rats,” “chicken,” and “fish.” Six minutes later, 
twenty Blue fighters intercepted the Purple raid. Blue lost twelve fighters and the 
remainder of its planes were out of ammunition. Purple lost fourteen fighters and 
five attack planes and had six additional fighters that were also out of ammunition. 
Simultaneously, Purple’s sixteen-fighter combat air patrol intercepted Blue Strike 
C. It lost ten fighters and its six remaining planes were out of ammunition, while 
Blue lost four fighters, six attack planes, and one tactical electronic-warfare plane. 
In sum in Move 1, Blue had lost thirty-four fighters and thirty-one attack planes 
while Purple lost fifty-nine fighters and six attack planes. (Pages 3–4.)
In Move 2, Blue continued on a course of 347 at a speed of twenty-seven knots 
while Purple continued on a course of 140 at a speed of twenty knots. At 0705, 
thirteen Purple fighters intercepted Blue Raid D. In the engagement, Purple lost 
nine fighters and its remaining four fighters were out of ammunition. Blue lost 
four fighters, four attack planes, and one photographic reconnaissance fighter. At 
0707, forty-two Blue fighters intercepted the Purple strike. In the fight, Blue lost 
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twenty-eight fighters and Purple lost ten fighters and sixteen attack planes. At the 
same time, Blue Strikes A and B attacked Purple fleet carriers CV-40 and CV-47 as 
well as Purple light carrier CVL-29. Twelve Blue fighters, each armed with two Tiny 
Tim rockets, attacked light carrier CVL-29. Two of these planes were lost to five-
inch gunfire and three were lost to automatic weapons. Five hits, however, were 
scored on the Purple ship to an effect of 95 percent Above Water Damage and light 
carrier CVL-29 was ruled sunk. Twelve Blue fighters strafed as well and eleven Blue 
attack planes with torpedoes attacked Purple fleet carrier CV-40. Four Blue aircraft 
were lost to five-inch gunfire and another three to automatic weapons but two hits 
were scored on CV-40, which was ruled to have 40 percent Above Water Damage, 
have its speed slowed to twenty knots, and have its two deck elevators out of com-
mission for two hours. In addition, twelve Blue fighters strafed Purple CV-47 and 
twenty-three attack planes struck that ship with thousand-pound bombs. Six Blue 
aircraft were lost to five-inch gunfire and another seven to automatic weapons but 
the ten bombs dropped netted two hits for 24 percent damage on CV-47. Although 
Blue lost nineteen fighters and fifteen attack planes in total, the Purple OTC put 
CV-40 in the Center of the task group and slowed the formation to twenty knots to 
protect the damaged ship. At 0700, five Purple tactical electronic-warfare aircraft 
began dropping window as well. Seven minutes later, the Purple OTC also ordered 
four of his combat air patrol fighters to return to the fleet area to intercept and at-
tack any Blue stragglers. (Pages 5–6.)
At 0717, the first Purple strike attacked in three sections from ahead and on 
each box. The first section of Purple planes attacked Blue CV-37 and light carrier 
CVL-48. The second section attacked CV-39 while the third attacked CV-38 and 
light carrier CVL-30. Fleet carriers CV-37, -38, and -39 were each damaged 35 
percent. Purple began the attack with fifty fighters and forty-six attack planes. It 
lost sixteen planes to five-inch gunfire and another eighteen planes to “sub-caliber” 
guns. Twenty-five fighters and thirty-seven attack planes actually made the attack 
and they obtained fifteen hits on the Blue ships. After the attack, thirteen fighters 
and eighteen attack planes got away. Purple’s second strike attacked Blue light carri-
ers CVL-30 and CVL-48 with thirty-nine fighters and forty-six attack planes. It lost 
fourteen planes to five-inch gunfire and another nineteen to automatic weapons. 
Twenty-two fighters and thirty attack planes actually made the attack and achieved 
six hits on the Blue ships. Light carrier CVL-48 was 36 percent damaged and light 
carrier CVL-30 was 40 percent damaged. Eleven Purple fighters and fifteen attack 
planes got away, with a total of twenty-eight fighters and thirty-one attack planes 
lost. Also at 0717, four Purple fighters intercepted Blue Raid E. Purple lost all four 
of the fighters but Blue lost two fighters, an attack plane carrying a torpedo, and 
an attack plane armed with a bomb. At the same time, the Blue Task Force Com-
mander directed the OTC to have his heavy carriers return to Dutch Harbor and 
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effect repairs in the minimum possible time. He also requested that replacement 
aircraft be flown to Dutch Harbor at the earliest possible date and for the OTC to 
report to the Task Force Commander when the carriers completed this replace-
ment. (Page 6.)
At 0717, Blue Strikes C and D attacked Purple CV-33 and light carrier CVL-49. 
Twelve fighters, eight attack planes with thousand-pound bombs, and six attack 
planes with torpedoes struck CV-33. Nine Blue planes were lost to five-inch gunfire 
and six more to automatic weapons. Eleven planes actually made the attack. One 
bomb hit and one torpedo hit on CV-33 resulted in 12 percent Above Water Dam-
age and 20 percent Under Water Damage. Twelve more Blue fighters and six attack 
planes armed with torpedoes plus ten attack planes armed with thousand-pound 
bombs “started in on” light carrier CVL-49. Eight of these planes were lost to five-
inch gunfire and eight more to automatic weapons. Twelve planes actually made the 
attack. One torpedo hit and one bomb hit caused 20 percent Above Water Damage 
and 23 percent Under Water Damage to light carrier CVL-49. Altogether, twelve of 
the Blue fighters and twenty of the attack planes were lost. One minute later, Com-
mander, Blue Alaskan Defense Force ordered his Task Force to change formation 
positions when the carriers departed for Dutch Harbor. He was to become the OTC 
and the Fleet Guide was to shift to fast battleship BB-61, which would remain at its 
same point in the Center of the formation. Fast battleships BB-63 and BB-64 would 
close to Circle 3 on the same bearing, while light cruisers CL-86 and CL-91 would 
close to Circle 4 on the same bearing. In addition, light cruisers CL-89 and CL-101 
would close to Circle 3 on the same bearing and Destroyer Squadron 21—less De-
stroyer Division 212—would form a screen ahead of the battleships in Circle 4 from 
bearing 314 to 045. (Pages 6–7.)
Ten minutes later, Blue Strike E—consisting of twelve fighters, eight attack 
planes with thousand-pound bombs, and nine attack planes with torpedoes—
struck Purple CV-40. Eight of the Blue planes were lost to five-inch gunfire and six 
more to automatic weapons. Eleven planes, however, got in to achieve one torpedo 
hit, inflicting CV-40 with 20 percent more Under Water Damage for a total now 
of 60 percent Total Damage and reducing its speed to twelve knots. Blue lost three 
more aircraft on retirement for a total loss in this raid of six fighters and eleven at-
tack planes. At 0730, Blue Strikes A and B were ordered to Shemya, as was Carrier 
Division 13, while Carrier Division 7 went to Dutch Harbor. Carrier Division 13 
was on course 011 at a speed of twenty-four knots, while Carrier Division 7 was 
on course 072 at the same speed but zigzagging. The carriers were ordered away 
specifically to assist planes in getting ready for another strike and to influence the 
Purple OTC into thinking that Blue had formed its Detached Wing. Accordingly, 
at the same time as the Blue ships were ordered away, Commander, Purple Cov-
ering Force sent a message to one of his AEW planes to keep the enemy carriers 
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proceeding toward the Aleutians under surveillance and verify the compositions of 
the formations. Damage was also assessed at this point. (Page 7.) 
At the end of Move 2, Blue had lost seventy-two fighters and fifty-two attack 
planes while Purple had lost sixty fighters and forty-four attack planes. In addi-
tion, Blue fleet carriers CV-37, CV-38, and CV-39 had each sustained 35 percent 
damage, while light carrier CVL-48 had taken 36 percent damage and light carrier 
CVL-30 had taken 40 percent damage. Purple had seen light carrier CVL-29 sunk 
and CV-47 was 24 percent damaged. In addition, CV-33 had 12 percent Above 
Water and 20 percent Under Water Damage; light carrier CVL-49 had had 20 per-
cent Above Water and 23 percent Under Water Damage; and CV-40 had taken 
60 percent Total Damage, 20 percent Above Water and 40 percent Under Water 
Damage. (Page 7.)
In Move 3, Blue continued in its Cruising Disposition on course 347 at a speed 
of twenty-seven knots. At 0730, both Purple forces went into Cruising Disposi-
tion 5-R and changed course to 315. At 0750, Purple changed course to 160 and 
landed its combat air patrol. At 0830, Purple changed course back to 315 at a speed 
of twelve knots and landed its returning strike planes. Thirty minutes before, it 
had had two AEW planes shadowing Blue while Blue had five AEW planes shad-
owing Purple. Both forces received contact reports on their adversaries and the 
Purple AEW aircraft picked up the Blue carriers on a northerly course at twenty-
four knots. Also at 0800, Blue sent fighters to reconnoiter the route from Attu to 
Shemya as Blue Carrier Division 13 changed course to 000 degrees at twenty-four 
knots and began zigzagging. Fifteen minutes later, Blue Carrier Division 7 changed 
course to 162 at twenty-four knots and was also zigzagging. At 0900, Blue changed 
to its Approach Disposition on course 016 at a speed of twenty-seven knots while 
Purple lost five of its attack planes on recovery twelve minutes later. At 0930, the 
beginning of Move 4, Blue was on course 000 at a speed of twenty-seven knots. 
Blue completed its shift to a modified Approach Disposition with its cruisers in 
the Van in a V formation and screened by eighteen destroyers. The Blue battle line 
was ten miles behind, also in a V formation that was screened by another eighteen 
destroyers. At the same time, Purple was on a course of 160 at a speed of twelve 
knots and one of its fighters shot down a Blue attack plane deployed as an AEW 
asset. At 1000, Purple changed course to 090 while maintaining its speed of twelve 
knots. (Pages 8–9.)
At 1009, the Blue Commander, Center Force received a message from the Blue 
OTC. The Blue leader was envisioning the worst possible situation he could en-
counter, one in which two Purple battleships were in the Van with the Purple heavy 
cruisers. In this event, the Blue OTC intended to advance one of his BB-61-class 
fast battleships toward the Purple battleships to a range of thirty-five thousand 
yards and take both under divide fire. He therefore “proposed” to Commander, 
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Center Force that the latter officer advance his battle cruisers up on the bow and 
concentrate on the leading Purple battleship with fire from both battle cruisers. 
He also wanted Commander, Center Force to make a torpedo attack on the Purple 
battleships at the earliest opportunity. With a combined assault from the Blue bat-
tleship, the battle cruisers, and the torpedo strikes, he felt confident that he could 
“finish” the Purple battleships. When these were out of action, he intended to have 
his BB-61-class fast battleship drop back on Purple’s bow toward the remaining 
Purple battleships and he again proposed that Commander, Center Force have his 
battle cruisers drop back to thirty-five thousand yards from the Purple ships. At 
this point, the Blue OTC proposed to have his four BB-61-class fast battleships and 
his two CB-1-class battle cruisers concentrate on the remaining three Purple battle-
ships. Commander, Center Force was then to attempt crossing the outside Purple 
range. (Page 9.)
At 1030, Purple changed course to 315, still at a speed of twelve knots, and the 
Purple fleet carriers and Destroyer Division 172 were ordered to withdraw from 
the Purple Disposition and act as the Carrier Group. The latter ships were, how-
ever, to conform to the Main Body’s movement and other forces were to form the 
Approach Disposition in accordance with previous instructions. Destroyer Squad-
ron 17—less Destroyer Division 172—was to join the Force Center and, upon de-
ployment, join the Van Force destroyers in the outer area on approach axis 170 
and course 090. At the same time, the Blue cruisers in their Van were in a circular 
position screened by their eighteen destroyers as was the Blue battle line, with the 
latter in a line of division and screened by the additional eighteen destroyers. At 
1030, Blue Cruiser Division 17 launched eight observation planes to an altitude of 
eighteen thousand feet, each one carrying two hundred-pound general-purpose 
bombs and two 350-pound depth charges. These planes had orders to strike the 
deck of Purple CV-40. Simultaneously, Purple CV-40 began launching a strike on 
Blue light carriers CVL-30 and CVL-48. The strike actually departed at 1102 in 
two groups and arrived over the target at 1138. Group 1 consisted of six fighters 
with one Tiny Tim rocket each and eleven fighters with thousand-pound general-
purpose bombs each. Two fighters were shot down going in but the strike made 
one hit on each light carrier. Three more Purple planes were shot down getting 
away. Group 2 attacked the Blue battle line. This strike consisted of eighteen fight-
ers armed with Tiny Tims, thirty attack planes loaded with torpedoes, and another 
nine attack planes with one 1,600-pound armor-piercing bomb each. The Purple 
planes achieved five rocket and two torpedo hits on each of the two Blue column 
leaders. Ten fighters and twenty-four attack planes were lost from the Purple strike 
to antiaircraft fire and Purple fleet carriers lost four attack planes and five fighters 
upon launching its strike. (Pages 9–10.)
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At 1030, one of the Purple AEW aircraft saw five to seven planes launched from 
the Blue cruisers. At 1100, Purple changed course to 090—still at a speed of twelve 
knots and in its Approach Disposition—with two battleships and two light cruis-
ers in the Center Force screened by nine destroyers, and heavy cruiser CA-124 and 
light cruisers CL-56 and CL-57 in the Right Flank Force with Destroyer Divisions 
71 and 72. Its Left Flank Force consisted of heavy cruiser CA-122, light cruisers 
CL-55 and CL-58, and Destroyer Divisions 91 and 92, while its battle line was com-
posed of Battleship Division 3 and five screening destroyers. The four remaining 
Purple carriers were screened by four destroyers, with CV-40 in the Center of this 
circular formation. (Page 10.) 
Also at 1100, the Purple OTC received a message from Commander, Detached 
Wing. The latter officer informed his superior that unless he was otherwise ad-
vised, he would use the following plan to initially deploy his Wing and Destroyer 
Division 112 during the approach: until the nearest Blue unit was within fifty miles, 
he would employ Destroyer Division 112 as a circular open screen out to a distance 
of four thousand yards from the Center of Battleship Division 4. When Blue had 
approached to within fifty miles, he would use Destroyer Division 112 in specific 
ways. He would put one section of destroyers on bearing 020 relative from his axis 
and the other on bearing 340 relative to his axis—both eight thousand yards from 
the Center of Battleship Division 4—so that under any circumstances forty torpe-
does could be fired on any Blue heavy ships in the Van. At 1105, Commander, De-
tached Wing sent the Purple OTC another part of his message in which he stated 
that at “appropriate” ranges, he would form his two sections of destroyers so that 
they could provide crossing fire and he could use Destroyer Division 112 in what 
he saw as his only offensive opportunity. Battleship Division 4 would engage the 
Blue battle cruiser but then retire to the Purple battle line if Blue BB-61-class fast 
battleships were encountered. (Pages 10–11.)
Toward the end of Move 4, specifically at 1109, five of the Blue observation 
planes were shot down by the Purple combat air patrol. A minute later, however, 
the three remaining observation planes from Blue Cruiser Division 17 got in to 
make their attack. All three of these planes were shot down, but so were two Purple 
fighters and the attack resulted in Purple CV-40 taking on a twenty-degree list. At 
1130, Blue also advanced one battleship with two screening destroyers to a posi-
tion four miles astern of the Blue Center Group. During Move 4, Blue had lost all 
eight of its observation planes from Cruiser Division 17 as well as one attack plane. 
Purple, however, had lost twenty-two fighters and twenty-eight attack planes. For 
all four Moves, Blue air losses now amounted to 106 fighters, eighty-four attack 
planes, and the eight observation planes. Purple air losses now amounted to a total 
of 141 fighters and eighty-three attack planes. (Pages 11–11a.)
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At the beginning of Move 5, Blue was on course 005 at a speed of twenty-seven 
knots, still in its modified Approach Disposition and with fast battleship BB-63 
closing the Van Force. Purple was on course 130 at a speed of twenty knots in an 
axis of 170 in its Approach Disposition. At 1138, Blue fast battleships BB-61 and 
BB-62 were hit by two aerial torpedoes each and suffered 30 percent Under Water 
Damage. Rockets caused another 6.5 percent Above Water Damage and the Direc-
tor of the Maneuver ruled that the Above Water Damage would remain but that the 
Under Water Damage would be restored. At 1140, Purple CV-40 took on such a list 
that it was considered out of commission. At 1224, the Blue and Purple forces were 
placed on the Maneuver Board. At the beginning of Move 6, this placement en-
tailed the Blue Main Body of three battleships screened by Destroyer Squadrons 12 
and 21 on Circle 10. Van Forces, led by Cruiser Division 4, were on Circle 24, while 
Cruiser Division 17 was on Circle 20. Fast battleship BB-63, with two screening de-
stroyers, was four miles astern of the two Blue battle cruisers. Destroyer Squadrons 
2 and 4 were also with the battle cruisers, and Blue by now had reduced speed to 
twenty knots. The Blue cruisers were in a line of bearing 135 and the destroyers in 
the Van were in a column of twos. The battleships were in line of Division Guide, 
with Battleship Division 1 in column. (Pages 12–13.)
At the beginning of Move 6, Purple was in an Approach Disposition. Battle-
ship Division 3, the Battleline, was screened by Destroyer Division 111. The Center 
Force consisted of fast battleships BB-55 and BB-56, screened by Destroyer Divi-
sion 112 about eleven miles on the axis from the battle line. Heavy cruisers CA-123 
and CA-132 were about four thousand yards astern of the Van battleships, with 
Destroyer Division 171 in two sections, one section on each side of the heavy cruis-
ers. The Right Flank Group consisted of two light cruisers bearing fifty degrees and 
six miles from the battle line as well as one heavy cruiser about eleven miles and 
fifty-five degrees from the battle line. The Right Flank Group also consisted of De-
stroyer Squadron 72 midway between the heavy and light cruisers. The Left Flank 
Group consisted of two light cruisers, CL-55 and CL-58; heavy cruiser CA-122; and 
Destroyer Squadron 9 in a similar formation to that of the Right Flank Group but 
on a course of 130 and an axis of 170. At 1224, carriers and carrier aircraft were 
ruled out of the Problem. Thereafter, Blue began a change of course from the Van to 
035 at a Task Force speed of twenty knots. Fast battleship BB-63 was still closing the 
Blue battle cruisers in the Van and the destroyers in the battle line screen began tak-
ing normal flank approach positions on Circle 10, sixty degrees to the right and left 
of the battle line. At 1230, Purple changed course to 165, still at a speed of twenty 
knots but with no other change in disposition. At the end of Move 6, all available 
observation planes were airborne. (Page 13.)
At the beginning of Move 7, Blue shifted its battle line to a line of bearing. By 
this time, fast battleship BB-63 had closed the Blue battle cruisers to about two 
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thousand yards and the Blue Task Force continued its change of course that was 
started in Move 6. Purple continued on its course of 165 with a speed of twenty 
knots but Purple Destroyer Division 171 with the Center Force was now maneuver-
ing to form its two sections into one division. At 1200, Purple also had launched 
two observation planes and then launched twenty-three more at 1233. At 1236, the 
Blue battle line received a message from Commander, Blue Battleline. He ordered 
that fire on the Purple Van be undertaken at thirty-eight thousand yards and that 
slow fire be employed until the Purple ships were within “hitting gun range.” His 
ships were also to use air spot modified radar control and then shift to full ra-
dar control when the range permitted. At 1236 and 1239, the end of Move 7, the 
heavy ships in both the Blue and Purple Vans made radar contact, with each force 
about fifty thousand yards from the other. By the beginning of Move 8, Blue fast 
battleship BB-63 was on the line with the Blue battle cruisers. Destroyers that 
had been escorting the battleship were falling back astern of the Center Force 
destroyers and changing speed to thirty knots on a course of 035. Purple by this 
time had changed course to 120 at a speed of twenty knots. At the end of Move 
8, the range between the Blue and Purple Center Forces had closed to forty-one 
thousand yards. (Page 14.)
At the beginning of Move 9, Blue changed course to 080 at a speed of thirty 
knots. Purple Commander, Detached Wing requested permission at the beginning 
of the move for his destroyers to fire long-range torpedoes at the Blue force but 
permission was denied by the Purple OTC. Purple Commander, Detached Wing 
then retired his destroyer screen to a position two thousand yards on the disen-
gaged side. He subsequently changed course to 045 to attempt to bring the Blue 
Van bearing to 180. The question was asked, however, why the Purple Detached 
Wing did not simply continue to close. At the beginning of Move 10, Blue changed 
course to 035, still at a speed of thirty knots. The Purple Detached Wing continued 
on course 045 and the Purple battle line changed course to 080 at a speed of twenty-
two knots. Move 11 began with Blue still on course 080 at a speed of thirty knots 
and the Purple battle line still on a course of 080, but with a speed of fourteen knots. 
The Purple Detached Wing was now falling back on the battle line and continuing 
on course 045. By the end of Move 11, the range between the two Van forces was 
thirty-eight thousand yards, at which range Blue fast battleship BB-63 opened fire 
on Purple fast battleship BB-55. Halfway through Move 12, the Blue battle cruis-
ers and fast battleship BB-63 changed course to 090 at a speed of thirty knots. The 
Purple Detached Wing also changed course to 090 at the same speed and the Pur-
ple battle line changed course to 160 while increasing speed to twenty-four knots. 
The Purple Detached Wing opened fire on Blue fast battleship BB-63 and the Blue 
battle cruisers at a range of thirty-five thousand yards, while the Blue ships did 
the same to the Purple Detached Wing at the same range. At 1302, the Blue battle 
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line received a message from Commander, Battleline. He ordered his battleships to 
open fire on the Purple Center Force battleships at forty thousand yards with slow 
fire and with fire distribution from the Van fast battleship BB-61, then BB-62 and 
BB-64. The Blue battle line was to maneuver to remain outside of thirty-five thou-
sand yards from the Purple battleships in the Center Force. (Pages 15–16.)
Move 13 saw Blue continuing on course 090 at thirty knots and the Purple battle 
line continuing on a course of 160 at a speed of twenty-seven knots. The Purple 
Right Flank heavy cruiser CA-124 was off about six or seven thousand yards from 
the nearest ship and the Purple Detached Wing was on course 090, while the Purple 
Center Force was on course 120. Move 14 began with the Blue battle line turning 
to the north, and its Left and Right Flank Forces maintaining position on the battle 
line. The Blue Van Forces were on an easterly course at a speed of thirty knots. The 
Purple battle line changed course to 120 at a speed of twenty-seven knots, while the 
Purple Center Force continued on course 120, the Detached Wing changed course 
to 103, and the Flank Forces kept station on the battle line. Move 15 saw Blue con-
tinuing on a northerly course at a speed of twenty-eight knots, its battle cruisers 
making thirty-three knots, and the attached fast battleship making thirty knots. 
The Purple battle line continued on course 120 at twenty-seven knots, though it 
was ruled that these units were separated because of “excessive” speed. The Purple 
Center Force continued on course 120 and the Detached Wing remained on course 
103. Also at this time, Purple fast battleships BB-56 and BB-55 reopened fire on 
Blue fast battleship BB-63. The question was also asked of the student officers what 
would have happened if Purple had changed course to the west. Simultaneously, 
Blue battle cruisers CB-1 and CB-2 opened fire on Purple fast battleship BB-56, 
which was now under triple concentration fire from the Blue ships. At the end of 
Move 15, as a result of this gunfire, Purple fast battleship BB-56 had Above Water 
Damage of 10 percent. (Pages 17–18.)
In Move 16, Blue changed course to the northeast at a speed of twenty-eight 
knots. The Purple battle line continued on course 120 at a speed of twenty-four 
knots and the Purple Center Force changed course to 085 at a speed of thirty-two 
knots, while the Detached Wing continued on its course of 103 with a speed of 
twenty-seven knots. Purple fast battleships BB-55 and BB-56 were still concentrat-
ing their fire on Blue fast battleship BB-63. According to the Maneuver Rules, the 
Chance Factor would have sunk the Blue battleship but the Director of the Ma-
neuver ruled that the sinking would not apply at this time. Instead, he awarded the 
Blue battleship 10 percent damage and reduced its speed to fifteen knots for one 
move. In Move 17, Blue continued on its northeasterly course at twenty-eight knots 
and the Blue Van Force took the Blue Fleet Course at a speed of thirty knots. The 
Purple battle line continued on course 120 at twenty-four knots, the Center Force 
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continued on a course of 085 at thirty-two knots, and the Detached Wing contin-
ued on course 103 at twenty-seven knots. Blue fast battleship BB-63 now shifted its 
fire to Purple fast battleship BB-55 and Purple fast battleship BB-56 shifted its fire 
to Blue battle cruiser CB-1. By this time, Blue fast battleship BB-63 had 20 percent 
Total Damage. (Page 18.)
At the beginning of Move 18, the Blue battle line changed course to 050 at a 
speed of twenty-eight knots. The Purple battle line continued on course 120 at 
twenty-four knots but the Purple Center Force retired on the battle line to the 
northeastward at a speed of twenty-seven knots. The Purple Detached Wing also 
retired on the battle line to the northeastward and the Purple Left Flank Force was 
now due east of its battle line and retiring to the north. The Purple Right Flank 
Force was still maintaining its position relative to the Purple battle line. Blue fast 
battleship BB-63 was still under fire from Purple fast battleship BB-55 and was sunk 
by the Chance Factor but the Director of the Maneuver instead ruled an additional 
10 percent damage and an arbitrary speed reduction to twenty-two knots instead. 
He also ruled that this damage could be restored later. At 1321, Commander, Blue 
Battleline sent his ships a message in which he ordered them to be prepared to take 
the Purple cruisers or battleships under fire at a maximum range of forty thousand 
yards. The fire distribution was to be Normal from the Purple Van, with slow fire 
until hitting gun range was established. (Page 19.) 
At the end of the move, Blue fast battleship BB-63 had 30 percent Above Wa-
ter Damage and had expended 24 percent of its ammunition. At the beginning of 
Move 19, Blue changed course to 010 and increased its speed to thirty-one knots. 
Blue light cruiser CL-101 left the division formation to take station 070 on Circle 
6 from the battle line. The Purple battle line continued on course 120 at a speed of 
twenty-seven knots, while the Purple Center Force was still on its northeast course 
at thirty-two knots and the Purple Detached Wing was on the same northeasterly 
course at twenty-seven knots. Purple fast battleship BB-56 was now dividing its 
fire between Blue battle cruisers CB-1 and CB-2 but the Purple battleship was also 
20 percent damaged by end of Move 19. Blue fast battleship BB-63 took another 
10 percent damage during this move for Total Damage now of 40 percent. The 
Director of the Maneuver additionally ruled now that all ships that had lost radar 
because of 30 percent Above Water Damage would be assessed a two-tenths reduc-
tion for Fire Effect when outside the range of visibility, in this case twenty thousand 
yards. (Pages 19–20.)
In Move 20, Blue continued on course 010 at a speed of thirty-one knots, while 
the Purple battle line continued on course 120 at a speed of twenty-seven knots. 
The Purple Center Force changed course to 100 at a speed of thirty-two knots and 
the Purple Detached Wing changed course to 090 at a speed of twenty-three knots. 
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The Blue battle line then fired on Purple heavy cruiser CA-124 with a triple con-
centration. At the beginning of Move 21, Blue changed course to 050 at a speed of 
twenty-eight knots. The Purple battle line also changed course, this time to 215 at a 
speed of twenty-seven knots while the Purple Center Force changed course to 060 
at twenty-seven knots and the Detached Wing changed course to 225 at twenty-
four knots. Purple light forces in the Van then appeared to swing to the left out 
of fear of Blue Van heavy units that were closing in the direction of Purple. It also 
appeared at this point that the Purple OTC would welcome any maneuver by the 
Blue Van Commander that would place these three high-value Blue heavy units in 
a position where Purple could expedite a torpedo attack. It appeared just as impor-
tant to the Purple Liaison Officer that those three Blue heavy units be eliminated 
as might any three units from the Blue battle line. When the Purple forces turned 
to course 215, Blue battle cruisers CB-1 and CB-2 were each 10 percent damaged 
and Purple heavy cruiser CA-124—in the Right Flank Force—opened fire on Blue 
Destroyer Division 122. At the end of the move, Purple heavy cruisers CA-122 and 
CA-124 were also each damaged 10 percent. (Pages 20–21.)
Move 22 saw Blue continuing on course 050 at a speed of twenty-eight knots, 
the Purple battle line change course to 205 at twenty-seven knots, the Purple Cen-
ter Force continue on course 060 at twenty-seven knots, and the Purple Detached 
Wing change course to 245 at twenty-four knots. The Blue battle line also shifted 
its fire to the Purple Detached Wing while the Purple battle line fired on Blue fast 
battleship BB-63 and the Purple Right Flank Force heavy cruisers opened fire on 
Blue Destroyer Squadron 12. In addition, Blue battle cruiser CB-1 shifted fire to 
Purple heavy cruiser CA-123 and Blue battle cruiser CB-2 shifted fire to Purple 
heavy cruiser CA-122. The latter ship was left 10 percent damaged. At 1331, the 
Blue destroyer squadron on the left flank fired forty-five torpedoes, five from each 
ship on a base torpedo course of 314, with a one-degree spread, and on a twenty- 
foot depth setting. The target was the Purple battle line and the torpedoes’ speed 
was thirty-two knots. Thirty-two of the torpedoes ran hot, straight, and normal 
but the Blue destroyers were under fire by the time they fired their torpedoes. By 
the end of this move, Blue fast battleship BB-63 was 56 percent damaged. Its guns 
could only fire from Local Control and it had no Plane Spot, searchlights, second-
ary batteries, or antiaircraft batteries. In addition, it had lost 23 percent of its speed. 
(Page 21.)
Move 23 began at 1333 and saw the Blue battle line continuing on course 050 
at a speed of twenty-eight knots, with the exception of Blue fast battleship BB-63, 
which had changed course to 090 and had a speed of twenty-five knots. The Purple 
battle line continued on course 205 at a speed of twenty-seven knots, the Purple 
Center Force changed course to 160 with a speed of twenty-seven knots, and the 
Purple Detached Wing changed course to 205 at a speed of twenty-four knots. The 
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Purple battle line shifted fire to the Blue battle line as Blue Destroyer Divisions 211 
and 212 fired thirty-five torpedoes, including five each at the two fast battleships in 
the Purple Rear. These torpedoes were fired on a base torpedo course of 303 with 
a one-degree spread, a twenty-two-foot depth setting, and a speed of thirty-two 
knots. The Blue destroyers at this time were not under fire and thirty-two of the 
torpedoes ran hot, straight, and normal. By this time, however, Blue fast battleship 
BB-63 was 94 percent damaged, and Blue Destroyer Divisions 121 and 122 were 
each 10 percent damaged. Purple heavy cruiser CA-122 was also 10 percent dam-
aged. (Page 22.) 
In Move 24, Blue changed course to 080 at a speed of twenty-eight knots and 
the Purple battle line changed course to 195 at a speed of twenty-seven knots. The 
Purple Center Force continued on course 160 but increased its speed to thirty-two 
knots while the Purple Detached Wing continued on course 205 at a speed of twenty- 
four knots. At 1337, Blue Destroyer Squadron 12 fired forty-five torpedoes at the 
Purple battle line on a base torpedo course of 325 with a one-degree spread and a 
twenty-foot depth setting. The torpedoes had a speed of thirty-two knots and thirty- 
two of them ran hot, straight, and normal. The Blue destroyers, however, were un-
der fire by this time and each division had sustained 10 percent damage. Also at 
1337, Blue fast battleship BB-63 sank and Purple heavy cruisers CA-122, -132, and 
-123 took three Blue light cruisers from Cruiser Division 17 under fire. The Purple 
Van battleships also took the leading Blue battleships under fire and during Moves 
23 and 24, Blue battle cruisers CB-1 and CB-2 had been firing on Purple heavy 
cruisers CA-122, -123, and -132. However, the Blue ships were not considered to be 
in as advantageous a position for support as they could have been. In addition, Blue 
destroyer DD-748 from Destroyer Division 211 was sunk by its own torpedo when 
the division ran through its own torpedo water. At the end of the move, Purple fast 
battleships BB-55, -56, and -60 were firing on Blue fast battleship BB-61, which was 
assessed with 13 percent damage. Blue Destroyer Divisions 121 and 122 were also 
each assessed with 20 percent damage. (Pages 22–23.)
At the beginning of Move 25, Blue continued on course 080 at a speed of twenty-
seven knots. By this time, the Purple battle line changed course to 095, also at a 
speed of twenty-seven knots. The Purple Center Force had changed course to 125 
at a speed of thirty-two knots and the Purple Detached Wing changed course to 
095 at a speed of twenty-four knots. Purple fast battleship BB-58 fired on Blue 
fast battleship BB-62, which was 10 percent damaged, while Purple fast battleship 
BB-59 fired on Blue fast battleship BB-64, which was also 10 percent damaged. Ad-
ditionally, Purple heavy cruisers CA-122, -123, and -132 fired on Blue light cruisers 
CL-86, -89, and -91. Blue light cruiser CL-91 was damaged 10 percent as well. Simul-
taneously, Purple light cruisers CL-55 and CL-58 fired on Blue Destroyer Squadron 
12 and Blue fast battleship BB-61 fired on Purple fast battleships BB-55 and BB-56. 
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Blue fast battleship BB-64 was also firing on Purple fast battleships BB-58 and BB-
59, while Blue fast battleship BB-62 fired on Purple fast battleship BB-60. The result 
of all of this action was that among the Purple battleships, fast battleship BB-55 was 
22 percent damaged, fast battleship BB-56 was 29 percent damaged, fast battleship 
BB-58 was 34 percent damaged, BB-59 was 4 percent damaged, and BB-60 was 
6 percent damaged. In the same action, Blue battle cruiser CB-1 fired on Purple 
CA-123 and inflicted 30 percent damage on the Purple cruiser, while Blue battle 
cruiser CB-2 fired on Purple CA-122 and inflicted 20 percent damage on that ship. 
Finally, Blue Destroyer Divisions 211 and 212 were 20 and 30 percent damaged, 
respectively, while Blue fast battleship BB-61 took 30 percent damage. (Page 23.)
Move 26 saw the Blue battle line change course to 090 at a speed of thirty-one 
knots, while the Purple battle line continued on course 095 at a speed of twenty- 
seven knots. The Purple Center Force continued on course 125 at a speed of thirty-
two knots and the Purple Detached Wing also continued on course 095 but at a 
speed of twenty-four knots. At 1343, Blue Destroyer Divisions 211 and 212 fired 
thirty-five torpedoes at the Purple Van battleships on a base torpedo course of 
028 with a one-degree spread, a depth setting of twenty-two feet, and a speed of 
thirty-two knots. Thirty of the torpedoes ran hot, straight, and normal and the 
Blue destroyers were not under fire. In addition, Blue Destroyer Squadron 2 was 
firing on Purple Destroyer Division 171, Blue light cruiser CL-101 was firing on 
Purple Destroyer Division 111, and Blue light cruiser CL-91 was firing on Purple 
Destroyer Division 91. Purple Destroyer Division 92 was being fired on by Blue 
light cruisers CL-86 and CL-89 and Purple heavy cruisers CA-122 and CA-132 
were being fired on by Blue battle cruisers CB-1 and CB-2. At the end of this move, 
Purple heavy cruiser CA-123 and Blue Destroyer Squadron 21 had both been 30 
percent damaged, Blue fast battleship BB-61 had been 40 percent damaged, and 
Blue light cruiser CL-91 had been 10 percent damaged. (Pages 23–24.)
Move 27 began with Blue continuing on course 090 at a speed of thirty-one 
knots and the Purple battle line continuing on course 095 but with a reduced speed 
of twenty-four knots. The Purple Center Force changed course to 145 at a speed of 
twenty-seven knots and the Purple Detached Wing continued on course 095, also 
at a speed of twenty-four knots. Blue gunfire during this move entailed Blue De-
stroyer Division 22 and Blue light cruiser CL-91 firing on Purple Destroyer Divi-
sion 91, Blue Destroyer Division 21 and Blue light cruisers CL-86 and CL-80 firing 
on Purple Destroyer Division 92, and Blue light cruiser CL-108 firing on Purple 
Destroyer Division 111. Move 27 Blue gun action also entailed Blue Destroyer Di-
visions 41 and 122 firing on Purple Destroyer Division 112, Blue Destroyer Divi-
sions 42 and 121 firing on Purple Destroyer Division 171, and Blue battle cruiser 
CB-2 firing on Purple heavy cruisers CA-122 and CA-123. In addition, Blue battle 
cruiser CB-1 fired on Purple heavy cruisers CA-123 and CA-132 while Blue fast 
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battleship BB-61 fired on Purple fast battleships BB-55 and BB-56. Finally, Blue fast 
battleship BB-62 fired on Purple fast battleship BB-60 while Blue fast battleship BB-
64 fired on Purple fast battleships BB-58 and BB-59. (Page 24.)
Move 27 Purple gunfire saw Purple heavy cruiser CA-124 and light cruiser CL-
56 firing on Blue Destroyer Division 212. In addition, Purple light cruiser CL-57 
and Purple Destroyer Division 112 were firing on Blue Destroyer Division 211 
while Purple light cruiser CL-58 and Purple Destroyer Division 92 were firing on 
Blue Destroyer Division 41. Move 27 Purple gunfire also entailed Purple Destroyer 
Divisions 91 and 111 as well as Purple light cruiser CL-55 firing on Blue Destroyer 
Division 42; Purple heavy cruiser CA-122 firing on Blue light cruiser CL-86; and 
Purple heavy cruiser CA-123 firing on Blue light cruiser CL-89. Additionally, Pur-
ple heavy cruiser CA-132 fired on Blue light cruiser CL-91; Purple fast battleship 
BB-58 fired on Blue fast battleship BB-62; Purple fast battleship BB-59 fired on 
Blue fast battleship BB-64; and Purple fast battleships BB-55, -56, and -60 were all 
firing on Blue fast battleship BB-61. (Page 25.)
The result of all of this gunfire was that at the end of Move 27, Blue fast battle-
ship BB-61 was 46 percent damaged, Blue fast battleship BB-62 was 16 percent 
damaged, and Blue fast battleship BB-64 was 20 percent damaged. The Blue battle 
cruisers CB-1 and CB-2 now were each 11 percent damaged and Blue light cruiser 
CL-86 was 18 percent damaged. Blue light cruiser CL-89 was 9 percent damaged 
and Blue light cruiser CL-91 was 22 percent damaged but Blue light cruiser CL-101 
was undamaged. Blue Destroyer Divisions 21 and 22 were also undamaged but Blue 
Destroyer Division 41 was 15 percent damaged, Blue Destroyer Division 42 was 
24 percent damaged, and Blue Destroyer Division 211 was 40 percent damaged. 
Finally, Blue Destroyer Division 212 was 27 percent damaged, Blue Destroyer Divi-
sion 121 was 33 percent damaged, and Blue Destroyer Division 122 was 43 percent 
damaged. As for Purple, Purple fast battleship BB-55 was 25 percent damaged, Pur-
ple fast battleship BB-56 was 36 percent damaged, and Purple fast battleship BB-58 
was 42 percent damaged. Purple fast battleship BB-59 was only 8 percent damaged 
but Purple fast battleship BB-60 was 12 percent damaged. As for its heavy cruis-
ers, Purple heavy cruiser CA-122 was 20 percent damaged, Purple heavy cruiser 
CA-123 had been sunk, Purple heavy cruiser CA-124 was 4 percent damaged, and 
Purple heavy cruiser CA-132 was undamaged. Purple light cruisers CL-55, -56, -57, 
and -58 were all undamaged, as were Purple Destroyer Divisions 71, 72, and 172. 
Purple Destroyer Division 91, however, was 54 percent damaged; Purple Destroyer 
Division 92 was 71 percent damaged; and Purple Destroyer Division 111 was 6 
percent damaged. Finally, Purple Destroyer Division 112 was 46 percent damaged 
and Purple Destroyer Division 171 was 54 percent damaged. (Page 25.)
In Move 28, Blue continued on course 090 at a speed of twenty-six knots while 
the Purple battle line continued on course 095 at a speed of twenty-four knots. The 
 398 BLUE VERSUS PURPLE
Purple Center Force saw Purple heavy cruiser CA-122 on course 120 and Purple 
heavy cruiser CA-132 on course 115, both at speeds of twenty-nine knots. The 
Purple Detached Wing continued on course 095 at a speed of twenty-four knots 
as well. At 1349, Blue Destroyer Division 41 fired twenty-five torpedoes at Purple 
fast battleship BB-55 on a base torpedo course of 320 with a one-degree spread 
and a twenty-two-foot depth setting. Eighteen of these torpedoes ran hot, straight, 
and normal while Blue Destroyer Division 42 fired another thirty torpedoes at the 
same target on a base torpedo course of 325 with the same spread and depth set-
ting. Twenty-one of these torpedoes ran hot, straight, and normal. One minute 
later, Blue Destroyer Division 21 fired fifty torpedoes at the rear Purple battleship 
of the Purple Van Force on a base torpedo course of 310 and with the same spread 
and depth setting of the torpedoes from the other Blue destroyer divisions. Blue 
Destroyer Division 22 fired another fifty torpedoes at the Purple Van Force on 
the same course and with the same spread and depth setting of those from Blue 
Destroyer Division 21. Forty-five torpedoes in each salvo ran hot, straight, and 
normal. Purple heavy cruiser CA-124 passed through torpedo water but as there 
was only one chance in four for a hit, all of the torpedoes missed this ship. Purple 
light cruiser CL-57 also passed through torpedo waters and similarly escaped any 
damage. (Page 26.)
Gunfire in this move consisted of Blue light cruiser CL-89 firing with its main 
and secondary batteries on Purple Destroyer Division 91 while Blue light cruisers 
CL-86 and CL-91 also fired with their main and secondary batteries on Purple 
Destroyer Division 92. Blue Destroyer Squadron 2 fired on Purple Destroyer Di-
vision 111 while Blue Destroyer Divisions 121 and 42 as well as Blue Destroyer 
Squadron 21 fired on Purple Destroyer Division 171. Blue Destroyer Division 41 
also fired on Purple Destroyer Division 112 while Blue Destroyer Division 122 
fired on Purple light cruisers CL-55 and CL-58. Blue light cruiser CL-101 also 
fired on Purple light cruiser CL-58, Blue battle cruiser CB-1 fired on Purple heavy 
cruiser CA-132, and Blue battle cruiser CB-2 fired on Purple heavy cruiser CA-
122. Finally, Blue fast battleships BB-61 and BB-62 fired on Purple fast battle-
ship BB-56 while Blue fast battleship BB-64 fired on Purple fast battleship BB-55. 
Purple gunfire on Blue entailed Purple heavy cruiser CA-124, Purple light cruiser 
CL-56, and Purple Destroyer Division 71 firing on Blue Destroyer Division 212. 
Purple light cruiser CL-57 as well as Purple Destroyer Divisions 72 and 112 fired 
on Blue Destroyer Division 211 while Purple heavy cruisers CA-122 and CA-132 
were firing on Blue Destroyer Division 21. Purple light cruiser CL-55 also fired on 
Blue Destroyer Division 42 and Purple light cruiser CL-58 fired on Blue Destroyer 
Division 41 while Purple heavy cruiser CA-122 fired on Blue light cruiser CL-86 
and Purple heavy cruiser CA-132 fired on Blue light cruiser CL-91. As for the 
battleships, Purple fast battleships BB-55, -56, and -60 fired on Blue fast battleship 
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BB-61 while Blue fast battleship BB-62 was fired on by Purple fast battleships BB-
58 and BB-59. (Page 26.)
Damage from Move 28 saw Blue fast battleship BB-61 now having a total of 58 
percent damage, while Blue fast battleship BB-62 had a total of 18 percent dam-
age. Blue fast battleship BB-64 now had 40 percent Total Damage, while Blue light 
cruiser CL-86 had 38 percent damage. Blue light cruiser CL-91 had 42 percent 
damage and Blue Destroyer Division 21 had taken 25 percent damage. Blue De-
stroyer Division 22 was undamaged but Blue Destroyer Divisions 41 and 42 had 
taken totals of 42 percent and 51 percent damage, respectively. Blue Destroyer 
Division 212 had a total of 57 percent damage, while Blue Destroyer Divisions 
122 and 211 were entirely sunk. As for Purple, Purple fast battleship BB-55 was 
25 percent damaged, Purple fast battleship BB-56 was 46 percent damaged, and 
Purple fast battleship BB-58 was 42 percent damaged. In addition, Purple heavy 
cruiser CA-122 was now 40 percent damaged, Purple heavy cruiser CA-132 was 
only 10 percent damaged, and Purple light cruiser CL-55 was only 5 percent dam-
aged. However, Purple Destroyer Divisions 91, 92, 111, and 112 had been entirely 
sunk. (Page 27.)
At the beginning of Move 29, the Blue battle line changed course to 105 with 
a speed of twenty-five knots while the Purple battle line continued on course 095 
at a speed of twenty-four knots. Purple heavy cruiser CA-122 changed course to 
220 with a speed of twenty-seven knots and Purple heavy cruiser CA-132 changed 
course to 205 at the same speed. The Purple Detached Wing changed course to 
135 with a speed of twenty-four knots. At 1352, the two remaining destroyers of 
Purple Destroyer Division 91—before they were sunk—fired ten torpedoes each 
on a base torpedo course of 129 with a one-degree spread, a depth setting of eight 
feet, and a speed of thirty-two knots. Fourteen of these torpedoes ran hot, straight, 
and normal but the Purple destroyers were already under fire. Blue ships firing on 
Purple ships now entailed Blue fast battleships BB-61 and BB-62 firing on Purple 
fast battleship BB-56; Blue fast battleship BB-64 firing on Purple fast battleship BB-
55; Blue battle cruiser CB-1 firing on Purple heavy cruiser CA-132; and Blue battle 
cruiser CB-2 firing on CA-122. In addition, Blue light cruiser CL-86 was firing on 
Purple heavy cruiser CA-122 with its main and secondary batteries, while Blue 
light cruiser CL-89 fired with its main and secondary batteries on Purple heavy 
cruiser CA-132. Blue light cruiser CL-89 was also firing with its main battery on 
Purple light cruiser CL-58. Blue light cruiser CL-101 employed its main and sec-
ondary batteries on Purple light cruiser CL-55, which was also being fired on by 
Blue Destroyer Division 121. Blue Destroyer Division 21 also fired on Purple heavy 
cruiser CA-122 and Purple heavy cruiser CA-132 was fired on by Blue Destroy-
er Division 22. Finally, as concerned the Blue ships in this move, Blue Destroyer 
Division 41 was firing on Purple light cruiser CL-58, Blue Destroyer Division 42 
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was firing on Purple light cruiser CL-55, and Blue Destroyer Squadron 21 fired on 
Purple Destroyer Division 72. (Page 27.)
Purple ships firing at Blue during Move 29 entailed Purple fast battleship BB-58 
firing with its main battery on Blue fast battleship BB-62. In addition, Purple fast 
battleships BB-59 and BB-60 also employed their main batteries on Blue fast battle-
ships BB-64 and BB-61, respectively. All three of the Purple battleships were also 
employing their secondary batteries on Blue Destroyer Division 212, while Purple 
fast battleships BB-55 and BB-56 employed their main batteries on Blue fast battle-
ship BB-61. Purple fast battleships BB-55 and BB-56 also deployed their secondary 
batteries against Blue Destroyer Divisions 42 and 41, respectively. As concerned the 
Purple cruisers, Purple heavy cruiser CA-132 fired with its main battery on Blue 
light cruisers CL-86 and CL-91 and with its secondary battery on Blue destroy-
ers DD-757 and DD-775. Purple light cruisers CL-55 and CL-58 opened up with 
their main batteries on Blue light cruiser CL-101 and the two Purple light cruisers 
used their secondary batteries on Blue Destroyer Divisions 42 and 41, respectively. 
(Pages 27–28.) 
Purple heavy cruiser CA-124 and light cruisers CL-56 and CL-57 also used their 
main batteries on Blue Destroyer Division 121, while Purple Destroyer Division 71 
fired on Blue Destroyer Division 212. Blue Destroyer Division 121 was also fired 
on by Purple Destroyer Division 112 and Blue Destroyer Division 41 was fired on 
by Purple Destroyer Division 91. Damage from Move 29 saw Purple heavy cruis-
ers CA-122 and CA-132 sunk, as were Purple light cruisers CL-55 and CL-58. In 
addition, Purple Destroyer Division 172 was 36 percent damaged. Blue ships saw 
Blue fast battleship BB-61 having 64 percent damage and Blue fast battleship BB-
62 having 21 percent damage. In addition, Blue light cruiser CL-86 was sunk, Blue 
light cruiser CL-91 was 72 percent damaged, and Blue Destroyer Division 21 was 
79 percent damaged. Blue Destroyer Division 41 was sunk, as were Blue Destroyer 
Divisions 42, 121, and 212. (Page 28.)12 
Move 30, the last one of the maneuver, saw the Blue battle line changing course 
to 040 at a speed of twenty-five knots while the Purple battle line continued on 
course 095 at a speed of twenty-seven knots and the Purple Detached Wing con-
tinued on course 135 at a speed of twenty-four knots. In this move, Blue fast bat-
tleships BB-61, -62, and -64 fired on Purple fast battleships BB-60, -58, and -59, 
respectively, while Blue battle cruisers CB-2 and CB-1 fired on Purple fast battle-
ships BB-56 and BB-55, respectively. Blue light cruiser CL-89 used its main and 
secondary batteries on Purple destroyer DD-730 while Blue light cruiser CL-91 did 
the same to Purple destroyer DD-731. Blue light cruiser CL-101 employed its sec-
ondary battery to engage Purple destroyer DD-731 and its main battery on Purple 
fast battleship BB-56 while Blue Destroyer Division 21 engaged Purple Destroyer 
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Division 91 with gunfire and Blue Destroyer Division 22 did the same to Purple 
fast battleship BB-56. Purple ships firing on Blue included Purple fast battleships 
BB-58, -59, and -60 engaging Blue fast battleships BB-62, -64, and -61, respectively. 
At the same time, the Purple battleships engaged Blue Destroyer Division 42 with 
their secondary batteries and Purple fast battleships BB-55 and BB-56 employed 
their main batteries on Blue fast battleship BB-61. The latter two Purple battleships 
also engaged Blue Destroyer Divisions 41 and 42, respectively, with their secondary 
batteries, while Purple heavy cruiser CA-124 fired on Blue fast battleship BB-64. In 
addition, Purple light cruiser CL-55 engaged Blue light cruiser CL-101 with both 
its main and secondary batteries and Blue Destroyer Division 42 was taken on by 
Purple Destroyer Divisions 71 and 72. Finally, Purple Destroyer Division 91 en-
gaged Blue Destroyer Division 22. (Pages 28–30.)
In terms of damage in this last move, Blue fast battleship BB-61 was 64 percent 
damaged at the end of the maneuver, while Blue fast battleship BB-62 was 23 per-
cent damaged and Blue fast battleship BB-64 was 40 percent damaged. Blue battle 
cruisers CB-1 and CB-2 were each 11 percent damaged, while Blue light cruiser 
CL-89 was 9 percent damaged, Blue light cruiser CL-91 was 72 percent damaged, 
and Blue light cruiser CL-101 was undamaged. Blue Destroyer Division 21, how-
ever, was 79 percent damaged and Blue Destroyer Division 22 was 38 percent dam-
aged. As for the Purple ships, Purple fast battleship BB-55 was 43 percent damaged, 
Purple fast battleship BB-56 was 50 percent damaged, and Purple fast battleship 
BB-58 was 47 percent damaged. However, Purple fast battleships BB-59 and BB-
60 were only 11 percent and 13 percent damaged, respectively, and Purple heavy 
cruiser CA-124 was only 4 percent damaged. While Purple light cruiser CL-55 was 
83 percent damaged, Purple light cruisers CL-56 and CL-57 were undamaged, as 
was Purple Destroyer Division 71. Purple Destroyer Division 72, however, was 36 
percent damaged and Purple Destroyer Division 91 had been sunk. (Page 30.)
Though this Critique was also not recorded, its organization again indicates what 
was discussed after the Conduct of the Maneuver. There were first to be discus-
sions of both the Blue and Purple Staff Solutions by Captains Sweeney and Sullivan, 
respectively. Following these would be discussions of both the Blue and Purple Of-
ficer in Tactical Command Solutions by Captain Madeira and then Captain Taylor. 
These would then lead to discussions of the Staff and Student Cruising Disposi-
tions as well as discussion of the Air Phases that entailed Moves 1 to 5. The latter 
points would be debated by the Department of Tactics as well as Colonel Cooley 
and Captain Hoffheins. Additionally, there would be Analysis and Summation of 
the Air Damage by Commander Pelling from the Department of Tactics, a discus-
sion of the Surface Phases in Moves 6 to 30 by the Tactics Section and “interested” 
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commanders, and an Analysis and Summation of Battle Damage, again by Com-
mander Pelling. The Critique would conclude with a talk on Lessons Learned and 
Conclusions, all of this being organized by Captain Sweeney.13
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In the late summer and fall of 1946, the U.S. Naval War College began a more complete transition from seeing Japan as its primary hypothetical enemy in the Pacific to the Soviet Union. While this transition had begun in the late spring 
of 1946 and Orange would appear again—in the summer of 1946 and in at least 
one exercise in the late fall—the 1946–47 academic year would see Purple largely 
become the number-one enemy of the U.S. Navy when it came to war plans and 
officer education. 
What is highly noticeable in the war games described in this book—as in the 
games of the previous academic year at the Naval War College—is that major as-
pects of war gaming reflected the theoretical underpinnings of the activity itself, as 
well as more-practical applications of interwar and wartime doctrine. The theoreti-
cal and pedagogical bases of war gaming indicated that the strategic and tactical 
scenarios of the exercises and maneuvers themselves were less important than the 
simulation of real-world conditions under which naval commanders would have to 
make decisions. Therefore, exercises and maneuvers could be conducted under any 
strategic and tactical premises that the Naval War College staff and the director of a 
given maneuver thought would provide learning opportunities for and experiences 
with naval operational decision making. (These purposes would have justified, for 
instance, such striking artificialities as equipping Purple with Essex-like aircraft 
carriers, which the Soviet Union in fact gave no sign of building.) In fact, exercises 
and maneuvers did not even have to be played out to a conclusion, with one side 
winning or losing; such a conclusion might even undercut the learning experience 
to which the staff was attempting to expose the student officers.1 
Nevertheless, the strategic and geographic foci of the various exercises and 
maneuvers—essentially operations in the North Pacific that were aimed at Purple 
striking Blue in the Aleutians, or even invading Japan, or Blue striking and intend-
ing to invade Purple on the Kamchatka Peninsula—reflected what the Naval War 
College staff thought a war in the Pacific against the Soviet Union would entail. 
Other aspects of the operations problems were very realistic as well in terms of 
those expectations—such as the Purple focus on using submarines and land-based 
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naval aviation to compensate for a lack of aircraft carriers, or the use of atomic 
bombs by Blue against Purple.2
What seems less plausible upon initial examination was the operational and 
tactical focus on surface warfare in so many of the exercises and maneuvers, as 
had also been the case in the previous academic year. Since the U.S. Navy had tran-
sitioned from a prewar gunship-oriented fleet to one focused on carrier aviation 
and submarines, it seems anachronistic—pedagogy aside—that the Naval War Col-
lege now created and conducted a series of war games in which carrier forces were 
neutralized in many cases. As in the previous academic year, in most cases, games 
simulated situations in which operational and tactical engagements were fought 
seemingly with interwar doctrine, with carriers restricted to fighting other carriers, 
providing reconnaissance for the surface fleets, and employing their airpower to 
aid surface ships in fighting decisive battles. Similarly, while submarines were more 
conspicuous and more often used as strike platforms than they had once been, they 
were still primarily employed as scouting platforms.3 
Upon reexamination, however, the maneuvers again take on an aspect of “les-
sons learned” in wartime. The postwar Naval War College maneuvers harken back 
to Adm. Raymond Spruance’s dispositions at the battle of the Philippine Sea on 17 
June 1944, when he directed that the enemy carriers be knocked out first as a pre-
lude to air strikes on heavy surface forces, which in turn were part of his intended 
preparations for a surface engagement. The war games designed by Vice Adm. Wil-
liam S. Pye and his staff were also highly similar to Spruance’s operations off the 
Marianas as well as to Adm. William Halsey’s initial preparations for the battle of 
Cape Engaño in October 1944.4 Far from throwbacks to the interwar period, Naval 
War College exercises and operations problems in the summer and fall of 1946 
combined interwar and wartime doctrine with some of the most recent experiences 
of the U.S. Pacific Fleet.5 
Some of these operational and tactical scenarios need to be additionally viewed 
in postwar contexts. The U.S. Navy was going through a rapid demobilization in 
1946 and the huge postwar fleet that had been planned for during the war was in 
fact being reduced in size significantly, primarily for fiscal reasons.6 It can easily be 
seen that Admiral Spruance and his officers in the summer and fall of 1946 felt no 
more confident about having a large postwar fleet than had Admiral Pye and the 
Naval War College staff a year before. Given the postwar politics of defense unifi-
cation and interservice rivalry over roles and missions, the Navy was by this time 
finding itself more under siege with respect to the future size of the U.S. Fleet.7 
Against the context of a shrinking fleet beginning nonetheless to take on global 
responsibilities, the maneuvers seem even more realistic when certain periods of 
the Pacific War are recalled. As noted in my previous book in this series, at the end 
of November 1942, the U.S. Navy had been left with only two fleet carriers and 
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two fast battleships operational because of the number of carriers sunk in 1942 
and the small number of new battleships commissioned. In addition, there was a 
shortage of cruisers because of losses in the battles around Guadalcanal in 1942–43; 
by the summer of 1943, the Navy was being forced to rely heavily on destroyers 
as its primary combatant platform.8 Moreover, the game scenarios in which Blue 
and Purple neutralized each other’s carrier airpower were remarkably reminiscent 
of the mutual exhaustion of carrier forces in the battles of the Coral Sea, eastern 
Solomons, and Santa Cruz Islands in 1942. In fact, after Santa Cruz, the United 
States and Japan had such slender carrier forces available that the naval battles of 
Guadalcanal were entirely surface engagements.9 In addition, in 1950, at the begin-
ning of the Korean War, the Navy was to find itself with just two carriers deployed 
in the Pacific basin (though additional ships were provided as soon as President 
Harry Truman made the decision to use American forces to defend South Korea).10 
The difference of the situation in 1950 from that of 1942, however, cannot be 
stressed enough. In 1950, there were additional carriers to deploy; most were de-
ployed in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, because of the central focus on Europe 
in the context of the doctrine of “containment.” In late 1942, however, there simply 
were no more fleet carriers available before the arrival of the Essex class in 1943.11 
Given the newfound global military responsibilities of the United States after 1945, 
the small number of carriers that had been available in 1942 may have been on the 
minds of Spruance and the Naval War College staff, much as it had influenced the 
thinking of Admiral Pye and his officers a year before. In other words, the faculty 
at the Naval War College in both academic years had to war-game a potential future 
in which the nation’s foreign-policy commitments outstripped its military assets, as 
had occurred in the late interwar period. What if the U.S. Navy found itself ordered 
in the future to fight with such slim resources? To model this politico-military-fiscal 
situation, the Naval War College replayed the Navy’s worst year in the war, 1942. 
In addition, while the Pacific was now seen by the Navy as a secondary or even 
tertiary theater compared with the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the Persian 
Gulf, the Naval War College by this time thought that future naval engagements 
that did take place in the Pacific would occur in the far-northern part of the basin. 
There, more reliance would have to be placed on surface ships because of poor 
weather and the degraded performance of aircraft and other vital equipment, such 
as radar, in northern latitudes. These scenarios were a major theme during Admiral 
Spruance’s tenure as President of the Naval War College since actual experience in 
the spring of 1946 was demonstrating that carrier operations were less than viable 
in Arctic waters.12 
Uncertainty about the future also drove war gaming in a number of other re-
spects. Looking back from our own time, it seems ridiculous that Naval War Col-
lege staff and students were still in 1946 replaying what appear to be surface-warfare 
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scenarios from the Pacific War as they had in the previous academic year. If, how-
ever, we realize that these were really combined-arms naval warfare scenarios that 
reflected the most recent experience, that of the late Pacific War, and that no one re-
ally knew what the next war would entail, the war games lose some of their anach-
ronistic feel. No one in the American national-security establishment at this time 
had a crystal ball and no one could predict what the next war would be like any 
more than they could have a year before. Obviously, a majority understood the 
Soviet Union to be the next probable enemy but the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not 
completely dismiss a resurgent Japan as a potential enemy until well into 1946, after 
the College had planned its curriculum for that academic year.13 
In addition, even assuming the Soviet Union as the probable next enemy, there 
was no guarantee by 1946–47 that the next war would be a limited, “brushfire” war 
as the United States was actually to encounter in Korea and Vietnam. Again, the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff between 1945 and 1950 assumed that the next war would most 
likely be a large conflict with the Soviet Union, fought by heavy ground, air, and 
naval forces in the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, mainland Europe, the Middle East, 
and the Persian Gulf—a conflict that almost exactly mirrored World War II in those 
theaters of operation.14 If no one in the central American national-security estab-
lishment was accurately guessing what the next wars would actually look like, why 
would the Naval War College not assume, as its civilian overseers did, that the next 
conflict might look very much like World War II? The Soviet Union seemed to be 
building an oceangoing fleet of its own; why would the U.S. Navy assume it would 
never again have to fight another blue-water navy? If, therefore, the Navy might be 
forced to fight in areas like the Pacific, to fight an enemy like the Soviet Union in 
northern latitudes, or to fight some other blue-water fleet, combat such as that of 
the early Pacific War might again become a reality—in particular, one that needed 
to be rethought and refought.15 We can comfortably say now that it did not happen 
that way or the Naval War College staff should have known better but this would 
be reading back into history rather than analyzing that history in its actual context.
Fear of a repetition of the early wartime strategic situation, fiscal uncertainty 
about the future force structure, and the inculcation by Spruance and the College’s 
military faculty—many of whose members had just returned from the Pacific—of 
wartime American naval doctrine provided the Naval War College the basis for 
many of its scenarios. The result was a series of war games primarily oriented to-
ward combined-arms surface engagements between opposing fleets against the 
background of a realization that although carriers had become the new focal point 
of American naval power, fast carriers could not perform all missions in the North 
Pacific and still might have to operate in conjunction with heavy surface forces. 
There was a realization—as there had been a year before—that while fast battleships 
were no longer at the center of naval warfare, they were not obsolete or useless.16
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The Naval War College had a most difficult charge in this time. In an era of 
rapid demobilization, of domestic reconversion, and of a foreign policy that was 
changing in a revolutionary way at breakneck speed, staff and students at the Naval 
War College struggled to translate the lessons of the war into new strategy, tactics, 
and procedures. All of this had to be done on a slim budget and, in a new age of 
possible atomic warfare, in a way that shaped American naval forces as a deterrent. 
In the context of all of these transformations as the Naval War College was begin-
ning to envision conflict against a new enemy after a forty-year focus on Orange, 
it does not seem incredible that it was still grappling with them in 1946. Nor does 
it seem out of the ordinary that the war games looking toward the future were so 
similar to the Navy’s worst months of its last war. 
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